Attitudes, Values and Professional Self-Conceptions of Private Security Contractors in Iraq.
An Exploratory Study.

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Zusammenfassung

Every military that expects to be relevant beyond its national borders in the future will be working with the private sector.[1]

There's only a few things in this world I can do really, really well. War is one.[2]

Während Präsident Obama einen Abzug der Truppen aus dem Irak versprach, schloss die „Koalition der Willigen" im August 2009 Verträge mit fünf privaten Sicherheitsunternehmen mit einem Volumen von 485 Millionen US Dollar zur Sicherung amerikanischer Liegenschaften. Die Beauftragung privater Sicherheitsunternehmen hat seit Beginn des Kriegs im Irak im Frühling 2003 einen Boom erfahren. Seit Ende 2008 haben fast 200.000 Angestellte privater Sicherheitsunternehmen (contractors) Militäroperationen unterstützt oder ergänzend an ihnen mitgewirkt; geschätzte 30.000 von ihnen haben Sicherheitsdienstleistungen erbracht. Die private Sicherheitsindustrie kam 2004 in die Schlagzeilen als ein wütender Mob vier Angestellte einer Sicherheitsfirma nahe der Stadt Fallujah tötete und verstümmelte. Darauf folgende Medienberichte stellten bei privaten Sicherheitsunternehmen angestellte Personen als geldgierige, Rambo-ähnliche Söldner dar, mit nur rudimentären oder ganz fehlenden Werten, die sich kaum um ethisch korrektes Verhalten kümmern und riefen zu einer stärkeren Kontrolle dieser Branche auf. Derzeit wissen wir nur wenig über die Menschen, die bei privaten Sicherheitsunternehmen arbeiten und Aufgaben übernehmen, die seit jeher dem Militär vorbehalten sind. Mit dieser Pilotstudie untersuchen die Autoren die Identität, Werte und Einstellungen von Sicherheitspersonal um ihr berufliches Selbstverständnis und ihre Motivation besser zu verstehen sowie um zu eruieren, ob es so etwas wie eine berufliche Identität unter den Angestellten von privaten Sicherheitsunternehmen gibt, und wenn ja, was für eine Identität dies ist.

Insbesondere in Zusammenhängen, die von unzureichender formeller Kontrolle gekennzeichnet sind, wird die Frage der Identität besonders wichtig, da Motivationen, Einstellungen, Werte und Normen, die in einer sozialen Gruppe verinnerlicht und von allen Mitgliedern geteilt werden, Teil der informellen Regelungsmechanismen sind, deren Vorhandensein wiederum formelle rechtliche und politische Kontrolle stärken kann. Während die formelle Regulierung von privaten Sicherheitsdienstleistern seit Herbst 2007 signifikant gestärkt worden ist, untersucht diese Studie, ob die Werte und Normen auf denen diese Regelungen aufbauen auch wirklich auf der individuellen Ebene verinnerlicht wurden.

Um diese Frage zu beantworten, haben die Autoren eine Online-Umfrage an mehr als 200 Angestellte privater Sicherheitsunternehmen geschickt. Die Umfrage war so verfasst, dass Unterschiede in Bezug auf Patriotismus, Kriegsbereitschaft, Machiavellismus, Sozialdominanz, Maskulinität und Engagement im Job wie auch ihre Einstellung gegenüber bestimmten ethischen Kriterien beurteilt werden konnten. Die Ergebnisse zeigen ein differenzierteres Bild der Selbsteinschätzung und Einstellun-

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1   Doug Brooks. 2008. "Recipe for Success." Journal of International Peace Operations, Vol. 2, No. 2, September-October, p. 6.

2   Security Contractor Wolf Weiss cited in: Tish Durkin, "Heavy Metal Mercenary", Rolling Stone Magazine, 9 September 2004, available at <www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/6477829/heavy_metal_mercenary>, accessed 20 July 2009.

gen derer, die in der privaten Sicherheitsbranche arbeiten, als es generell in der Presse dargestellt wird. Im Großen und Ganzen scheinen Teilnehmer an dieser Umfrage eine ähnliche berufliche Ausrichtung zu haben, und es gab nur wenige signifikante Unterschiede in ihrer Einstellung. Wider Erwarten gab nur ein Viertel der Befragten an, dass sie wegen der Aussicht auf gute Bezahlung besonders motiviert seien, im Bereich privater Sicherheitsdienstleister eine Stelle zu suchen. Stattdessen motivierte die überwältigende Mehrheit insbesondere die Möglichkeit, sich neuen Herausforderungen zu stellen und anderen zu helfen. Fast alle Befragten waren der Meinung, dass ihre Arbeit als private Sicherheitsdienstleister eine ‚Berufung sei, ihrem Land zu dienen und erschienen höchst motiviert, professionelle Normen und ethische Standards einzuhalten. Die Datenlage legt nahe, dass die Normen und Werte, welche die formelle politische und rechtliche Kontrolle der Branche anleiten, von den Teilnehmern an dieser Umfrage verinnerlicht wurden.

Einschränkend muss jedoch bemerkt werden, dass die Selbstwahrnehmung Einzelner nicht unbedingt mit ihrem tatsächlichen Verhalten vor Ort übereinstimmen muss. Durch weitere Forschung sollte eruiert werden, ob eine Einhaltung der Werte und Normen, wie durch die Antworten auf die Umfrage gemessen, sich auch wirklich in ethischem Verhalten manifestiert. In einem weiteren Schritt sollte der Umfang der Analyse erweitert werden, indem Teilnehmer mit unterschiedlichem demografischen, beruflichen, nationalen und kulturellen Hintergrund befragt werden, um zu bewerten, inwiefern die hier dargelegten Ergebnisse verallgemeinert werden können.

Executive Summary

While President Obama has pledged to withdraw military forces from Iraq, the Multi-National Force-Iraq awarded $485 million in contracts in August 2009 to five private security firms to provide security for US bases. The use of security contractors has boomed since the war in Iraq began in the spring of 2003. As of the end of 2008, nearly 200,000 private contractors supported or supplemented military operations in Iraq, an estimated 30,000 of them providing security services. The private security industry made headlines in 2004 when an angry mob killed and mutilated four contractors near the Iraqi city of Fallujah. Subsequent media reports portrayed contractors as money-grabbing, gun-toting, thrill-seeking Rambo-type mercenaries with little to no moral inhibitions or concern for ethical conduct and called for increasing regulation of the industry.

To date, we know very little about the people who sign on with private security firms to assume roles traditionally reserved for military professionals. With this pilot study, we set out to explore the identity, values and attitudes of private security contractors in order to improve our understanding of the occupational self-conceptions and motivations of individuals working for private security firms and to find out whether there is an emerging professional identity among employees of private security firms and, if so, what that identity is.

Particularly in contexts characterized by insufficient formal control, identity becomes a highly relevant factor, as motivations, attitudes, values and norms that are internalized and shared among the members of a social group constitute part of informal regulation, the existence of which, in turn, may strengthen formal legal and political control. Although mechanisms of formal regulation of the private security industry have been considerably strengthened since the fall of 2007, the purpose of this study is to explore, whether the values and norms informing these changes have actually been internalized by individual contractors.

In order to answer this question, we administered an online survey to more than 200 security contractors with law enforcement backgrounds who completed at least one deployment with a security firm in Iraq. The survey was designed to assess respondents' levels of patriotism, warriorism, Machiavellianism, social dominance orientation, masculinity, and job engagement as well as their attitudes toward provisions about ethical conduct as specified by the private security industry's trade organization.

Our findings reveal a more differentiated picture of the self-conception and attitudes of individuals working in the private security industry than is commonly depicted by the media. Overall, respondents in our sample seemed to share a similar professional outlook, showing only very few significant attitudinal differences. Contrary to expectations, only one-quarter of respondents stated that they were highly motivated to seek employment in the private security field by prospects of monetary gain. Instead, they overwhelmingly mentioned the opportunity to face and meet new challenges and to help others as most important motivators. Almost all respondents viewed their work as security contractors as a "calling" to serve their country and appeared highly committed to professional norms and ethical standards. Our data indicate that the norms and values guiding formal political and legal control of the industry seem to have been internalized effectively among the members in our sample.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that individuals' self-image, as reflected in their responses to a survey, does not necessarily correspond to their actual behavior in the field. Future research should assess whether or not adherence to values and norms as measured through survey responses really translates into ethical behavior on the ground. In addition, future research should broaden the scope of the analysis by targeting subjects with different demographic, professional, national, and cultural backgrounds to assess the generalizability of the results presented here.

1.   Introduction

In April 2004, four men working for the United States' security firm Blackwater were killed by Iraqi insurgents close to the city of Fallujah. The gruesome pictures of their mutilated corpses hanging from a bridge and encircled by an angry mob made the headlines of almost all major newspapers at the time. Since the Fallujah killings, a rapidly growing private security industry has remained in the public's eye, mostly through media reports calling for tightened regulation of security companies. Tales of waste, fraud and overbilling gave the industry a bad name.[3] In addition, accounts of human rights abuses, connected for instance to interrogations at Baghdad's infamous Abu Ghraib prison and stories of shooting incidents involving contractors, called into question the merits of outsourcing security functions to the private sector and the suitability of some of the contractors hired to fulfill those functions (see Schooner, 2005). Who are these individuals – armed and ready to risk their lives for, so a common assumption, a pay check? What are their backgrounds, expectations, ideals and motivations?

To date, we know very little about the people who sign on with private security firms to assume roles traditionally reserved for military professionals. The objective of this research is to explore the identity, values and attitudes of private security contractors in order to improve our understanding of the occupational self-conceptions and motivations of individuals who sign on with private security firms. More specifically, this research seeks to examine whether there is an emerging professional identity among employees of private security firms and, if so, what that identity is.

Particularly in terms of proposals for regulating the private security industry, identity becomes a highly relevant factor, as motivations, attitudes, values and norms shared among the members of a social group constitute part of informal regulation, the existence of which may strengthen formal legal and political control. In other words, political and legal control mechanisms function most effectively if the standards and values they are based on have been internalized by those whose behavior they are designed to shape.

In order to the emergence of a professional identity among security contractors and the extent to which they have internalized the norms and values shaping the industry, we administered an online survey to more than 200 American security contractors. Respondents in our sample were law enforcement officers who had joined a U.S. based security firm and completed at least one tour of duty on contract with the Department of State in a conflict region. Since contractors assume roles traditionally reserved for military professionals, we employed a number of value-scales previously used in cognitive research examining the values and attitudes of officers and soldiers. The survey was designed to assess the effect of respondents' most important social identities on their levels of patriotism, warriorism, Machiavellianism, social dominance orientation, masculinity, job engagement and support for regulatory provisions about their ethical conduct.

The study will begin with a brief outline of the history, overall scope and main causes for military outsourcing. Based on previous research, we have developed a typology of service-types, which we then apply to the case of armed security provision in Iraq,

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3   Cf. Christian T. Miller, "Military Suspends Firm Accused of Overbilling in Iraq", Los Angeles Times, 9 October 2004, available at <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/09/world/fg-custer9>, accessed 15 August 2009. Jason McLure, "How a Contractor Cashed In on Iraq", Legal Times, 4 March 2005.

since most reported incidents of contractor misconduct have occurred in that theater of operations. Although mechanisms of formal regulation have been considerably strengthened since the Fall of 2007, the purpose of this study is to explore, whether the values and norms informing these changes have actually been internalized by individual contractors. We attempt to answer this question through data analysis of an online survey administered to more than 200 individuals with law enforcement backgrounds who have completed at least one deployment with a security firm in Iraq.

2.   Research Context

2.1.   Background: Genesis of an Industry

The use of contractor personnel in combat is not new. Throughout history, states hired outsiders to fight their battles.[4] "In some eras," Peter Singer, Director of the Brookings Institution's 21st Century Defense Initiative and an expert on private security issues, acknowledges "these private entrants into conflict were individual foreigners, brought in to fight for whichever side bid the highest, known as 'mercenaries' in common parlance. In other periods, they came in the form of highly organized entities. For both, the important factor was their goal: private profit, derived from the very act of fighting" (Singer, 2008, p. 19).

For example, during the American Revolutionary War, George Washington contracted civilian merchants to deliver supplies to his troops. At the same time, German landgraves sold into service some 30,000 soldiers as auxiliaries to the British to fight against American revolutionaries. These so-called Hessians were not mercenaries in the strict sense, as they did not voluntarily hire out their services for money.[5] Instead, as in many 18th century armies, most of these soldiers were conscripts, debtors or petty criminals who fought for low pay and, in some cases, received nothing but their daily food.

Apart from those outsourced combat functions, field armies during the 1700s and 1800s relied on contracted wagons, drivers and civilians to perform construction functions and almost all medical care (see CBO, 2005). During World War II, contractor functions expanded to address the increasingly complex technical needs posed by maintenance of military aircraft, vehicles and signal equipment. Reliance on contractors rose further during the Korean and Vietnam Wars in support of weapons systems, establishing base camps and depots and providing logistical functions. For instance, by one estimate, "more than 50 percent of the direct-support helicopter maintenance needed during those two wars was provided by contractors" (ibid, p. 1).

With the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in the 1970s, concern mounted about the military's reliance on contractor support. A 1982 Defense Science Board report noted that despite satisfactory performance during crises and combat, "there were no formal mechanisms to ensure [contractors'] continued performance" (ibid, p. 2). Subsequently, the Department of Defense (DoD) reversed course and steered maintenance away from contractors and back toward "organic" sources. According to DoD Directive 1130.2, issued in January of 1983:

> Contractor field services (CFS) (…) shall be used when necessary
> to accomplish military mission, when provision of services by DoD
> engineering and technical services specialists is impractical and
> when required skills are not available within the Military Depart-
> ments (…) the use of CFS is limited to a period not to exceed 12
> months after the DoD components achieve self-sufficiency in the
> use of new equipment or system (ibid, p. 2).

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4   For a concise overview of the history of privateering, mercenaries and mercantile companies, see Thompson, 1996, pp. 21-40.

5   These troops were called Hessians since more than half of them originated from the German district of Hessen-Kassel.

In July 1990, however, the pendulum swung the other direction again and the Pentagon cancelled Directive 1130. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the US military used civilian contractors extensively: in all, the Pentagon engaged 76 contractors who deployed some 9,200 employees to Iraq in support of Gulf War I. The Pentagon hired its contractors on hundreds of separate contracts. Not surprisingly, the results were mixed. A number of contracts contained poorly defined Statements of Work or none at all and oftentimes ambiguous contract requirements. As a result, many contractors preformed inadequately and inefficiently and left their customers dissatisfied (ibid).

Nevertheless, the use of contractors by the US military continued to increase significantly during the 1990s. Between 1991 and 1999, the ratio between contractors and soldiers during US military operations changed from 100:1 to 10:1 (Boemcken, 2008). According to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, "[a]ny function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function" (53) (DoD, 2001, p. 53). Following the US-led 'war on terror', reliance on contractors has increased even further. Indeed, any major US military deployment overseas is now virtually impossible without the assistance of private companies.

2.2. Main Reasons for Outsourcing Security

What prompted the corporate evolution of services supporting military operations? What factors sparked the rapid and unrestrained rise of the private security industry between the two Gulf Wars? Singer attributes the privatization of security to three dynamics: "the end of the Cold War, transformations in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a general trend toward privatization and outsourcing of government functions around the world" (Singer, 2005, p. 120).

The end of the Cold War "provided a vacuum in the market of security" (Singer, 2008, p. 49)= At the same time as militaries downsized—the number of soldiers worldwide declined by about one-third from 29 to 20 million between 1988 and 2002 (BICC, 2005)—global threats became "more varied, more capable, and more dangerous" (Singer, 2008, p. 49). While many had hoped for a "new world order",[6] states collapsed, inciting widespread instability and violence virtually anywhere but the developed Western world. It is thus that military outsourcing was facilitated by a combination of force downsizing and increased demand for force contributions to provide aid or support military interventions (see Wulf, 2005). By and large, private military actors, Singer (2008) found, particularly thrive in "periods of systemic transition" and "areas of weak governance" (p. 20 and 38).

Simultaneously, globalization, including the post-Cold War opening of international markets produced mixed results for different parts of the world, leaving the "bottom billion," as renowned World Bank economist Paul Collier (2007) calls the least developed, in poverty, malnourished, undereducated, marginalized and disconnected. Those with little hope constitute "a huge reserve for the illegal economy, organized crime, and armed conflict" (Singer, 2008, p. 51). The combination of a growing number of disaffected and an oversupply of dislocated military-aged labor provided a market flood of soldiers ready to fight for whoever not only paid the bill but also provided a means of subsistence.

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6   The hope for a new world order was initially coined by President George H. W. Bush in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1990. For details see Gregg, 1993.

With large budget cuts and force reductions, the emerging need for international interventions to curb civil war, ethnic strife and genocide, as well as rapidly growing demand by weak or besieged governments for contracted fighting services, the conditions were ripe for the rise of the private security industry.

2.3.   The Private Security Industry: Scope, Definition and Types of Services

A 2008 report from the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that between 2003 and 2007 US government agencies have awarded defense- or security-related contracts totaling around US $85 billion to private sector companies performing services in the Iraqi theater.[7] In 2008, these companies were employing roughly 190,000 on-site individuals, approximately as many as there were US soldiers deployed at the height of the Iraq War and "at least 2.5 times higher than that ratio during any other major U.S. conflict." Of the total number of contractor personnel in Iraq, 95 percent provided services funded by the DoD (CBO, 2008).

Given that many firms take on roles traditionally reserved for the military and that some perform tasks that are either "intricately linked to warfare" (Singer, 2008, p. 19) or, at least, of "a specifically military nature," (Freeman and Skoens, 2008, p. 5) some observers refer to them as private military companies (PMCs). However, combat engagement and/or armed services make up only a very small fraction of the industry. Based in part on existing literature, [8] we distinguish five types of firms by their relative distance from an assumed front-line in the context of armed conflict (see table 1 on page 37 for a summary).

- Armed operative combat support is performed in immediate proximity to the battlefield and includes the active and armed participation in offensive war-fighting activities. Firms offering such services usually function as force multipliers for their clients who typically include weak or fragile states with relatively low military capabilities.[9] Examples include the now defunct Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, both of which engaged in a number of African civil wars in the 1990s (see Harding, 1997; Boemcken, 2006), and the Russian arms manufacturer Sukhoi who leased an entire air force, including jet fighter pilots, to the Ethiopian military during its war against Eritrea between 1999 and 2001 (see Wulf, 2003). It is important to note that the market share for these classic 'military companies' has been steadily decreasing since the late 1990s (see Boemcken, 2005).

- A small, yet increasingly significant number of contractors specialize in offering **armed security** services in hostile war and conflict environments. Although not offensive in purpose and as such, strictly speaking, not classifiable as armed operative combat support, the specific nature of their operational assignments often requires a readiness to engage in fighting. Tasks include: (1) static security, i.e. protecting fixed sites such as housing areas, oil-pipelines, reconstruction work sites, military bases or government buildings; (2) convoy security, i.e. escorts for vehicle convoys moving equipment, supplies or people through Iraq; and (3) se-

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7   This accounts for almost 20 percent of the US $446 billion appropriated *in toto* for activities in Iraq, but does not include contracts supporting operations in Iraq that are performed outside the Iraqi theater. See CBO, 2008.
8   See Singer's "tip-of-the-spear" typology in Singer, 2008; Avant, 2005.
9   With plenty of highly skilled individuals with military training looking for employment and a rapidly expanding global security market, companies offering combat and combat support services blossomed in the mid-1990s. Early success stories included South African-based Executive Outcomes whose engagement forced negotiations in Angola and facilitated the end of fighting in Sierra Leone. For further detail see also Wulf, 2005; Keen, 2005.

curity escorts and personal security details (PSDs), i.e. 'bodyguard' services, protecting the individual movements of high-ranking government or contractor officials (see SIGIR, 2008).

- Although not engaged in actual fighting, **unarmed operative combat support** services are performed in close proximity to the battle-space and/or have an immediate impact on activities therein. For instance, during the 2003 attack against Iraq, private contractors were involved in guiding B-2 bombers, F-117 jet-fighters, M1-tanks and Apache combat helicopters (see Avant, 2005). In 2004, the US-company AirScan won a US $10 million contract from the Coalition Provisional Authority for providing security-related surveillance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Unarmed operative combat support is becoming increasingly important with ever more complex, computer-based weapons systems often being handled by civilian rather than military personnel (see Boemcken, 2008).

- **Military and/or security-related consultancy and training** services typically assist a client's armed forces. Although these firms do not themselves operate on the battlefield, they provide strategic, operational and/or organizational analysis—known in military terminology as the 'commander's estimate.' Companies providing such services have become particularly relevant in the context of so-called 'nation-building' efforts. Between 2003 and 2006, the US-firm DynCorp International reportedly trained at least 32,000 recruits for the new Iraqi armed forces (Mathieu and Dearden, 2006). In November 2008, the Pentagon awarded the company a US $99 million contract to assist the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, which is responsible for providing advisors and trainers to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and the Interior. Similarly, another US company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), was awarded a US $15 million contract to staff a "Baghdad Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence" through the year 2010 (Cullen, 2008).

- Finally, **military support services** include secondary military functions (e.g., logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, transportation), which are far removed from the frontline and have little direct impact on the battlefield (see Singer, 2008). Military support services make up the lion-share of military outsourcing, freeing up a client's military capability to focus on core combat functions (see Kuemmel, 2004). Of the estimated 190,000 contractors in Iraq, some 80,000 work in the area of facilities management and "base support", 30,000 in "construction", 10,000 as "translators and interpreters" and 10,000 in "transportation and logistics" (CBO, 2008).[10]

2.4.   Armed Security Services in Iraq: Companies, Clients and Contracts

As of 2008, an estimated 30,000 contractors provided security services in Iraq, up from 20,000 in 2004 and 25,000 in 2005 (GAO, 2005; CRS, 2008; Human Rights First, 2008). Of these, approximately three-quarters were armed (CBO, 2008), presenting the second largest armed force in the country, surpassed only by the US military.[11] The biggest client for security companies operating in Iraq is the US government. CBO estimates that direct US government spending on private security services was US $6 to $10 billion over the 2003-2007 period with US $3 to $4 billion

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10   As the CBO has observed, "most contract obligations over the 2003-2007 period were for logistics support, construction, petroleum products, or food" (ibid., p. 1).

11   These figures refer only to individuals employed by non-Iraqi security companies.

allocated to private security contractors in Iraq. In addition to this, between US $3 and $6 billion was indirectly awarded to security sub-contractors, which protected various reconstruction companies receiving US-funds (ibid). All in all, it can therefore be assumed that security companies in Iraq have so far appropriated at least US $6 billion, possibly even more than US $10 billion of US-government spending.

Between 10,000 and 13,000 private security operatives are working on contracts for either the DoD or State Department (DoS), constituting about five percent of all US-funded contractor personnel in the country (ibid). According to an October 2008 report by the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), these contractors were employed by at least 77 companies, the top-ten of which accounted for almost 90 percent of all security-related revenues stemming from US reconstruction efforts (see Table 2, page 38) (SIGIR, 2008).

To protect its embassy in Baghdad as well as to escort VIPs and diplomatic convoys, the State Department has hired 2,800 private security personnel. Most of them work under a US $1.2 billion contract, which was awarded in 2005 for a period of five years to Blackwater USA, DynCorp International and Triple Canopy (CRS, 2008). The number of security contractors working for DoD fluctuates between 7,000 (March 2008) and 10,000 (December 2007), depending on operational requirements. They provide static security to military bases and installations, personal security for senior military officials and armed protection to supply convoys, more than 19.000 of which have traveled through Iraq since 2004. So far, DoD has purchased most security services from the British company Aegis Defence Services, which won an initial US $293 million contract in 2004 as well as a follow-up contract worth US $475 million in 2007. Besides armed protection, its tasks also involve the collection and analysis of security-relevant information as well as the overall coordination of movements by both DoD- and DoS-funded security companies operating throughout Iraq (ibid).

Apart from the US government, other important clients for security companies in Iraq include the Iraqi government, foreign diplomatic missions, transnational corporations and private businesses, as well as international and humanitarian organizations (see Boemcken, 2007). In contrast to US-financed services, reliable data on the scope and types of private security activities in these, often highly fragmented, sectors is very scarce, however. Among the larger clients is Baghdad International Airport, which employs approximately 1,000 security personnel (CBO, 2008). The British Foreign Office and its Department for International Development (DfID) have reportedly spent up to £200 million on private security services in Iraq.[12]

2.5.   The Micro-Level: Who is Working for Private Security Companies?

Overall, the contractor workforce in Iraq is diverse and fragmented, both in terms of cultural as well as professional backgrounds. CBO estimates that half of the approximately 30,000 employees of foreign security companies are Iraqis. Of the other half, one-third is thought to be US citizens (approx. 5,000 individuals) and two-thirds from at least 30 other countries (CBO, 2008). Some of the latter come from Western states, mainly the United Kingdom but also, for example, Germany and France. In part to save costs, however, security contractors are increasingly being recruited

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12   Andrew Johnson, Marie Woolf and Raymond Whitaker. "The security industry: Britain's private army in Iraq." Independent, 3 June 2007 at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ middle-east/the-security-industry-britains-private-army-in-iraq-451532.html>, accessed 20 July 2009.

from developing, and often conflict-ridden regions, including Nepal, Colombia, Serbia, Chile, the Fiji Islands, Nigeria and Uganda.[13]

Apart from their diverse national origins, security contractors in Iraq can also be differentiated in terms of their professional careers. Virtually all have a background in the public security sector of their home countries, spanning the range from law enforcement to the military and comprising all ranks from enlisted to officer. Eager to expand business and profits, Blackwater, for instance, actively recruited highly qualified ex-Special Forces soldiers to deploy in Iraq and offered them salaries that dwarfed basic military pay. Clearly, "when a guy can make more money in one month than he can make all year in the military or in a civilian job, it's hard to turn down," explains ex-Navy SEAL Dale McClellan, one of the original founders of Blackwater (quoted in Scahill, 2007).

Pay is typically commensurate with transferable skills and experiences but considerably higher than military pay at the comparable skill level/rank. In the early days of the US occupation, a security contractor could reportedly earn between US $500 and $1,500 per day (CRS, 2008). Although pay-scales have decreased since then, sufficiently skilled security contractors from Western countries are still assumed to be paid between US $3,000 and $6,000 a month, with additional allowances of up to US $2,000 when working in particularly dangerous areas.[14]

Not least due to their comparatively high wages reported in the media, many commentators have likened individual security contractors to greedy, ruthless and unscrupulous mercenaries, "freelance soldiers … who, for large amounts of money, fight for dubious causes" (Singer, 2008). For example, Singer conjectured that security contractors were motivated less by "goodwill and honour" than by personal economic gain (ibid, p. 152). And author Robert Young Pelton (2006) suggested that "private security has no ideology, no homeland, no flag. There is no God and country. There is only the paycheck" (p. 218). This characterization would hold that profit orientation, as the principal rationale for signing up with a security company, undermines or even erodes any ideals and ethical standards. Indeed, on first sight it seems to be confirmed by numerous allegations of human rights abuses committed by contractors in the field.

2.6.   The Problem: Conduct Unbecoming

Following the US occupation of Iraq, there have been several media reports on alleged human rights violations of contractors. Employees of the companies CACI and Titan, offering translation and interrogation services to the US military, have been implicated in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal.[15] Moreover, a number of reports have pointed to sexual harassment, and in a few cases even rape, committed by male contractors either against female colleagues or local Iraqis.[16]

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13   See Arne Perras. "Wer Glück hat, schafft es nach Bagdad." Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 November 2008.

14   Vasemaca Rarabici. "Iraq: Death is a Price of Blood Money", CorpWatch, 2 May 2006, at <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13525>, accessed 20 July 2009.

15   See the report of the Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade at <http://www.agonist.org/annex/taguba.htm>, accessed 06 August 2009. See also Pratap Chatterjee and A.C. Thompson. "Private Contractors and Torture at Abu Ghraib", CorpWatch, 7 May 2004, at <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11285>, accessed 20 July 2009.

16   Cf. United Press International. "Iraq contractor in sex harrassment probe." 11 February 2009, at <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/02/11/Iraq-contractor-in-sex-harrassment-probe/UPI-70931234376214>, accessed 20 July 2009. Also: David Isenberg. "No Justice on Contractor Rape." Cato Institute/United Press International, 18 April 2008, available at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9342>, accessed 20 July 2009.

The most serious allegations of human rights violations, however, concern shooting incidents. To date, the most widely reported incident occurred on 16 September 2007, when Blackwater security guards, while escorting a US diplomatic convoy for the State Department, engaged in a firefight in crowded Nisour Square in the heart of Baghdad City that left 17 Iraqi civilians dead. Although Blackwater claimed that the shooting had started in response to an ambush against the convoy, eyewitnesses and US military officials at the scene testified that the firing had commenced without hostile provocation (Human Rights First, 2008). In its investigation of the Nisour Square shooting, the FBI concluded that at least 14 out of the 17 shootings were unjustified and that Blackwater guards had "recklessly violated American rules for the use of lethal force."[17]

Although certainly one of the bloodiest, the Nisour Square shootings were by no means an isolated incident. A congressional investigation following the September 2007 killings revealed that "Blackwater has been involved in at least 195 'escalation of force' incidents in Iraq since 2005 that involved the firing of shots by Blackwater forces." This, the report continues, "is an average of 1.4 shootings per week" (House of Representatives, 2007). A 2008 report by Human Rights First estimates that "there are thousands of occasions in Iraq in which [security contractors] have discharged their weapons (…) toward civilians", in the course of which they have claimed an "unknown number of lives" (pp. 4-5). Many incidents involving the use of force against civilians occurred during convoy or mobile security details, when weapons were fired against vehicles closing up too quickly or failing to get out of the way in time.[18] For instance, in May 2005, US Marines arrested 19 security contractors working for the company Zapata Engineering who had indiscriminately fired at US troops and Iraqi civilians from a passing convoy.[19]

Are these incidents indicative of the shortfalls of a rapidly growing industry? Are they, in fact, evidence confirming the picture portrayed in many media outlets of security contractors as 'gun-slinging cowboys'? Or are they unavoidable side-effects of working in a combat zone? No doubt, contractors in Iraq operate in a highly demanding and stressful environment. Every road could be spiked with IEDs (improvised explosive devices); every approaching car could contain a possible suicide-bomber. The *Washington Post* reported that throughout 2007 one in seven supply convoys

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17 Ginger Thompson and James Risen, "US: Plea by Blackwater Guard Helps Indict Others." New York Times, 9 December 2008, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/washington/ 09blackwater.html?ref=world>, accessed 30 March 2009.

18 This is vividly illustrated by a video, which was leaked in December 2005 by Iraq-based staff of Aegis Defence Services. To the music of Elvis Presley's "Runaway Train", it contains a compilation of short clips showing security contractors apparently shooting at approaching civilians cars from the back of a truck. For further detail, see <http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=ciDnOoVl5yQ, accessed 20 July 2009>. Possible attacks against civilians are also suggested in many of the so-called Serious Incident Reports (SIRs), which PMSC staff are requested to submit, usually following instances of weapons discharge in response to insurgent attacks. An analysis of 200 such SIRs by the Los Angeles Times revealed that 11 percent "involved contractors firing toward civilian vehicles believed to be a threat". See T. Christian Miller, "Private Security Guards in Iraq Operate With Little Supervision", Los Angeles Times, 4 December 2005, at <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/04/world/fg-guards4>, accessed 20 July 2009. Among another 400 SIRs, the Raleigh News and Observer identified 61 instances of opening fire without having sufficiently established beforehand whether the target was indeed a threat (15 percent). By contrast, "in just seven cases were Iraqis clearly attacking." See Jay Price, "Hired Guns Unaccountable", News and Observer, 23 March 2006, at <http://www.newsobserver.com/505/story/421071.html>, accessed 20 July 2009.

19 T. Christian Miller, "U.S. Marines Detained 19 Contractors in Iraq", Los Angeles Times, 8 June 2005, at <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/08/world/fg-security8>, accessed 20 July 2009. Shootings injuring or killing Iraqi civilians have also reportedly involved the contractors working for the security firms Unity Resource Group, DynCorp, Crescent Security and Triple Canopy. See Steve Fainaru, "Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War", Washington Post, 16 June 2007, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/ AR2007061502602.html>, and James Glanz et al., "Security Guard Kills Iraq Driver", New York Times, 12 November 2007, at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? res=9A04E4DF1739F931A25752C1A9619C8B63&sec= &spon=&pagewanted=all>, both accessed 20 July 2009.

escorted by private forces was ambushed.[20] In contrast to US military fatalities, there are no official statistics on contractor deaths. However, according to one website that tracks casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, as of August 2009 there have been 458 contractor casualties in Iraq.[21] The Human Rights First report (2008) even estimates that as many as 1,000 contractors may have been killed and 12,000 wounded in Iraq.

Tensions run high in Iraq. Yet, while the highly volatile operational context may be partly to blame for individual misconduct, it certainly does not justify human rights violations. Indeed, the repeated instances of security contractors firing against civilians raise questions about the effective regulation of the industry.

2.7.   Regulating the Industry: The Nature of Formal and Informal Control

In this segment, we examine existing means for regulating the private security industry. Regulation, we argue, has two sides. On the one hand, it refers to the range of formal mechanisms devised to monitor and, if necessary, punish non-compliance with a set of legal prescriptions. On the other hand, it may also be imposed informally through inter-subjectively internalized values and norms. Depending on the degree of internalization and the kinds of values in question, formal regulation may be either supported or undermined. The following section examines the recent changes in legal and political efforts to regulate the security industry (formal control) and explores the extent to which these behavioral prescriptions have been internalized by individual contractors (informal control).

2.8.   Formal Regulation

The concept of formal regulation, as used in the present context, is closely related to what, in social theory, has been referred to as "sovereign", "juridical", "legal" or "coercive" forms of power, i.e. the simple top-down imposition of sanctions, drawing an authoritative distinction between the acceptable and the forbidden. They manifest themselves most visibly within a successive and singular series of actions, namely the identification of an isolated infringement, its public articulation and the subsequent punishment of the offender. Less visibly, however, juridical or rather "disciplinary" forms of power are in constant operation, carefully monitoring, supervising and recording all kinds of social activities for possible transgressions of the law (see Foucault, 1975).

Some commentators have suggested that security contractors in Iraq were "unregulated" and operating in a "legal vacuum".[22] However, since the beginning of the US occupation in 2003, their activities have been subject to quite extensive codes of formal regulation. For example, any company providing security services in Iraq requires a license furnished by the 'Private Security Companies Directorate' which is part of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior.[23] In addition, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 3 of December 2003 specifies a number of rules related to the carrying of weapons. In order to be armed at all, contractors need a permission,

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20   Steve Fainaru, "Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War", Washington Post, 16 June 2007
21   See iCasualties. "Iraq Coalition Casualty Count.".Available at <http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ Contractors.aspx>, accessed 07 August 2009.
22   See Richard Norton-Taylor. "Fears over huge growth in Iraq's unregulated private armies." Guardian, 31 October 2006, at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/31/iraq.iraqtimeline>, accessed 26 July 2009.
23   See homepage of the Private Security Companies Directorate at <http://www.iraqiinterior.com/ PSCD/Pscd_index1.htm>, accessed 26 July 2009.

which may be granted either by the US authorities or the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, the order also restricts the type of weapons accessible to security contractors (CPA, 2003).

The precise functions and tasks of security contractors have been stipulated in a CPA Memorandum of June 2004, prohibiting them from joining Coalition forces in "combat operations except in self-defense or in defense of persons as specified in [their] contracts". Also, security contractors are not allowed to engage in "law enforcement activities", although they may "stop, detain, search, and disarm civilians" where the clients' safety requires it or if such functions are specified in their contract (CPA, 2004, p. 11, p. 7, p. 10).

Despite these rules of engagement, a number of critics have specifically pointed to the insufficient legal accountability of security contractors in Iraq (see Singer, 2008). In fact, until January 2009, as specified in the CPA order from June 2004, contractors working for US government agencies were immune to Iraqi law with regard to all actions performed in fulfillment of their contractual obligations (CPA, 2004). In theory, of course, all contractors remained subject to the provisions of extra-territorial jurisdiction of their respective home countries. However, civilian law enforcement agencies are usually not prepared for conducting criminal investigations in war zones (see Boemcken, 2006b). And indeed, during the first five years of US occupation not a single contractor in Iraq was prosecuted for acts of violence against locals, including contractors implicated in the torture scandal in Abu Ghraib prison. As Singer explained, "even when contractors do military jobs, they remain private businesses and thus fall outside the military chain of command and justice systems" (Singer, 2005, p. 124). The watchdog group Human Rights First arrived at a sobering assessment: "The failure to investigate and prosecute these violent attacks has created a culture of impunity that angers the local population, undermines the military mission, and promotes more abuse by contractors over time" (Human Rights First, 2008, pp. iii-iv).

An apparent lack of effective political oversight further compounded the impression of insufficient regulation. Parallel to increasing efforts of outsourcing formerly military functions to the private sector, the number of defense contract managers in the DoD was reportedly cut by nearly 3,000 between 1997 and 2002 (see Caparini and Schreier, 2005). Accordingly, the House Appropriations Committee remarked as late as 2007 that it "is clear that DoD currently lacks the means to provide proper oversight of its service contracts, in parts because of an insufficient number of contract oversight personnel."[24] A report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) had concluded a year earlier that "problems with management and oversight of contractors have negatively impacted military operations and unit morale and hindered DoD's ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are effectively meeting their contract requirements" (GAO, 2006).

In the aftermath of the Nisour Square shootings, however, formal mechanisms to regulate the industry and the behavior of individual contractors have tightened considerably. In January 2009, the Iraqi government lifted the immunity of contractors to local law, thus making it theoretically possible for Iraqi authorities to criminally prosecute security contractors for unlawful behavior. Moreover, already in 2007 Congress passed the MEJA (Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act) Expansion and Enforcement Act (H.R. 2740), subjecting all contractors working for the US government in

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24 Cited in a hearing in the US Senate before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support of the Committee on Armed Services, 6 December 2007; available at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg366/html/CHRG-110shrg366.htm>, accessed 26 July 2009. See also Franke, Forthcoming.

war zones to the jurisdiction of US criminal law. In a first application of this Act in December 2008, five Blackwater guards were indicted for their involvement in the Nisour Square shootings. According to IPOA President Doug Brooks another "50 MEJA cases appear to be pending right now".[25]

Besides legal accountability, political oversight also seems to have improved. In December 2007 and July 2008 both the DoD and DoS agreed to extend their oversight responsibilities (see CBO, 2008, p. 15). The DoD has since established an Armed Contractor Oversight Division and "significantly [increased] the number of Defense Contracting Management Agency personnel" (CRS, 2008, p. 42). The State Department has also taken steps to improve on-site monitoring of contractor activities. All its privately protected convoys in Iraq are now subject to video surveillance and accompanied by DoS Special Agents. What is more, at the embassy in Baghdad, a quick-response team of security officials stands ready to proceed to and investigate the scene of any shooting involving security guards contracted by the State Department (ibid, p. 45).

2.9.   Informal Regulation

In contrast to the top-down logic of formal regulation, informal regulation refers to the norms, rules and values that are internalized by individuals as a central element of their very sense of 'selfness' and identity. As a consequence, behavior is guided through continual *self*-surveillance and *self*-regulation instead of being imposed by the threat of external sanctions (see Foucault, 1980; Fraser, 1981).

Importantly, informal regulation is a fundamentally inter-subjective process. That is to say, identity is—above all—a *social* matter, for one arrives at a sense of selfhood predominantly through the identification with others. In this sense, Henri Tajfel coined the concept of "social identity". It refers to "that part of individuals' self concept which derives from knowledge of their membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Theories of social identity are based on three premises:

- people are motivated to create and maintain a positive self-concept;

- the self-concept derives largely from group identifications; and

- people establish positive social identities through normative comparisons between favorable in-groups and unfavorable out-groups (see Franke, 1999).

Social identity research has demonstrated that individuals tend to invoke their group identifications in many decision contexts, since the norms, values, stereotypes and behavior patterns associated with a particular identity provide a sense of certainty and may inform their choice among decision alternatives (see for instance Abrams and Hogg, 1999; Hogg, 1996; Hogg and Abrams, 1998, Pratto et al., 1994; Sherif et al., 1988; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius and Haley, 2005; Sniderman et al., 1991). When informal regulation is effective, individuals will voluntarily conform to an inter-subjectively shared system of rules and values, which, in turn, establishes their social identity and shapes and constrains their behavior. In theory, informal control may well exist in the absence of formal laws and disciplinary practices, hence providing for a modicum of order and predictability in an otherwise more or less 'anarchical' environment. More commonly, however, informal regulation extends and intensifies

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25   Interview with the author, 25 March 2009.

formal regulatory practices (see Foucault, 2007). As a result, control is effectively maximized if both formal and informal regulation mutually reinforce each other. By contrast, when rules, norms and values are not internalized, we can expect formal regulation to be considerably weakened.

Employed as a decision heuristic, social identity may also result in undesirable outcomes, as in the cases of contractor misconduct outlined above. Social psychologists tend to explain these phenomena as results of cognitive biases that distort reality, because individuals attempt to master new situations through the application of familiar perceptions and behavior patterns that may not fit the context (see Kahnemann et al., 1982). For instance, warrior-soldiers trained for combat may have difficulty adjusting to peacebuilding tasks, if those tasks are not salient components of their professional self-conception. Empirical research on cognitive inconsistencies suggests that individuals may try to reduce uncertainty and overcome identity tensions by bolstering the stature of the in-group and of in-group norms, attitudes and behaviors either through derogation of the out-group or by redefining the prototypicality of the situational context (see Abrams and Hogg, 1999; Rosch, 1978; Tajfel, 1981). In other words, soldiers may justify decisions to use force by claiming to act in pursuit of some greater good (e.g., restore peace and democracy, terminate an unjust regime or end human suffering) (see Franke, 2003). In situations where the rules of engagement (i.e. formal regulation) are ambiguous or non-existent, behavior may be controlled by the norms and values that constitute the identity invoked in that situation (i.e. informal regulation).

Although the concepts of informal regulation and social control have been examined widely for the armed forces (see Janowitz, 1971; Seiffert, 1996; Leonhard and Biehl, 2005; Maringer, 2008), they have not been applied in any systematic fashion to the private security industry, despite the fact that self-regulation has become a mantra for an industry still trying to repair its tarnished image that resulted in part from insufficient control mechanisms. While there is currently no regulatory industry standard, there are strong incentives for companies to monitor their employees' behavior and adopt self-regulating mechanisms.

In the United States, the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) formed in 2001 as a non-profit umbrella organization to represent the interests of the "peace and stability operations industry". According to its website, it seeks to "promote high operational and ethical standards of firms", for the purpose of which it has developed a voluntary Code of Conduct calling on IPOA members to respect human rights, operate with integrity, honesty and fairness, recognize and support legal accountability, work only for legitimate and recognized governments, international and non-governmental organizations and lawful private companies, and ensure adequate training and vetting of their personnel.[26]

As of March 2009, the IPOA serves a total of 53 corporate members all of whom have signed its Code of Conduct and have pledged to abide by the ethical standards established therein. Self-regulation seems an attractive choice for many companies. IPOA membership has more than doubled since 2006. Roland Vargoega, owner and president of Dynsec Group, affirms: "Our membership in IPOA has helped differenti-

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26   The latest version of the IPOA Code of Conduct, adopted in February 2009, is available at <http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconductv12en.html>, accessed 29 March 2009. In a similar fashion, the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), which aims "to promote, enhance and regulate the interests and activities of UK-based firms and companies that provide armed security services in countries outside the UK", has committed itself to a number of ethical criteria in its Charter. For example, its member companies have agreed to decline any "contracts for the provision of security services where to do so will conflict with applicable human rights legislation", see <http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents-charter.asp>, accessed 27 July 2009.

ate our company by the fact that our clients can see that we live up to the highest standard within the industry. By such IPOA has helped us win contracts."[27]

For the specific case of Iraq, informal self-regulation on behalf of firms can also be discerned from statements by the Private Security Company Association of Iraq (PSCAI), the trade organization of all major foreign security companies working in the country. Unlike other trade organizations, PSCAI does not purport its own list of ethical guidelines, which members have to subscribe to. However, according to a 2007 press release, the PSCAI is "committed to furthering professionalism, transparency and accountability within the private security industry operating in Iraq."[28]

Although the impact and effectiveness of industry self-regulation has been subject of some recent research (see Schneiker, 2009), to date there has been no systematic analysis of the values, self-conceptions and ethical standards of individual security contractors. Is the image of the unscrupulous and thrill-seeking mercenary, propagated by both the media and many academic writings, justified? If so, there is a danger that formal regulation as well as industry self-regulation will be seriously undermined. By contrast, the reported human rights violations could, of course, have been committed by a few 'black sheep' and therefore need to be considered as exceptional instances rather than indicative of more general attitudes within the industry as a whole.

More than half a century of research in military sociology has demonstrated that militaries instill in their soldiers a strong sense of unit cohesion and systematically build a robust and resilient warrior identity (see most prominently Huntingdon, 1957; Janowitz, 1971; Shils and Janowitz, 1948). For instance, in his analysis of socialization at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Franke (1999) found that the rigor of cadet basic training produces a strong in-group identity. The Cadet Leader Development System specifies:

> [C]adets develop as individuals within a group context. They seek to differentiate themselves as individuals as they simultaneously seek to become members of a larger social group....Through an integrative process, cadets develop or acquire the values, attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, and skills which empower them as leaders and which make effective leadership meaningful (United States Military Academy, 1994).

With its long history and unique tradition, the military has become a well-honed identity-producing institution that creates a distinct professional self-conception among its members. How strong is the sense of identification with a professional self-conception among employees in the private security sector?

As a result of the cultural and professional diversity of contractors, we can expect a multiplicity of individual motivations, values and self-conceptions in the security industry. Moreover, given short-term contractual assignments and frequent rotations, it is unlikely to find an overarching homogeneous professional ethos based on unit cohesion, as encountered in the military. However, commonalities in home-country and, particularly, professional history seem to serve as important referents for constituting shared identities on the subordinate level of small groups. Consistent with the tenets of social identity theory we expect individuals in novel contexts to seek shared

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27   See <http://ipoaworld.org/eng/testimonials.html>, accessed 19 March 2009.
28   See <http://www.pscai.org/press.html>, accessed 27 July 2009.

bases for identification with like-minded others and against members of perceived out-groups.

Confirming this expectation, in his first-hand account of security contractors in Iraq, Pelton (2006) observed social group-based hierarchical relationships: "Retired cops fall at the bottom of the food chain, followed by army reserves, FBI, regular marines, Army Rangers, Marine Forward Recon, all the way up to Vanilla SF, DEVGRU (Seal Team 6), and finally Delta Force". He goes on, "each of these has a different language, culture, affiliation, and loyalty, so they nearly always break into like-minded groups and view the other tribes as somehow suspicious" (p. 178).

Asked to provide security detail in Iraq, the small team of a handful of individuals, usually from a similar cultural and professional background, seems to be the key unit—the in-group—for creating a common sense of belonging and shared occupational identity. By contrast, overall identification with their respective companies seems relatively weak since the majority of contracts last only for a very limited period of time and many security contractors regularly change employers. Again, in the words of Pelton:

> Even though they all do the same thing for the same company, each team within Blackwater represents its own tribe. Sometimes teams are fully stocked with either retired SEALS, marines, or SF [Special Forces], making the group identity even stronger. The only guys who don't seem to trash-talk the others are the ex-cops. They just don't have the necessary ego and swagger. Team cohesiveness is so strong, one may hesitate to trust or rely on anyone outside their own tight circle, always suspecting that another team's methods are somehow less safe than their own" (p. 221).

So far, all accounts of the social identity, norms, values and attitudes of security contractors have been based on anecdotal evidence. The following section presents the results of our empirical survey of US security contractors with operational experience in Iraq.

3.   Data Analysis and Findings

3.1.   Subjects and Design

The initial intent of this research was to examine the value-orientations and profes-
sional self-conception of a broad range of contractors working for private security
companies in Iraq. Since very little is known to date about the individuals working in
the security industry, it was crucially important for this pilot study to solicit the partic-
ipation of contractors with actual experience in working for legitimate firms operating
in Iraq. Although there is an increasing number of internet sites and web-based chat
rooms for persons to share experiences and voice opinions on matters related to
security contracting, it is impossible to verify the backgrounds of individuals partici-
pating in these internet forums and to establish representativeness of any samples
drawn from among them.

To gain access specifically to contractors providing security detail—that is taking on
roles traditionally undertaken by military personnel—we refrained from soliciting par-
ticipation in the Survey through the Internet. Instead, we contacted the largest and
most prominent US-based security firms—including Dyncorp International, Blackwa-
ter, MPRI, Triple Canopy, and Tactical Intelligence—asking for their assistance and
support in administering the Security Contractor Survey to their employees. Although
the initial request generated a lot of positive feedback and interest in our pilot study,
the contractual obligations of many of these companies with the US Department of
State, and in some cases also anxiousness about potentially unfavorable media re-
porting of our findings, prevented them from participating in the Survey.

While the firms themselves declined participation in this study, the CivPol Alumni
Organization, a non-profit organization founded in 2007 to "promote the accomplish-
ments of American police officers serving in post-conflict environments throughout
the world" agreed to support our research and solicit volunteers from among its
members to complete the Security Contractor Survey.[29] Active members of the
CivPol Alumni Association are typically American police officers who have completed
at least one tour of duty on contract in a conflict region. Usually, these police officers
receive a leave of absence from their regular jobs and are recruited by the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to participate in international
civilian police activities and local police development programs in countries around
the world.

To date, the CivPol Alumni Association sponsors some 1,400 active members, all of
whom received an e-mail from the Association President with an Internet link to the
Security Contractor Survey and a request to complete the Survey online at their con-
venience. With this approach, it was impossible for the researchers to identify re-
spondents, thus ensuring the anonymity of all information provided on the Survey.
Between March and May of 2009, 355 active CivPol Alumni Association members
followed the e-mail link and responded to at least part of the survey (a 25 percent
response rate). In all, 223 respondents answered every question on the Survey and

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29   The CivPol Alumni Association's mission statement specifies: "The CivPol Alumni Association promotes the accom-
plishments of American police officers serving in post-conflict environments throughout the world, seeks to gain for-
mal recognition for those who have died in the line of duty, and supports officers and their families before, during and
after deployment." Detailed information on the organization is available at <http://www.civpol-alumni.org>, accessed
13 July 2009.

were included in our response sample. Their answers present the basis for our analyses and the findings reported below.

3.2.   Measures

In order to assess their value-orientations and attitudes, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with 61 separate statements. Responses were scored on a five-point numerical Likert scale (from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree") and mean response values were calculated. Survey items measuring the same concept were combined into separate scales and mean scale values were computed.[30] The following seven scales were adapted from earlier research examining the identity and self-conception of military professionals (the exact wording of the scale items can be found in Table 3, pages 39-44):

- **Patriotism (PAT).** National attachment and patriotic motivations have been primary reasons for young people to pursue military careers and for enlisted personnel to make sense of their mission assignments (See Franke, 1999; Burk, 1989; Faris, 1995). Patriotic feelings, Faris (1995) found, were reinforced especially through experiences that enhanced a sense of unselfish service to one's country. To measure patriotism in our sample, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements concerning their allegiance and loyalty to the United States and their attitudes toward serving and fighting for their country.

- **Warriorism (WAR)***.* In his classic analysis of "The Soldier and the State", Samuel Huntington (1957) found that soldiers typically believed in the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature and argued that the traditional warrior believed in the inevitability of war, tended to be skeptical of international law and organizations as effective instruments for preventing war and only hesitantly accepted civilian control over the armed forces (see also Franke, 1999). To measure their level of warriorism, respondents were asked for their attitudes toward the military's warfighting and peacekeeping roles, their own expectations to fight in a war, and the personal satisfaction they expected to gain from participating in warfighting and peacekeeping missions.

- **Machiavellianism (MACH).** Following the writings of Machiavelli, Christie and Geis (1970) developed a series of hypothetical personality traits that someone who is effective in controlling others (high Mach) should possess, among them a relative lack of affect in interpersonal relationships, little concern with conventional morality, and a focus on getting things done. Studies showed that high Machs were less susceptible to social pressures that might urge compliance, cooperation, or even attitude change, than low Machs.[31] Oyserman (1993) found high Machs to be competitive, self- rather than other-oriented and less inclined to value group success unless it can be used to their advantage. To measure

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30   The following scale results were obtained for the sample: (1) six-item patriotism scale (PAT: M = 3.92; SD = 0.57; range = 2.17-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.71); (2) five-item warriorism scale (WAR: M = 3.46; SD = 0.54; range = 1.80-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.47); (3) six-item Machiavellianism scale (MACH: M = 2.36; SD = 0.47; range = 1.00-3.83; Cronbach's alpha = 0.45); (4) five-item job engagement scale (JOB: M = 4.80; SD = 0.27; range = 4.00-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.75); (5) nine-item social dominance orientation scale (SDO: M = 2.15; SD = 0.51; range = 1.00-3.78; Cronbach's alpha = 0.75); (6) eight-item masculinity scale (MAS: M = 3.04; SD = 0.51; range = 1.86-4.43; Cronbach's alpha = 0.66); and (7) five-item ethical conduct scale (ETH: M = 4.65; SD = 0.45; range = 2.80-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.84).

31   For more recent applications see Franke, 1999.

their levels of Machiavellianism, respondents were asked about a number of moral and ethical perceptions.

- **Ethical Conduct (ETH)**. To further explore respondents' ethical perceptions—and to supplement the results of the MACH scale—respondents were asked about their attitudes toward the ethical provisions specified in the IPOA Code of Conduct, asking individuals to respect and enforce international law and human rights and to conduct oneself with integrity, honesty and fairness.

- **Social Dominance Orientation** *(SDO)*. Consistent with social identity theory, Sidanius et al. (1992) found that individuals created social categories and positive social identities primarily by comparing in-groups with out-groups along those dimensions most likely to generate a favorable outcome for the in-group(s). At the individual level, Sidanius and Liu (1992) labeled this predisposition "social dominance orientation" (SDO) that is "the degree to which a person desires to establish and maintain the superiority of his or her own group over other groups" (p.686). This predisposition, in combination with various cultural factors, leads to the establishment of a hierarchical system that consists of at least two 'castes': a hegemonic group at the top of the social system and a negative reference group at the bottom. This hierarchy is preserved through attitudes, values, beliefs, and ideologies which justify the groups' position in the social system and may serve as a decision heuristic under novel or stress (e.g., combat) situations. To measure social dominance orientation among contractors in our sample, respondents were asked about their attitudes toward group hierarchies and equal treatment of groups.

- **Masculinity (MAS).** This category is designed in part to examine the extent to which security contractors may have a particular propensity for violence. Propensity for violence has often been correlated with high levels of masculinity. Although there is no consensus to date on how to define masculinity, researchers agree that the concept pertains to a socially constructed set of meanings, values and practices encompassing components such as aggression, honor, dominance, loyalty, respect, courage, adventure and risk-taking (Herek, 1986; Krienert, 2003; Miedzian, 1991; Segal, 1993; Steans, 1998; Weinstein et al., 1995). In the United States, for a man to present a positive masculine image includes being tough and courageous and displaying physical strength, aggressiveness and visible proof of achievement (see Gutmann, 1997; Messerschmidt, 1993; 2000). David and Brannon (1976) identified four essential elements in defining how a man is expected to behave: avoidance of emotional expression, achievement of a level of social status, emanating an air of toughness, confidence and independence, and willingness to take risks and engage in violence. These elements were the basis for the Brannon Masculinity Scale (Brannon and Juni, 1984), a shortened version of which was used to assess the level of masculinity among contractors in the present sample.

- **Job Engagement (JOB).** Psychological research has shown that individuals who view their job as an integral part of their identity will feel a personal commitment to doing well and, consequently, tend to perform better (see Brown, 1996; Britt, 2003). To get a sense of their job engagement, respondents were asked about their commitment to and investment in their job and their investment in their job performance.

The following section presents the results of our data analysis.

3.3. The CivPol Sample

All respondents in the sample were US citizens with a law enforcement background and the vast majority were male (216 or 96.9%), white (77.5%), and married (77.1%). All respondents had completed at least high school (34.5%) and almost half (49.8%) held undergraduate and 15.7% graduate degrees. Almost two-thirds (136 or 61.5%) of respondents had served in the military and 4-in-5 out of those (108) had been directly involved in combat. Of the respondents with a military background, almost all had served as enlisted personnel (95%) and nearly three-fourths were discharged at the ranks of E4-E6 (71%). At the time of Survey administration, respondents had an average of 4.7 years of experience working for the private security industry, with a median of three years. About one-quarter of respondents (23.7%) had less than two years of private security work experience, 44.9% had worked 2-5 years, 23.7% 5-10 years, and 16 respondents (7.7%) had worked for more than ten years in the private security sector. Almost one-third of respondents (69 or 30.9%) reported that their job required them to "engage in actual fighting/security detail or security protection" and more than three-quarters (171 or 76.7%) reported providing advisory and training services (multiple responses were possible to this question).

3.4. General Results

Overall, the mean scores for the value-orientation scales indicate that respondents in our sample were highly committed to their jobs and to ethical conduct on the job. They also tended to score higher than average on the patriotism and warriorism scales and lower on the Machiavellianism and social dominance orientation (SDO) scales.[32] In general, the following results by scale/response rubric seem noteworthy for the sample as a whole (see Table 3, 39-44; individual statements are identified below by scale designator):

- *Job Engagement.* Virtually all respondents were committed to performing well at their job (J1), cared about the outcomes resulting from their job performance (J4), and invested a large part of themselves into their job performance (J5).

- *Ethical Conduct.* At the same time, virtually everybody in our sample agreed that it was important to "respect the dignity of all human beings and adhere to relevant international law" (E1), to "minimize loss of life and destruction of property" (E2), to investigate violations of human rights and humanitarian law (E4) and to take action against unlawful activities (E5).

Literally every respondent agreed that "integrity, honesty and fairness are key guiding principles for anyone deployed in a contingency operation" (E3). Despite adherence to these high ethical standards, fewer than half (49.6%) agreed that "one should take action only when it is morally right" (M3), while nearly one-third (32.4%) disagreed.

- *Warriorism.* The majority of respondents (60.5%) "expected to engage in actual fighting" when they decided to sign on with a security firm (W1). Not surprisingly, and perhaps as a consequence, the vast majority believed that "sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest" (W2: 92.4%), that "the military's

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32 For comparison purposes, respondents in the present sample tended to score about as high on the patriotism and Machiavellianism scales as respondents in military samples had in the past and lower on the warriorism scale (see Franke and Guttieri, 2009; Franke and Heinecken, 2001; Franke, 1999).

primary focus should be preparation for and conduct of combat operations" (W4: 77%) and that war is inherent in human nature (W5: 71.8%).

- *Machiavellianism.* Despite the strong belief about the inevitability of war (W5), the majority of respondents in our sample had a positive view of human nature: between half and three-quarters disagreed that "it is hard to get ahead without cutting corners" (M6), "people won't work unless they are forced to" (M2), "people have a vicious streak" (M5) and "anyone who completely trust anyone else is asking for trouble" (M4).

- *Patriotism.* Almost every respondent (96.0%) viewed his/her work as a security contractor "as a 'calling' where I can serve my country" (P1) and eight-in-ten (83.0%) agreed that citizens should show strong allegiance to their country (P3) and be willing to fight for their country (P4). Interestingly, the majority of respondents (50.2%) disagreed that "the strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defense of one's country" (P5).

- *Social Dominance Orientation.* In all, respondents showed low levels of SDO, overwhelmingly believing in the equality of groups and in equalizing conditions for different groups (S1-S9).

- *Masculinity.* Respondents showed average levels of masculinity. Three-quarters of respondents were not bothered "when a man does something that I consider feminine" (A6) and one-third disagreed that a man should "look somewhat tough" (A4) and that men should "not show pain" (A8).

- *Civilian Contractor Roles.* Respondents seemed to make clear distinctions between their professional responsibilities as contractors and the roles performed by the military. Almost eight-in-ten respondents (78.0%) agreed that "there are certain functions performed by military personnel that (…) cannot be performed by a civilian contractor" (C2) and two-thirds (65.9%) disagreed that there are no military functions that "cannot be performed by a civilian contractor" (C1). At the same time, nearly nine-in-ten respondents (89.7%) were very certain that "civilian contractors deployed abroad should be protected by the same international treaties as the armed forces" (C4).

Interestingly, the sample was evenly split in their opinion of whether (39.2%) or not (41.9%) "civilian contractors employed by the enemy in a combat zone should be regarded as unlawful combatants" (C7). At the same time, slightly more than half (51.4%) of the respondents felt that "civilian contractors performing in combat roles should be regarded as military professionals" (C6).

- *Preparation for Service as Contractor.* Overall, a large majority of respondents seemed satisfied with how their company prepared them for their operational assignments. Eight-in-ten respondents (79.8%) felt that they had been informed properly about the levels of risk associated with their deployment (B1) and that they had received instruction in the rules of engagement prior to deployment (B4: 78.9%). Seven-in-ten respondents felt they had received proper training and instruction "about applicable laws and regional sensitivities" (B2: 70.0%) and had been given appropriate equipment and materials to perform their duties (B3: 70.4%). Nevertheless, about one-quarter of respondents (22.0%) disagreed that their company had provided sufficient training and preparation (B2).

Finally, respondents largely gave their companies passing grades on supporting international, humanitarian and non-governmental organizations (B5: 70.3%), on ac-

counting for and controlling weapons and ammunition (B6: 78.9%) and on the use of appropriate weapons (B7: 88.8%).

3.5.   Motivation

Respondents were asked to indicate in order of priority what motivated them to seek employment with a security firm from a set of nine predetermined choices (see Table 4, page 45). For the purpose of this analysis, we aggregated responses and classi-fied a respondent's top three choices as "very important," choices 4-6 as "important" and the last three choices as "less or not important." The results indicate that by far the most often cited reasons for working in the security sector were to "face and meet new challenges" (74.9%) and to "help others" (64.6%). About one-third of re-spondents hoped that their work would make a difference (38.0%) and saw their con-tractor service as a way to serve their country (31.3%). In contrast to expectations raised in part by media reporting about the security industry, only one-quarter (25.2%) of respondents indicated that they were motivated by the fact that they could "make more money than in their previous job."

Correlating respondents' motivations for employment in the security field with their value orientations, as measured by their mean scale scores, did not render any sta-tistically significant differences, suggesting a fairly balanced, professional and ho-mogeneous cohort of respondents. For instance, observing significant differences in terms of the warriorism, Machiavellianism or SDO scores of respondents for whom "seeking adventure and excitement" was very important to those for whom adventure and excitement was less or not important might have supported the commonly held view that contractors are primarily in it for the money, seeking a "well-paying, high-risk, adrenaline-packed thrill ride" (Pelton, 2007, p. 95). By contrast, respondents in our sample seemed to be motivated primarily by a desire to serve their country as security professionals and to make a meaningful contribution "in support of interna-tional peacekeeping operations" (ibid).

These findings are consistent with other recent research on the motivations of secu-rity contractors. For instance, Scahill (2007) also found that signing on with the secu-rity industry was not all about the pay. Contracting, he concluded, offered "a chance for many combat enthusiasts, retired from the service and stuck in the ennui of eve-ryday existence, to return to their glory days on the battlefield under the banner of the international fight against terrorism" (p. 146). As one former Navy SEAL inter-viewed by Scahill explained, "It's what you do. Say you spent twenty years doing things like riding high-speed boats and jumping out of airplanes. Now, all of a sud-den, you're selling insurance. It's tough." For a 55-year old police officer, the deci-sion to sign on with Blackwater meant "the last chance in my life to do something exciting" (ibid).

3.6.   Comparison by Operational Experience and Demographic Background

Overall, demographic control variables showed little significant differences in value-orientations among respondents in our sample. Neither level of education, marital status nor type of client a respondents' firm worked for (e.g., government, interna-tional organization, private company, humanitarian actor) seemed to affect scale scores in any statistically significant way. Comparisons by military background, branch of service, fighting/ security detail experience, and duration of employment in

the private security sector rendered a few attitudinal differences among respondents in our sample (see Table 5, page 46):

- Respondents who had served in the military tended to be more patriotic and very slightly more engaged in their jobs than their counterparts with no military service experience, though job engagement scores were very high across the board.

- Of those contractors with military background, respondents who had served in a combat arms branch displayed significantly higher warriorism and SDO and were slightly more patriotic.

- Respondents whose job required them to "engage in actual fighting, security detail or security protection" tended to show a slightly higher level of job engagement, although job engagement was very high for the sample as a whole.

- Respondents with less than five years of work experience in the private security sector showed higher levels of masculinity and patriotism than their counterparts with more than five years experience.

3.7.   Mutual Adherence to Values

To assess respondents' mutual adherence to warriorism, patriotism, social dominance orientation and masculinity, the sample was split into two groups of equal size for each value scale. Respondents were designated "high" or "low" scorers depending on whether their individual mean scale score fell above or below the overall sample median for the respective scale (see Table 6, pages 47-57, for detailed results). Given self-selection of our sample, none of the results reported in this section can be used to make inferences beyond the population of CivPol security contractors. Thus, respondents labeled low scorers on patriotism or high scorers on masculinity might still be significantly more patriotic or less masculine than other security contractors, military professionals or the US population at large. Consequently, any reference to respondents as low scorers on a particular value scale carries weight only for comparisons with respondents who scored high on that scale.

For the purpose of the present analysis, we compared high and low scorers on warriorism, patriotism, social dominance orientation and masculinity in terms of the strength of their adherence to other values and their attitudes as reflected in their responses to individual survey statements. Table 7, pages 58-63, presents the findings of this analysis:

- **Warriorism.** Overall, high scorers on warriorism tended to be significantly more patriotic and socially dominant than low scorers. While nearly nine-in-ten high scorers felt that citizens' primary allegiance was to their country (88%) and that they should be willing to fight for their country (89%), significantly fewer low scorers agreed with these statements (73% in either case). While one-third of high scorers (32%) agreed that military service was the strongest indicator of good citizenship (and 44% disagreed), almost two-thirds of low scorers (62%) disagreed (and 25% agreed). Although the results indicate that high scorers on warriorism also tend to score higher on social dominance, overall SDO levels for either group are so low that this difference, though statistically significant, is not significant substantially.

- **Patriotism**. Respondents who scored high on patriotism were significantly more warrioristic and scored higher on the masculinity scale than their low scoring counterparts. Especially in terms of believing in the inevitability of war and the subsequent need to prepare for and fight wars in the national interest, high scorers showed significantly more warrioristic attitudes than low scorers (although sizeable majorities in both groups agreed with the statements). While eight-in-ten high scorers (80%) agreed that "a man should always try to project an air of confidence," fewer than two-thirds (63%) of low scorers agreed. Similarly, while almost half of high scorers thought that men should not show pain (45%) and that "a real man enjoys a bit of danger now and then" (41%), significantly fewer low scorers shared those beliefs (22% and 18% respectively).

- **Social Dominance Orientation**. Respondents who scored high on social dominance orientation—although their scores were still fairly low—tended to be significantly more warrioristic and patriotic than their low-scoring counterparts. They also scored higher on Machiavellianism, indicating a higher degree of self-interest, and masculinity, but were significantly less concerned with ethical conduct as part of their job performance. Overall, these results confirm what we would expect from the value-orientations of individuals with high levels of social dominance. Since respondents, irrespective of SDO score, still scored well above average on warriorism, patriotism, job engagement and ethical conduct and below average on Machiavellianism, social dominance orientation does not seem to affect adherence to other values substantively.

Comparing respondents in terms of their scores on the masculinity scale shows high SDO scorers to score above average and low scorers to score below average. While only one-quarter of high scorers disagreed that "a real man enjoys a bit of danger now and then" (25%) and that men should not show pain (26%), half of low scorers disagreed (52% and 49%). Similarly, fewer than one-in-five (19%) of high scorers disagreed that a man should "look somewhat tough," more than half (53%) of low scorers disagreed. On the other hand, while almost two-thirds of low scorers (63%) believed that a man should "have the respect and admiration of everyone who knows him," fewer than half of high scorers (48%) shared this view. These results seem consistent with the higher Machiavellianism scores of high SDO scorers, indicating that they are more self-interested and focused on their own individual well-being and less concerned with external approval.

- **Masculinity**. While there are no significant differences between low and high scorers in their levels of warriorism, highly masculine respondents scored significantly higher on the patriotism, Machiavellianism and SDO scales, indicating a more negative view of human nature, stronger levels of self-interest, less trust in others and less support of the equal treatment of groups.

3.8.   The Social Identity of Contractors

Instead of presenting respondents with a forced-choice list of possible in-groups and out-groups, the social identity of respondents in our sample was assessed by analyzing group affiliations that are meaningful both cognitively and emotionally to them. While minimal group experiments and most standard survey approaches induce pre-arranged, yet normatively inconsequential in-group categorizations, we examine social identity within the operational experience of private security contractors, thereby extending social identity theory to a new genuine field setting.

To assess the social identity of contractors, the Security Contractor Survey present-ed respondents with this statement: "As individuals in society we all belong to a vari-ety of groups, e.g., social (club, family, friendship), religious, ethnic, academic, oc-cupational, geographic, ideological, etc." Next, respondents were asked to identify "in order of priority up to five groups that you very strongly identify with, whose be-liefs and values you share and that affect how you see yourself as a person." Re-spondents were then provided with space to list up to five groups in order of im-portance to their self-conception. Each respondent's list of groups was recorded ver-batim, and classification codes for social reference groups were converted to group entries belonging to the same category.[33] Two judges independently reviewed the entries and assigned a numeric code to each of the groups listed following instruc-tions in the codebook.[34]

3.8.1. Most important in-groups:

Asked about their primary reference group—that is the in-group listed as most im-portant—half the respondents in our sample listed either a religious (primarily Chris-tian) group (24.8%) or their family (22.8%). For ten percent of respondents, either the police (10.4%) or the military (9.9%) were the most important reference groups, followed by law enforcement (7.9%) and the United States (6.9%).

3.8.2. Potent Identity Images

To account for contextual variations in the way that multiple identities interact and shape value orientations, respondents were not only compared in terms of their most important in-group, but also in terms of whether or not they viewed any military, reli-gious, occupational, etc. groups as important to their self-conceptions. Respondents were assigned to one of two groups: those who listed any social, military, religious, occupational, etc. among their five most important in-groups, irrespective of rank order, were considered to have a potent social, military, etc. identity. Respondents who did not list any of these groups among their most important in-groups were con-sidered to have a less potent (i.e., latent) social, military, occupational, etc. identity.

Next, we compared respondents with potent and latent family, religious, national, military, police, law enforcement, security firm, gun rights/National Rifle Association identifications in terms of the strength of their value-orientations.[35] The potency of respondents' family and religious identities did not show any statistically significant effects on their overall value-orientations, and too few respondents listed a private security firm (N=8) or a gun rights groups (N=21) to conduct meaningful statistical analysis. Exploring the impact of the potency of military, national, and lawpol (com-bining potent law enforcement and police groups) identities on respondents' value-

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33 For instance, specific law enforcement affiliations (e.g., "FBI", "California Highway Patrol", "Texas Crime Prevention Association") were classified as "law enforcement" and subsumed under the overall category of "profession-al/occupational" in-group. Similarly, survey entries of "Army", "Marine Corps" or "American Legion" were coded sepa-rately and also subsumed under the main category "military in-group." Based on respondents in-group entries, similar super-categories were devised for "social" (including "family"), "religious/church," ethnic/racial," "geographic" (includ-ing "US/ American/ country"), "ideological/political," and "social issue group" (including "National Rifle Association").

34 Initial agreement among the judges was high (interrater reliability of .9197). The interrater reliability was computed as (n-d)/n, where n = number of total ratings and d = number of disagreements. Note that consistent disagreements, i.e., coders consistently disagreed on how to classify a particular response, were included only once in the number of dis-agreements. For instance, one judge consistently coded "Fraternal Order of Police" with the code for "Police," while the other judge consistently coded this more generally as "Professional Organization." Discussing coding differences among the judges led to agreement to the same numeric code for each entry, thereby improving interrater reliability to 1.00.

35 Selection of these identifications was based on types of in-groups most often listed in subjects' responses.

orientations rendered a few statistically significant differences displayed in Table 7, pages 58-63.[36]

Military Identity. Not surprisingly, respondents with a potent military identity (referred to hereafter also as "strong identifiers") scored significantly higher on the warriorism scale than their cohort peers with a latent military identity (referred to hereafter also as "weak identifiers"). While more than half (53%) of respondents with a potent military identity did not expect to "engage in actual fighting," almost two-thirds of respondents with a latent identity (62%) did not expect to engage in fighting. While respondents with a potent military identity showed higher job engagement levels, both groups were strongly committed to their jobs. Asked whether "civilian contractors performing in combat or combat support roles should be regarded as military professionals," six-in-ten strong identifiers (58% and 61% respectively), but fewer than half of weak identifiers (48% and 49% respectively) agreed. In addition, significantly more weak identifiers (31%) thought that "the use of civilian contractors in combat roles is compatible with the military ethos" than did strong identifiers (17%). Finally, and somewhat surprising, significantly more weak identifiers felt that their company "provided them with the appropriate training, equipment, and materials necessary to perform their duties" (74% with 15% disagreeing) than did strong identifiers (65% with 32% disagreeing). Similarly, significantly more weak than strong identifiers said they had "received instruction in 'rules of engagement' prior to deployment" (83% versus 73%).

- *National Identity.* Compared in terms of whether or not respondents listed a national (e.g., "US," "American" or "my country") reference group also rendered some statistically significant differences. Strong identifiers were more warrioristic. While only two-thirds of weak identifiers (67%) thought war was inherent in human nature, almost nine-in-ten strong identifiers (88%) believed in the inevitability of war. Similarly, fewer weak identifiers expected to engage in fighting than did strong identifiers. Other notable significant differences included respondents' view on contractor roles and legal status. More than half of strong identifiers (51%) but fewer than one-third of weak identifiers (31%) felt that a man should not show pain very much. While nearly half of strong identifiers (42%) agreed that "there are no functions performed by military personnel that, in principle, cannot be performed by a civilian contractor," fewer than one-quarter of weak identifiers (23%) shared this view. Asked whether "civilian contractors employed by the enemy in a combat zone should be regarded as unlawful combatants," about one-quarter (28%) of strong identifiers agreed (and 58% disagreed), while four-in-ten (43%) of weak identifiers agreed (and 38% disagreed). No significant differences were found in terms of respondents' patriotism, Machiavellianism or ethical conduct scores or in terms of their preparation for contractor service.

- *LawPol Identity.* Although comparing respondents in terms of the potency of their identity as police or law enforcement professionals rendered no significant scale score differences, a number of individual statements showed significant differences between weak and strong identifiers. Significantly more strong than weak identifiers believed that "all citizens should be willing to fight for their country" (88% versus 75%) and that "one should take action only when it is morally right" (59% versus 34%).

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36 Means difference tests of scale and statement mean scores were conducted as t-tests using SAS software; differences in terms of levels of agreement with individual statements were conducted as χ2-tests using SAS software.

At the same time, significantly more strong identifiers felt that civilian contractors performing combat or combat support roles should be regarded as military professionals (55% for both statements) than did weak identifiers (49% and 46% respectively). Finally, while almost two-thirds of weak identifiers (63%) agreed that "the use of civilian contractors in combat roles is compatible with the military ethos," only half of strong identifiers (50%) agreed.

Discussion and Conclusion

Initially, we set out in this pilot study to explore the identity, values and attitudes of private security contractors to improve our understanding of the self-conceptions and motivations of individuals who sign on with private security firms and to shed light on the question of whether there is an emerging professional identity among private security contractors. Much of the media reporting and the academic research that has accompanied the rapid rise of the private security industry has portrayed contractors as money-grabbing, gun-toting, thrill-seeking Rambo-type mercenaries with little to no moral inhibitions or concern for ethical conduct. Although much of this portrayal has been based on anecdotal evidence collected through interviews and observation (see Scahill, 2007; Pelton, 2006) or gathered from reports of shooting incidents or human rights violations (see US House of Representatives, 2007; Human Rights First, 2008)[37] to date there has been no systematic analysis of contractor values and attitudes nor has there been any methodological attempt to understand the motivations of contractors in general.

Our findings, based on a small sample of security contractors with law enforcement background who have completed at least one deployment with a security firm, reveal a more differentiated picture of the self-conception and attitudes of individuals who are drawn to working in the private security industry. Overall, respondents in our sample seemed to share a similar professional outlook, showing only very few significant attitudinal differences. This suggests that our respondents are part of a fairly homogeneous cohort of security contractors. From the data at hand it is impossible to determine the extent to which the members of the CivPol Alumni Association are representative of contractors with different personal or professional backgrounds or of the industry as a whole. Consequently, we are unable to generalize our findings beyond the population of US-American contractors with professional backgrounds in law enforcement. Future research should broaden the scope of the analysis by targeting subjects with different demographic, professional, national, and cultural backgrounds to assess the generalizability of the results presented here. On the basis of such research it would then become possible to develop a typology of professional identities prevalent in the security industry, reflecting the continuum from 'low' to 'high' degrees of informal regulation. .

Despite the homogeneous nature of our relatively small sample, we can still draw some interesting preliminary conclusions about the self-image of a distinct subset of private security contractors. Contrary to expectations raised by recent media reporting, only one-quarter of respondents in our sample stated that they were highly motivated to seek employment in the private security field by prospects of monetary gain. Moreover, only one-in-five cited "seeking adventure and excitement" as a prime motivator for their professional choice. Instead, respondents overwhelmingly mentioned the opportunity to face and meet new challenges and to help others as most important motivators. This finding is consistent with earlier findings that many contractors wished to be "proud" of what they did, to do "something worthwhile", to help other people (Pelton, 2006, p. 179).

While very much concerned about others—as is also reflected in their low Machiavellianism scores—almost all respondents viewed their work as security contractors as a "calling" to serve their country. Given this sentiment and the relatively large propor-

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37   See Taguba report at <http://www.agonist.org/annex/taguba.htm>, accessed 06 August 2009.

tion of respondents in our sample with military background and combat experience, it is not surprising that respondents overall scored high on the patriotism and warrior-ism scales. In this respect, their scores were comparable to the scores of military professionals captured in earlier research (see Franke, 1999; Franke and Heinecken, 2001; Franke and Guttieri, 2007).

From the data at hand, it would appear that a large number of security contractors in our sample think of their current occupation as a logical continuation of their previous military careers. This confirms earlier findings summarized best by the quote of an ex-Navy Seal: "It's what you do. Say you spend twenty years doing things like riding high-speed boats and jumping out of airplanes. Now, all of a sudden, you're selling insurance. It's tough" (Scahill, 2007, p. 67).

Individuals in our sample not only viewed their job as a calling, they also appeared highly committed to professional norms and ethical standards of democratic socie-ties. Respondents' high degree of job engagement in combination with their relatively low Machiavellianism and social dominance orientation scores would suggest that the norms and values guiding formal political and legal control have been internal-ized among respondents in our sample. In other words, in our sample we did not find any respondents representing the profiteering gun-slinger types that have brand-marked much of the industry. Rather, the overwhelming majority of respondents ad-hered to and endorsed the Code of Conduct developed by the IPOA as an ethical standard for its corporate members. Since adherence to these standards is voluntary and enforcement tenuous, the existence of effective informal control mechanism can, of course, by no means replace formal regulation. At least for our sample, however, we might expect informal self-conceptions to strengthen and reinforce adherence to legal prescriptions.

Indeed, in contrast to the impression generated by large parts of the media, the in-dustry as a whole is not opposed to formal regulation. As the president of the IPOA Doug Brooks affirms, "[o]ne of the great misconceptions is that the industry seeks to evade laws, regulations and accountability. In fact, rules and guidelines can make commercial operations far easier, more predictable and simpler. They also serve as a barrier for entry to less professional companies and limit the ability of those firms to tarnish the entire industry" (Brooks, 2006).

Notwithstanding our findings, it is important to note that individuals' self-image, as reflected in their responses to a survey, does not necessarily correspond to their *ac-tual* behavior in the field. Behavior is always context-dependent and high scores on survey statements reflecting high moral standards may not guarantee ethical con-duct. Although a person might claim to respect human rights, in particular circum-stances he (or she) may still shoot at civilians or torture prisoners. Consequently, our findings cannot claim to make any statement with regard to actual behavior of con-tractors deployed to Iraq or any other conflict area. They merely illustrate the openly expressed attitudes, values and self-conceptions of a self-select group of American security contractors with law enforcement backgrounds. The self-image of respond-ents in our sample, however, appears to correspond with the norms and values guid-ing formal political and legal regulation of the industry. Future research should as-sess whether or not adherence to values and norms as measured through survey responses really translates into ethical behavior on the ground.

Annex

List of Tables   **page**

Table 1: Typology of Private Military and Security Services

Proximity to combat	Classification	Types of services	Companies providing these services (examples)	Presence in Iraq, main clients
Immediate	**Armed operational combat support**	Offensive, usually highly specialized force multipliers	Executive Outcomes, Sandline International (both defunct)	No such companies currently operating in Iraq
Close	**Armed security services**	Static security, convoy security, security escorts	Blackwater, Tripe Canopy, Aegis Defence, DynCorp	Approx. 30,000 employees of PSCs currently working in Iraq. Between 10,000 and 13,000 for the US State Department or the US military.
Medium	**Unarmed operational combat support**	Intelligence, operation of weapon systems	AirScan	Operation of UAVs for surveillance purposes (for the US military).
Distant	**military and/or security-related advice and training**	Consultancy, training	MPRI, DynCorp	Training of Iraqi army and police forces.
Very distant	**Military support**	Logistics, supply, construction, translation, maintenance, management	Brown & Root Services, DynCorp	For DoD: 80,000 individual contractors working on base support, 30,000 on construction, 10,000 as translators, 10,000 in transportation

Table 2: Top Ten Security Companies with US-Government Contracts in Iraq (2008)

	Company name	DoD contracts*	DoS contracts*	USAID contracts*
1	Blackwater Worldwide	27.7	1,147.0	31.3
2	Aegis Defence Services Ltd.	798.6	0	0
3	DynCorp International LLC	31.4	659.2	0
4	Triple Canopy, Inc.	106.9	422.2	0.3
5	EOD Technology, Inc.	328.7	0	0
6	Sabre International Security	225.8	0	58.7
7	SOC-SMG	271.9	0	0
8	Agility Logistics	183.0	0	0
9	Unity Resources Group	0	50.0	93.0
10	ArmorGroup	91.6	0	46.1

Source: SIGIR, 2008.

*In US $ million

Table 3: Sample Statement Responses

	% Agree	%Neutral	%Disagree
Warriorism (Mean = 3.46)			
W1. When I decided to sign on with a security firm, I expected to engage in actual fighting.	13.4	26.0	60.5
W2. Sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest.	92.4	4.0	3.6
W3. In today's world, peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central to a military's functions.	39.8	22.2	38.0
W4. The military's primary focus should be preparation for and conduct of combat operations.	77.1	9.9	13.0
W5. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war.	71.8	13.5	14.8
Patriotism (Mean = 3.92)			
P1. I look upon my work as a security contractor as a "calling" where I can serve my country.	96.0	3.6	0.5
P2. We should strive for loyalty to our own country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood.	72.2	11.2	16.6
P3. A citizen should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his or her own country.	83.0	9.0	8.0
P4. All citizens should be willing to fight for their country.	83.4	11.7	4.9
P5. The strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defense of one's country.	29.6	20.2	50.2

	% Agree	%Neutral	%Disagree
P6. The promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education.	80.7	15.2	4.1
Machiavellianism (Mean = 2.36)			
M1. Most people are basically good and kind.	73.1	22.4	4.5
M2. Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they're forced to do so.	16.2	10.8	73.0
M3. One should take action only when it is morally right.	49.6	18.0	32.4
M4. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.	22.4	22.0	55.6
M5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak, and it will come out when they are given a chance.	14.8	15.2	70.0
M6. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.	5.8	10.8	83.4
Job Engagement (Mean = 4.80)			
J1. I am committed to performing well at my job.	100.0	0.0	0.0
J2. I feel personal responsibility for my job performance.	100.0	0.0	0.0
J3. How well I do in my job matters a great deal to me.	100.0	0.0	0.0
J4. I really care about the outcomes that result from my job performance.	100.0	0.0	0.0

	% Agree	%Neutral	%Disagree
J5. I invest a large part of myself into my job performance.	98.7	1.4	0.0
Social Dominance Orientation (Mean = 2.15)			
S1. No group should dominate in society.	82.9	9.0	8.1
S2. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	10.3	10.8	78.9
S3. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.	79.8	9.9	10.3
S4. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	65.8	22.5	11.7
S5. It would be good if groups could be equal.	73.1	17.0	9.9
S6. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	5.4	13.9	80.7
S7. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	6.3	12.1	81.6
S8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	22.4	21.1	56.5
S9. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	14.8	18.8	66.4
Masculinity (Mean = 3.04)			
A1. It's essential for a man to have the respect and admiration of everyone who knows him.	54.5	24.8	20.7

	% Agree	%Neutral	%Disagree
A2. Success in his work has to be a man's central goal in life.	46.6	26.0	27.3
A3. A man should always try to project an air of confidence even when he doesn't really feel confident inside.	72.4	17.2	10.4
A4. I like for a man to look somewhat tough.	14.8	50.7	34.5
A5. A real man enjoys a bit of danger now and then.	30.0	32.3	37.7
A6. It bothers me when a man does something that I consider feminine.	5.8	18.8	75.3
A7. When a man is feeling a little pain he should not let it show very much.	34.1	29.6	36.3
Ethical Conduct (Mean = 4.65)			
E1. When deployed in the field, it is important to respect the dignity of all human beings and strictly adhere to all relevant international laws and protocols on human rights.	96.4	2.7	0.9
E2. Security personnel in the field should always take every practicable measure to minimize loss of life and destruction of property.	99.5	0.5	0.0
E3. Integrity, honesty and fairness are key guiding principles for anyone deployed in a contingency operation.	99.1	0.5	0.5
E4. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law should always be fully investigated and, when necessary, prosecuted.	93.3	4.0	2.7
E5. Organizations should always take firm and definitive action if their employees engage in unlawful activities.	98.7	0.9	0.5

	% Agree	%Neutral	%Disagree
C1. There are no functions performed by military personnel that, in principle, cannot be performed by a civilian contractor.	27.4	6.7	65.9
Civilian Contractor Roles			
C2. There are certain functions performed by military personnel that should never be performed by a civilian contractor.	78.0	8.1	13.9
C3. Civilian contractors performing in combat support roles should be regarded as military professionals.	51.1	21.1	27.8
C4. Civilian contractors deployed abroad should be protected by the same international treaties as the armed forces.	89.7	5.8	4.5
C5. Civilian contractors do their jobs more effectively than uniformed personnel could.	20.2	30.5	49.3
C6. Civilian contractors performing in combat roles should be regarded as military professionals.	51.4	22.5	26.1
C7. Civilian contractors employed by the enemy in a combat zone should be regarded as unlawful combatants.	39.2	18.9	41.9
C8. The use of civilian contractors in combat roles is compatible with military ethos.	45.9	27.5	26.6
Preparation for Service as Contractor			
B1. Before every deployment, I have always been fully informed about the level of risk associated with my deployment.	79.8	5.8	14.4
B2. I feel that I was properly trained and supervised and provided with the necessary instruction about applicable laws and regional sensitivities of the area of operation.	70.0	8.0	22.0

	% Agree	%Neutral	%Disagree
B3. I feel that my company has provided me with the appropriate training, equipment, and materials necessary to perform my duties.	70.4	9.0	20.6
B4. I have received instruction in "rules of engagement" prior to my deployment.	78.9	8.5	12.6
B5. My company makes a concerted effort to support international organizations, humanitarian and non-governmental organizations and other entities working to minimize human suffering and support reconstructive and reconciliatory goals of peace operations.	70.3	24.3	5.4
B6. My company places the highest emphasis on accounting for and controlling all weapons and ammunition utilized during an operation.	78.9	12.1	9.0
B7. My company will utilize only appropriate weapons commonly used in military, security, or law enforcement operations.	88.8	7.2	4.0

Table 4: Motivators for Seeking Employment in the Security Sector (in percent)

Motivators	Very important	Important	Less/not important
To face and meet new challenges	74.9	20.8	4.3
To help others	64.6	24.1	11.3
To feel like my work makes a difference	38.0	37.1	24.9
To serve my country	31.3	34.1	34.6
To make more money than in my previous job	25.2	44.1	30.6
For personal growth	22.0	33.9	44.0
To seek adventure and excitement	19.1	35.4	45.5
To improve my chances of finding a better job	13.1	36.7	50.2
To travel and visit new places	11.3	32.1	56.6

Table 5: Mean Scale Scores by Operational Experience/Demographic Background
(std. dev. in parentheses)

		Warriorism	Patriotism	Machiavellianism	Job Engagement	Social Dominance	Masculinity	Ethical Conduct
Military Background	Yes (N=136)	3.45 (0.58)	3.99 (0.56)*	2.34 (0.46)	4.82 (0.26)+	2.15 (0.49)	3.05 (0.55)	4.66 (0.47)
	No (N=85)	3.48 (0.50)	3.82 (0.57)	2.38 (0.49)	4.76 (0.28)	2.16 (0.56)	3.02 (0.46)	4.64 (0.42)
Combat	Yes (N=55)	3.60 (0.61)*	4.09 (0.50)+	2.41 (0.50)	4.84 (0.22)	2.26 (0.51)*	3.08 (0.56)	4.68 (0.46)
Combat support	No (N=75)	3.36 (0.55)	3.92 (0.61)	2.30 (0.43)	4.81 (0.28)	2.09 (0.46)	3.04 (0.54)	4.63 (0.49)
Fighting/	Yes (N=69)	3.66 (0.49)	3.97 (0.48)	2.38 (0.48)	4.83 (0.25)*	2.15 (0.51)	3.05 (0.48)	4.68 (0.43)
Security detail	No (N=154)	3.37 (0.55)	3.90 (0.60)	2.35 (0.47)	4.78 (0.27)	2.15 (0.52)	3.03 (0.27)	4.64 (0.46)
PSI experience	*Less than 5 years* (N=142)	3.50 (0.55)	3.98 (0.57)+	2.35 (0.48)	4.80 (0.26)	2.14 (0.50)	3.11 (0.52)*	4.68 (0.46)
	5 years or more (N=65)	3.39 (0.48)	3.84 (0.54)	2.40 (0.47)	4.80 (0.28)	2.17 (0.57)	2.92 (0.52)	4.61 (0.42)

*** indicates significant means difference at *p*<0.001.

** indicates significant means difference at *p*<0.01.

* indicates significant means difference at *p*<0.05.

+ indicates significant means difference at *p*<0.1.

Table 6: Responses by Adherence to Values

Scale Items:	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree
Warriorism:	**3.76**		**2.86*****		**4.04**		**3.68*****	
Expectation to fight	2.68	19/46	1.87****	3/89	2.54	16/50	2.25*	10/72
Necessity of war	4.46	98/1	3.91***	81/9	4.50	95/4	4.15***	90/3
Centrality of peacekeeping (R)	3.25	29/50	2.32***	6/15	2.89	43/36	2.99	36/41
Focus on combat	4.26	90/3	3.19***	52/33	4.16	85/8	3.60***	69/19
Human nature	4.20	89/5	3.26***	39/35	3.89	77/12	3.55**	66/18
Patriotism:	**4.01**		**3.86*****		**3.76**		**3.81**	
Contracting as a "calling"	4.61	95/1	4.57	99/0	4.76	97/0	4.42***	94/1
Allegiance to country	4.27	88/5	3.83***	73/13	4.61	97/2	3.58***	67/15
Loyalty to country	4.00	78/12	3.47***	60/25	4.36	91/2	3.23***	51/33

| Scale Items: | Warriorism | | | | Patriotism | | | |
| | High Scorers (N=148) | | Low Scorers (N=75) | | High Scorers (N=117) | | Low Scorers (N=106) | |
	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree
Fighting for country	4.30	89/3	3.89**	73/8	4.62	97/0	3.65***	69/10
Military service	2.91	32/44	2.51*	25/63	3.32	50/32	2.24***	6/71
Promotion of patriotism	4.16	85/2	3.75***	72/8	4.45	97/0	3.55***	62/8
Machiavellianism	2.38		2.31		2.35		2.36	
People good and kind (R)	2.20	72/5	2.20	75/4	2.16	74/4	2.24	72/4
People won't work	2.32	19/72	2.21	11/75	2.28	17/73	2.29	15/73
Moral actions (R)	2.69	50/31	2.74	49/35	2.60	53/30	2.79	45/35
Trust in others	2.62	23/5	2.64	21/55	2.59	22/56	2.67	22/55
Vicious streak	2.39	16/66	2.23	12/77	2.42	21/67	2.25**	8/74
Cutting corners	2.07	7/80	1.84*	4/91	2.05	7/79	1.93	5/88

Scale Items:	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree
Job Engagement:	**4.82**		**4.75+**		**4.85**		**4.74****	
Performing well	4.96	100/0	4.93	100/0	4.96	100/0	4.94	100/0
Responsible for performance	4.91	100/0	4.87	100/0	4.94	100/0	4.84*	100/0
Doing well in job	4.91	100/0	4.89	100/0	4.92	100/0	4.88	100/0
Job outcomes	4.77	100/0	4.55*	100/0	4.72	100/0	4.58*	100/0
Self-investment	4.63	99/0	4.50+	99/0	4.69	99/0	4.47**	98/0
Social Dominance Orientation:	**2.22**		**2.02****		**2.20**		**2.09+**	
No group dominate (R)	1.83	82/7	1.87	85/9	1.72	85/9	1.98*	80/8
Some groups inferior	2.04	12/78	1.77+	7/81	2.13	13/74	1.75**	8/85
Treat people equally (R)	2.09	79/11	2.03	81/8	1.98	85/9	2.17*	75/12

	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		**Low Scorers** (N=75)		**High Scorers** (N=117)		**Low Scorers** (N=106)	
Scale Items:	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*
Equalize conditions (R)	2.44	62/13	2.21+	73/9	2.28	69/9	2.45	62/15
Equality of groups (R)	2.26	74/9	2.21	72/11	2.23	74/9	2.25	73/10
Groups stay in place	2.13	7/76	1.87**	3/89	2.19	8/73	1.89**	3/90
Step on groups	2.08	7/79	1.85*	5/87	1.86	6/83	1.85	7/80
Keep groups in place	2.68	26/51	2.27**	15/68	2.84	30/43	2.21***	14/72
Groups on top	2.26	18/63	2.08*	9/73	2.48	21/60	2.10**	8/74
Masculinity:	**3.08**		**2.96**		**3.18**		**2.88*****	
Respect and admiration	3.45	50/22	3.59	63/19	3.65	61/19	3.33*	47/23
Success in work	3.18	43/33	3.48*	53/16	3.34	53/29	3.22	40/25
Air of confidence	3.77	73/10	3.61	70/11	3.85	80/9	3.56**	63/12

	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
Scale Items:	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree
Enjoy danger	3.07	36/32	2.64**	19/48	3.14	41/31	2.69***	18/45
Bothered feminine	2.18	6/74	2.13	5/79	2.24	9/68	2.08*	3/83
Look tough	2.87	18/28	2.53**	8/47	2.96	23/26	2.54***	6/44
Don't show pain	3.02	39/33	2.79+	25/43	3.11	45/30	2.75**	22/43
Ethical Conduct:	4.63		4.70		4.70		4.60	
Respect human rights	4.55	96/1	4.62	97/1	4.62	95/1	4.52	98/1
Minimize loss of life	4.70	99/0	4.75	100/0	4.76	99/0	4.66	100/0
Integrity and honesty	4.76	99/1	4.72	100/0	4.83	100/0	4.66*	98/0
Investigate law violations	4.46	91/4	4.67*	97/0	4.55	93/4	4.51	93/1
Action against unlawful activities	4.66	98/1	4.76	100/0	4.74	98/1	4.65	99/0

Scale Items:	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
	Mean	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*
Warriorism:	**3.60**		3.30***		3.49		3.40	
Expectation to fight	2.50	16/56	2.29+	11/66	2.48	16/56	2.28	9/68
Necessity of war	4.43	96/2	4.21*	88/6	4.35	93/3	4.31	91/5
Centrality of peacekeeping (R)	2.99	38/39	2.87	42/37	2.85	41/36	3.07	37/41
Focus on combat	4.05	81/9	3.71*	72/18	3.88	79/13	3.92	75/13
Human nature	4.02	83/5	3.38***	58/27	3.93	78/9	3.41***	63/24
Patriotism:	**4.01**		3.82*		**4.03**		**3.76*****	
Contracting as a "calling"	4.53	93/1	4.68*	99/0	4.61	97/1	4.57	94/0
Allegiance to country	4.16	83/8	4.08	83/8	4.24	87/6	3.93*	76/11
Loyalty to country	4.07	82/9	3.51***	60/26	4.01	81/10	3.53**	59/26

Scale Items:	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree
Fighting for country	4.29	90/3	4.01*	75/7	4.27	87/4	4.00*	78/7
Military service	2.90	31/45	2.68	28/56	2.95	33/44	2.58*	25/60
Promotion of patriotism	4.09	81/3	3.94	80/5	4.09	84/2	3.92	76/7
Machiavellianism	**2.50**		**2.18***		**2.44**		**2.23****	
People good and kind (R)	2.29	68/6	2.09*	79/3	2.18	73/4	2.23	73/5
People won't work	2.37	17/69	2.18	15/77	2.45	23/67	2.02**	6/83
Moral actions (R)	2.75	45/33	2.63	55/32	2.56	55/28	2.90*	41/40
Trust in others	2.80	26/47	2.43**	18/66	2.82	29/47	2.33***	13/69
Vicious streak	2.61	21/58	2.00***	7/84	2.53	21/61	2.05***	6/83
Cutting corners	2.20	7/75	1.75***	4/93	2.07	8/79	1.88*	3/90

Scale Items:	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree
Job Engagement:	**4.76**		**4.84***		**4.80**		**4.79**	
Performing well	4.93	100/0	4.97	100/0	4.94	100/0	4.97	100/0
Responsible for performance	4.88	100/0	4.91	100/0	4.91	100/	4.86	100/0
Doing well in job	4.88	100/0	4.93	100/0	4.90	100/0	4.91	100/0
Job outcomes	4.58	100/0	4.73*	100/0	4.64	100/0	4.66	100/0
Self-investment	4.54	98/0	4.64	100/0	4.61	99/0	4.55	98/0
Social Dominance Orientation:	**2.51**		**1.71****		**2.24**		**2.02****	
No group dominate (R)	2.14	71/14	1.48***	97/1	1.87	82/10	1.80	85/5
Some groups inferior	2.29	16/68	1.54***	4/92	2.10	13/73	1.73**	7/88
Treat people equally (R)	2.34	69/18	1.74***	93/1	2.03	82/10	2.14	76/10

Scale Items:	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree
Equalize conditions (R)	2.74	46/20	1.91***	89/2	2.35	63/10	2.38	69/13
Equality of groups (R)	2.53	59/16	1.89***	90/2	2.24	75/10	2.25	70/9
Groups stay in place	2.40	10/66	1.61***	0/99	2.23	9/72	1.76***	0/94
Step on groups	2.32	11/70	1.62***	1/96	2.13	7/76	1.82**	5/90
Keep groups in place	3.09	36/33	1.87***	6/85	2.67	24/50	2.34*	19/66
Groups on top	2.78	25/46	1.72***	2/91	2.52	21/56	1.97***	6/82
Masculinity:	**3.15**		**2.90***		**3.37**		**2.53***	
Respect and admiration	3.38	48/24	3.64+	63/17	3.87	71/8	2.93***	30/40
Success in work	3.20	45/30	3.38	49/25	3.66	64/13	2.70***	19/49
Air of confidence	3.80	77/8	3.61+	67/13	4.01	89/2	3.25***	47/23

Scale Items:	Warriorism				Patriotism			
	High Scorers (N=148)		Low Scorers (N=75)		High Scorers (N=117)		Low Scorers (N=106)	
	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree
Enjoy danger	3.17	38/25	2.62***	21/52	3.33	47/20	2.30***	5/65
Bothered feminine	2.39	9/66	1.91***	2/87	2.42	10/62	1.76***	0/95
Look tough	3.01	19/19	2.45***	10/53	3.01	23/21	2.38***	2/55
Don't show pain	3.14	39/26	2.70***	29/49	3.27	21/56	2.43***	6/82
Ethical Conduct:	**4.54**		**4.78***		**4.63**		**4.69**	
Respect human rights	4.48	94/1	4.69*	99/1	4.57	96/0	4.58	97/2
Minimize loss of life	4.63	100/0	4.81**	99/0	4.67	99/0	4.77	100/0
Integrity and honesty	4.67	98/1	4.84**	100/0	4.72	99/1	4.79	100/0
Investigate law violations	4.37	90/5	4.72***	97/0	4.53	93/3	4.53	93/2
Action against unlawful activities	4.57	98/1	4.85***	100/0	4.66	98/1	4.75	100/0

Scale items were measured at a 5-point numerical Likert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" were combined as "% Agree;" responses of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" were combined as "% Disagree." Responses to individual items were scored so that a high mean indicates a high level of agreement with the statement. For computation of overall scale scores, (R)-items were reversed.

*** indicates a significant difference ($p < 0.001$) from the High Score mean.

** indicates a significant difference ($p < 0.01$) from the High Score mean.

* indicates a significant difference ($p < 0.05$) from the High Score mean.

+ indicates a significant difference ($p < 0.1$) from the High Score mean.

Table 7: Value-Orientations by Social Identity

Scale Items:	Military Identity				National Identity				LawPol Identity			
	Potent (N=66)		Latent (N=128)		Potent (N=43)		Latent (N=151)		Potent (N=123)		Latent (N=71)	
	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree
Warriorism:	**3.57**		**3.41***		**3.59**		**3.43+**		**3.48**		**3.44**	
When I decided to sign on with a security firm, I expected to engage in actual fighting.	2.55	14/53	2.38	13/62	2.67	21/44	2.37+	11/63+	2.36	9/63	2.58	21/51*
Sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest.	4.44	95/5	4.28	90/3+	4.33	95/2	4.34	91/4	4.38	94/3	4.25	89/4
Human nature being what it is, there will always be war.	3.76	73/15	3.70	71/15	4.09	88/7	3.61***	67/17*	3.65	69/16	3.83	76/13
Patriotism:	**4.01**		**3.91**		**3.94**		**3.94**		**3.97**		**3.89**	
All citizens should be willing to fight for their country.	4.27	89/3	4.12	80/7	4.14	79/7	4.18	84/5	4.25	88/4	4.03+	75/8+

Scale Items:	Military Identity				National Identity				LawPol Identity			
	Potent (N=66)		Latent (N=128)		Potent (N=43)		Latent (N=151)		Potent (N=123)		Latent (N=71)	
	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree	Mean	%Agree/ %Disagree
The promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education.	4.12	89/5	4.02	78/3*	4.02	79/5	4.07	83/3	4.05	83/2	4.07	80/6
Machiavellianism	**2.37**		**2.34**		**2.33**		**2.35**		**2.31**		**2.40**	
Most people are basically good and kind.	2.21	73/5	2.17	74/5	2.16	79/7	2.19	72/5	2.22	71/3	2.13	79/8*
One should take action only when it is morally right.	2.56	52/27	2.74	50/35	2.62	52/31	2.70	50/33	2.47	59/25	3.04***	34/46**
Social Dominance Orientation	**2.16**		**2.14**		**2.12**		**2.16**		**2.13**		**2.17**	
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	2.02	8/76	1.90	12/81+	1.98	7/79	1.93	11/79	1.93	11/79	1.94	10/80

Scale Items:	Military Identity				National Identity				LawPol Identity			
	Potent (N=66)		Latent (N=128)		Potent (N=43)		Latent (N=151)		Potent (N=123)		Latent (N=71)	
	Mean	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	2.15	5/76	2.01	6/80	1.93	7/91	2.09*	5/75*	2.07	6/78	2.03	6/80
Job Engagement:	**4.85**		**4.78***		**4.85**		**4.79**		**4.83**		**4.75+**	
I invest a large part of myself into my job performance.	4.71	100/0	4.55*	98/0	4.74	100/0	4.57*	98/0	4.67	100/0	4.49*	96/0*
Masculinity	**3.03**		**3.05**		**3.11**		**3.03**		**3.05**		**3.03**	
When a man is feeling a little pain he should not let it show very much.	3.08	44/33	2.88	31/38	3.28	51/23	2.85**	31/40	2.89	34/39	3.04	38/32
Ethical Conduct	**4.70**		**4.66**		**4.68**		**4.68**		**4.67**		**4.68**	
Civilian Contractor Roles												

Scale Items:	Military Identity				National Identity				LawPol Identity			
	Potent (N=66)		Latent (N=128)		Potent (N=43)		Latent (N=151)		Potent (N=123)		Latent (N=71)	
	Mean	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*
There are no functions performed by military personnel that, in principle, cannot be performed by a civilian contractor.	3.41	32/61	3.63	24/70	3.26	42/56	3.64*	23/70*	3.59	26/67	3.51	28/66
Civilian contractors performing in combat support roles should be regarded as military professionals.	2.39	61/20	2.77*	49/30	2.56	51/21	2.66	54/28	2.52	55/21	2.85*	49/37*
Civilian contractors performing in combat roles should be regarded as military professionals.	2.43	58/23	2.70+	48/27	2.53	53/19	2.63	51/28	2.48	55/20	2.85*	46/37*

| Scale Items: | Military Identity | | | | National Identity | | | | LawPol Identity | | | |
| | Potent (N=66) | | Latent (N=128) | | Potent (N=43) | | Latent (N=151) | | Potent (N=123) | | Latent (N=71) | |
	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree	Mean	%Agree/%Disagree
Civilian contractors employed by the enemy in a combat zone should be regarded as unlawful combatants.	3.06	34/45	2.83	43/41	3.16	28/58	2.83+	43/38+	2.89	39/39	2.94	42/49*
The use of civilian contractors in combat roles is compatible with military ethos.	2.47	56/17	2.69	55/31*	2.42	65/23	2.67	52/27	2.63	50/26	2.58	63/27*
Preparation for Service as Contractor												
I feel that my company has provided me with the appropriate training, equipment, and materials necessary to perform my duties.	2.58	65/32	2.13**	74/15**	2.21	77/14	2.30	70/23	2.29	72/20	2.27	70/21

Scale Items:	Military Identity				National Identity				LawPol Identity			
	Potent (N=66)		Latent (N=128)		Potent (N=43)		Latent (N=151)		Potent (N=123)		Latent (N=71)	
	Mean	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*	*Mean*	*%Agree/ %Disagree*
I have received instruction in "rules of engagement" prior to my deployment.	2.24	73/20	1.96+	83/9+	2.00	84/9	2.07	78/13	2.03	80/11	2.10	79/14

Scale items were measured at a 5-point numerical Likert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" were combined as "% Agree;" responses of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" were combined as "% Disagree." Responses to individual items were scored so that a high mean indicates a high level of agreement with the statement.

*** indicates significant means difference at p<0.001.

** indicates significant means difference at p<0.01.

* indicates significant means difference at p<0.05.

+ indicates significant means difference at p<0.1.

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- Andreas Mehler/Daniel Lambach/Judy Smith-Höhn: Legitimate Oligopolies of Violence in Post-conflict Societies with particular Focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone. Osnabrück 2010 (Heft 23).

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