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

THE ISIS PRESS
ISTANBUL

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Published by
The Isis Press
Şemsibey Sokak 10
Beylerbeyi, 81210 Istanbul
Tel.: (0216) 321 38 51
Fax.: (0216) 321 86 66
e-mail: isis@turk.net
www.theisispress.com

first published in 2003

ISBN: 975-428-238-2

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SAİD HALİM PASHA:

OTTOMAN STATESMAN AND ISLAMIST THINKER

(1865-1921)

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Ahmet Şeyhun was born in 1958 in Istanbul. He received a law degree from the University of Istanbul in 1986. After practising law in the same city, he obtained a Master's degree in History at the Boğaziçi University. He earned his Ph.d. in Islamic Studies at McGill University in 2002.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is based on a Ph.D. thesis submitted at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.

First of all, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Üner Turgay, my thesis supervisor, for his guidance, comments and criticisms. In every stage of my dissertation his concern with the improvement of my work had been consistent and his suggestions constructive. This work could not have been completed without the valuable contribution of Rukiye and Sinan Kuneralp who kindly provided me the writings of Said Halim Pasha in the form of manuscripts and typescripts from the family archives. I would like to thank Princess Zeyneb Halim who has kindly granted me an interview and provided me with some valuable information on her uncle Said Halim Pasha. Thanks are also due to Princess Nimet Halim Celâloğlu who kindly allowed the use of family photographs. I also thank Ibrahim Zaky who helped me with my Arabic transliteration. I would also like to express my eternal gratitude to my family: without the undying support of my parents Sevin and Kemal Şeyhun and my sister Yeşim Çorluhan, I would not have reached this stage. Finally, this work would have never seen the light of day without the loving support of Brenda.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

In my dissertation, I used modern Turkish spelling for all Ottoman and modern Turkish terms, names and book titles. For Arabic terms of non-Ottoman context, I followed the system of Arabic transliteration accepted by the Institute of Islamic Studies. For Ottoman cities in the Balkans and Anatolia I preferred using the Turkish names like İzmir, Edirne, Selanik, Üsküb, İşkodra. For Ottoman cities in the Arab Middle East I preferred using the established English names like Cairo, Tripoli, Damascus and Mecca.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to present a critical account of the political life and thought of Prince Said Halim Pasha (1865-1921) against the political and intellectual background of his times.

So why study a figure such as Said Halim Pasha? The answer lies in his important and unique standing among Muslim intellectuals in his field. The originality of Said Halim Pasha's thought can be found in its skillful combination of revivalist and modernist ideas. At the core of his ideology is the revivalist principle of islamization, which in turn was inspired by the tenets of medieval Muslim thinker Ibn Taymiyya.

A junior member of the Egyptian khedivial family, Said Halim was raised in his father's mansion in Yeniköy on the Bosphorus and sent to Europe for advanced studies. Upon his return to Istanbul he secretly became a member of the Young Turk Movement. Nevertheless, although the Young Turks opposed the policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), the young prince served as a high-ranking official in the Hamidian regime and received gratifications and honors from the sultan. When Abdülhamid's secret police finally discovered his links with the Young Turk opposition, Said Halim had again to face exile: he was first sent to Egypt and from there he went on to Europe.

While in Europe he took part in the Young Turk opposition to Hamidian rule. After the proclamation of the Constitution in July 1908, Said Halim returned to Istanbul and was given the important positions of senator and President of the State Council. In January 1913 he became the minister of foreign affairs in Mahmud Şevket Pasha's cabinet and was appointed shortly afterwards as grand vizir in June 1913 following the latter's assassination.

Said Halim Pasha's appointment was of special significance because it was for the first time since the 1908 Revolution that a Unionist had attained the grand vizirate and headed a cabinet formed of largely of Unionist members. Prior to this and following the fall of the Hamidian regime, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) had for the most part dominated Ottoman politics. But rather than involve itself directly in the cabinet, it had chosen to exert power through its parliamentary majority. The reasons for the Unionists'

hesitation to participate in cabinet included their political inexperience and humble social origins. In a society where only experienced and cultivated bureaucrats were considered politically trustworthy, CUP members who lacked these qualities were essentially barred from the executive branch of government. This allowed figures like Said Pasha and Kamil Pasha, who were at the service of the autocratic sultan and closely associated with the ancien régime, to maintain their authority by playing pivotal political roles.

The appointment of Said Halim to the grand vizirate constituted a break with this tradition: the new grand vizir was not an old, well-settled, well connected and experienced statesman coming from the *Bab-ı Ali* tradition, nor was he a high ranking military figure like his predecessor, Mahmud Şevket Pasha. Rather, he was a high-born, princely intellectual and idealist who was completely committed to the cause of the Young Turks. He was also a skillful diplomat who took a strong stand against the Great Powers' plans of partitioning the Ottoman Empire.

A respected statesman and an able diplomat, Said Halim was first and foremost an influential thinker, one of the most outspoken representatives of the Islamist school during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920). His stance within the Islamist school could be qualified as modernist-revivalist: modernist, not only because of his modern Western style discourse but also because of the many Western-originated institutions and concepts (i.e, parliament and democracy) which figure in his political theory; revivalist because of his advocacy of a return to a pristine Islam. In his famous work entitled *Islamization* (better known under its Turkish title *İslamlaşmak*), Said Halim proposes a complete Islamization of Muslim societies, including "forgetting" their pre-Islamic past and purifying themselves of their pre-Islamic heritage.

Said Halim Pasha's works were written originally in French and most often published in Istanbul and various European capitals between 1910 and 1921. His earliest work—published in Paris—in 1910, bears the ironic title of *Le fanatisme musulman*. In essence it is a tract explaining how Christian Europe's hostility towards the Islamic world since the time of the Crusades caused the economic and technological retardation prevalent in Muslim countries. His second work, *Essai sur les causes de la décadence des peuples musulmans* (published in Istanbul in 1918), also deals with the decline of the Muslim world and is an example of the modernist-revivalist genre that characterized the Muslim decline literature of that period.

Said Halim tended to use the pseudonym Mohammed in the above titles. However, his major work, *Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane*, which expounds his social and political thought, was published in Rome in 1921 (the year of his assassination by an Armenian militant), under his full name and title: *Le prince Said Halim Pacha; ancien Grand-Vézir*. This last work was republished a year later in the journal *Orient et Occident* under the title *Notes pour servir à la réforme de la société musulmane*. An English translation was published in 1967 in Karachi, Pakistan by the Waqf Institution of Begoum Aïsha Bavani under the title *Reform in the Muslim Society*.

Most of Said Halim's works were translated into Ottoman Turkish and appeared during his lifetime in the Islamist-modernist periodical *Sebilürreşad*. Indeed most of the original French versions of these works are existant only in their original hand- and typewritten form and bear the author's annotations.

For the purpose of this study I have relied on the original French versions which no scholar has previously examined. These invaluable sources were generously and kindly provided to me by Rukiye Kuneralp, a member of the family of Said Halim Pasha and include *La crise politique*, which was only partly and inaccurately translated into Turkish for two articles entitled "*Meşrutiyet*" (The Constitutional Regime) and *"Mukallitliklerimiz"* (Our Imitations). In my study, I used both the French original and the Turkish versions comparatively. Other essays are *"La société ottomane"* translated into Turkish under the title *"İçtimai buhranımız"* (Our Society in Crisis); and "Islamization" which enjoyed fame among Islamist intellectuals in its Turkish translation "*İslamlaşmak*."

The political life and thought of Said Halim Pasha have not previously been studied by scholars in any detail. Mustafa Düzdağ's edition of his works using the Turkish title of one of Said Halim's articles, *"Buhranlarımız,"* (Our Crises) is merely a modern Turkish adaptation of a work that was already published under the same title in 1335-1338 (1919). A previous edition of this work had also appeared in 1332 (1916). Düzdağ's work also contains also a few pages of biographical notes on Said Halim written by various contemporary figures and by historians. The only study which offers any in-depth analysis of Said Halim's political life is Hanefi Bostan's work entitled *Bir İslamcı Düşünür Said Halim Paşa* (Said Halim Pasha: An Islamist Thinker) (1990). Despite its title, the work does not examine Said Halim's ideas but is instead an account of the life and times of Said Halim.

The topic of Islamism in the late Ottoman Empire has been the object of many scholarly studies over the past forty years. A fundamental work on this topic was written by the late professor Tarık Zafer Tunaya in 1962 and is entitled *İslamcılık Cereyanı* (Islamist Current). It consists of a critical survey of Islamist thought during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920), as well as the four decades of Islamist political activity in Republican Turkey. The political and social thought of Said Halim Pasha and other contemporary thinkers including Musa Kazım, Ahmed Naim, Mustafa Sabri and Mehmed Akif (Ersoy) are briefly presented in this study in order to emphasize the continuity between the Islamism of the late Ottoman period and that of the Republican era.

There has recently appeared a more comprehensive account which, although lacking critical perspective is nevertheless valuable. This is İsmail Kara's *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi,* published in three volumes between 1986 and 1989. Kara's work is merely a collection of extracts from the works of the Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period and Republican era along with short biographies of each thinker. In a more recent study entitled *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri*, published in 1994, Kara endeavored to present the social and political ideas of the Islamist thinkers of the Second Constitutional Period from a critical perspective. Despite its angle, this work remained a general study and could only offer an overall picture of the Islamists' ideas of that period. As far as Said Halim's ideas were concerned, Kara contended himself with investigating a very limited aspect of the pasha's thought and dwelled almost exclusively on Said Halim criticism of the 1908 constitution.

The first critical account of Islamism in the late Ottoman Empire in English was brilliantly but briefly presented by Niyazi Berkes in his important work *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1963). Here the author also analyzed this and other contemporary social and political currents such as Westernism and Turkism while vividly presenting the ideological debate between these schools. Nevertheless, this work also was intended as a general work on intellectual history of the late Ottoman Empire and therefore could only make some sketchy references to Said Halim's thought besides the ideas of other Islamist intellectuals of his time.

Another interesting study on the Islamic modernism of the Second Constitutional Period was Akşin Somel's M.A thesis. Submitted to the Department of History of the Boğaziçi University, it is limited to the Islamist

thinkers who wrote for the Islamist journal of *Sırat-ı Müstakim*. Somel later published his thesis as an article entitled *Sırat-ı Müstakim: Islamic modernism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1912*, in the *Journal of Middle East Studies* v.1 no.1. Akşin did not include Said Halim Pasha in his study.

For the political and especially diplomatic history of the last decade (1912-1922) of the Ottoman Empire (an especially important facet of this study given Said Halim Pasha's role in the politics of that period, first as minister of foreign affairs (January 1913-October 1915) then as grand vizir (June 1913-February 1917)), I consulted all relevant secondary sources available in Turkish, English and French. One of the most important of these is Ulrich Trumpener's study of the Ottoman involvement in the First World War entitled *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918*. Nevertheless, as rightly pointed out by Feroz Ahmad, the weak point of Trumpener's work is the author's "unfamiliarity with the Turkish side of the story" and his almost exclusive reliance on German diplomatic material.[1] Among the most important of the Turkish sources written during the Republican era is the colossal work by Yusuf Hikmet Bayur entitled *Türk İnkilabı Tarihi* (History of the Turkish Revolution), which draws on all available Ottoman archival materials, as well as relevant European diplomatic sources. I also used the published memoirs and diaries of many Ottoman statesmen from this era including Mahmud Şevket Pasha, Cemal Pasha, Talat Pasha, Ahmed İzzet Pasha and Ali İhsan Sabis Pasha along with those of Palace officials like Tahsin Pasha, Ali Fuad (Türkgeldi) and Halit Ziya (Uşaklıgil), and Mehmet Tevfik (Biren) Beys. I also consulted the memoirs written by religious dignitaries of the empire including Şeyhülislam Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi and the Armenian patriarch Zaven (the latter shedding important light on the Armenian crisis and tragedy), as well as those of Amir Husayn of Mecca (particularly on the Hijazi revolt), both of which occurred during the grand vizirate of Said Halim Pasha despite his unsuccessful efforts to prevent them. Most important for my study were the political memoirs of Said Halim Pasha written by himself in Rome in the months before his assassination and published in Istanbul in 2001. In addition to the Ottoman sources, I also used the published diplomatic documents of the British, French and Russian governments which cast light on this turbulent period. The memoirs of certain Western diplomats at the Porte at the time of the outbreak of the First World War including French ambassador Maurice Bompard and the United States' ambassador, Henry Morgentau, as well as other contemporary statesmen of the Great Powers like Serge Sazonov (the last Russian foreign minister) and

[1]For a detailed criticism of Trumpener's work, see, Feroz Ahmad's book review in *Middle Eastern Studies*, 6 (January 1970), pp. 100-105.

Edward Grey (the British foreign minister) were consulted. During May-June 2001, I conducted a laborious and thorough research in the Ottoman Prime Ministry Archives on the diplomatic activities of Said Halim Pasha and found some very interesting untapped material. I incorporated them into my work. I also had the opportunity of interviewing Princess Zeyneb Halim, niece of Said Halim Pasha, (daughter of Abbas Halim Pasha) in her residence at Salacak, a lovely neighborhood of the Asiatic part of Istanbul. During this interview, Princess Halim provided me with some very valuable information on the private and public life of her uncle Said Halim Pasha.

The political career and thought of Said Halim Pasha cannot be properly examined outside the political and ideological context of his times. Consequently, the second and third chapters of my study focus on the political and ideological developments of the last three decades of the Ottoman Empire. This is done so as to provide the reader with a better understanding of Said Halim's role during this critical period. Indeed as the Ottoman Empire entered its twilight, many competing ideologies began to take shape.

An Islamist thinker, Said Halim was also a loyal Unionist statesman. Despite his ideological differences with secular-minded leaders of the CUP such as Talat and Enver, Said Halim cast his political lot with them. Such actions may appear contradictory; nevertheless, as a fervent champion of Islamic patriotism, Said Halim believed that only the strong leadership of the CUP could reinvigorate and save the Ottoman Empire, the last bulwark of Islam, and preserve it from conquest by aggressive European imperialism which, according to him, was a modern version of the Crusades.

Contrary to the prevailing historical view, Said Halim Pasha was not a mere figurehead of the powerful triumvirate formed by Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha (actually, it would be more accurate to call it a diarchy, since Cemal Pasha's influence never matched that of Enver and Talat). Instead, Said Halim Pasha served as a counterbalance in the cabinet to the manoeuvres of Enver and Talat. As long as Said Halim remained in power he was an obstacle to the secularizing reforms that the Turkist wing of the CUP was pushing for. For example, two important legislative acts, *The Enactment of the Law of Şeriat Courts Procedure* (an essential move towards unifying the judicial procedure) and *The Codification of the New Family Law*, (which considerably reduced the role of the *Şeriat* in the private lives of Ottoman subjects) could only have been decreed once Said Halim Pasha had resigned

from the grand-vizirate. The laws were signed into force in March 1917, a month after Said Halim's resignation.

As for Said Halim's political thought, it is important to contextualize it within the framework of his political life and within the important intellectual currents of the late Hamidian (1895-1908) and the Second Constitutional (1908-1920) periods. The three main ideologies of this twenty-five year span—Islamism, Turkism, and Westernism—are examined in Chapter Four of this study alongside Said Halim Pasha's rigorous defense of his ideas vis-à-vis Turkist and Westernist writers. My comments focus on his dispute with Ziya Gökalp concerning the impact of national popular and pre-Islamic cultures (*hars*) on the progress and evolution of the Muslim peoples. An examination of this dispute will help us understand the issue of nationalism and Islam which lay at the core of this ideological conflict.[1]

[1]A collection of Said Halim Pasha's works in Turkish has appeared while the present study was in press. I was therefore unable to use it: *Said Halim Paşa: Bütün Eserleri,* ed. N. Ahmet Özalp, (Istanbul: Anka Yayınları 2003).

CHAPTER ONE: ISLAMISM

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century European colonial powers had succeeded in asserting their military, political and economic supremacy over most non-European societies. Prior to 1775 the Muslim heartlands had rarely been under a direct threat or occupation by a Western power. Indeed until that period, an equilibrium of power existed between the Ottomans, Safavids and Moguls, the three great Muslim empires of Islam, and the expanding Western powers.

This precarious balance was upset during the last decades of the eighteenth century as Muslim empires in central Islamic lands began to lose ground to growing European pressure due to the rising economic and military power of the latter. For example, as a result of a disastrous war with Russia (1768-1774), the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign, on 21 July 1774, the infamous Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.[1] Among the conditions agreed to by the Ottomans were their being coerced into granting the Russians access to the Black Sea, an economic reserve for the Ottomans until then. Also, they relinquished control of the Crimea, a region largely inhabited by Muslim Tartars (this territory, while having gained its independence through the treaty, was eventually annexed by Russia).

According to Article 2 of the treaty, the Tartars of the Crimea would recognize the Ottoman sultan as the caliph. This clause would later constitute the basis of the Ottoman sultans' claim to the universal Caliphate. The same cannot be said for the sultan's orthodox subjects: while some historians hold that articles 7 and 14 served in the past as a legal basis for an alleged Russian

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[1]For the Italian version of this treaty (one of the three original languages in which the treaty was written — the other official versions being in Ottoman Turkish and Russian), see Geo. Fred. de Martens, *Recueil de Traités d'alliance, de paix, de trève, de neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d'échanges etc et de plusieurs autres actes servant à la connaissance des relations étrangères des Puissances et États de l'Europe* (Gottingue: Librarie de Dieterich, 1771-1779). (Hereafter cited as Martens, *Recueil*) See also Gabriel Noradoungian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris: 1903), vol.1, pp. 351-353. (Hereafter cited as Noradoungian, *Recueil*). For the English translation of the treaty see J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record 1535-1956* (Oxford: Archive Editions, 1987), vol.1, pp. 54-61.

protectorate over the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire[1], others such as Roderic Davison contend that they offer no such ground to the Russian tsar.[2]

It was in this period that in 1798 Napoleon invaded Egypt and marched into Palestine. For the first time since the Crusades the Muslim heartland was occupied by a Western power. Even Iran was not immune: it too suffered territorial losses at the hands of the Russians and had to cede Georgia and Daghestan in 1813.

Further afield in the Indian subcontinent, the eighteenth century witnessed the gradual disintegration of the Timurid Mughal Empire as a result of its weakening imperial institutions and court rivalries. Persian ruler Nadir Shah's invasion of Delhi in 1739 and the Afghan invasions under Ahmed Shah Abdali between 1748 and 1767 constituted severe blows for the Mughal Empire and accelerated its fall. The situation accelerated the centrifugal forces within the sub-continent. The Jat, Maratha, Sikh and other chieftains increasingly carved out autonomous territories for themselves and undermined the Mughal authority.[3] Nevertheless, though the disintegration of the Mughal Empire had started as an internal problem, its fall would be at the hands of the British East India Company, which had taken advantage of the political chaos to conquer India from within in a series of successful wars during the 1760s and 1820s. However, it was not until after the suppression of the Sepoy revolt in 1858, that the British were able to establish their domination over the subcontinent on a firm basis.

The internal crises of Muslim societies at the end of the eighteenth century, along with the decline of central Muslim empires and their subsequent subjugation by European colonial powers led to the emergence in Arabia and India of several protest movements. The leaders of these mainly revivalist movements believed that the source of this crisis lay in moral decay and

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[1]Article VII of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (in its original Italian version) says:" La Fulgida Porta promette una ferma protezione alla religione Christiana, e alle Chiefe di quella permette ancora à ministri dell'Imperial Corte di Russia di fare in ogni occurenza varie rapprefentanze alla Porta à favore della sotto mentevatta eretta Chiefa in Constantinopoli, accennata nell'art.XIV non meno che di quei che la fervono, e promette ricevere queste rimostranze con attenzione, come fatte da persona considerata d'una vicina e finceramente amica Potenza". Martens, *Recueil*. vol. II, p. 296.

[2]Roderic Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered" *Slavic Review*. 35 (September 1976): p. 482.

[3]For the disintegration of the Mughal Empire see, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Muzaffar Alam eds. *The Mughal State 1526-1750*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. See also Muzaffar Alam *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India, Awadh and Punjab, 1707-1748*. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986).

deviation from pristine Islamic principles. They sought the restoration of the power of Islam by purifying the religion of alien elements and by following the *sunna* of the Prophet.

The most important of these movements emerged in the mid-eighteenth century in central Arabia, and was called the Wahhabiyya, taking its name from its founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1115-1201 A.H./1703-1792 A.D.).[1] The latter had found in 1744 a powerful protector in Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Saud, a local ruler who adopted his doctrine and agreed to provide him with the financial, political, and military backing necessary to enable Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to spread his tenets across Arabia.

Although the Wahhabi movement had emerged originally in reaction to the practices of popular Islam in Arabia, it had become by the late eighteenth century a serious threat to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman elite had already initiated a series of modernizing reforms to improve traditional state institutions, particularly the military and the civil service. While the Ottomans used European structures as their model, the Wahhabis advocated a return to the formative period of Islam which they idealized as a pristine age.

Wahhabiyya ideology was based on the doctrine of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (164-241 A.H./780-855 A.D.) and was inspired by the Hanbali theologian and revivalist Ibn Taymiyya (661-728 A.H./1263-1328 A.D.). Considered one of the most important thinkers in Islam, Ibn Taymiyya was the principal inspiration for Muslim revivalists in the eighteenth century and for modernists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[2] Born in Harran (a town located in present-day south-eastern Turkey), Ibn Taymiyya completed his education in Damascus at the Sukkariyya Madrasa. He was subsequently appointed as a professor at the Hanbaliyya Madrasa in the same city on 17 Shaban 695 (20 June 1296). Ibn Taymiyya devoted his academic and political career to a determined and indefatigable struggle against what he called *"Mushrikūn"* (Polytheists). His main goals were to "purify" Islam of any corruptive elements and to enhance the role of the *Şeriat* by restoring it to its central position in Muslim life.

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[1] D.S. Margoliouth, "Wahhabiya", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 1st edition, pp. 1086-1090.

[2] The most detailed and critical study of the doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya remains the voluminous work of Henri Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Tak-id-din Ahmad b. Taimiya* (Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1939).

Although Ibn Taymiyya's thought derives from Hanbali doctrine, its originality lies in the combination of diverse arguments proposed by dogmatic theologians, traditionalists, and Sufi thinkers. These, in turn, are based on *kalām, ḥadīth,* and *irāda* in order to create a new doctrine of mediation. Ibn Taymiyya condemned the practices of popular or folk Islam and considered them as a deviation from the teachings of the Qur'an and the Prophet.

He stated in his *Kitāb Iqtidā al-Ṣirāṭ al Mustaqīm wa Mukhālafat Aṣḥāb al-Jahīm* (The Book for the Following of the Straight Path Against the People of Hell) that the survival of pagan customs and habits in Islam had exercised a detrimental effect on Muslims, causing them to diverge from the essence of their religion. Ibn Taymiyya submits that holy days, such as *Āshūrā*, *Mawlid al-Nabiyy* and *Īḍ-Adhā* began to be celebrated in Islam in later periods under the influence of other religions. Indeed, the feast of *Mawlid al-Nabiyy* (birthday of the Prophet) was instituted as an emulation of Christmas.[1]

Ibn Taymiyya equally condemned the visitation of the tombs of the saints (*Ziyārat al-Qubūr*) in order to request their intercession. This he identifies with idol worship since the veneration of the saints' tombs would turn these places into sanctuaries.[2] Ibn Taymiyya's ideas on the visitation of tombs were adopted by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who also considered this practice as a form of *shirk* (polytheism).

The cardinal point of Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab's doctrine was *tawḥīd* (Unity of God), which he expounded in *Kitāb al Tawḥīd* (The Book of Unity). According to Abd-al Wahhab, *tawḥīd* has three meanings which were, *tawḥīd al-rubābiyya, tawhid al-ulḍīhiyya* and *tawḥīd al-asmā wal ṣifāt*. Abd-al Wahhab in his thought put emphasis on the third meaning of the *tawḥīd, tawḥīdal asmā wal ṣifāt* (the unity of God's attributes as stated in the Qur'an without interpretation).[3] He gave the definition of his creed as such: "To describe God as He described Himself in the Qur'an and as His Prophet did in the hadith"[4] The aim of Ibn Abd-al Wahhab was to purify Islam from the practices of *Jāhiliyya* and to reislamize the tribes of Arabia by teaching them the tenets of pristine Islam.

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[1]Muhammad Umar Memon, *Ibn Taimiya's Struggle Against Popular Religion, with an Annotated Translation of his Kitāb Ițidā al-Ṣirat al Mustaqīm Mukhālafat Aṣḥāb al-jahīm.* (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), pp. 12-13.
[2]Ibid., pp. 13-20.
[3]Esther Peskes, " Wahhabiyya". *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, p. 40.
[4]H. Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya." *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* new edition, p. 951.

The ideas of Said Halim Pasha on the decline of Muslim societies are to a large extent reminiscent of those of Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. According to Said Halim, the major cause of Muslim decline lay in the misunderstanding of the true meaning of the Prophet's message and its subsequent distortion by later developments in Islamic history. Said Halim explains the decline of Muslim societies with reference to their failure to renounce their pre-Islamic heritage. He argues that since the nations which adopted Islam were heirs to old and distinct civilizations, it was inevitable that their respective ancient histories would still exert a strong influence on them. To him, this phenomenon prevented Muslim nations from fully comprehending and implementing the religious tenets of their faith thus depriving them of the blessings of Islam. This situation, continues Said Halim, had led to a paralysis which left Muslim societies inert between their pre-Islamic legacy and pristine Islamic doctrine, constituting a continuous hindrance to their development. To Said Halim the only way to achieve progress was for Muslims to swing the pendulum in favor of a pristine interpretation of Islam.

REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

During the first half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was faced with many external and internal challenges. Changing economic and social factors in the European provinces of the empire favored the emergence of local Balkan nationalism. Among these factors were the rise of a strong Christian (especially Orthodox) merchant class; the economic growth of Austria, which started to exert important economic, cultural, and political influences on the Balkan peoples lying south of her borders; and finally, the spread of humanist ideas such as those espoused by the leaders of the French Revolution. Such revolutionary thought played an important role in the formation of nationalist movements in the Balkans: in 1817, for instance Serbia gained her autonomy. This was followed by Greece's independence in 1830. These territorial losses were the result of a series of military defeats mainly at the hands of Russia, which emerged as a major power in the second half of the eighteenth century. Alarmed, the Ottoman sultans adopted a series of military and administrative reforms to modernize the empire.

The first systematic reforms were undertaken by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). Selim began in 1793 by modernizing the artillery. The first military reforms had been undertaken by Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1747), who

employed a French artillery expert, Claude Alexandre, Comte de Bonneval (1675-1747). After converting to Islam and adopting the name Ahmed, Bonneval was commissioned by the reformist Grand Vizir Topal Osman Pasha to reorganize the Bombardiers corps (*Humbara Ocağı*).[1] Selim's personal initiative was to create a new army, the *Nizam-i Cedid,* trained in European methods and armed with modern weapons. At the same time he reformed the navy by expanding and modernizing the imperial arsenal (*Tersane-i Amire*) and builing a new fleet.

Although priority in Selim's reforms was given to military issues, he also undertook administrative reforms. These consisted of restructuring the central government in an effort to increase its efficiency. During his reign Selim had a vacillating attitude towards the bureaucratic centralization. On the one hand, he tried to restore the eroded power and authority of the Ottoman governors (*valis*) in the provinces so as to curb the autonomist tendencies of the local notables (*ayans*) and, on the other, he had to ally himself with some local feudal lords (*derebeys*) and try to play them off against each other in order to consolidate his authority[2]. On this issue Ariel Salzmann wrote that: "Despite stated intentions, recentralization of fiscality and the implementation of the proposed military reforms were not accomplished without considerable vacillation, backtracking and compromise however."[3] According to Salzmann, "[d]ue to the urgency of military needs, the regime was forced more than once to reverse policy on provincial military and fiscal matters in order to win loyalties or to mobilize troops from strategically positioned provincial magnates".[4]

If credit for initiating the modernization of the Ottoman military and administrative institutions belongs to Selim III, then the recognition must be given to his cousin and eventual successor Mahmud II (1808-1839) for allowing the reform movement to take root finally in the soil of the empire. Selim's ideas were realized on a much larger scale under Mahmud II, who

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[1]For further information on Comte de Bonneval-Ahmed Pasha see his memoirs, *Nouveaux mémoires du Comte de Bonneval, ci-devant général de l'infanterie au service de S.M. Impériale et Catholique contenant ce qui lui est arrivé de plus remarquable durant son séjour en Turquie* (The Hague: Chez Jean van Duren, 1737). See also Albert Vandal, *Le Pacha à trois queues. Une vie aventureuse au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1953); Bowen, "Ahmad Pasha Bonneval." *Encyclopaedia of Islam* new edition, pp. 291-292; M. Cavid Baysun "Ahmed Paşa (Bonneval, Humbaracıbaşı)." *İslam Ansiklopedisi,* p. 199.

[2]Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971), pp. 283-327. (Hereafter cited as Stanford, *Between*).

[3]Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancient Regime Revisited; Privatization and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire." *Politics and Society* 21 (December 1993): p. 407.

[4]Ibid., pp. 407-408.

managed to override traditionalist opposition to the implemention of his reforms. These changes transformed the bureaucratic structure of the empire and paved the way for further secularization and Westernization of Ottoman statecraft.[1]

When the wars with Russia (1827-1829) and Egypt (1831-1833) ended, Mahmud II focused his energies on military, administrative, and educational reform.[2] His military reforms began immediately after the elimination of the age-old and archaic Janissary corps in June 1826. The Janissaries had proven their obsolescence once again by their failure to suppress the Greek Rebellion (1821-1829). In order to replace them Mahmud created a new army called the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye* (The Victorious Mohammedan Soldiers) whose organization was based on the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army created by Selim III in 1792. Like his predecessors, Mahmud turned to the European Powers for military instructors.

However, unlike previous reformist sultans such as Abdülhamid I (1774-1789) and Selim III[3] who were concerned mostly with modernizing the military, Mahmud undertook a series of major bureaucratic reforms in order to restructure the outdated Ottoman administration. He reasoned that centralization of the civil service would result in a more efficient and firmer control over the provinces by the central government.

Mahmud's administrative reforms not only made government structures more effective, they also enhanced the sultan's role in the empire's governing hierarchy. This second modification had the effect of limiting the grand vizir's authority. With few exceptions such as Murad IV (1630-1640), a succession of weak sultans had allowed the grand vizirs to make the policies of the government. Under Mahmud II, the grand vizir was no longer the sultan's powerful vicegerent, enjoying a key role in the decision-making process.

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[1]Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 91-135. (Hereafter cited as Berkes, *Development*).

[2]For the reforms of Mahmud II, see Ahmed Lutfi, *Tarih-i Lutfi, Vakanuvis Ahmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi,* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1984). See also Enver Ziya Karal and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, Nizam-i Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789-1856),* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi 1947), vol. 5. pp.146-168. See also J. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), vol. 2, pp. 36-51. (Hereafter cited as Shaw and Shaw, *History*). For the bureaucratic reforms of Mahmud II, see Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 124-150. (Hereafter cited as Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*).

[3]For a critical account of the reforms of Selim III see, Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old And New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). See also Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 5.

Instead, policy-drafting and day-to-day decisions became the prerogative of the sultan. It was now clear who was the head of the government. This diminution of the grand vizir's power was reflected in the new title of "prime minister" (Baş Vekil) given to this post in 1838.

Many of the grand vizir's duties and privileges were now assigned to separate ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior (*Dahiliye Nezareti*) and the Ministry of Legal Actions (*Divan-ı Deavi Nezareti)* which later became the Ministry of Justice (*Adliye Nezareti*). Other ministries also had to be created: for example, a Ministry of Finance (*Umur-u Maliye Nezareti*) took over the financial functions which had formerly been controlled by the Imperial Treasury *(Hazine-i Amire*) and the Imperial Mint (*Darphane-i Amire*).[1]

Another important achievement was the creation in March 1836 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs *(Hariciye Nezareti*), which assumed the duties performed by the scribal offices formerly under the direction of the Chief Scribe (*Reis ül-Küttap*).

Mahmud II did not content himself with military and bureaucratic reforms: he also undertook the reform of the educational system. The reforms carried out in these three domains were closely interrelated: the new schools inaugurated by Mahmud were crucial in training the personnel necessary to staff and run the new bureaucracy and military that he created. This was the only way to assure the success of his reforms.

Mahmud established many modern institutions of learning; some were built on the foundations of institutions already in existence, such as the School of Engineering (first opened in 1734 and reinstituted in 1769), and the naval academy (established in 1776). Unfortunately, most of these establishments had fallen into disuse over time. A new naval engineering school and a medical school were opened in 1827, followed by a military academy in 1834. The graduates of these schools formed the Ottoman military and bureaucratic elite who continued the modernization process.[2]

According to Said Halim, this new officialdom created by Sultan Mahmud II, while being an efficient tool for implementing Westernizing and centralizing reforms, was nevertheless completely devoid of any social basis.

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[1]Shaw and Shaw, *History*, pp. 36-38.
[2]Ibid., pp. 48-49.

Indeed it stood in stark contrast to the traditional Ottoman ruling class who possessed both a social basis and a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the sovereign:

> Créé par les besoins de la centralisation et destinée à n'être qu'un instrument docile de l'autorité centralisée en la personne du Souverain, cette classe privilégiée de fonctionnaires pouvait bien avoir une valeur administrative, mais elle devait nécessairement être dépourvue d'une valeur sociale réelle. Elle n'avait ni l'indépendance ni la stabilité, ni la tradition, ni les qualités morales et intellectuelles.[1]

Said Halim's harsh judgement of the socio-political aspect of the new bureacratic elite is not an accurate reflection of its true nature. Contrary to what he argues, this new bureaucratic class rapidly built its own power base and by the late 1830s became the dominant force in Ottoman politics, especially during the final years of Sultan Mahmud's reign.

Unlike Said Halim, who critizicized the Westernizing reform efforts of Selim III and Mahmud II, the majority of high-ranking ulema of the time not only sanctioned and supported these reforms but also involved themselves directly in their design and implementation.[2]

By the end of the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876) and with the accession of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) to the throne, government gradually became concentrated in the palace. Indeed, he shifted the decision-making process from the government offices at the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Ali*) to the Palace Secretariat (*Mabeyn*) at Yıldız Palace.[3]

The military and bureaucratic reforms achieved by Mahmud II were extended under the reign of his son Abdülmecid (1839-1861). The implementation of the new reforms was, however, carried out by Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-1858), a prominent bureaucrat who was already very actively involved in Mahmud's reform policy. His role was pivotal in designing and implementing the reforms, first during the final years of

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[1] Said Halim Pasha, *La Societé Ottomane* (in typescript), p. 6.

[2] For more information concerning the attitude of the ulema to the reforms undertaken by Selim III and Mahmud II see, Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the time of Selim III and Mahmud II." in Uriel Heyd ed., *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization,* Scripta Hieroslymitana, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press of the Hebrew University, 1961), vol. 9.

[3] For the shift of the political and bureaucratic authority from the Porte to the Palace, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, pp. 229-231. Also see Gabriel Charmes, *L'Avenir de la Turquie - Le Pan Islamisme*, (Paris: Calman Levy, 1883), pp. 235-236.

Mahmud's reign and later under his successor, Abdülmecid. Mustafa Reşid Pasha was known in Ottoman history as "the Father of the Tanzimat".[1] The reforms, couched in the form of a decree, were prepared under his direction in close association with another prominent Tanzimat statesman and thinker, Sadık Rifat Pasha (1807-1857), and proclaimed on 3 November 1839 under the name of *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu* (Imperial Edict of the Rose Garden). This was a remarkable achievement for Mustafa Reşid Pasha; despite his grip over the affairs of the empire, at the time of the proclamation of the Tanzimat, he was only the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Tanzimat Charter was the final enactment of the ideas and principles which had been gradually developed by reformist bureaucrats like Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rifat Pasha in collaboration with the reformist Sultan Mahmud II. Nevertheless, the political ideas of Reşid and Sadık Rifat Pashas were different from Mahmud's ideas in quite important ways. Both pashas considered the monarch too autocratic and superficial in his reforming efforts; therefore, they tried to curb his power by solidly establishing "the rule of law" into the Ottoman political system.[2] The basic principles of the Tanzimat Charter are:

a) Guaranteed protection by the state of the fundamental rights regarding the security of life, honour and property;
b) Guaranteed right to a fair trial for every person accused of committing a crime;
c) Application of the principle of equity in military recruitment;
d) Law reform and new legislation respecting the principles of the *şeriat*;
e) Equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan before the law.[3]

While the first four articles declared the principles inherent to the *Şeriat*, the final one was a considerable radical shift from the point of view of Islamic law. According to Butrus Abu Manneh, the principles decreed in the Gülhane Charter were formulated under the direct influence of Islamic law and inspired by Muslim medieval political thinking, especially by the ideas of al-Ghazali[4]. Abu Manneh also criticized scholars like Berkes of seeing only the

[1]For Reşid Pasha's role in the preparation and realization of the Tanzimat reforms, see Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1954).
[2]Berkes, *Development*. p. 183-184.
[3]Ibid., pp. 176-180.
[4]Butrus Abu Manneh,"The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript", *Die Welt des Islams* 34 (1994): pp. 173-203.

influence of Western political thought in the content of the Gülhane Charter. In my opinion the latter judgement is problematic since Berkes acknowledges that "the şeriat laws [are] embodied in the Charter as fundamentals".[1] In his analysis of Gülhane Charter, Halil İnalcık concludes that, although the charter was promulgated according to classical Ottoman tradition, it also indeniably contains some "modern revolutionary principles".[2] On the other hand, İlber Ortaylı and Tekin Akıllıoğlu argue that while it is difficult to deny the influence of French political concepts on the development of the Tanzimat Charter, these concepts were nevertheless skilfully adapted to the realities of Ottoman statecraft by the reformist bureaucrats of Mahmud's administration, especially by Sadık Rifat Pasha, and the result was a genuine political document.[3]

The legal reforms promised in the Gülhane Charter began to be implemented soon after its proclamation. In May 1840 a new penal code *(ceza kanunnamesi)* was promulgated. The new code was a hybrid document combining both European (French) and Islamic legal principles. While it sanctioned the principle of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims before the law, it also retained the *şeri* rules of *qisas* and *diya*; nor did it abolish the death penalty for apostasy against Islam.

During the Tanzimat period the penal code was modified twice. The second modification in 1858 was especially radical in nature since the bill was modeled on the French (Napoleonic) penal code of 1810. Niyazi Berkes rightly concludes that this enactment marked "the introduction of Western legal formulation in the field of Ottoman public law".[4] Nevertheless, despite its provisions being almost completely drawn from French penal law, the text of the code contained many *şeri* principles found in former codes. Penal law reform was followed by the codification of commercial law. Here too French law, more specifically the French commercial code of 1807, was a source. The Ottoman version was enacted in 1850.[5]

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[1]Berkes, *Development*, p. 145.

[2]Halil İnalcık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu."*Belleten.* 28 (October 1964): pp. 581-622.

[3]İlber Ortaylı and Tekin Akıllıoğlu, "Le Tanzimat et le modèle français; mimétisme ou adaptation?", in Hamit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont ed., *L'Empire Ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France.* (Istanbul: Isis, 1986), pp. 197-208.

[4]Berkes, *Development*, p. 164.

[5]For a critical account of the westernization of Ottoman public law, see Berkes, *Development*, 160-169. See also Jean Henri Ubicini, *Lettres sur la Turquie. tableau statistique, religieux, politique, administratif, militaire, commercial etc. de l'Empire ottoman depuis le khatt-i cherif de Gulkhane (1839)* (Paris: J. Dumaine 1853-54), pp. 167-174. For the French translation of the Tanzimat Charter, see Ubicini, pp. 527-537.

All these reforms took place against a turbulent background: after the settlement of the Egyptian Crisis in February 1841 the empire faced more domestic problems. There was civil and religious strife in Lebanon between the Druzes and the Maronites (a chronic problem between 1841 and 1861)[1] as well as external threats including Russian claims to the Holy Places in Palestine (May 1853).[2] These last crises ultimately led to the Crimean War (1853-1855). Moreover, conservative political forces within the empire were continually trying to hamper the reform movement.[3] These forces included old-fashioned pashas still attached to the traditional order which allowed them more power and autonomy than the newly enacted reforms; conservative members of the ulema and *mültezim*s (tax farmers) who built their fortunes by overtaxing the *reaya*; as well as other beneficiaries of the ancien régime. All violently attacked the Tanzimat Charter and the reforms it brought.

At the end of the Crimean War, Sultan Abdülmecid, under pressure from Britain, agreed to introduce a new reform project, which was embodied in an edict called the *Islahat Fermanı*, better known to European historians as the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*. Proclaimed on 18 February 1856, the new decree was significanly different from the Tanzimat Charter of 1839. Unlike the latter, the new reform edict did not combine Islamic and European legal maxims; rather it made a clear break from Islamic legal tradition. After reasserting the principle of equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the sultan, the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* of 1856 enforced this principle by recognizing the full equality of non-Muslims and Muslims in matters of military and civil services, justice, taxation, and access to educational institutions.

REACTION TO THE TANZIMAT: THE YOUNG OTTOMAN MOVEMENT

The discontent with the reforms which was first voiced over the Tanzimat Charter and later again with the *Islahat* edict was expressed by a

[1]For a critical account of this troubled period in Lebanese history, see the work of Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). See also Caesar Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I. B. Tauris, 2000). For the stable period which ensued, see the critical work of Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[2]For the origins of the Crimean War, see David M. Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War* (London: Longman, 1994).

[3]For a contemporary account of the opposition exerted by the Empire's conservative forces against the Tanzimat reforms, see M. A. Melik, *L'Orient devant l'Occident* (Paris: Imprimerie de A. Guyot, 1856).

group of Ottoman intellectuals who became known in Ottoman history as the Young Ottomans. The Young Ottoman movement began in protest against the inability of Tanzimat statesmen to restore the empire's political and economic position, and in opposition to their compliance with the European Powers whose chancelleries were dominating the Porte.[1] It was born in the famous *Tercüme Odası* (Translation Bureau) of the Porte,[2] where young clerks learned foreign languages, particularly French, and through these languages came in contact with European ideas. Although these liberal notions played a very important role in the formation of Young Ottoman thought, the essence of the ideology was nonetheless imbued with Islamic principles. In Islam, Young Ottomans found many of the ideas that had become prominent during the European Enlightenment, such as liberty, justice, and patriotism.[3] In their opinion, Locke's ideas regarding representative government were already anticipated in the Qur'an under the concept of *mushāwara*.[4] Also, early Islamic policy was, in theory, always drafted according to decisions made in the *shūrā* or by a representative council. These ideas were best expressed in the writings of Namık Kemal (1840-1888), a leading figure among Young Ottoman intellectuals. Kemal based his political thought on his adaptation of European liberal ideas to Islamic principles. He introduced two new concepts in Islamic political thought by attributing to the words *vatan* and *hürriyet* the Western connotations of fatherland and liberty.[5] In his article entitled *Wa Shāwirhum fī al Amr*, Namık Kemal declares that only a constitutional regime could restore the former strength and prestige of the Ottoman Empire.[6] While earlier documents like the Tanzimat Charter, the *Islahat* edict and some other recent imperial decrees contained some legal principles, they were not sufficient, according to Kemal, for a civilized state like the Ottoman Empire. In his opinion, a constitutional regime was not only necessary to assure a fair administration for Ottoman subjects but also to deny Russia any opportunity of making further inroads into the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, especially under the pretext of protecting the sultan's Christian subjects. It would also convince Europe of the fairness of the Ottoman administration.

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[1]The best study on the Young Ottoman movement is still Şerif Mardin's *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). (Hereafter cited as Mardin, *Genesis*).

[2]The Translation Bureau was founded in 1821 during the Greek Revolt in order to replace Phanariote Greek dragomans with Muslim translators (the dragomans were suspected of participating in the Greek Revolution). For more information, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, pp. 132-139.

[3]Mardin, *Genesis*, 8, p. 326.

[4]Ibid., p. 333.

[5]Ibid., p. 327.

[6]Namık Kemal."Wa shāwirihum fī al Amr" in *Makalat-i Siyasiye ve Edebiye* (Istanbul: Selanik Matbaası 1327), pp. 176-186.

Kemal's patriotism was embodied in Pan-Ottomanism and his loyalty to the Islamic heritage. For him, the concept of fatherland was not limited to the Ottoman lands but encompassed all Islamic realms which were united by the memory of a common and glorious past. Namık Kemal's vision of a fatherland is imbued with nostalgia and steeped in romanticism. He describes it as: "not composed of the vague lines traced by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea resulting from the conglomeration of various noble feelings such as the people, liberty, brotherhood, interest, sovereignty, respect for one's ancestors, love of family and childhood memories."[1] Nevertheless, despite his strong emphasis on Islam as the basis of his patriotism, Namık Kemal did not exclude non-Muslim elements of the empire from his construction of fatherland. He was strongly committed to the feasibility of a Pan-Ottoman union which would include the empire's non-Muslim communities. In Namık Kemal's opinion the different religions, languages, and races existing in the Ottoman Empire did not form an obstacle to the formation of an Ottoman nation.[2] He concluded that a proper education would be the key to reducing cultural differences among diverse elements of the empire. This policy would include a uniform syllabus which would instill patriotism in the minds of the new generation.

The above summary shows how Namık Kemal's ideas on Ottoman nationalism were of an ambivalent nature. While asserting the equality of all Ottomans irrespective of ethnicity or religion and upholding the idea of Ottoman citizenship as a secular concept, he nevertheless considered Islam to be the glue which would hold together the empire and its diverse nationalities.

Namık Kemal was the first Muslim thinker in Islamic history to advocate a parliamentary regime. Although his political liberalism was inspired by the liberal ideas of European thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, it was nevertheless presented in an Islamic discourse. He believed that the concept of representative government had already found its expression in the Qur'an and its application in early Islamic history. The same observation could also be made for the political system of the Ottoman Empire before the centralizing reforms of Mahmud II.

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[1]Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Namık Kemal Antolojisi* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1942), p. 61.
[2]Mardin, *Genesis*, p. 328.

Namık Kemal regarded the classical Ottoman political structure as a precursor of the modern representative regime. The separation of powers Montesquieu argued for in his *Spirit of the Laws* was already in force in Ottoman politics. Indeed, it was based on a system of checks and balances: for example, the sultan's authority was restrained by the ulema and the Janissaries.[1]

Another Young Ottoman thinker who took an Islamist approach was Ziya Pasha (1825-1880). Like Namık Kemal, he started his administrative career in the Translation Bureau where he came in contact with the ideas of the Enlightenment. Although a product of the same intellectual milieu, Ziya Pasha differed from Namık Kemal in many aspects. Unlike Kemal, who spent most of his life in exile, Ziya Pasha occupied important positions during his long administrative career. Besides, he was closely connected with the Palace and identified himself with the imperial administration. These characteristics had an undeniable impact on his political thought, which is conservative in nature in comparison to Kemal's ideology. One of the most striking divergences between these two Young Ottoman thinkers lay in Ziya Pasha's aloofness to the concept of liberty (*hürriyet*). Notwithstanding Ziya Pasha's being convinced of the necessity of establishing a constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire, he expressed caution toward the preservation of the imperial prerogatives of the sultan.[2] In his opinion the causes of Ottoman decline had been to a large extent generated by the diminution of the sultan's power vis-à-vis the grand vizirate.

The ideas of the Young Ottoman thinkers found a receptive ear among the bureaucratic elite of the Porte and the military commanders who decided to depose Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876). The coup d'État which took place on 30 May 1876 came as an answer to the political and economic crises which had gripped the empire for the last five years. On the same day the reignmakers within the Porte bureaucracy, namely Midhat, Hüseyin Avni, Süleyman and Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdü Pashas, installed Murad V (30 May-7 September 1876) on the throne in order to realize their plan to establish a constitutional regime.

On March 19, 1877, the first Ottoman Parliament was convened. The new parliament was composed of two chambers, the House of Deputies (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) and the Assembly of Notables (*Meclis-i Ayan*). Members

[1] Ibid., p. 310.
[2] Ibid., pp. 340-344.

of the former chamber were elected by the members of administrative councils located in provincial capitals, *sancak*s, and districts, while members of the latter were appointed directly by the sultan. Since one of the main principles of the Tanzimat was to consider all subjects of the empire as Ottoman, regardless of their religious affiliation, establishing parliamentary quotas for membership based on religious affiliation was inconceivable. However, the problem of under-representation of the empire's non-Muslim communities had to be addressed and was eventually resolved by assigning a disproportionately high number of deputies to European provinces.

Although it constituted an important milestone in Ottoman political history, the Constitution of 1876 did not alter very much the absolute character of the Ottoman monarchy since Article 3 declared that the sovereignty (*saltanat*) is vested in the eldest member of the House of Osman as the sultan-caliph.[1] The constitution was declared as a result of a popular demand or pressure. It was also granted by the monarch to appease mostly external pressures exerted by the European Powers. To Said Halim, "this constitution was designed by the dignitaries of the Porte as a means to check the power of the sultan and to curb his absolutism".[2] The pasha also acknowledges that the Ottoman constitution of 1876 "provides to the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, which stretches out to the deserts of Arabia and the majority of whose population lives a primitive life under the absolute authority of a religious or tribal chief, such extensive rights that even the most advanced nations of our time do not posses."[3] This argument has little validity since there is a quasi-complete consensus among scholars that the constitution of 1876 is far from being a liberal one. In reality, many of the provisions of this constitution conferred large powers on the sultan and left parliament with only limited rights which were also subject to the sanction of the monarch.

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[1] Suna Kili and Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri, Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze* (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), p. 31 See also, Şeref Gözübüyük, *Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları*. (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1993), p. 11.

[2] Said Halim Pasha, *Buhranlarımız* (Istanbul: Şems Matbaası, 1335-1338.) p. 1 (Hereafter cited Said Halim Pasha *Buhranlarımız*). Also see the most recent edition of the same work, *Buhranlarımız* ve *Son Eserleri*, edited by Ertuğrul Düzdağ. (Istanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1993). pp. 5-6. (Hereafter cited as Said Halim Paşa, *Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri*).

[3] Said Halim Pasha, *Buhranlarımız*, pp. 14-15. Said Halim Pasha *Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri*. pp. 18-19.

THE RISE OF ISLAMISM AS A POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

During these years, Tanzimat statesmen had proven to be unsuccessful in halting the economic and political deterioration of the empire. This became especially evident during the last years of Sultan Abdülaziz. The Ottomanism of the Tanzimat as a unifying ideology of the empire's diverse peoples did not find much sympathy among the Christian peoples of the Balkan provinces. The revolts in Crete (1866), Herzegovina (1875), and Bulgaria (1876) clearly demonstrated the failure of Pan-Ottomanist policies to fuse together diverse elements of the empire (*ittihad-ı anasır*).

The nationalist aspirations of the Christian peoples in the Balkans were the result of economic and social change and an ensuing cultural revival which had swept through these provinces during the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries[1]. They were also motivated by the Pan-Orthodox and Pan-Slavist policies of Russia. Morever, these revolts fitted in with the latter's ambitions to take possession of Istanbul and the Straits as a key to the Black Sea, and to resuscitate the Byzantine Empire.[2]

The Porte responded to these rebellions vigorously by sending its troops. At the same time the Muslim populations in these provinces also became involved in the upheavals and many massacres and atrocities were committed by both sides. This was especially true in Bulgaria where thousands of Christians and Muslims died. The result was an atmosphere of hatred and distrust between Muslim and Christian communities. As a consequence of the nationalist revolts in the Balkans and the ensuing war with Russia (1877-1878), the Ottoman Empire lost many of its European provinces. The end of Ottoman rule in these realms caused a large-scale migration of Muslims from the Balkans toward Anatolia.[3] During this same period a violent anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim campaign started in the West. Many publications expressing hostile opinions about Muslims and Turks were distributed, helping to turn Western public opinion against the Ottoman Empire. The great majority of these books and pamphlets were published in England, including Gladstone's *The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*. Although presented as an

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[1]For the rise of the Balkan nationalism and its causes see Barbara Jelavich. *History of the Balkans, Eigtheenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[2]For an analytical account of nineteenth-century Russian Balkan policy, see Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[3]For the migration of the Balkan Muslims to Anatolia see Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press).

expression of European public opinion against the Turkish oppression of Christian subjects, a very strong motive behind the campaign was the Porte's declaration of bankruptcy and its decision to suspend payment of interest on foreign loans.[1] The Ottoman financial collapse was the result of a policy of heavy indebtedness and extravagant court expenditures. The situation was further aggravated by a series of extremely bad harvests which began in 1872.

The Tanzimat's political and economic failure led to the revival of Islamist ideas in the Ottoman Empire which had been favoured by Sultan Abdülaziz since the early years of his reign. Domestic and international political events had the effect of gradually enhancing his role as the caliph of all Muslims.[2] Indeed, since the 1860s Muslim lands outside the empire had been exposed to a new wave of European colonial expansionism. In 1859, after ten years of heroic resistance to Russian invasion, Imam Shamil and his fighters were finally overwhelmed by the sheer might of the Tsarist armies.[3] Following Shamil's defeat, hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the Caucasus began to immigrate to Ottoman-ruled lands. Another Muslim region which fell under Russian rule was Central Asia, where Russian hegemony had gradually been imposed on local Muslim Turkic khanates since the mid-1860s. Tsarist rule was completely established in Central Asia with the Russian conquest of the Trans-Caspian Turkmen lands between 1881 and 1884.[4] Russian advances in the Caucasus and Central Asia represented only one facet of European colonial encroachment over the whole of the Muslim world.

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, European domination was entrenched in most Muslim countries. France occupied Algeria in 1830, established a protectorate in Tunisia in 1881 and, after the partitioning of Africa at the Congress of Berlin in 1885, united most of the Sub-Saharan Muslim lands into French West Africa. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 and the Sudan in 1898, after defeating local Muslim resistance forces that were led

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[1]Berkes, *Development*, p. 219, Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: 1929), p. 81.

[2]For a recent research on the origins of the Ottoman Caliphate see, Tufan Buzpınar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882." *Die Welt des Islams* 36, pp. 59-89.

[3]For an excellent study of Shamil's heroic resistance to Russian conquest, see Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan* (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

[4]For the establishment of Russian hegemony over the Central Asian Khanates, see Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); for the Russian conquest of Turkmen lands, see Mehmet Saray, *The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism: A Study of the Turkmen People and their Incorporation into the Russian Empire* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1989).

by Arabi Pasha and the Mahdi, respectively. Britain had already firmly established her rule over the Indian subcontinent after suppressing the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, a revolt which had been led by Indian Muslims. In South-East Asia, the Dutch had been at work since the seventeenth century, gradually establishing their overseas empire at the expense of local Muslim states. By the end of the nineteenth century, nearly all of the Indonesian archipelago had come under direct Dutch rule, the exception being an on-going Muslim resistance movement in Aceh, which eventually fell in 1907, after a long period of fierce guerilla fighting.

The culmination of these defeats and the establishment of Western colonial rule or protectorate over Muslim countries created a consciousness of solidarity among the Muslim peoples against a common menace which threatened their very existence. The Ottoman Empire, although economically and financially dependent on the West, was the only large politically independent Muslim state during the era of European imperialism, thus making its leadership in the Muslim world unequalled. Also, its capital was the seat of the caliphate and its sultan enjoyed enormous prestige for being the custodian of the two holiest cities of Islam: since 1516, Sultan Selim I (1512-1520), after his victory over the Mamluks, declared himself the "Servitor of the Two Holy Places" (*Khādim al- Harameyn al-Sharūfayn)*, a title until then held by the Mamluk sultans.[1] Thus, for the Muslim peoples living under colonial domination in Asia and Africa, the Ottoman Sultanate represented a rallying point in their struggle for independence.[2]

The answer of the Ottomans to this call constituted a bone of contention among scholars of Ottoman history. During the later years of Sultan Abdülaziz's reign, Muslim delegations from Central Asian khanates and Indonesian islands visited the Ottoman capital to solicit military assistance from the sultan. In 1874, the Ottoman government gave, in response to a request made by Yakub Beg, amir of Kashgar, substantial military aid to the local Kashgar Muslim resistance who were fighting Russian and Chinese regimes, including a contingent of officers who were experts in training.[3] The Ottoman military assistance to the amir of Kashgar was also encouraged by

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[1]Buzpınar, "Opposition", p. 63.

[2]For the role played by the Ottoman government and the Caliphate in the Pan-Islamic resistance in the Muslim world to the Western imperialism, see also Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)*. (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

[3]Mehmet Saray, *Rus işgali devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasebetler (1775-1875)*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), pp. 103-115.

the British who were anxious to check Russian expansionism in Central Asia.[1]

Sultan Abdülaziz's policy of Pan-Islamism was broadened in a more systematic fashion by his successor Abdülhamid II. Much ink has been spilled about his Pan-Islamist policy; numerous books, articles, and pamphlets have been published on this subject by Muslim and Western scholars since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, the Pan-Islamist policy of Abdülhamid has remained controversial. Scholars are divided on this issue: some like Orhan Kologlu and Caesar Farah do not accept the fact that Sultan Abdülhamid II had a well defined pan-Islamic policy. This last view was put forward by Jacob Landau who argued that Pan-Islamism was the "Imperial Ideology" of the Hamidian Regime. Landau based his view on the vast body of literature by European writers, particularly French historians, who, during the reign of Abdülhamid and shortly after his deposition in 1909, presented the Ottoman sultan and his government as the principal organizers of Pan-Islamic activities.[2] In their minds they saw their colonial lands and territories being swept away by a wave of Muslim crusades or, more accurately, *crescentades,*[3] whose objective was to incite Muslims to revolt against European rule and to destroy colonial empires. This view has been refuted by Engin Akarlı who argued that "Abdulhamid was realistic enough to know that the task of protecting all Muslims was beyond the capacities of the Ottoman State. He hoped that at least Muslims living within Ottoman borders could be rallied around the common cause of self protection".[4] According to Akarlı if Abdülhamid "pretended to the leadership of all Muslims, that was only to foil foreign pressures on the Ottoman government by gaining leverage over European powers who had Muslim dominions."[5] Reflecting Akarlı's view, Caesar Farah also wrote in his article entitled "Reassessing Sultan Abdülhamid's Islamic policy" that "Abdulhamid preferred to use the sword of Islam like the sword of Damocles to frighten and intimidate his enemies, more specifically to scare off the vultures of imperial Christiandom, rather than to

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[1]Lois Frechtling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863-1881" *Journal of Royal Central Asian Society* 27 (1939): pp. 471-489.

[2]A myriad of European writers, mostly French and British, produced this vast literature about Pan-Islam. One of the best known examples was Gabriel Charmes's *L'avenir de la Turquie - Le Panislamisme* (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1883).

[3]Lee, D.E., "The Origins of Pan-Islamism." *American Historical Review* 47 (Jan. 1942): p. 282.

[4]Engin Deniz Akarlı "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions." (Ph.D diss., Princeton University, 1976), p. 60. (Hereafter cited as Akarlı, "The Problems.")

[5]Ibid. p. 61.

combat them when his military power was far from adequate for the task."[1] Farah also severly criticizes Jacob Landau for relying "[p]redominantly on the assertions of Western writers" whom he calls "Catholic religious fanatics and government officials who served largely as propagandists against the Ottoman sultan while masquerading often as scholars."[2]

One of the most fundamental theories on the rise of Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire was formulated by Kemal Karpat. According to Karpat, Pan-Islamism first appeared as a social phenomenon among the Muslim folk of the empire as a response to the military and political decline of the Ottoman power in Europe and its subsequent consequences which dramatically affected their lives.[3]

Another major organ of diffusion of Pan-Islamist ideas among Muslims inside and outside the empire was the Muslim press. Since the 1870s, certain Ottoman periodicals had become the mouthpiece of Pan-Islamism. The most prominent of them, *Basiret,* an Istanbul daily, propagated the idea that world Islamic unity should be realized under the leadership of the Ottoman caliphate.[4] The same newspaper also urged Muslims to support Muslim resistance in Algeria and India.

Under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the Pan-Islamic press campaign continued to flourish and many additional periodicals were founded. Among them was *Mizan* (The Balance), which began publication in Istanbul in 1886 as a weekly magazine under editor-in-chief Mehmed Murad (1853-1912), called Mizancı. A native of Daghestan, and educated in Russia, Murad immigrated to the Ottoman Empire and became a professor of history and philosophy at the *Mülkiye* (School of Civil Service, established to train personnel for the Tanzimat bureaucracy in Istanbul on 12 February 1859). In his articles in *Mizan,* Murad advocated an Islamic constitutional regime where the sultan's authority would be limited by the provisions of the *şeriat,* particularly by those which ordained the establishment of a regime of *meşveret.* Although he pleaded for a constitutional regime, the concept of

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[1]Caesar Farah, "Reassessing Sultan Abdülhamid II's Islamic Policy." *Archivum Ottomanicum* 14 (1995/1996): p. 192.
[2]Ibid., p. 194.
[3]Kemal Karpat, "Pan-Islamizm ve İkinci Abdülhamid: Yanlış bir Görüşün Düzeltilmesi." *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 48 (June 1987): pp. 11-37.
[4]Ibid., p. 57.

hilafet was central in Murad's political thought.[1] It was apparently for this reason that he later reconciled with Abdülhamid and shifted his focus from political liberalism to Pan-Islamism, believing that this could be realized under the aegis of the Ottoman sultan. Considering that the majority of the empire's Muslims were Arabs, the Ottoman government largely relied on the Arabic press to carry on its Pan-Islamic propaganda. *Al-Jawāib* was the major Arabic periodical published in the Ottoman Empire which engaged in Pan-Islamic propaganda. Printed in Istanbul and supported financially by the Palace, it was at the service of the Hamidian regime. This paper became especially well-known during France's invasion of Tunisia in 1881 because of its role in fostering resistance to the French.[2]

To strengthen his authority in the Arab provinces and to integrate them into the Ottoman system, Abdülhamid increasingly employed civil servants and officers of Arab origin in the Ottoman administration.[3] He also founded a special boarding school in Istanbul where the sons of Arab tribal chiefs received government scholarships.[4] Abdülhamid also established direct and personal relations with many important Arab tribal chiefs to bring them under his control. One of the most important of these sheiks was Ibn Reshid, the amir of Shammar who had the privilege of communicating directly with the sultan by using a private telegraph code.[5]

Besides certain sufi *tarikat*s and the press, other Pan-Islamic propaganda tools used by Abdülhamid included emissaries. During his long reign, the sultan sent many delegations and emissaries to many corners of the Muslim world in order to propagate his version of Pan-Islamism and to establish his spiritual authority over Muslims in Asia and Africa. It was for this reason that many Ottoman delegations were dispatched to Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, China, Java, and central and eastern Africa.[6]

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[1]For an extensive study of Mizancı Murad's life and thought, see Birol Emil, *Mizancı Murad Bey: hayatı ve eserleri*. (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979). (Hereafter cited as Birol, *Mizancı*).

[2]Landau, *Politics*, pp. 60-62.

[3]Engin Akarlı "Abdulhamid's Islamic Policy in the Arab Provinces." *in Türk-Arap İlişkileri: Geçmişte, Bugün ve Gelecekte*. (Ankara, 1979), p. 53.

[4]Ibid., p. 54.

[5]Ibid., p. 55.

[6]S. H. Fitzjohn, "The Sultan and Central Africa,"*The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record* 10 (July-October, 1900): pp. 282-299.

In his Pan-Islamist policy, Abdülhamid was assisted by a number of sheikhs, *naqib*s, amirs and other Muslim dignitaries who not only served as his counsellors but also as his instruments of policy. The most notorious and influential of them was Sheikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi.[1] Al-Sayyadi was a sheikh of the Rifa'i order in Aleppo who, besides organizing the *tarikat* network in the Arab provinces in an effort to consolidate the sultan's power, also wrote many Pan-Islamist pamphlets to justify Abdülhamid II's right to the caliphate. He also publicized the doctrine of the Rifaiyah order among Muslims. According to B. Abu-Manneh there are 212 publications bearing al-Sayyadi's name, almost all of which were published between 1880 and 1908. In his writings he defended the view that the system of absolute government in Islam derives from basic religious tenets and can be cited from the Quranic verse "Obey God, his prophet, and those entrusted with authority among you." This view was the complete opposite of that defended by his much more famous nemesis, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) an internationally renowned Muslim political writer and activist.[2]

Early in 1892 the sultan invited Jamal ad-Din to Istanbul. While Abdülhamid's intentions were to make al-Afghani a valuable instrument in his Pan-Islamist policy, he soon became suspicious of his activities and placed al-Afghani under strict surveillance and comfortable confinement. The sultan was responding to rumors that Afghani was involved in a British plot to establish an Arab caliphate in cooperation with the khedive of Egypt Abbas Hilmi.[3] Consequently, Afghani was severely restricted in pursuing Pan-Islamist activities in the Ottoman capital; he could, however, correspond with the Shi'i ulema of Iraq and Iran in order to garner their support for the sultan's policies and bring the Ottoman Shi'i population under his influence.[4] Afghani died in Istanbul in 1897 of cancer of the jaw. Rumors that he had been poisoned by the sultan were false.[5]

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[1]For a very interesting study on Abulhuda al-Sayyadi and his relations with Sultan Abdulhamid II, see B. Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdülhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," *Middle Eastern Studies* 15/2 (May 1979): pp. 131-153.

[2]For an excellent study of the life and works of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, see Nikkie R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

[3]Ibid., p. 383.

[4]For the efforts of the Ottoman government to gain the support of the Shii ulema and population in its Mesopotamian provinces but also in Iran, see Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II, (1876-1909)". *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 23 (August 1991): pp. 345-359.

[5]Ibid., p. 420.

The important position that Jamal al-Din Afghani occupied was not due to his theoretical contributions to modern Islamic thought and his political activism. The anti-imperialist, Pan-Islamist ideas that he endeavored to spread across the Muslim world were engendered by Young Ottoman thinkers, especially by Namık Kemal, and adopted by Sultan Abdülhamid II as his regime's principal ideology.

Afghani first expounded his Pan-Islamist ideas in a long letter (probably written during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878) to an Ottoman statesman in the hope of its being presented to the sultan. In the letter, he proposed the formation of a defensive alliance against Russian expansionism lead by the Ottoman sultan and composed of the three major Muslim powers of Western and Central Asia, namely the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Afghanistan. With this pact, Afghani envisioned the first concrete step towards the realization of the "Unity of Islam" (*ittihād-ı islamiye*) and the "union of community" (*ittifāq-ı umma*).[1] Furthermore, he hoped to obtain British support for this project through the mediation of Indian Muslims, and eventually to provoke a war between Russia and Britain over Central Asia. Such confrontations would, he hoped, wear down the two imperial powers and ultimately force them to give up their domination over the Muslim world.

Besides being a fervent advocate of the unity of the Muslim world, Afghani also encouraged the creation of local nationalist movements. The articles he wrote in India between 1879 and 1882 echoed his earlier teachings in Egypt in the 1870s in that they put much emphasis on a nation's culture and its pre-Islamic heritage.[2] Afghani believed that Egyptian and Indian Muslims should be proud of their pre-Islamic heritage and should treasure it because it would foster their development. On this point Afghani's teachings were in complete opposition to what Said Halim felt about pre-Islamic heritage. (Afghani strongly emphasized this pre-Islamic aspect in Indian nationalism as opposed to Pan-Islamism in order to unite all Indians — both Hindus and Muslims — against British imperialism.) This modification in his campaign is an example of his pragmatic approach to anti-imperialism.

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[1] Ibid., p. 135.
[2] Ibid., pp. 159-160.

PAN-ISLAMISM IN SAİD HALİM'S THOUGHT

In spite of a general awakening in the Muslim world, Said Halim perceived a potential danger in the increasing encroachment of European imperalism on Muslim lands. The apprehension felt by the European powers about their Muslim colonies was caused by their misconception of the nature and aims of this Pan-Islamic revival. Said Halim asserted that, contrary to what Europeans thought, the latter movement did not harbour a belligerent character and certainly did not preach the rallying of Muslims around a despotic authority which would encourage supporters to commit massacres. Pan-Islamism, in his view, represented neither a political union of peoples belonging to the same faith, nor it was an occult religious sect or secret politicial association; rather, it was the leading voice of progress and liberty in Muslim societies.

For Said Halim, the idea of Pan-Islam represented the desire of the intellectual elites of Muslim countries to ensure the salvation of the Islamic world through liberty and progress. Pan-Islamism represented the revival of an Islamic conscience among Muslims all over the world who were determined to liberate themselves from the shackles of ignorance and servitude by improving their intellectual prowess, their capacities and their material condition. Said Halim maintained that the oppressors of the Muslim peoples were not only their Western colonizers, but also their own despotic rulers who were directly responsible for the present degradation of Muslims by keeping them through coercion in a state of ignorance and servility and hindering their development. Therefore, he declared that Muslims had to unite not only against European colonialism, but also against despotic potentates who ruled over them oppressively, even if one of these were the caliph himself.[1]

After refuting the view that Pan-Islamism preached enmity against Christian Europe, Said Halim commented on political and social revolutions in Europe and compared them with the modern Islamic revival. Since, he argued, it was accepted that these revolutions were pursued in the name of liberty and progress, the West had no right to accuse the Pan-Islamic movement of fanaticism when, like the revolutions in Europe, it aspired to establish the rules of liberty and progress in Muslim lands.[2] The Pan-Islamic revival, affirmed Said Halim, would restore to the Islamic World its former might and splendor by emancipating it from the decay of its civilization.

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[1] Said Halim, *Pan-Islamisme*, pp. 5, 8-9.
[2] Ibid., p. 6.

According to Said Halim, Muslim ulema had come into contact with the scholastic ideas during the Crusades through their dealings with Christian European clergy. Eventually, this scholasticism began to dominate Islamic intellectual life and to hinder its development.[1] Thus, whereas Afghani considered the Pan-Islamic movement primarily as a rallying ideology for the Muslim world to fight Western colonial encroachments, Said Halim believed that Pan-Islamism would lead to the regeneration of Muslim society through a revival of past accomplishments. This is very much reminiscent of Muhammad Abduh's position who sought the salvation of the Muslim World in an intellectual and religious awakening more than in an anti-imperialist political struggle against the colonial powers.

Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), one of the most prominent and influential Muslim modernist thinkers of that era, had first embarked on his intellectual and political career as a disciple and collaborator of Jamal-ad-Din al-Afghani. In 1884, they published in Paris *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqā* (The Firm Bond), a short lived but famous Pan-Islamist journal which played a crucial role in the awakening of Muslim consciousness and the spread of Pan-Islamist ideas in Muslim lands. While they shared the same goals and ideals, Abduh proposed different methods of emancipation than his mentor. Instead of revolutionary activism, Abduh advocated gradual reform in order to heal the ills of Muslim societies and reverse their inner decay.

According to Abduh, Islam is a rational religion; indeed, the Qur'an urges man to investigate Allah's creation by using his intellect. For Abduh, the real Muslim is the one who thinks and acts according to reason. In his view, Muslims had generally accepted that in case of disaccord between rational and traditional explanations of a given matter, precedence would be given to the one based on reason.

Islamic teaching had for centuries been kept under restraint by the ulema who relied heavily on *taqlid*. In his *Risāla*, writing on the commentary on Chapter II, Verse 243 of the Qur'an, Abduh accused "those who believe in *taqlid*" to be very far "from the guidance of the *Kur'an* " and reproached the ulema for "infecting the hearts of the masses with *taklīd*."[2] Abduh refuted the reasoning of the vindicators of the *taqlid* who argued that only members of the *Salaf* or early generation of Muslims were able to understand the true meaning

[1] Ibid., p. 9; Said Halim Pacha, *Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane* (Rome: Imprimerie Editrice Italia, 1921), pp. 7, 18.
[2] Adams, *Islam and Modernism,* pp. 130-131.

of Qur'anic principles correctly and that later generations should therefore follow them without question. This argument, asserted Abduh, contradicted the real message of Islam, which "turned aside the hearts of men from exclusive attachment to customs and practices of the fathers which had been handed down from father to son." "Islam," he said, "attributed folly and levity to those who accept blindly the words of their predecessors."[1] According to Abduh:

> precedence in point of time [in Islam] [was] not a mark of superiority of intellect or intelligence; but that the preceding generations and the later are on an equality so far as critical acumen and natural abilities are concerned. Indeed, the later generations have a knowledge of past circumstances and a capacity to reflect upon them, and to profit by the effects of them in the world, which have survived until their times, that the fathers and the forefathers who preceded them did not have.[2]

It is evident from the above that Muhammad Abduh preferred the modern interpretation of Islam proposed by the current generation. Having said that, he urged Muslims in his writings "to understand the religion [of Islam] as the early generation understood it, before the appearance of divisions among them."[3] What Abduh was critical of was the slavish imitation of and the opinionated adherence to the doctrines of medieval Muslim jurists.

According to Abduh, the reforms of Muhammad Ali had divided Egyptian society into two groups. On one side stood the conservative Muslim majority loyal to their traditions and hostile to any kind of reform and on the other side stood the Western-minded minority who wanted to Westernize and modernize Egypt and who held little respect for her traditional Islamic heritage. Since, says Abduh, the latter controlled the country's political and economic power, their influence was enabling them to gain ground at the expense of traditional Muslims. Muhammad Ali and his successors had tried to modernize Egypt by importing and "planting European institutions and laws to her soil".[4] Although Abduh did not deny the benefits that accrued from the efforts to modernize Egypt, he argued that importing foreign institutions and laws could not really work because they were alien to the country. Also, the country's citizens would not understand them and would consequentely not comply with them. These same ideas were adopted by Said Halim in his criticism of the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire.

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[1] Ibid., p. 132.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., p. 174.
[4] Hourani, *Arabic Thought,* p. 137.

Because the ideas of Abduh like those of the Afghani and Young Ottomans constituted a bridge between traditional Islamists like the ulema and Westernists, he gained the sympathy and respect of both parties. While traditional Islamists considered him to be a defender of Islamic values against Westernizing reforms, Westernists admired his patriotic and enlightened approach. Nevertheless, it is also true that Abduh was the object of severely critical attacks of a coalition of thinkers in the final years of his tenure as the chief mufti of Egypt. Many of his so-called opponents were also less Islamists than Abduh. Among them we can mention Mustafa Kamil who criticized Abduh "because he cared too much for having official influence"[1], and Qasim Amin (1865-1908) who declared that "Sharia was the first law to provide for the equality of women with men"[2]. Although Abduh was a conservative-modernist Muslim thinker, his ideas prepared the ground, especially in Egypt, for the further development of secularism. Indeed, most of his disciples later became secularist thinkers.[3] According to Albert Hourani, by challenging the traditional interpretation of the ulema, Abduh unintentionially exposed Islam to the devastating influences of modernity. Abduh, argues Hourani, "had intended to build a wall against secularism; he had in fact provided an easy bridge by which it could capture one position after another".[4]

As for Abduh's attitude toward folk Islam, it was at best ambivalent: while he believed in the existence of holy men in Islam who were friends of the Prophet (*awliyā)* and recognized their extraordinary power in granting *karāma*s or wonders and grace-gifts, he could not accept their capacity of performing *mujizāt* (miracles). He criticized those who expected favors and intercessions from dead saints by visiting their tombs.

Another Muslim modernist thinker was Hayreddin Pasha of Tunis (1822-1889).[5] He was born in the Caucasus and brought to Istanbul as a young boy in order to be raised in the household of a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat. In 1840 he was recruited into the service of Ahmad Bey of Tunis where his talents allowed him to advance rapidly to prominence. In 1873 he

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[1]Ibid., p. 160.
[2]Ibid., p. 164.
[3]Ibid., pp. 159-161.
[4]Ibid., p. 144.
[5]For the political career and thought of Hayreddin Pasha, see Magali Morsy, *Essai sur les réformes nécessaires aux états musulmans* (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1987), annotated; see also Alaaddin A. Çetin, *Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa.* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988). (Hereafter cited as Morsy, *Essai*). See also Ibrahim Abu-Lughud, "The Islamic influence on Khayr Al-Din of Tunis." in Donald P. Little ed. *Essays on Islamic Civilization, presented to Niyazi Berkes*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976, pp. 9-24. (Hereafter cited as, Abu-Lughud, "Islamic Influence").

became the prime minister of Tunisia, a position which he held despite the growing interference of the colonial powers in Tunisian internal affairs and suspicions of the bey. In September 1878, following his dismissal by the bey, Hayreddin Pasha returned to Istanbul and entered the service of the Ottoman State. In December 1878 he was appointed grand vizir by Abdülhamid II. Hayreddin submitted to the sultan many lengthy reports by proposing the administrative, financial, and judicial reforms. Although some of his reform projects had been implemented and increased government efficiency, he eventually came into conflict with Abdülhamid on the issue of extending the power of the grand vizir and the ministers. The sultan considered this as an encroachment upon his authority.[1] Consequently he was dismissed and spent the rest of his life in retirement.

Hayreddin Pasha expounded his social and political ideas in a work published in Tunis in 1867 under the title of *Aqwām al-Masālik fī Ma'rifat Aḥwal al Mamālik* (The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries) which has been partially translated into French and published in Paris under the title of *Réformes nécessaires aux États musulmans*. In his work, Hayreddin Pasha leveled criticism at Islamic civilization and compared it with the West whose progress had aroused his admiration. Muslim countries, advocated Hayreddin Pasha, should emulate Europe in their modernization. He thoroughly supported the reforms of the Tanzimat which, in his view benefitted the Ottoman Empire.[2] Here he differed from Said Halim Pasha who severely criticized these reforms as detrimental to Ottoman society. Ercüment Kuran, a modern Turkish scholar, has argued that Said Halim's political ideas were inspired by those of Hayreddin.[3] Instead, it can safely be said that in many aspects they are contradictory. Hayreddin declared that the Tanzimat reforms had been opposed by those who did not wish the Ottoman Empire to become a strong state. These opponents included the European powers and local pashas, who having been used to ruling arbitrarily, discovered that their personal interests had been checked by the new regime's centralization.[4] The major difference between the political theories of Hayreddin and Said Halim is that whereas the latter clearly advocates a parliamentary regime under the auspices of the *şeriat*, Hayreddin does not require more than the establishment of a certain control and checks over the acts and deeds of the sultan's government by giving power to the ulama and

[1]Akarlı, *The problems*, pp. 104-119.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ercümend Kuran, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İslam düşüncesinin gelişmesi." *Türk Kültürü* (November 1978): pp. 275-281.
[4]Morsy, *Essai*, p. 117.

certain other influencial sectors of the society. According to Ibrahim Abu-Lughud, "Hayreddin was more inclined to support a certain curtailment of the absolute power of the sultan rather than to promote popular representative institutions".[1]

According to Hayreddin, internal strife and divisions between Muslims caused the decline of the Islamic world, despite the rich and solid cultural heritage of Muslim nations that could help them to develop rapidly and restore them to their former splendor.[2] The Ottoman sultans, said Hayreddin, had tried to check the decline of their empire by promulgating the *kanunname*s (sultanic edicts). The content and style of Hayreddin's work exhibit a quite different character from those of Said Halim. Unlike in the writings of the latter, in Hayreddin's work social and political ideas were mainly expounded on a bare theoretical basis with very little reference to a detailed historical information and with almost no citations from other thinkers; Hayreddin's *Aqwām* is heavily loaded with historical and encyclopedic knowledge and contains lengthy references and quotations from the works of many Muslim and Western thinkers, scholars and statesmen.

The common goal of these Islamist thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was to stop the internal decline of Islamdom and to resist the encroachment of European imperalism which threatened the Muslim world. These two phenomena were intrinsically connected to each other. Islamism was in many ways a by-product of the rise of the some Western states as a technological, economic and political powers and its subsequent domination over the rest of the globe. The ascendence of these Western Powers has been associated historically with the age of modernity. Islamism as a political ideology emerged as a response to the impact of modernity on the Muslim world, but is itself a modern phenomenon as well. On this issue, Ira Lapidus concluded correctly: "contemporary Islamic movements are both a response to the conditions of modernity — to the centralization of state power and the development of capitalist economies — and a cultural expression of modernity."[3] The political and intellectual career of Said Halim Pasha, which I will discuss in the following chapters, represented this Muslim response both to the threat of European imperalism and to the internal decline of Islamdom.

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[1]Ibrahim Abu-Lughud, "The Islamic Influence." p. 22.
[2]Morsy, *Essai,* pp. 113-114.
[3]Ira Lapidus. "Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms." *JESHO* 40: pp. 445-457.

CHAPTER TWO: THE LIFE AND EARLY POLITICAL CAREER OF SAİD HALİM PASHA SET IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Said Halim was born in Cairo at the palace of *Şubra* on 28 January 1865.[1] He was the grandson of Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt.

In 1869, Said Halim's father Prince Halim Pasha was forced to leave Egypt in the wake of a dispute between him and the ruling khedive, Ismail Pasha (1863-1879) over the matter of succession.[2] In 1866 Prince Halim, the younger son of Muhammad Ali, had been deprived of his right to assume the khedivate by a *ferman* (Imperial edict) issued by the Ottoman sultan, Abdülaziz (1861-1876), suzerain of Egypt.[3] The new law of succession was based on primogeniture, thereby depriving the other male members of the khedive's family of any claim to the throne. The real motive behind this exclusion was Khedive Ismail's desire to secure the Egyptian throne for his own son Tawfiq (1879-1892).[4] The khedive won the support of the sultan for his case by means of some fiscal concessions. Reacting to this change which excluded him from the line of succession to the Egyptian throne, Prince Halim attempted a coup d'État in order to overthrow the khedive. The coup was aborted and Prince Halim was exiled.

After leaving Egypt, Prince Halim and his six-year-old son Said Halim moved to Istanbul. Upon arriving to the Ottoman capital Halim Pasha bought a *yalı* (mansion built on the seaside) in Balta Limanı.[5] Halim Pasha also

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[1] Sadr-i Azam Fehametlu, Devletlu, Prens Said Halim Paşa hazretlerinin Tercüme-i hal-i saileri. Bab-i Ali Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Müdüriyeti. Copy found in the Private Papers of Said Halim Pasha in possesion of Rukiye Kuneralp (hereafter called Tercüme-i Hal). This data is based on the information given by Princess Zeyneb Halim, daughter of Abbas Halim Pasha and niece of Said Halim Pasha, during an interview she granted me in her residence in Salacak, Istanbul. (Hereafter cited as Interview, Z. Halim, 2001). For Said Halim's birthday, different authors suggest different dates: for example Mahmud Kemal İnal wrote in his famous biographical work *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar* that Said Halim Pasha was born on 1863 (11 Ramazan 1280); Bostan, in his biographical work of *Said Halim Pasha, Bir Islamcı Düşünür*, gives the date of 21 February 1864, basing his claim on records of Sicil-i Ahval. My sources are the official biography that Said Halim dictated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the family notes, in particular, the notes of Abbas Halim Pasha which are in the possession of Princess Zeyneb Halim.

[2] Ibid.

[3] G. Douin, *Histoire du règne du Khédive Ismail* (Roma: Instituto Poligrafico della Stato, 1933), vol. 1, pp. 218-220. For the English version of the *ferman* changing the order of succession, see Thomas Erskine Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question, a Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875), pp. 114-116.

[4] Ibid., pp. 205-207.

[5] (Interview, Z. Halim, 2001).

erected a smaller residence on the edge of the forest facing his property. This one was called *Süngerli Köşk* (Sponge Kiosk) because of the texture of its marble walls.[1] Halim Pasha also constructed a hunting lodge in Alemdağ, near the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus.[2] Sultan Abdülhamid immediately built a gendarme station just outside the boundaries of Halim Pasha's property in order to watch him.[3] At the mansion of his father the young Said Halim learned from his tutors, among other things, Arabic, Persian, French, and English. In 1880 when he was fifteen, Said Halim was sent with his younger brother Abbas Halim to Geneva to further pursue his education. Said Halim stayed five years in Switzerland where he studied political science.

After returning to Istanbul in 1885, Said Halim and his brother Abbas Halim were presented by their father to the sultan with these words, "I brought up two slaves for your Majesty".[4] Sultan Abdülhamid decorated Said Halim with the second rank *Mecidi* Order, and bestowed upon him the title of pasha on 13 May 1888[5]. On 21 May 1888, he was appointed to the State Council. This was followed by a series of honors and decorations awarded by the sultan. In February 1889, he received the order of *ali-i Osmani*, second rank, (*İkinci rütbeden nişan-i ali-i Osmani);* on 23 April 1892, the order of *ali-i Osmani*, first rank (*Birinci rütbeden nişan-i-âli-i Osmani);* and on 17 November 1899, the jeweled medal of Sultan Mecid (*Murassa Mecidi nişan-i zi sani*). On 22 September 1900, Said Halim Pasha was promoted to the rank of *Rumeli Beylerbeyi*.[6] All of these awards and honors were bestowed upon Said Halim by the sultan because of his desire to assure the pasha's loyalty and to prevent him from joining the opposition. In 1894 the father of Said Halim, Halim Pasha died[7]. The following year in 1895 Said Halim Pasha married Princess Emine Tosun granddaughter of Said Pacha, *vali* of Egypt and himself son of Muhammad Ali Pasha[8]. From this marriage Said Halim had two sons: Prince Mehmed Halim (b. April 1896) and Prince İbrahim Halim (1898-1964).[9]

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid.
[5]İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), p. 1893. (Hereafter cited as İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*).
[6]Ibid.
[7](Interview. Z. Halim, 2001).
[8](Tercüme-i Hal).
[9]Ibid; (Interview, Z. Halim, 2001).

After the death of Said Halim's father, Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha seized the property of Said Halim and his brother in Egypt. Nevertheless, Said Halim managed to get his property back with the support of Lord Cromer, the British high commissioner in Egypt.[1]

During the same period, opposition to Abdülhamid was growing, and secret societies devoted to the cause of overthrowing him were being organized abroad, especially in Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Cairo, as well as inside the empire. The most important of these societies was the Ottoman Society of Union and Progress which had been founded by a group of medical students on 1 May 1889 under the name of the Society for Ottoman Unity (İttihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti).[2] The members of this association were known in Europe as *Jeunes Turcs* (Young Turks) and their ultimate objective was to bring down the Hamidian regime and proclaim the Constitution.

Despite Abdülhamid's efforts to suppress it, the Young Turk movement spread through diverse levels of Ottoman society and succeeded in extending the scope of its membership outside student circles and especially those attending modern professional schools where it had first developed. As the movement grew, it attracted new adherents from various groups in the empire including the army, the *İlmiye* and the civilian bureaucracy.

The Young Turks experienced a setback between 1897 and 1899, due to the desertion of Mehmed Murad Bey to the Hamidian cause and the Ottoman victory over Greece in 1897, which enhanced Abdülhamid's prestige and strengthened his position. Mehmed Murad had been the natural leader of the Young Turk movement in Europe against the Hamidian regime until he was convinced by the sultan to return to Istanbul. Murad was a Pan-Islamist and in his writings he defended the ideal of a constitutional Islamic regime.[3] Nevertheless, in the early stage of his intellectual life Murad was against the parliamentary regime and the reestablishment of the 1876 Constitution.[4] His conviction that the salvation of Muslims and the survival of the Ottoman

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[1](Interview, Z. Halim, 2001).

[2]For the foundation of the Society of Union and Progress see Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük* vol. 1 *(1889-1902)* Istanbul: İletişim yayınları, 1986. (Hereafter cited as Hanioğlu, *İttihat*), also see, Doctor İbrahim Temo, *Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Teşekkülü ve Hidematı Vatniye (sic) ve İnkilabı Milliye Dair Hatıratım.* (Romanya: Mecidiye, 1939), pp. 16-18. According to Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, the Society of Union and Progress was founded in 1308 (1892); Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkilap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler* (Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1948), p. 30. (Hereafter cited as Kuran, *İnkilap).*

[3]Birol, *Mizancı*, p. 345.

[4]Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları 1964). pp. 62-63.

Empire could only be assured by a strong caliphate eventually resulted in a reconciliation with the sultan. Another important feature in Murad's thought was his Russian-educated background. The effects of this could be seen in his ideas on Turkism which developed under the influence of the ideas of the slavophiles in Russia.[1] An equally important influence from Russian intellectualism was his defence of peasants' rigths.[2] Unlike Murad who later compromised with the sultan and returned to Istanbul, Ahmed Rıza remained intransigent in his fight against the Hamidian autocracy and continued to serve as the torchbearer of Young Turk ideology by diffusing his ideas through his journal *Mechveret*. By late 1899, the tables began to turn when a prominent member of the imperial family, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha (1853-1903), husband of the sultan's sister, arrived in Paris with his two sons Sabaheddin and Lutfullah to join the Young Turk opposition. This constituted a severe blow to Abdülhamid's prestige, and in reaction he intensified his grip on the top bureaucracy and his immediate entourage.[3] Disturbed by this suffocating atmosphere, Said Halim lost interest in public affairs and started to neglect his duties on the State Council and to withdraw to his mansion (*yalı*) on the Bosphorus.[4] There he devoted most of his time and energy to the study of Islamic history and institutions and began to reflect on the crisis which afflicted contemporary Muslim world. Even these intellectual activities did not pass unnoticed by the vigilant censors of an autocratic regime which was intolerant of any activity which raised the suspicions of the sultan. Consequently, upon a report by a *jurnalcı* (an informant for Abdülhamid's intelligence service), Said Halim's residence was searched and he himself was required to leave the country and not to return.[5]

Said Halim went first to Paris in winter 1905[6] where he officially became a member of the CUP. Later he went to Egypt where he had built a palace for himself on Champollion Street by the Italian architect Antonio Lasciac.[7] There he became the biggest shareholder of the Société Belgo-

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[1]Ibid, pp. 75-76.

[2]Ibid., p. 72.

[3]Paul Fesch, *Constantinople aux derniers jours d'Abdul Hamid* (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1907), p. 358.

[4]Feroz Ahmad, "Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed." *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic World* vol. 3. (Hereafter cited as Ahmad, Said Halim), p. 459.

[5]Hanefi Bostan, *Said Halim Paşa* (Istanbul: İrfan Yayınevi, 1992), p. 22 (Hereafter cited as Bostan, Said Halim).

[6](Tercüme-i Hal), (Interview, Z. Halim, 2001).

[7]Information based on the private papers of Said Halim. Today Said Halim's palace in Cairo houses *Nasiriya* School. See also "The Grand Vezir's Palace" by Samir Raafat, *Cairo Times*, 7 June 2001.

Egyptienne de Ezbekié founded in 1899 in Uzbekié, a district in Cairo.[1] He also established direct, close relations with the Young Turk movement and provided financial support for the journal *Osmanlı*.[2] Said Halim took on the responsibility of inspector of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1906.[3] Presumably, Said Halim had already been in contact with the Young Turks while living in Istanbul.[4] Indeed, his brother Mehmed Ali Halim Pasha was one of the organizers of the Young Ottoman Conference (Yeni Osmanlı Kongresi) held in Brindisi, Italy in 1899 and his other brother Abbas Halim Pasha supported the Young Turks. Judging by a letter written from Paris on 24 October 1901 to Şerif Pasha, Ahmed Rıza mentioned that he had had a meeting with Abbas Halim.[5]

Under Khedive Abbas Hilmi's administration (1892-1914), Egypt became a sanctuary for Young Turk opposition to the Hamidian regime. This was fully in keeping with Said Halim's relations with the movement and not an individual deviance from the official policy of the khedivial family vis-à-vis the Young Turks.

Meanwhile in Europe, the Young Turk movement was experiencing an internal crisis. Prens Sabaheddin (1877-1948), the elder son of Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, had decided to challenge the leadership of Ahmed Rıza Bey. Unlike the latter, who believed in a strongly centralized country and the necessity of state intervention in order to encourage economic development, Prens Sabaheddin argued that only a policy of decentralization coupled with a liberal economy would rejuvenate the empire. Heavily influenced by Le Play's social theories and by the epoch-making work of his disciple, Edmond Demolins, *À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?,* Prens Sabaheddin argued that societies based on individualism prosper, whereas those having a communal system are doomed to stagnation. The former condition was, according to him, characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries, the latter of Ottoman society. Therefore, said Prens Sabaheddin, in order to regenerate the empire, the government should adopt an individualistic system, encourage free enterprise, and establish a political system based on decentralization whereby every province would be administered by its local government.[6]

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Hanioğlu, *İttihat*, p. 387.
[3]Kuran, *Inkilap*, p. 212.
[4]Ibid., p. 131.
[5]Ibid., pp. 165-166.
[6]Prens Sabaheddin, *Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve tevsi-i mezuniyet hakkında bir izah* (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Kütüphane-i Cihan, no date), pp. 2-5.

Halim Pasha, Said Halim Pasha's father.

Said Halim Pasha as a young man.

Said Halim Pasha as grand vizir.

Said Halim Pasha's wife, Princess Emine Tosun.

Said Halim Pasha's brother, Abbas Halim Pasha.

An Islamıst thinker. Said Halim by an Ottoman cartoonist.

Sabaheddin's advocacy of self-rule was strongly supported by non-Turkish groups of the anti-Hamidian coalition, especially by Armenian organizations which also advocated recourse to foreign intervention in order to depose the sultan.[1] Fearing the potential for dismemberment of the empire, Ahmed Rıza categorically opposed such a scheme. These dissenting views finally resulted in a deadlock in the 1902 Young Turk Congress. Opposition was divided between two main branches, the first revolving around Ahmed Rıza and the second around Prens Sabaheddin. In 1906, in order to diffuse his ideas, Prens Sabaheddin started to publish a journal, *Terakki* (Progress), and established an association known as the Teşebbüs-ü şahsi-ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (League for Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative).

The years between 1903 and 1908 were marked by a series of important events which made a decisive impact on the collapse of the Hamidian regime. In 1903, after declaring that their interests in the empire were threatened, Russia, Austria, and Italy resorted to gunboat diplomacy and sent their warships into Ottoman waters.[2] In 1904 an international force composed of Russian, Austrian, Italian, French, and British gendarmerie officers was sent to Macedonia in order to assist the Ottoman troops in maintaining law and order. The following year the same powers proposed to the Porte the establishment of financial control over Macedonia. Faced with Abdülhamid's refusal, they occupied the customs and post offices of Midilli (Lesbos) and Limni (Lemnos) islands in order to compel the sultan to accept their terms.[3]

All these foreign transgressions of Ottoman sovereignty and the sultan's impotence in their wake generated frustation in army circles, causing many to believe in the necessity of military intervention in order to save the empire from total disintegration.

On 27-29 December 1907 various Young Turk associations held a congress in Paris, the second since 1902, in order to resolve their differences and decide upon a strategy against the common foe, the Hamidian regime. This

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[1]François Georgeon, "Le dernier sursaut (1878-1908)." in Robert Mantran ed., *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*. (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 572. (Hereafter cited as Georgeon, Dernier sursaut); Shaw and Shaw, *History*, p. 258.; see also Ramsaur, *Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 71. (Hereafter cited as Ramsaur, *Young Turks*).

[2]Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Hereafter cited as BOA).,Yıldız Tasnifi Sadaret Hususi Evrakı, Dosya no 447, sıra no. 95.

[3]Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkilabı Tarihi* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), vol. 1, p. 182 (Hereafter cited as Bayur, *Türk*).

time, unlike the first Young Turk Congress, Prens Sabaheddin's group and the Armenian revolutionaries managed to gain the upper hand: they obtained approval for several violent measures designed to overthrow the Hamidian regime and to restore the Constitution.[1]

During this time Said Halim stayed in Egypt as inspector of the CUP and continued to provide financial support to Young Turk activities there and in Paris. In his memoirs, Ahmed Rıza mentioned the name of Said Halim Pasha among other members of the Egyptian khedivial family who financially supported the Young Turk movement in exile.[2] Rıza also wrote that it was only after Said Halim Pasha found the necessary money that Enver and Niyazi could start their rebellion against the sultan in Resne.[3] Meanwhile Said Halim regularly corresponded with leading members of the Committee in Paris (Ahmed Rıza's group). Most of the letters he received in return were from two prominent Unionists who were struggling to give a more solid structure to the Committee, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir (1877-1922) and Dr. Nazım (1870-1926).[4] In Egypt, Said Halim Pasha received letters from Bahaeddin Şakir asking the pasha to establish a CUP branch in Cairo and publish an Arabic supplement of the *Şura-yi Ümmet*. Said Halim refused these requests on the grounds that the free-willed and non-conformist attitude of the Young Turk community in Egypt would not help the cause and that Egyptians showed a complete lack of interest in it.[5] Indeed, in his reply to Bahaeddin Şakir, Said Halim also wrote that an Arabic edition of the *Şura-yi Ümmet* would be futile since the masses in Egypt were not interested in politics and the elite was merely occupied with their national politics, which consisted of "driving the British out of Egypt".[6] In their struggle against the British, wrote Said Halim, Egyptian nationalists relied on the help of the Ottoman government and the palace; therefore, he said, they would not side with the Young Turks.[7]

The arrival of the Constitutional Revolution of 23 July 1908 had been anticipated by a series of minor rebellions and mutinies across the empire.[8] The number of mutinies gradually increased from early in 1906 until they

[1] Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 127.
[2] Ahmed Rıza, *Meclis-i Mebusan ve Ayan Reisi Ahmed Rıza Bey'in Anıları* (Istanbul: Arba, 1988), pp. 19-20.
[3] Ibid., p. 20.
[4] Kuran, *İnkilap*, pp. 210-213.
[5] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation For a Revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 164. (Hereafter cited as Hanioğlu, *Preparation*)
[6] Ibid, p. 165.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 130.

reached a climax in June 1908.[1] Most of these uprisings were in fact acts of insubordination by the troops whose salaries had been in arrears for a long period of time. Moreover, riots broke out in several provinces, most of them in eastern Anatolia, because of the misrule and oppression of the governors there. A bad harvest followed by the harsh 1907-1908 winter in these regions worsened the situation. A very interesting aspect of these rebellions in eastern Anatolia was the close collaboration of the Armenian revolutionary organisation, Dashaktsutiun with their Muslim counterparts who rebelled against the sultan's government.[2] Meanwhile, the Committee consolidated its position in Macedonia. Its membership was increasing among the officers of the Third Army and among both non-Muslim and Muslim inhabitants of the province.

During the period of June-July 1908 revolutionary activities in Macedonia suddenly gained momentum and the Hamidian administration lost control of the situation. On 7 July, Şemsi Pasha, one of the sultan's most faithful generals who had been entrusted with the suppression of the revolutionary movement in Macedonia, was shot dead at Manastır. The Palace reacted to this open challenge by dispatching new troops from Anatolia to Selanik. These troops proved to be reluctant to fight and instead joined the rebels.[3] During the same period, the Muslim population of Manastır rioted against the sultan's administration. All of these events constituted a severe blow to the authority of the Hamidian regime.

On 23 July 1908 the Constitution was declared by the Committee, first in Manastır, and then within the next few hours in other Macedonian cities including Üsküb and Serez. Informed officially about the situation in a telegram sent by his highest ranking official in Macedonia, Inspector-General Hilmi Pasha (1855-1923), the sultan, after a night of deliberation with the State Council, finally accepted the *fait accompli* and gave the necessary orders for the official proclamation of the Constitution on the morning of 24 July.[4]

The Constitution had been restored as a result of the long-standing political struggle by the Young Turks and, more directly, because of the mutiny of the Third Army in Macedonia. However, in Istanbul and in the Asiatic provinces of the empire, people were convinced that it was granted as a

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[1]For a detailed description of these revolts see, Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 29-72. (Hereafter cited as Kansu, *The Revolution*).
[2]Hanioğlu, *Preparation*. pp. 109-120.
[3]Charles Roden Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution* (London, 1909), p. 62.
[4]Ahmad, "Said Halim", p. 13; Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 1.

favor by the sultan. This misconception originated both partly because of the censorship exercised by the still functioning Hamidian administration and mainly because of the deep-rooted mentality of a society which expected changes from above. Nevertheless, this situation did not last very long and as soon as censorship was abolished the masses became aware of the real story.[1] This revelation, however, did not create any sort of hostile feelings toward the sultan, who in a volte-face, declared his loyalty to the Constitution and managed to save face.

After the restoration of the Constitution, Said Halim and other expatriates returned to Istanbul. Though he was in exile, Said Halim's membership on the State Council had continued, and it was only after the restoration of the Constitution that he was officially relieved of his position on 3 September 1908.[2] In the same year, Said Halim was elected to public office as mayor of Yeniköy under the CUP banner. His re-entering politics after the restoration of the constitutional regime did not stop him from severely criticizing the adoption of the 1876 constitution as the political charter of the new regime. According to him, this Constitution did not suit at all the realities of the Ottoman Empire.[3] The Constitution, writes Said Halim, in his article entitled *Meşrutiyet* (Constitutional Regime), was designed for a country whose political traditions and social fabric was totally different from those of the Ottoman Empire.[4] In this respect, Said Halim's ideas contradicted those of Namık Kemal who advocated the adoption of the Constitution of the Second French Empire.[5] "To Namık Kemal, the French Constitution appeared to include the most suitable combination of checks and balances for Turkey."[6]

Meanwhile, relations between the CUP and Kamil Pasha were quickly deteriorating. The old grand vizir resented the Committee's intervention in his government policy. In fact, Kamil Pasha had always scorned the Unionists while at the same time underestimating their power. He never considered them to be a serious political challenge, but perceived them as a tool he could use to counterbalance the one power that constituted the only threat to his authority, the sultan.[7]

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[1]Akşin, *Jön Türkler*, p. 84.
[2]Bostan, *Said Halim*, p. 26.
[3]Said Halim Pasha, *Buhranlarımız*, p. 9
[4]Said Halim Pasha, *Buhranlarımız ve son eserleri*, pp. 18-19.
[5]Mardin, *Genesis*, p. 311.
[6]Ibid.
[7]Ahmad, "Said Halim", p. 31.

After the Bulgarian crisis of October 1908, tensions between the CUP and Kamil Pasha were exacerbated. The grand vizir then approached the recently formed Liberal Union (Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası) and became their principal candidate in Istanbul during the elections held in late November. The elections resulted in a decisive victory for the CUP, which captured all but one seat in Parliament (it went to the Liberals). The Liberals' near shutout was the result of a lack of organization and their recent entry into politics.[1]

At the same time, the Senate was reactivated and the sultan appointed Said Halim Pasha as one of its 39 members on 14 December 1908.[2]

The collapse of the Hamidian regime and the proclamation of the Constitution after thirty-three years of authoritarian rule created an environment where various previously banned political movements could flourish. During this Second Constitutional Period, three main currents battled it out in the political arena in an effort to gain control over the empire's destiny. They were *Garpçılık* (Westernism), *Türkçülük* (Turkism), and *İslamcılık* (Islamism).

The origins and traditions of Westernism can be traced back to reformist sultans like Selim III and Mahmud II, and even to the fun-loving Sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730) of the Tulip Age (1718-1730) and Grand Vizir Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha, who was the brother-in-law of the sultan.[3] Their aim was to modernize the Ottoman state by initiating military and bureaucratic reforms along the European model, and that the reforms were to be undertaken under Western Europe's growing economic, military, and political impact. Nevertheless, neither the reformist sultans nor the European-minded pashas of the Tanzimat had any intention of extending the scope of their reforms to social issues.

Unlike their reformist predecessors of the Tanzimat era, partisans of Westernism during the Second Constitutional Period were not content with modernizing the military and the bureaucracy; nor did they limit the range of their reforms to commercial and criminal law. Instead, they attacked the very

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[1]Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler* vol. 1, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi*. (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988); Hasan Kayalı, "Elections and Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1877-1919." *IJMES* 27 (1995): pp. 271-272. (Hereafter cited as Kayalı, "Elections."); Ahmad, "Said Halim", p. 28.

[2]Bostan, *Said Halim*, p. 26.

[3]Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha, who aspired to the court of Versailles, took Louis XV's thriving France as a model for reviving a disintegrating Ottoman Empire.

core of Muslim life: the family and the role of women in society. To Westernist thinkers, the main reason for the decay of Muslim civilization was the degraded status of women in Islam. One of the most prominent spokesmen of Westernism, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932), wrote in his journal *İçtihad* that "women should have the exact same rights as men concerning family affairs, inheritance, and other matters." He also advocated the unveiling of Muslim Ottoman women.[1]

Abdullah Cevdet also felt that the decline was due to decaying institutions, backward traditions, and an Asiatic mentality. He believed that if Muslims stubbornly clung to their old ways and did not adopt European manners, they would soon be wiped out from the face of the earth. Writing in 1912, after the defeat of the Ottoman armies during the Balkan Wars, he explained that the recent Turkish reverses were caused by the military's adversion to anything Western and by its resistance to espousing European civilization. He wrote:

> We lost Ishkodra, Manastır, Selanik, and Tripolitania because of our weakness, ignorance, and poverty. They were taken [from us] by power, science, and wealth. Yes, Europe is superior [...] Europe is our instructor; to love her means to love science, progress, material, and moral strength. To be an assiduous and grateful apprentice of Europe: here is our task. If we do not become their friend by our own will, they will obtain this friendship forcibly. To claim that the whole world is hostile to us and that the non-Muslim countries are against us is an indication of a mental disease called "folie de persécution." Around 1840, Europe slapped Japan. Consequently, Japan has awakened and has tried to understand the origins of this force which stroked her. In this purpose she sent to Europe and America 25,000 of her youth. If Europe slapped us thousand times and if we do not awake is this Europe's fault? We have so much contempt for non-Muslim nations that we do not even consider important their most brilliant victories over us. Because we are Muslims, the world of the hereafter [*kisver-i ahret*] belongs to us, Paradise is ours. As far as non-Muslims are concerned, whatever their success and position be in this world, their place in the next world is hell. If we go on with this mentality, our fate is obvious. Enough seeing ourselves under a magnifying glass... Our greatest enemy is ourselves, our own mentality. The relationship between foreigners (Westerners) and us is the relationship between strong and weak, learned and ignorant, rich and indigent. There is no other civilization, and that civilization is the European civilization. We should accept it with its roses and its thorns.[2]

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[1] Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), p. 309.

[2] Ibid., pp. 357-359. Translation is mine.

The second school of thought prevalent in the ideological debates of the Second Constitutional Period was Turkism.[1] Unlike Westernism and Islamism, Turkism had no established tradition in the political history of the Ottoman Empire; rather it developed as an ideology under the influence of two European constructions: nationalism and orientalism.

Nationalism developed in Europe in the first part of the nineteenth century, and inevitably had an important impact on the thought of Young Ottoman intellectuals like Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha. They combined emerging European nationalism with Islamic principles in their writings to develop their doctrine of Islamic nationalism.

Another phenomenon which had an impact on Turkism was the works of European orientalists who, since the mid-eighteenth century, had constantly studied, along with other oriental peoples, the Turks and their Central Asian civilization. The growing number of books published on this subject constituted a field what was called Turcology. This orientalist scholarship, which reconstructed a Turkic history that was distinct from Islamic history, offered a source of inspiration and a base of legitimacy for the advocates of the Turkist cause. One of the earliest examples of this literature on Turcology was a book entitled *Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols et des autres Tartares occidentaux*. It was written by the French orientalist Joseph de Guignes and was published in Paris between 1756 and 1758.[2] On the Turcs he wrote:

> Ces Peuples sont appelés Tou-kioue par les chinois, et Turcs par les autres peuples. Ils habitoient dans les monts Altai, qui sont situés le long de l'Irtich [...] Ces peuples étoient descendus des anciens Hiong-Nou, qui après leur destruction s'étoient cantonnés vers Irtich. Ils soumirent toute la Tartarie, une partie de la Siberie, firent des fréquents incursions dans la Chine & dans la Perse, & envoyerent des Ambassadeurs aux Romains.[3]

During the nineteenth century, many other scholars studied ancient Turkish history. Among them were A. de Sacy, Radloff, and V. Thomson. Thomson rendered an invaluable service to Turcology by deciphering the runic inscriptions of Orhon in 1893.

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[1]On Turkism, see David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908*. (London: Frank Cass, 1977) and Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

[2]Joseph de Guignes, *Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols, et des autres Tartares occidentaux, avant & depuis J.C. jusqu'à présent. Ouvrage tiré des livres chinois & des manuscripts orientaux de la Bibliothèque du Roi* (Paris: Chez Desint & Saillant, 1756).

[3]Ibid., pp. 224-225.

Elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, the elite also began to show an interest in Turcology. One of the most prominent to do so was Ahmed Vefik Pasha (1823-1891). He wrote the first Ottoman-Turkish dictionary, *Lehçe-i Osmani,* and translated an important source of Central Asian Turkic history from Çağatay, *Evsal-i Şecere-i Türki,* written by Aboul Gazi Bahadır, Khan of Khiva in 1663.[1] In 1869 Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha, an Ottoman official of Polish origin, wrote his *Les Turcs anciens et modernes*. He argued that the Turks were a Touro-Aryan race from which all European nations descended.[2] He considered the Touro-Aryans (people with both Turanian and Indo-European blood) to be the creators of European civilization.

The most important work which made Young Turk intellectuals aware of their pre-Islamic Turkic heritage was the *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie*. Published in Paris in 1896 by the eminent orientalist Léon Cahun (1841-1900), it was a history of the Turkic and Mongolian peoples from the earliest period to the end of Timur's reign in 1405. His work, which was written in a colourful, popular language, praised the Turks as world conquerors who had established their hegemony over lands stretching from the Sea of Japan to the Black Sea ("De la mer Noire au golfe Persique, à l'océan Indien et à la mer du Japon, le Kaan chinois [sic] force du Ciel est bien l'empereur.")[3]

The origins of Turkism as an intellectual current can be traced back to the last decade of the Hamidian regime. It first developed within a literary school called *Yeni Hayat* (New Life). One of the most prominent figures of *Yeni Hayat* was a young writer from Diyarbekir named Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924). After his death, he was recognized as the father of Turkish nationalism.[4] Gökalp's ideas profoundly influenced the political thought of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the new Turkish Republic in 1923. According to Gökalp, the rise of nationalism, in particular in Eastern countries, occurred in three successive stages. First, it began as a cultural revival; second, it expressed itself as a political movement; and third, it helped

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[1]For a French translation of this work see Aboul-Ghazi Behadour Khan, *Histoire des Mogols et des Tatares*, edited by Baron Des Maisons (St. Petersburg: Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences 1871).

[2]Moustafa Djelaleddine, *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes*, (Constantinople: Imprimerie du Courrier d'Orient, 1869).

[3]Léon Cahun, *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie, Turcs et Mongols, des origines à 1405* (Paris: A. Colin, 1896), p. 440.

[4]For Gökalp's social and political thought, see Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*. (London: Luzac, 1950) (hereafter cited as Heyd, *Foundations*), and Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985). Some of Gökalp's works are translated into English by Niyazi Berkes under the title of *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, (selected essays of Ziya Gokalp)*. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1959).

to determine its economic policy.[1] Gökalp summarized his ideology with the slogan of *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (Turkification, Islamization and Modernization). These concepts did not contradict each other; they instead complemented each other.[2] He explained his maxim as "we are of Turkish nationality (*millet*), we belong to the Islamic religious community (*ümmet*) and to the Western sphere of civilization (*medeniyet*)".[3] For Gökalp these three components of the Turkish nation were both complementary and distinct from each other: complementary because each of them constituted an aspect of Turkish society, distinct because they were not necessarily related. Adhering to the Islamic faith did not mean that Turks belonged to the sphere of Islamic civilization that Gökalp called oriental civilization. Gökalp perceived Islam as a religion (*din*), not as a civilization (*medeniyet*), which he considered to be a combination of Sassanian and Byzantine civilizations. Historically, nations evolve and change their civilizations but keep their national culture (*hars*) says Gökalp.[4] The Turks in their history passed from an East Asian (Chinese) to an Islamic (oriental) civilization by their conversion to Islam. But in doing so they did not change their national culture. Thus, he asserted, Turks could adopt European civilization and still preserve their religion and national culture, just as the Japanese had. Gökalp divides the material and intellectual development of societies into two: a) *medeniyet* (civilization); and b) *hars* (national culture). *Medeniyet* is international but *hars* is national. Western or Islamic civilizations have been embraced by many different nations, each with its own national culture.[5]

Gökalp expounded his opinions on social, political, and religious matters in many articles which appeared in several periodicals during the Second Constitutional Period, including *Türk Yurdu, Genç Kalemler, Yeni Mecmua,* and *İslam Mecmuası*. This last publication was founded in February 1914 by the CUP in order to disseminate its views on Islam in response to those advocated by traditionalist Muslim circles represented by the Cemiyet-i İlmiye.

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[1]Heyd, *Foundations*, p. 104.

[2]Ziya Gökalp,"Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak" in *Türk Yurdu* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şürekası 1329) vol.3, pp. 336-337. Later published in Latin script, Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa 1960), pp. 10-11.

[3]Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Ankara: Serdengeçti Neşriyat, 1950), p. 50.

[4]Ziya Gökalp, *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara: Diyarbakır'ı Tanıtma ve Turizm Derneği Yayınları, 1972), p. 21.

[5]Ibid., p. 10.

According to Gökalp, *şeriat* was based on two sources, *nass* (the sacred texts of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*) and *örf* (local custom). Unlike *nass*, which is immutable, *örf* constantly changes in response to the needs of the society which created it. From the early days of Islam, declared Gökalp, Muslim jurists interpreted Quranic principles and the *Sunna* in the light of *örf*; therefore, it always played a major role in the development of Islamic law. In order to support his view, he quoted the *hadith*: *"mā raʾāhuʾl-muʾminūna ḥasanan fahuwa ʿindallāhi-ḥasanun"* (what the believers consider as beautiful is beautiful before God).[1]

The poet Mehmed Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944) was among the first writers in the Ottoman Empire to devote his pen to the Turkist cause.[2] In his poems he continued to exalt Turkic ethnic pride by glorifying Turco-Mongolian history and by emphasizing Turanian unity. He wrote:

> O Turk wake up!
> O my nation! When you were living in the Altays, just five thousand years ago.
> God said to you: O Turkish race, fly from that place as an eagle who glides to the sunrise.
> Your hands which subjugate every force will sprinkle thunderbolts upon the proud heads.
> To you will open their arms,
> The thrones of China, Iran, India, and Egypt.
> ...
> If you want, from the source of the Danube up to China:
>
> Altay, Qiptchak, Siberia, Azerbaijan, Khwarezm, Ghazni, Khiva, Boukhara,
> Every place will enter into the realm of the new Turan.
> ...
> In every place you sang the songs of conquest
> Qara Khans, Oghuzs, Attillas, Gengkhis, Timurlenks, Yavuzs are your ancestors who make you proud.[3]

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[1] Heyd, *Foundations*, pp. 85-87.

[2] For the life and thought of Mehmed Emin see Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Mehmed Emin Yurdakul: Hayatı ve Eserleri* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1980); see also *Mehmed Emin Yurdakul'un Eserleri*-1, *Şiirler* ed. Fevziye Abdullah Tansel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1969).

[3] Mehmed Emin, *Türk Yurduna: Ey Türk Uyan* (Istanbul: n.p, 1914). Translation is mine.

Meeting of the Council of Ministers. Said Halim Pasha has Enver Pasha on his right.
His brother Abbas Halim Pasha, Minister of Public Works appears on the extreme left.

Said Halim Pasha leads the mourners at Mahmud Şevket Pasha's funerals.

Turkism was the most prominent ideology among the CUP elite between 1902 and late 1907.[1] According to Hanioğlu, although "the Young Turks had been inclined toward Turkism long before the Balkan wars, their self-imposed task of empire-saving for some time prevented the CUP leaders from unleashing their Turkism as a policy since they had reason to avoid stimulating other nationalist and separatist movements within the empire".[2] On this issue Kayalı wrote that: "[u]nsophisticated about the questions of nationality, the Unionists betrayed their Turkish chauvinism, particularly by their refusal to broaden the geographic, ethnic and religious base of their core organization. However they upheld the imperial policy and multi-ethnic agendas rather than implement a Turkish nationalist program in the conduct of state affairs".[3] After the 1908 Revolution, the Turkists gained new strength with the arrival of a group of Muslim Turkic intellectuals from Russia. The contribution made by the new comers was especially important in the diffusion of the Pan-Turkist ideal throughout intellectual circles in Istanbul. One of the most influential and prolific of these emigrés was Akçura Oğlu Yusuf Bey or Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) who quickly succeeded in providing Turkist ideology with a new perspective by clearly defining its nature and aims as well as by introducing it into the political arena of the Second Constitutional Period. Indeed, his effort enabled it to compete with other established ideologies such as Islamism and Ottomanism.[4]

Yusuf Akçura had already expounded his views on Turkism vis-à-vis Ottomanism and Islamism in a long article called "Üç Tarz-i Siyaset" (Three Political Systems). It was published in the April-May 1904 issue of *Türk,* an émigré journal published in Egypt. Akçura compared Turkism with Ottomanism and Islamism and came to the conclusion that the only viable ideology for the Ottoman Empire was Turkism. According to Akçura, the efforts of the Tanzimat statesmen to create an Ottoman nation had failed because both Muslim and non-Muslim elements of the empire had rejected the idea. He did not completely reject Islamism, but he considered it less appropriate for the rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire than Turkism.[5] The success of Islamism, declared Akçura, was limited because of the hostility of the Western Powers to this ideology. Indeed, since most of these European

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[1]Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, pp. 295-297.
[2]Ibid., p. 317.
[3]Kayalı, *Arabs,* p. 210.
[4]For the life and thought of Yusuf Akçura, see François Georgeon, *Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura, 1876-1935* (Paris: ADPF, 1980).
[5]Ibid., p. 103; Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976), pp. 31-33.

imperialists had Muslim colonial subjects and most of the existing Muslim states were under their control, Western nations would strongly oppose the adoption of an Islamist policy by the Ottoman Empire which, as a major Muslim power, could affect the loyalty of their colonial Muslim subjects.

The third important political and intellectual current of the Second Constitutional Period was Islamism. The Islamist intellectuals of the period could be divided into two groups: traditionalists and modernists. The first group was composed mainly of members of the ulema who had in the past enjoyed connections with the Hamidian regime. After the proclamation of the Constitution they organized themselves into a society called Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye (Society of Islamic Scholars). This society was founded in September 1908 and started to disseminate their version of Islamist ideas through a monthly periodical entitled *Beyan-ül Hak,* (The Statement of Truth). The most prominent figure among the traditionalists was Mustafa Sabri (1869-1954) who expounded in his writings a very conservative view of Islam. According to Sabri, the technological superiority and material welfare of the West should not have impressed Muslims since these worldly achievements were not of great value when compared to God's omnipotence. Any material progress, he argued, which contradicts Islamic principles would bring harm rather than good to Muslims.[1] Sabri asserted unequivocally that he was not against Muslims benefitting from the technological innovations of the era but that he would prefer poverty if the condition of benefitting from such innovations was cursing or discarding Islam. On the other hand, he defended the constitutional regime in his articles published in *Beyan* and argued that the true Islamic regime could only be representative.[2] According to Sabri the essence of the constitutional regime derives from the tenets of Islam.[3] Therefore, he said, every Islamic government governed by the laws of the *şeriat* had to be considered a constitutional government.[4]

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[1]İsmail Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, Metinler, Kişiler* II (Istanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1987), pp. 270-271. See also more recent study of Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri* (Istanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1994). (Hereafter cited as Kara, *İslamcıların*).

[2]Ibid., pp. 276-274.

[3]Mustafa Sabri, *Dini Müceddidler, yahud: Türkiye için Necat ve Itila Yollarında bir Rehber* (Istanbul: Şehzadebaşı Evkaf Matbaası , 1338-1341), p. 81.

[4]Ibid.

Another renowned traditionalist was the Islamist Babanzade Ahmed Naim (1872-1934). He distinguished himself with his severe criticism of nationalism, especially Turkish nationalism. Naim considered nationalism to be a "fatal disease which originated in the West and recently infected the Islamic World."[1] For Muslims, he wrote "claiming different national identities other than Islam, like Turkishness, Arabness, and Kurdishness, especially at a moment when the enemy's aggressive foot has penetrated into our heartlands would be an insanity."[2] Naim categorically denies the existence of a distinct Turkish identity even within the Islamic one and condemns Turkist intellectuals for inventing such a fictitious concept. Here Naim's views differed widely from those of Said Halim, who recognized the existence of different Muslim entities like Turks, Iranians, and Indians as a part of the Muslim nation. According to Naim, there was no Turkish history independent of Islamic history. He also refused to accept the existence of a Turkish nation: "For a thousand years, by continuously intermingling with other races, the Turks have completely lost their ethnic identity except their language."[3] Naim divided the partisans of Turkism into two categories: pure Turkists and Turkist-Islamists. The former, he says, wanted to sever themselves completely from the Islamic past in order to create a new identity with new ideals. Their aim was to create a new nation with a new faith. He equated this with atheism. The latter group claimed to be Turkist-Islamists who wanted to combine Islamic principles with Turkist ideas. This, according to Ahmed Naim, was unrealistic since one could not be loyal to two different ideologies. The Turks could not look at the same time to the *Kabe* and the *Turan*. Therefore, they had to leave *Turan* behind as they did a thousand years ago and continue to direct their attention to the *Kabe*, "We do not need to know," wrote Naim, "the Law of Genghis but rather the *şeriat* of Muhammad."[4]

As for the Islamists, one of their most articulate spokesmen was Mehmed Akif (1870-1936). In his long poem entitled *Sermon from the Süleymaniye Pulpit,* he provided a powerful and emotional portrayal of the misery existing in the Muslim world.[5] He also presented a dark and demoralized description of the Ottoman Empire under the oppressive and corrupt Hamidian regime where only toadies could advance to high positions.

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[1] Ahmed Naim, *İslamda Dava-yi Kavmiyet* (Darülhilafe: Sebil-ür Reşat Kütüphanesi, 1332A.H./1916A.D.), p. 4.
[2] Ibid., pp. 5-6.
[3] Ibid., p. 12.
[4] Ibid., p. 17.
[5] Mehmet Akif Ersoy, *Safahat* ed. M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ. (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989), pp. 139-174.

Focusing on Central Asia, where local Islam had completely degenerated under the corruptive influence of local customs and had lost its pristine qualities, Akif lamented that the lands of Bukhara and Samarkand which, in the past had given birth to men such as Ibn Sina and where the best observatory in the world was built, had sunk to the most infamous degradation where only ignorance and immorality ruled. According to Akif the person responsible for this situation was the local ulema who opposed every beneficial action as *bidat* (impious innovation).[1] He urged decadent Muslim peoples to emulate the Japanese in order to achieve a "modern civilization". He declared that the Japanese were able to apply Islamic principles more effectively than Muslims because they cultivated high virtues such as righteousness, courage, and diligence. In Japan, Islam prevailed under the guise of Buddhism. Akif cautioned Muslims to stay united in the face of European imperialist aggression and not to adopt ethnic nationalism which is potentially as destructive as an earthquake for Islamdom. He condemned Albanian, Arab, and Turkish nationalisms as wrong ideologies, exclaiming:

> Wake up O Muslims! Wake up and unite, renounce your ethnic separatism; at least take a lesson from the fates of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, all lost to Islam. They (the Western Powers) are also dividing Iran now! Otherwise your destiny will be the same: you will lose your independence and your country, the last of Islam will be overrun by the enemy.[2]

According to Akif, the afflictions of the Muslim world were being caused by the disparity between the intellectuals and the masses. This was the same diagnosis that Abduh, and later Said Halim, had proposed as the major cause of the ills affecting Muslim society. Like Said Halim, Mehmed Akif declared that the Muslim world could not develop by following the European path of progress. He attributed this to the fact that every nation has a different trend to follow in the course of human evolution.

As aptly demonstrated by Şükrü Hanioğlu in his latest work, the CUP leaders used these competing ideologies, especially, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism interchangeably according to the political circumstances of the time to the point of reaching "political opportunism".[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 153.
[2] Ibid., p. 179. (Translation is mine).
[3] Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, pp. 289-301.

In March 1909 Said Halim Pasha was nominated to the board of directors of the National Bank of Turkey. This bank was founded by the British Foreign Office and encouraged equally by the CUP in order to counterbalance the influence of the French dominated Ottoman Bank and to curb its predominance over the financial and economic life of the empire. The National Bank of Turkey was registered as an Ottoman-British joint investment, even though ninety-five percent of its capital was British. Nevertheless, in spite of the high hopes of its founders, the place of this newly founded bank in Ottoman financial and economic life remained quite marginal.[1]

On 10 February 1909, Kamil Pasha began a round of political manoeuvring in order to undermine the CUP's power. This consisted in a cabinet shuffle which consolidated his position in government; he replaced the minister of war and the minister of the navy with men loyal to him. This move was a repetition of the same unsuccessful scenario that Abdülhamid and Said Pasha had attempted six months previously in order to curb the power of the Committee and dominate the political scene. Once again the CUP successfully outmanoeuvred the Porte's actions and the grand vizir's checkmate was voted down in the Parliament.[2] One day after Kamil Pasha's resignation, on 14 February 1909, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the former inspector-general of Rumelia and an important figure in the proclamation of the constitution in 1908, was asked to form the new government.

The fall of Kamil Pasha constituted a severe blow to the anti-Unionist alliance and enhanced the power of the Committee. It also provided cause for concern to the CUP's liberal opponents who now strongly felt its power. Alarmed by the CUP's show of force, its opponents allied together to form the Liberal Union (Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası) on 14 September 1908. The party platform included Prince Sabaheddin's ideas such as decentralization and complete equality for non-Muslim minorities. In this way, it was able to secure support from these groups.[3]

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[1] For the National Bank of Turkey see Marian Kent "Agent of Empire? The National Bank of Turkey and British Foreign Policy" *Historical Journal* 18 (1975): pp. 367-389. Also see Jacques Thobie, *Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l'empire ottoman (1895-1914)*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale 1977.

[2] Ahmad, *Young Turks,* pp. 33-35; Akşin, *Jön Türkler,* pp. 110-113. For a detailed account of this event, see: Francis McCullagh, *The Fall of Abdul Hamid* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1910), pp. 33-38. (Hereafter cited as McCullagh, *Fall*).

[3] Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasal Partiler* vol. 2; Shaw and Shaw, *History*, p. 276; Georgeon, "La mort d'un empire." in Robert Mantran ed., *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman.* (Paris: Fayard, 1968), p. 581; André Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris: Librairie Payot, 1917), p. 15. (Hereafter cited as Mandelstam, *Le Sort*); McCullagh, *Fall*, p. 41.

Soon after its creation, the Liberal Union launched an aggressive press campaign against the CUP, which immediately responded in its own organ, *Tanin*.[1] The antagonism between these two opponents escalated over the next two months until it reached a climax on 13 April or (31 March according to Ottoman Rumi calendar) when an insurrection erupted among the ranks of the Ottoman troops stationed in Istanbul.

The Liberals were not the only political adversaries of the Unionists. There was also an Islamic opposition represented in the party of the Muhammedan Union (İttihad-ı Muhammedi). This party was officially founded on 5 April 1909, although it had been in operation since 6 February 1908. The Muhammedan Union also had a press organ called *Volkan*. The editor-in-chief of the latter was Derviş Vahdeti, a *Bektaşi* dervish from Cyprus. In his fiery articles, he attacked the secularist policies of the CUP and advocated the restoration of the *şeriat*. At the same time, Vahdeti praised the constitutional regime and supported the political ideas of Prince Sabaheddin. In an open letter to Sultan Abdülhamid, published in *Volkan*, on 14 April 1909, during the rebellion of 31 March, Vahdeti counseled the sultan "to consider those who urge him to close the Parliament as the traitors of religion and fatherland (*hain-i din ü vatan*)".[2] In *Volkan,* Vahdeti also pleaded for an enlightened and progressive Islam and criticized the conservative and traditionalist members of the ulema, whom he held responsible for the decay of Islamic society. The Muhammedan Union was one of the chief instigators of the mutiny of 31 March.[3] In spite of the different political views among the advocates of the Muhammedan Union and the Ahrar Fırkası, the two political parties came together in their opposition to the CUP. It mattered little that the former represented cosmopolitan and liberal views and the latter Islamic fundamentalism; they both had the common goal of obliterating the CUP.

On the evening of 13 April, soldiers of the First Army started to mutiny. By early morning, religious students (*softa*s) joined the rebel troops. They gathered in Ayasofya Square and demanded the reinstatement of the *şeriat* and the dismissal of Ali Rıza Pasha, minister of war and Ahmed Rıza Bey, president of the Assembly. The cabinet was soon paralyzed; it yielded to the demands of the mutineers by submitting its resignation to the sultan who

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[1]The newspapers that supported the Liberal Union were *Serbesti, İkdam, Sada-yi Millet, Sabah, Yeni Gazete*, and especially *Osmanlı* which was the press organ of *Ahrar* (Liberal Union).

[2]*Volkan Gazetesi*, 11 December 1908-20 April 1909. M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ ed., (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1992), p. 505.

[3]Sina Akşin, *Şeriatçı bir Ayaklanma* (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1994), pp. 241-247, (Hereafter cited as Akşin, *Şeriatçı*), McCullagh, *Fall*, p. 53.

immediately accepted it.[1] The rebellion had destroyed the power base of the CUP in Istanbul. The Unionists were in turmoil. Some escaped to Anatolia or went abroad; others took refuge in foreign embassies; most remained in hiding in Istanbul.

Meanwhile, the navy also mutinied and joined the rebel troops. During this time, a mob attacked and destroyed the offices of the CUP and those of the periodicals *Tanin* and *Şura-yı Ümmet*. On the streets soldiers killed a few members of the Committee.[2] In the capital, the situation remained unstable and the atmosphere became increasingly volatile. The new government of Tevfik Pasha, formed on 14 April, could not exert any control over the course of events because of the strength of the CUP organization in the provinces. The Committee was especially powerful in its birthplace, Macedonia, where it enjoyed the support of the Third Army.

On the night of 15/16 April, the Hareket Ordusu (Action Army), composed mostly of troops of the Third Army and volunteers, departed from Selanik in order to suppress the insurrection and restore order in the capital. As the Action Army approached Istanbul, reactions to it varied. The government, fearing fighting, loss of life, and general civil strife, not to mention total destruction of the city, opposed the entry of the Hareket Ordusu into Istanbul. The Action Army, however, ignored this request and entered the city. It began its occupation on the morning of 24 April after negotiations for a political solution failed. After some initial resistance, the rebel troops surrendered and the Action Army took control of the capital. Aykut Kansu called the 31 March rebellion, "the monarchist coup d'État" and argues that the intention of its organizers was "to restore absolutist monarchy".[3] This was also the opinion of Said Halim Pasha who wrote in his work entitled *Crise Politique: Gouvernement et mentalité,* that the attempt of the fallen monarch to seize the power again, "which had slip out from his criminal hands", was prevented thanks to the "providential" intervention of "our brave" army.

> Si notre vaillante armée n'avait su suppléer à notre inexpérience et notre défaut de maturité politique en empêchant, par son intervention providentielle le Sultan déchu de ressaisir le pouvoir absolu qui venait d'échapper de ses mains criminelles.[4]

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[1] Akşin, *31 Mart Olayı*, p. 55.

[2] McCullagh, *Fall*, pp. 136-138.

[3] Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey 1908-1913* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 77. (Hereafter cited as Kansu, *Politics*).

[4] Said Halim, *Crise Politique,* Second part, *Gouvernement et Mentalité*, p.1. (Hereafter cited as, *Crise Politique II*). Although this harsh language of Said Halim Pasha against Abdülhamid II was kept in the Ottoman Turkish translation of 1335-1338, ("Hakan-i mahlukun dest-i huninden."); in a later edition by E. Düzdağ, it was omitted and a mild language was preferred as ("eski hakan Abdülhamidin elinden kaçırdığı."). Said Halim, Pasha *Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri*, p. 37-38.

This argument is refuted by Sina Akşin who stated that there is no clear indication that the rebellion of 13 April was organized to bring back the Hamidian absolute monarchy, since one of the principal instigators of the insurrection, the Ahrar party, was not sympathetic to Sultan Abdülhamid.[1] Moreover, said Akşin, during the insurrection, the soldiers who mutinied did not make massive demonstrations in favor of the sultan, but only occasional and isolated ones.[2] On the other hand, during the insurrection, the sultan acted with extreme caution so not to provoke the mutinied troops and turn them against him.[3] Indeed, according to Ayşe Sultan, (Osmanoğlu), the daughter of Abdülhamid, during the rebellion her father called the mutinied troops "insubordinate" and compared them with the "rebellious janissaries".[4] Likewise, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Gerard Lowther, wrote to Edward Grey that he found unreliable "the rumors which circulated that the rising of the troops had been engineered from the Palace and the real author of the *coup* was the sultan himself". According to Lowther " The fact that the money found on the troops does not necessarily mean that the money came from the Palace, since the troops", he wrote, "have recently been regularly paid and it is in their habit to save for the day of their return to their homes, and they necessarily carry it with them".[5]

The suppression of the 31 March rebellion and the failure of the counter-revolution created a new balance of power in Ottoman politics. On 25 April 1909 martial law was declared and the Muhammedan Union was outlawed. Also on that date, Vahdeti was put on trial and condemned to death. He was hanged two months later. The military authorities also banned Ahrar Fırkası, which had been in their view one of the supporters if not one of the instigators of the mutiny. On 27 April 1909, after a heated debate, Parliament voted for the deposition of the aged monarch Abdülhamid II and sent him into exile in Selanik.[6] With all militant Islamist opposition eliminated and all liberal opposition silenced, the CUP, although shaken by recent events, remained the only organized political force capable of counterbalancing and challenging, to some extent, the growing influence of

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[1] Sina Akşin, *Şeriatçı*, p. 274.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Faik Reşit Unat ed. *İkinci Meşrutiyetin ilani ve Otuzbir Mart Hadisesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985), p. 56.
[4] Ayşe Osmanoğlu, *Babam Sultan Abdülhamid (Hatıralarım)* (Ankara: Selçuk Yayınları, 1986), p. 144.
[5] Lowther to Grey in *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley ed., vol. 5. (London: H.M Stationary Office, 1928). p. 315. (Hereafter cited as *British Documents*).
[6] Mc Cullagh, *Fall*, pp. 265-271.

the army. Nevertheless, Aykut Kansu argues that after the restoration of the constitutional regime, the CUP became "almost powerless" and "all power was virtually at the hands of Mahmud Şevket Pasha".[1]

Following the crushing of the mutiny by the Action Army, political power teetered between the military and the Committee. In this struggle, the army was represented by military strongman Mahmud Şevket Pasha (1858-1913), commander of the Hareket Ordusu which had "liberated" Istanbul, and former minister of war in the cabinet of İbrahim Hakkı Pasha (1863-1898). The bone of contention between the CUP and the army was the planning and auditing of the military budget.[2] Mahmud Şevket Pasha demanded an enormous increase in budgetary funds allocated to the military. His argument was that the empire's survival depended on a well-funded military. This claim was met with firm objections by the Minister of Finance Mehmed Cavid (1875-1926), on the grounds that it would aggravate the country's financial crisis. In the end, Mahmud Şevket triumphed and convinced Parliament to vote in an expanded budget. He also succeeded in exempting the military budget from any audit by the Ministry of Finance, making the army virtually unaccountable to any government or ministry.

Mahmud Şevket was also thoroughly convinced of the need to strengthen the military through modernization. He believed that the empire's economic development would be pointless without a strong and efficient army to protect it. He set out to build just such an army by turning to Germany for arms.[3]

The years 1910-1911 were also marked by a series of revolts and crises. First, there was the Albanian revolt which flared up in the Balkans as a reaction to the Porte's policy of centralization. Then, the Ottoman government faced another crisis: Italian aggression in Tripolitania. On 29 September 1911 after giving an ultimatum to the Porte, Italy started to occupy the last Ottoman provinces in Africa: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Ottoman government could not dispatch new troops to Tripolitania because of the Italian navy's domination of the sea. Some volunteers, including Mustafa Kemal and Enver managed to reach Tripolitania with a handful of officers and soldiers and organized a very successful resistance to the Italians in cooperation with the Sanusiyya order; together, they confined the Italian occupation to the coastal area.

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[1]Kansu, *Politics*, p. 129.
[2]Ahmad, *Young Turks*, p. 71.
[3]Glen Swanson. "Mahmud Şevket Pasha and the defense of the Ottoman Empire: A Study of War and Revolution During the Young Turk Period" (Ph.D diss., Indiana University, 1970). p. 106.

The Italian invasion of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica clearly demonstrated the weakness of the Ottoman defence system and its inability to protect the empire's territorial integrity. This situation emboldened the Balkan neighbours of the Ottoman Empire and prompted them to consider seriously partitioning the remaining Ottoman possessions in Europe. In order to realize their goal, the Balkan states began to form military alliances, thus setting aside their differences and disregarding their mutual ethnic and political hostilities.[1]

The domestic politics of the empire entered a new phase on 21 November 1911 with the formation of the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (Liberal Entente), a rallying point for those who were disappointed with the CUP's policy.[2] Like its precursor Ahrar Fırkası, the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası was a Tower of Babel, being composed of many different groups with different aims: it contained Albanian, Arab, Armenian, and Bulgarian nationalists, with each group pursuing its own national interests, along with former members of Ahrar, liberals, socialists, and even Islamists.[3]

On 15 January 1912, Parliament was dissolved by the sultan and elections were announced. At the same time the CUP resorted to some ministerial changes in order to establish better control over the political situation and to gain the upper hand in the forthcoming elections. As an acknowledgement for his services in the Senate both as senator and as head of the Unionist group, Said Halim Pasha was nominated by Grand Vizir Said Pasha to the presidency of the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet Reisliği*) and entered cabinet on 22 January 1912.[4]

The 1912 elections proved to be an ordeal for the Young Ottoman parliamentary regime. The electoral campaign was carried out on a much larger scale than in previous elections as the masses were now involved. During the campaign both the CUP and the Liberal Entente used all of their available resources and resorted to every possible expedient to increase their votes. The CUP especially exploited its advantage as the ruling party by using the administrative machine in order to intimidate its rivals. These measures included the occasional use of violence (which, incidentally, led to the naming of the elections as the *sopalı seçimler* or big stick elections).

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[1]For the formation of the Balkan Alliance against the Ottoman Empire, see Ernest Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 3-89. (Hereafter cited as Helmreich, *Diplomacy*); see also Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, (Paris: n.p, 1915).

[2]For Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası see Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası II. Meşrutiyet devrinde İttihat ve Terakki'ye karşı çıkanlar*. (Istanbul: Dergah yayınları, 1990).

[3]Ibid., pp. 50-53. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, p. 70.

[4](Tercüme-i Hal), Bostan, *Said Halim*, p. 27.

The CUP and the Liberal Entente were not "in agreement on basic political objectives" as is argued by some scholars, including Hasan Kayalı.[1] In fact, these two rival parties differed radically in program and ideology: while the CUP strove for a strongly centralized empire formed by loyally associated nationalities, the liberal intellectuals of the Entente argued that this policy would compromise the fundamentals of Ottomanism which they regarded as the only guarantee against the disintegration of the empire. One of the major ideological tenets of the Liberal Entente was decentralization *(adem-i merkeziyet)*, a politico-administrative system which was advocated during the late Hamidian period by Prens Sabahedin and adopted by Ahrar Fırkası after the 1908 Revolution.

Meanwhile, the war with Italy waged on. Frustrated by their failure to overcome the Ottoman-Sanussi resistance in Libya, the Italians made war on other areas of the Ottoman realm in order to force the Porte to yield and surrender Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. On 24 February 1912, the Italian fleet bombarded the port of Beirut and on 18 April and 17 May it occupied the Dodecanese with the support of its Greek inhabitants. With war spreading to the shores of the eastern Mediterranean and the closing of the Dardanelles by the Ottoman government, Russia became alarmed by what she saw as the blocking of her lifeline, an intolerable situation.[2] Soon Austria expressed her opposition to Italy's occupation of the Dodecanese[3] and eventually, the Great Powers put pressure on the Ottoman and Italian governments to initiate peace negotiations. The parties met on 12 July in Lausanne. The Ottoman delegation was headed by none other than Said Halim Pasha.

During the negotiations, Said Halim Pasha proposed to the Italian representatives a division of the province between the Ottoman Empire and Italy. The Porte would cede Tripolitania to Italy but Cyrenaica would remain under Ottoman rule. The Italians rejected this offer and demanded the cession of the whole province.

On 17 July, Grand Vizir Said Pasha tendered his resignation and Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (1839-1918), a hero of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878, was given the mandate to form a new cabinet, which became known as the *Büyük Kabine* (Grand Cabinet) because it was composed of, among other prominent members, three former grand vizirs. It was also called

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[1]Kayalı, "Elections." p. 273.
[2]Albertini, *Origins*, pp. 353-354.
[3]Ibid., p. 359.

the *Baba-Oğul Kabinesi* (Father and Son Cabinet) because the Minister of the Navy Mahmud Muhtar Pasha (1867-1935) was the grand vizir's son. The new cabinet judged inopportune to pursue negotiations with Italy and did not renew the delegatory powers of Said Halim Pasha, who had no choice but to return to Istanbul on 28 July.[1]

Early in October 1912, after completing their final preparations, the Balkan allies decided to take action. Hostilities were opened on 8 October with Montenegro's invasion of Ottoman territory in northern Albania. On 13 October, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia delivered a joint note to the Porte demanding a series of immediate reforms in the European provinces of the empire. These included the establishment of an autonomous regime in these provinces under the administration of Belgian or Swiss governors; the formation of provincial legislative assemblies and the creation of local police forces whose make-up would include an equal number of Muslims and non-Muslims. These measures would be applied by a council composed of Muslims and non-Muslims working under the supervision of the ambassadors representing the Great Powers and the Balkan governments. Lastly, the Ottoman government was asked to demobilize its army.[2]

The acceptance of these terms would have meant the end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans; obviously no Ottoman government could have been expected to consent to them. Nevertheless, the Porte made a last-ditch effort to avoid confrontation by offering a compromise: implementation of the reforms recommended in Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin in conformance with the law of 1880.[3]

On 17 October, the Balkan allies rejected the Ottoman counterproposal and declared war on the Ottoman State. The following two weeks witnessed the debacle of the Ottoman armies which were routed by the Bulgarians at the battles of Kırkkilise (23 October) and Lüleburgaz (31 October) and by the Serbs at Kumanova (24 October). The main causes of Ottoman military defeats were inadequate provisions, an almost non-existent intelligence and dispatch service, and a faulty and disastrous strategy designed by the Ottoman Minister of War Nazım Pasha. After the battle of Lüleburgaz, the defeated Ottoman army managed to retreat to Çatalca, where it hastily restored the old

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[1]Childs, *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War Over Libya, 1911-1912*, p. 164.
[2]Helmreich, *The Diplomacy*, pp. 135-136.
[3]Gabriel Noradounghian, vol. 4, p. 183.

fortifications in order to halt the Bulgarian advance toward the capital.[1] In three weeks, all the European possessions of the empire except the strongholds of İşkodra, Yanya, and Edirne, which continued to resist heroically, were lost to the enemy.

On 29 October 1912 under pressure from the Liberals, Grand Vizir Ahmed Muhtar Pasha tendered his resignation. He was replaced by octogenarian Kamil Pasha, who assumed the grand vizirate for the fourth and last time. Hopeful of gaining British support at that critical moment, he was soon disappointed when no changes were made to Britain's foreign policy: London preferred the friendship of the victorious Balkan states to that of a dying empire. Indeed, the recent economic and political developments in the world created a new international balance of power: the Ottoman Empire was no longer an indispensable ally to Britain in defending her route to India against Russian expansionism toward the warm seas. The Straits and Ottoman friendship lost their former importance for Britain since the latter's settling in Egypt and in the Persian Gulf. Britain and Russia had reached an agreement in Reval in July 1907 for the delimitation of their respective zones of influence in Asia. Therefore, Russia was not anymore a rival to Britain but a potential ally against Germany: a new rising power since the 1890s and a serious threat to Britain's supremacy in the World.[2] Nevertheless, the grand vizir in desperation requested that the Great Powers deploy warships to protect Istanbul from a possible Bulgarian occupation.

That threat, however, was never realized because the situation in the field had begun to change in favour of the Ottomans. Reorganized behind the Çatalca defense lines and reinforced by new troops from Anatolia, the Ottoman army began to offer serious resistance to the Bulgarians while at the same time inflicting heavy losses on them.[3] This military success restored the confidence of the Porte which stood fast against enemy demands. On 16 December, representatives of the belligerent parties met in St. James Palace in London in order to negotiate a peace treaty. The victors demanded the cession of all Ottoman territories situated to the west of a line drawn between Midya, on the

[1]For an eye-witness account and evaluation of the early phase of the Balkan Wars by a war correspondant, see E. Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks in Thrace* (London: Willian Heinemann, 1913). (Hereafter cited as Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks*).

[2]For the change of Britain's policy toward the Ottoman Empire due to the new international conjoncture, see Akarlı,"The Problems", pp. 65-75. See also Joseph Heller, *British Policy Toward the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914*. London: Frank Cass 1983 and Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East, The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921* (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956), p. 29.

[3]Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks*, p. 282.

Black Sea coast of Thrace, and Tekirdağ, a port on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara (the Gelibolu peninsula would remain in Ottoman possession). The Ottoman plenipotentiaries categorically rejected these demands on 28 December 1912 and in turn counterproposed their terms which offered autonomy to Macedonia, Albania and Crete under the sultan's suzerainty and placed the Aegean islands under direct Ottoman rule.[1] Balkan allies had in turn rejected these terms.

Meanwhile, the Great Powers had started to exert immense pressure on the Ottoman government to compel her to renounce Edirne and the Aegean islands. The Porte doggedly defied them by asserting that these two provinces were of paramount importance to the empire: Edirne, the second capital of the Ottomans, city of the *gazi* sultans and headquarters of early Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, was too closely associated with the glorious past of the House of Osman to be given up; as for the islands, they were too close to Anatolia and their cession would jeopardize the defense of the Asiatic provinces of the empire. On 1 January 1913, the Ottoman government offered new terms which included some further concessions. These proposals were also rejected by the Balkan states.

Since negotations had reached an impasse and the conference was bound to close, Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary and conference mediator, made an intervention and invited the concerned Great Powers to present a note to the Porte calling for the cession of Edirne and the islands. Meanwhile, in order to ensure the consent of the Ottoman government, Grey privately informed Tevfik Pasha (1845-1936), the Ottoman ambassador in London, that he would support an Ottoman counterproposal requesting the demilitarization of Edirne and its placement under an autonomous administration.[2] It would, therefore, constitute a buffer zone between Bulgarian and Ottoman territories and protect the straits from attack. As for the islands, their status would be determined by the Great Powers. On 17 January 1913 the cabinet of Kamil Pasha received the note and began deliberations on it.

The prevailing opinion in cabinet was to accept the terms offered by the Powers. Indeed, Kamil Pasha was seriously considering its acceptance along with further compromises over Edirne. It was at this point that the CUP took action: on 23 January 1913 the famous *"Bab-ı Ali Baskını"* (raid on the

[1] Bayur, *Türk*. 2, part 2, p. 208.
[2] Şeyhülislam Cemaleddin Efendi, *Siyasi Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990), pp. 98-99.

Sublime Porte) was launched. The operation was carefully planned and audaciously executed by a group of Unionists led by Enver Pasha (1881-1922) and Talat Bey (1878-1921). Said Halim Pasha was also among the organizers of this coup, which aimed at toppling the cabinet of Kamil Pasha and replacing it with a Unionist government. Flanked by his armed companions, Enver burst into a cabinet meeting and obtained the resignation of the aged grand vizir at gunpoint. During the operation, Nazım Pasha, standing outside the cabinet room, was shot dead by one of the fanatical members of the Committee, Yakup Cemil.[1] Both Enver and Talat severely condemned the assassination. The authors of the coup also determined the make-up of the new cabinet as the CUP reemerged from the shadows to resume political authority and to reassert its political will on the destiny of the empire. In spite of its dominant position, the Committee once again preferred not to govern directly but to act on the sidelines, exerting an indirect control over politics. Only three members of the CUP took up office in the new cabinet. Among them was Said Halim Pasha, who became the minister of foreign affairs.[2] However, the cabinet soon dissolved, because the new Grand Vizir, Mahmud Şevket Pasha, would not let himself be manipulated by the CUP. A few days after the formation of the new government, the cabinet met its first crisis. The grand vizir expressed his opposition to the continuation of the war and warned his colleagues that he would resign if peace negotiations were interrupted. Although the majority of ministers and hawks of the CUP were in favour of resuming the war, Mahmud Şevket ultimately prevailed and the government decided to continue negotiations with the Balkan allies. On 30 January 1913, the Porte communicated to the Great Powers some new terms: it consented to cede the part of Edirne which is situated on the right bank of Meriç River. That way, the left bank with its Ottoman Muslim architectural heritage would remain inside the empire.[3]

Besides these clauses, the Ottoman note included certain demands concerning customs. The Ottoman note was well received by the Powers and they advised Bulgaria to consider these proposals.[4] However, the latter rejected the Porte's conditions and hostilities reopened. On 3 February Bulgarian artillery began to bombard Edirne, but they did not launch a sizable offensive

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[1]Samih Nafiz Tansu, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası* (Istanbul: Pınar Yayınevi, 1964), p. 98.

[2]Said Halim's first post in Mahmud Şevket Pasha's cabinet was the *Şura-yi Devlet Reisliği* (State Council President) since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already proposed to İbrahim Hakkı Pasha. The latter refused this offer by accusing the Unionists of causing his misfortune. He said to them, *"Siz beni mahvettiniz"* ("You destroyed me").

[3]Bayur, *Türk,* vol. 2 part 2, pp. 280-282.

[4]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 2, p. 284; Helmreich, *Diplomacy*, p. 268.

on the Çatalca front until 25 March. While the initial attack was successfully repulsed by the Ottoman army, Edirne was eventually reduced to starvation and captured on 27 March by the Bulgarian army with Serbian reinforcements.

The fall of Edirne relieved the government of Mahmud Şevket Pasha of a great responsibility: surrendering the sacred capital of the ancestors to the enemy. Yet despite their successful capture of Edirne, the Bulgarians had failed to break through the Çatalca lines which their king, Ferdinand II (1887-1918), had called "the fences". Thus vanished his dream of entering Istanbul and receiving the crown of Byzantium in Hagia Sophia to the accompaniament of a *Te Deum*.[1]

In the meantime, tensions continued to grow in the Balkans between Bulgaria and her allies. There was disagreement over the division of spoils. Feeling threatened in Macedonia by Greece and Serbia and on the Danube by Romania, Bulgaria hastened to sign an armistice with the Ottomans in order not to be caught between two fires. The conclusion of the armistice was also desired by the Powers, who feared that the Balkan War would degenerate into a global conflict.[2] The armistice was concluded on 15 April 1913. This was followed by the signing of a peace treaty in London on 30 May between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan allies. According to the terms of the treaty the Ottoman Empire would cede all her territory situated to the west of the Midye-Enez line including the Aegean islands.[3]

The last clause of the treaty left the problem of the Aegean islands unsolved; it would be the cause of another crisis in the eastern Mediteranean region and would eventually bring the Ottoman Empire again at the fringe of a new war with Greece in December 1913.[4] Said Halim Pasha as the head of Ottoman diplomacy would play a key role during the ensuing negotiations with Greece. At the negotiations, Said Halim demonstrated skilfull diplomacy by solving the problem of the Aegean Islands to the advantage of the empire. On 11 August 1914 Said Halim Pasha proposed to grant administrative autonomy and the appointment of a Christian governor to the islands on the condition that this territory should be restituted to Ottoman sovereignty. On this occasion, he wrote to Galib Kemali Bey, Ottoman envoy to Athens:

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[1]Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks*, p. 231. Also see Helmreich, *Diplomacy*, p. 201.

[2]Serge Sazonov, *Fateful Years* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1928), p. 91.

[3]For a complete original version of the treaty see Heinrich Triepel, *Nouveau recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international*. série 3, vol. 10, (Leipzig: Librarie Dietrich, 1914), pp. 16-19 (Hereafter cited as Triepel, *Nouveau*) and Sinan Kuneralp, *Recueil des traités, conventions, protocoles, arrangements et déclarations signés entre l'Empire ottoman et les puissances étrangères*, (Istanbul: Isis 2000) pp. 187-188.

[4]For a detailed account of the Aegean problem between the Ottoman Empire and Greece in 1913-1914, see Bilal Şimşir, *Ege Sorunu Belgeler, Aegean Question, Documents*, 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989).

> Voici les bases que nous proposons pour le règlement de la question des îles: Les Iles de Lemnos, Mytilène, Chios et Samos seront aussi restituées à la souveraineté ottomane. Elles seront gouvernées par un gouverneur-général ottoman chrétien nomme par sa Majesté le Sultan et jouiront d'une entière autonomie administrative. Les revenus de ces îles, à l'exception des revenus des douanes, des postes ainsi que de ceux assignés à la dette publique ottomane seront consacrés aux besoins locaux. J'espère fermement qu'une fois cette question réglée sur les bases ci-dessus, nous parviendront facilement conclure à bref délai l'entente proposée par le Gouvernment Roumain.[1]

Nevertheless, the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914 would interrupt the peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and Greece and rendered the efforts of Said Halim Pasha fruitless.

In Saint James' Palace, peace negotiations were about to be concluded under very unfavorable terms for the Ottomans. Kamil Pasha, the former grand vizir who had been waiting since his forced resignation to make a political comeback, judged the moment right for such an action. He journeyed from Egypt on 28 May to take part in a coup d'État against the government. This coup was planned by opponents of the CUP, and in particular, by the Liberal Entente. They wanted to avenge the *Bab-ı Ali* coup and chase the Unionists from power by using the same tactics which these had used to attain it. But the plot was discovered, and as soon as Kamil Pasha arrived in Istanbul he was asked by Cemal Pasha, military governor of the capital, to immediately leave the city and to return to Egypt on the same ship that he came.[2] In the meantime, his residence had been put under surveillance in order to isolate him from his supporters and to compel the old vizir to leave the capital. Despite the intervention of the British embassy on his behalf, Kamil Pasha had to leave Istanbul after three days. Nevertheless, the conspirators did not yield. On 11 June 1913, they assassinated Grand Vizir Mahmud Şevket Pasha while he was driving from the Ministry of War to the Sublime Porte. The reaction of the Committee to this attack was immediate and severe. Cemal Pasha proclaimed martial law and was able to track down and arrest the authors of the conspiracy with amazing speed (three days). A court martial sentenced twenty-four people to death, twelve of them *in abstentia*.[3] According to Bayur, the

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[1] Şimşir, *Ege Sorunu*, p. 611.

[2] Ahmed Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919* (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 30. (Hereafter cited as Djemal Pasha, *Memories*).

[3] Danişman, *Beşinci*, pp. 60-63.

assassination of Mahmud Şevket Pasha should be investigated in the context of the treacherous political atmosphere of this period. He argued that the animosity and dislike between Mahmud Şevket Pasha and certain CUP leaders (Talat Bey in particular) who were known to have been harboring a deep grudge against the pasha could explain the former's lack of protection in face of his assassins.[1]

On the same day that Mahmud Şevket was assassinated, several ministers formed a special committee and had an audience with the sultan to recommend him the nomination of Said Halim Pasha, minister of foreign affairs, to the grand vizirate. However, Sultan Mehmed V had already Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, in mind for the position. Instead he appointed Said Halim, as the deputy grand vizir, until Hüseyin Hilmi returned from Austria to assume the post.[2] This arrangement was not acceptable to the CUP which insisted that Said Halim Pasha be appointed as grand vizir. Finally, the following day, 12 June 1913, the sultan yielded and Said Halim was appointed by Imperial decree (*irade*) to the grand vizirate.

The sultan decreed:

> My intimate and exalted vizir, Said Halim Pasha.
> The office of the grand vizirate was awarded this time to your care and responsability as Mehmed Said Efendi would remain *şeyhülislam*. I order that you submit a list of the ministers who will form your cabinet to our approval. Since our best wishes are for the salvation and the happiness of our country and nation, I wish that our God make all of you successful in order to realize this goal. 7 Receb 1331, 30 Mayıs 1329. Mehmed Reşad.[3]

Said Halim Pasha formed his cabinet and submitted it to the approval of the sultan on 17 June 1913, five days after the proclamation of this decree. In the cabinet, along with the position of the grand vizirate, Said Halim retained the foreign affairs portfolio. Other members of the cabinet were: Ahmed İzzet Pasha appointed as minister of war, Mahmud Pasha, minister of marine, Talat Bey, minister of interior, Halil Bey, president of Council of State, Rifat Bey, minister of justice, Osman Nizami Pasha, minister of public

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[1]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2 , part. 2. pp. 315-318.

[2]Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1951), p. 100. (Hereafter cited as Türkgeldi, *Görüp*).

[3]BOA, *Ali Fuad Türkgeldi'nin Mirascılarından Satın Alınan Evrak Kataloğu*. (Documents Acquired From the Heirs of Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, (Hereafter cited as Türkgeldi, *Collection*). (M.1670-1961) Dosya no. 5/ Gömlek 79. Translation is mine.

works, Süleyman Bustani Efendi, minister of commerce and agriculture and Hayri Bey, minister of education.[1]

The assassination of Mahmud Şevket Pasha had marked the culmination of an ongoing struggle between the Unionists and their political rivals, above all the Liberals, who were represented by the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Party. The Unionists had carried out the coup d'État of *Bab-ı Ali* on 23 January 1913 in order to restore political and military order in the empire which had long before reached its nadir. The apparent motive for the coup was to liberate Edirne which became the symbol for the survival of the state. Nevertheless, they failed to attain their objective in part because of disagreement between the Unionists and Grand Vizir Mahmud Şevket Pasha, who distrusted and scorned them.[2] This climate of disharmony, non-cooperation and even anthipathy between the grand vizir and the Committee leaders, who resented his arrogant attitude, created a political stalemate that worsened the political and military situation of the empire which had already deteriorated dangerously with the debacle of the Ottoman armies in the Balkans. Thus, by aborting the coup fomented by the Liberals, the Unionist leaders established their complete domination over Ottoman politics. While the disappearance of Mahmud Şevket Pasha from the political scene gave them a free hand, they preferred to rule indirectly under the shadow of respectable figures such as Said Halim Pasha, because of their low ranks in Ottoman government hierarchy and even in Ottoman society at large. In fact, many of the CUP leaders and members had relatively modest social background. The changes since Tanzimat, if not earlier, had in certain ways created an alternative elite of land-rich, semi-aristocratic and wealthy commercial families.

The formation of Said Halim's cabinet heralded a new era in the late history of the Ottoman Empire. With it ended the hegemony of the Porte in the empire's politics. In 1908 after the fall of the Hamidian autocracy the center of power was restored to the Porte until the establishment of the single-party autocracy between 1913-1918. Now, with the opposition crushed, the CUP completely dominated the political arena and established its complete hegemony over Ottoman politics and a period of single party autocracy resumed.

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[1]Bostan, *Said Halim Paşa,* p. 35.

[2]For Mahmud Şevket Pasha's harsh treatment of Unionist leaders such as Talat and Cemal, see the former's diary, *Sadrazam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmut Şevket Paşanın Günlüğü* (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988), pp. 18, 166, 167.

The first action undertaken by Said Halim's cabinet was to avenge Mahmud Şevket's assassination by sending to the gallows many of the conspirators and suspects involved. Among them was Damad Salih Pasha (d.1913), son of the famous Hayreddin Pasha of Tunis and husband of the sultan's niece.[1]

As a side note, it would be interesting to mention here the assassination attempt in Paris, of Şerif Pasha (1865-1951), in January 1914. Şerif Pasha, the former Ottoman envoy in Stockholm was married to Princess Emine, the sister of Said Halim Pasha. At that time, a Swedish newspaper accused Said Halim Pasha to be one of the instigators of the attack on his brother-in-law.[2] In the end, the allegation was never substantiated.

Meanwhile tensions among the victors continued to increase on the Balkan front. Indeed, none of the Balkan nations were satisfied with the respective gains alloted to them by the Great Powers at the London conference. Although Serbia acquired a large part of northern Macedonia, she was still not satisfied with the partition agreement: her access to the Adriatic coast was blocked by the creation of an independent Albania — which was fostered by the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and especially Italy). On the other hand, Bulgaria accused Serbia and Greece of jointly appropriating Macedonia which she had always claimed as *terra irredenta*. Taking advantage of the engagement of the Bulgarian army in Thrace against the Ottomans, Serbia occupied much of the Vardar Valley assigned to Bulgaria in the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement of 30 March 1912. It was against this backdrop that the Greeks moved rapidly into southern Macedonia and occupied Selanik, the coveted city of the Balkans.[3] Feeling itself the victim of an aggression perpetrated by her former allies, Bulgaria reacted by launching a surprise attack on Serbia and Greece on the night of 29/30 June.[4] However, Bulgaria's action was based on a total miscalculation of regional politics and a total disregard for the Great Powers' rules of engagement. St. Petersburg now decided to check Bulgaria's expansion, in a move which was strongly supported by Austria-

[1]Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, *Görüp*, pp. 103, 104.
[2]Rohat Alakom, *Bir Kürt Diplomatının Fırtınalı Yılları (1865-1951)* (Istanbul: Avesta 1998), p. 40.
[3]For the Greek occupation of Selanik, see "Protocol between Greece and Turkey for the surrender of Salonica-signed at Salonica", *British and Foreign States Papers*. vol.106. October 26,1912, pp. 1060-1062.
[4]Helmreich, *Diplomacy*, p. 63.

Hungary. Not only would Russia punish her ungrateful creation, but she would also curb the growing Habsburg influence in the Balkans.[1]

July 1913 was a month of military disaster for Bulgaria. In Macedonia, the Serbs and Greeks completely routed the Bulgarian armies. On 10 July, Romania joined forces with Serbs and Greeks and sent her armies across the Danube to march towards Varna. Defeated on all fronts, Bulgaria desperately pleaded for peace. At the same time, the idea of intervention in order to liberate Edirne was hotly debated at the Porte. While some cabinet members such as Grand Vizir Said Halim, Enver Pasha, and Minister of the Interior Talat Bey ardently advocated the army's immediate advance, others including Osman Nizami Pasha, the minister of public works, Oskan Efendi, the minister responsible for postal and telegraphic services, and Çürüksulu Mahmud Pasha, the minister of the navy, were opposed to any intervention.[2] The latter group's concern was mainly rooted in Europe's possible reaction to such a move. Said Halim and Talat did eventually impose their will on the cabinet, and Ottoman troops began to march towards Edirne on 12 July. They met little resistance since the Bulgarians had transferred most of their forces to Macedonia. On 20 July, the Ottoman army, commanded by Enver Pasha, entered the city amidst cheers of the populace. The recapture of eastern Thrace and Edirne by the Ottomans, however provoked a hostile reaction from the Great Powers, which exhorted the Porte to return the city to Bulgaria and to withdraw to the Midye-Enez line. Nevertheless, the cabinet of Said Halim Pasha successfully withstood the intense diplomatic pressure exerted by the European governments and defied their threats of military intervention.[3]

Despite appearance, the Powers were not united in their policy concerning the Ottoman Empire. Among them, only Russia and Austria-Hungary advocated the use of coercive measures including military action against the Ottomans. The Russian proposal for a joint naval demonstration

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[1] St. Petersburg's attitude toward the Bulgarian occupation of Edirne was dubious during the course of the war: on the one hand, as the leader of the Slavic world, Russia felt obliged to support Bulgaria's claim to the city; on the other hand, for strategic reasons, she did not want Bulgaria to approach too closely Istanbul and the Straits, territories which Russia considered as being her share in the event of a partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.

[2] Türkgeldi, *Görüp*, pp. 105, 106.

[3] *British Documents*; vol. 9 part 2. no. 1173. *Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914)* 3e série (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1935), no. 8 (Hereafter cited as *Documents diplomatiques*); Ernst C. Helmreich, "The Conflict Between Germany and Austria over Balkan Policy, 1913-1914," in Donald C. Mc Kay ed., *Essays in the History of Modern Europe* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1936), pp. 130-147.

was opposed by Germany and failed to win the favour of England and France.[1] The firm determination of the Ottoman government to keep Edirne bore fruit, and in late July the German government announced that it would not exert any pressure on the Porte in the matter of Edirne.[2] Soon after, Italy adopted the same position.[3]

A further Russian proposal advocating the use of financial pressure against the Ottoman Empire by means of the Public Debt Administration was rejected by the other Powers.[4] In spite of their discord the Powers did resort to a final *démarche* on 7 August and communicated a collective note to the Porte demanding that it observe the terms of the Treaty of London.[5] This had little impact on the Ottoman government, which resolutely affirmed its intention to retain Edirne. Finally, at the beginning of September, the Powers unanimously advised Bulgaria to commence peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire in order to prevent any further deterioration of her status. On 3 September, the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries arrived in Istanbul where a peace treaty was signed on 29 September.[6]

As soon as the Balkan Wars ended, the Porte faced another crisis, this time in its eastern provinces. The origins of this crisis can be traced back to the Treaty of Berlin. Article 61 of the treaty compelled the Porte to carry out certain administrative reforms in the six provinces of eastern Anatolia where a significant number of Armenians lived.[7] Nevertheless, during his long reign, Sultan Abdülhamid II categorically opposed the application of Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty; he believed that it would undermine Ottoman sovereignty in the heartland of the empire and prepare the ground for its eventual loss.[8] The sultan succeeded in avoiding pressure exerted by the Great Powers to apply this article by following a shrewd policy of appeasement. He was also lucky in that Tsar Alexander III (1881-1894) and his pan-Slavist camarilla (especially Foreign Minister Lobanov-Rostovakii) were not at all sympathetic to the

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[1] *British Documents*, vol. 9, part 2, no. 1175; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3e série, vol. 8, no. 45.
[2] *British Documents*, vol. 9, part 2, no. 1236
[3] Ibid., no. 1255.
[4] Ibid., no. 1248.
[5] *Documents diplomatiques* 3e série, vol. 8, no. 75.
[6] Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 2, p. 482; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3e série, vol. 8, no. 224; *British Documents*, vol. 9, part 2, no. 1258. For the complete and original text of the Istanbul Treaty, see Triepel, *Nouveau recueil*, pp. 78-93 and Kuneralp, *Recueil*, pp. 213-228.
[7] Noradounghian, *Recueil*, p. 191.
[8] *Abdülhamid'in Hatıra Defteri* (Abdülhamid's Memoirs), İsmet Bozdağ, ed. (Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 1986), p. 59.

Armenian cause.[1] Armenian revolutionaries had collaborated with Young Turks in their common struggle against Hamidian absolutism and after the 1908 Revolution the Dashnaktsuthiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) and the CUP had tried to maintain good relations with each other. These relations were not even much affected by the Adana riots in April 1909, which caused the death of thousands of Armenians and Muslims.[2] After the Adana massacres, both parties tried to soothe tensions by blaming the pro-Hamidian reactionary forces.[3] After October 1912, the situation started to change and Armenian leaders in the Ottoman Empire began to challenge the Porte's policy in eastern Anatolia.[4] Certainly this attitude was encouraged by recent international events. The routing of the Ottoman armies in the Balkan Wars, which resulted in the loss of almost all of the empire's European territories, caused a shock wave among all the inhabitants of the empire and generated a general pessimism about the empire's future. Partly as a result of this, Russian policy toward the Ottoman Empire also started to change. Already on 7 October 1912, the representatives of several Armenian associations met at a conference in Tiflis in order to ensure Russian intervention on behalf of Ottoman Armenians.[5] The Ottoman government had responded to Russian moves in eastern Anatolia by preparing a reform project concerning the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Harput, and Diyarbekir in December 1912. In April, the Porte took further steps to thwart a possible Russian intervention, asking Britain to send officials to assist the Ottomans in their reform efforts in these provinces.[6] The legal basis for this demand was Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention of 1878.

In his memoirs, Said Halim Pasha wrote that because of the diplomatic pressure exerted by Russia on the British government, the latter, which had initially given its consent, decided later to turn down the Porte's proposal:

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[1]Edgar Granville, "Le tsarisme en Asie-Mineure." *La revue politique internationale* March-April 1917, pp. 12-13; Ercüment Kuran, "Osmanlı-Rus İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Ermeni Sorunu." *OTAM* no. 5 (Ankara, 1994); H. Pasdermadjian, *Histoire de l'Arménie, depuis les origines jusqu'au traité de Lausanne*. (Paris: Librarie Orientale H. Samuelian, 1964), pp. 381-383 (Hereafter cited as Pasdermadjian, *Histoire*).

[2]For the causes of the Adana riots and massacres, see Damar Arıkoğlu, *Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: Tan Gazetesi ve Matbaası 1961), pp. 42-59; See also André Mandelstam, *Le Sort,* pp. 203-206; Djemal Pasha, *Memories*, pp. 255-262.

[3]Pasdermadjian, *Histoire*, p. 396.

[4]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 22-24.

[5]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, p. 22.

[6]Ibid., p. 23.

> Le Gouvernement Britannique [sic] qui avait au début acquiescé à la demande du Gouvernement Ottoman [sic] refusa au dernier moment d'y donner suite sur les démarches que fit la Russie à Londres de sorte que le projet ne put être réalisé.[1]

On 17 June 1913 an international conference of the ambassadors of the six Great Powers convened in Istanbul. During the conference, Michael De Giers, Russian ambassador to Istanbul, submitted to his colleagues a reform project prepared by André Mandelstamm, the first dragoman of the embassy. According to terms of the project, the six Ottoman provinces in eastern Anatolia would form one administrative entity and be placed under the authority of a Christian Ottoman governor appointed by the sultan for five years. This governor would have under his command a gendarme force, composed half-and-half of Muslims and Christians. Equally a half-and-half Muslim-Christian assembly would be formed to assist the governor.[2]

On 1 July, Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha submitted the Ottoman counterproposal to the conference. The document was based on a reform project already designed during the grand-vizirate of Mahmud Şevket Pasha. According to the Ottoman proposal, the lands falling under the eastern Anatolian reforms would also include the province of Trabzon and *sancak* of Samsun. The implementation of the reforms in this area would be entrusted to two general inspectors, both from a neutral country and between whom the task of supervision would be divided geographically. The general inspectors would be appointed by the sultan for a duration of five years.[3] In the end, the Ottoman project was dismissed as unsatisfactory by the Russian government. In order to break the deadlock, the parties agreed to submit their differences to an international commission that would hold a new conference at the summer residence of the Austrian ambassador in Yeniköy.

During the Yeniköy Conference, which lasted from 3 to 24 July, the negotiations focused on two proposals: 1) the six eastern provinces being united under one governor and forming an "Armenian province" (the Russian plan); and 2) an even larger area, including the province of Trabzon and the *sancak* of Samsun, being placed under the supervision of two European general inspectors (the Ottoman counterproposal).[4] During the discussions, the

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[1]Said Halim Pasha, *L'Empire Ottoman et la Guerre Mondiale* (Istanbul: Les Editions Isis, 2001), p. 6. (Hereafter cited as *L'Empire Ottoman*).
[2]For the complete version of the Russian reform project see Mandelstam, *Le Sort*, pp. 218-222.
[3]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, p. 119.
[4]Ibid., pp. 108-120.

German and Austrian representatives and later the Italian delegate, rejected the Russian proposals and sided with the Porte.[1] The diplomats of the Central Powers viewed the Russian project to be, in effect, a plan to partition Asiatic Turkey, and accordingly opposed it. In fact, the real concern of the Triple Alliance was not the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as they claimed, but the defence of their future zones of influence in Anatolia against Russian encroachment.[2] Indeed, while the Yeniköy Conference was taking place, German Foreign Minister Jagow and his Italian counterpart Marci di San Giuliano were discussing in Kiel their respective zones of influence in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire during a visit by the royal family of Italy to Kaiser Wilhelm II. According to Gottlieb von Jagow, Germany's share in this partition should consist of the territories extending from Alanya in the west to Acra or Lattaqia (Lazkiye), including Cilicia and the plain of Konya, in the east where the Baghdad railway still under construction passed.[3] Accordingly, Italy would acquire the Antalya region which lay to the west of Alanya.[4] German territorial claims in Anatolia and Mesopotamia immediately aroused British hostility since the British government considered any German presence in the Near East much more detrimental to its interests than Russian expansion.[5] Under these circumstances, the Yeniköy Conference ended on 23 July without reaching any resolution. Nevertheless, the Russian government did not renounce its designs on Anatolia and took its first steps towards new talks on the Armenian problem on 30 August 1913.[6] On 22 September Baron Hans von Wangenheim (1859-1915), German ambassador to Istanbul and De Giers reached agreement upon a six-point plan formulated as pledges of the Ottoman government. According to the terms of this treaty the Porte would ask the Powers to recommend two inspectors-general, one for the northern part of eastern Anatolia, comprising Erzurum, Trabzon and Sivas; other for the southern portion of eastern Anatolia covering Van, Bitlis, Harput and Diyarbekir (Art. 1). The Porte would sign a five-year contract with each of these inspectors. According to the agreement the Ottoman government would also accept to nominate high officials and judges upon the proposal made by

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[1]Mandelstam, *Le Sort*, 228; Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 125-130.

[2]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, p. 126.

[3]Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History 1913-1923* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), pp. 52-54. (Hereafter cited as Howard, *Partition*); Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 126-127.

[4]Howard, *Partition*, 55-56; Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 127-129.

[5]Howard, *Partition*, 58; on the Great Powers' plans to partition the Ottoman Empire and their conflicting interests, see also Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway, A Study of Imperialism* (New York: The Mac Millan Company, 1923).

[6]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, p. 139.

the inspectors (Art. 2). An elected council, composed of an equal number of Muslims and Christians, would be created (Art. 3). Furthermore, the Ottoman government agreed to the Great Powers supervising the application of these reforms through their ambassadors (Art.6).[1]

According to accounts provided by the Russian ambassador to his British counterpart in the Ottoman capital, Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha indicated that he would not express any objection to most of the articles as long as the new project was approved by the German and Russian ambassadors.[2] The proposal to appoint two inspectors-general who would be chosen by the Great Powers and invested with extraordinary powers was quite acceptable to Said Halim. Nor did he object to the creation of mixed assemblies and to the equal repartition of public offices between Muslims and Christians. Said Halim did oppose, however, the supervision of the plan by the ambassadors.[3]

Nevertheless, soon after this conference, Said Halim changed his position radically and thoroughly denounced the project. According to the French ambassador in Istanbul, Maurice Bompard (1854-1935), Said Halim had nervously told him that the Great Powers wanted to create everywhere in the Ottoman Empire autonomous provinces like Lebanon which would be beyond the control of the Ottoman government, thus enabling them to intervene in the local administration. But the grand vizir affirmed that "what was possible in some measure on an isolated mountain, without any administration or strategic importance could not be repeated in the *vilayet*s which are the bulwarks of the empire in the east." Said Halim Pasha stated with indignation that the Great Powers did not wish the Ottoman government to take any role in the reforms of its own provinces. He declared furiously: "It is not in this way we will obtain peace in Armenia. They would not act differently if they wanted to cause trouble and anarchy. I refuse to have anything to do with this. If one day they succeed in realizing their designs this will be with another grand vizir."[4]

Said Halim's determined stance against the Russo-German scheme, which in his eyes posed a challenge to Ottoman sovereignty in eastern Anatolia, appeared to bear fruit. According to the British ambassador in

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[1]Mandelstam, *Le Sort*, p. 234-235; Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 145-146.
[2]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 2, part 3, p. 148; *British Documents,* vol. 10, part 1, no. 581.
[3]Ibid.
[4]*Documents Diplomatiques,* 3e. série, vol. 8, no. 296. (Translation is mine).

Istanbul, Sir Louis Mallet (1864-1936), the Russian ambassador De Giers was forced to yield to the persistent attitude of the grand vizir and to accept that inspectors should be Ottoman subjects assisted by foreign advisers, as demanded in a note communicated by the Porte to the Russian embassy on 7 November.[1] Britain supported the Russo-German position on this issue and Mallet put further pressure on Said Halim by asking him to accept the Russo-German plan for Armenia in an interview on 11 November. In his reponse to the British ambassador the grand vizir affirmed that "the Porte would never accept such an Inspectorate-General as was mentioned in the two ambassadors' project," but that "he hoped to arrive at an agreement with Monsieur De Giers to whom he had proposed the appointment of foreign advisers instead of foreign inspectors-general."[2]

Nevertheless, Said Halim conceded on two points in an effort to reach a compromise with the Powers. First the Ottoman government would agree to foreign advisers being recommended by the Great Powers; second the Porte consented to accepting the opinion of the advisors in case of a disaccord.[3]

De Giers rejected these counterproposals. He insisted on the imposition of the six original points that had been agreed upon in the earlier Russo-German plan.[4] The Imperialist Powers had already decided not to extend the life of the Ottoman Empire and to divide up its territory among themselves, thus settling the Eastern Question to their advantage. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the anger of many Muslims within the empire, especially those who lived in urban areas, was clear in the harsh tone of the fiery articles appearing in the Unionist press, especially in *Tanin* and *Jeune Turc*. Muslims in urban centers were particularly receptive to these appeals in the wake of the traumatic experiences of Muslim refugees from the Balkan Wars. The resolute stand of the Porte, which was supported by Muslim public opinion in the cities, forced the diplomats of the Powers to step back and soften their original position. On 25 November, after having discussed the issue again with Said Halim, the German and Russian ambassadors drew up a new plan in which the Powers renounced their control over the application of reforms. Moreover, it was also conceded that the inspectors-general need not be of European extraction as had originally been decided. Nevertheless, the latter

[1] *British Documents*, vol. 10, part 1, no. 581.
[2] Ibid., no. 582.
[3] Ibid., no. 584.
[4] Ibid.

accommodation made by the Powers was effectively obviated since German and Russian planners had already agreed on the foreign advisers being invested with more authority than the Ottoman inspectors-general.[1]

In order to thwart this subterfuge, Said Halim Pasha declared to Mallet that, "the Turkish Government could not allow the right of the Powers to send them advisers, who would interfere in their internal administration and be in constant communication with the foreign Ambassadors. It was wounding to their dignity and would not work in practice."[2]

The diplomatic manoeuvering between the Powers and the Porte finally yielded the 8 Februray 1914 agreement on the reform project for the empire's eastern provinces. Said Halim Pasha, the grand vizir of the Ottoman Empire, and Constantin Goulkevitch, chargé d'affaires of the Russian embassy in Istanbul, were the signatories to the agreement.

According to the terms of the treaty two foreign inspectors-general would be appointed to govern the six provinces of eastern Anatolia (Art. 1); these inspectors-general would supervise the civil and justice administrations, with the security forces at their disposal (Art. 2); the inspectors could judge inefficient, if need be, all officials whom they supervise (Art. 3). Laws, decrees and public announcements would be issued in the local languages for every sector; court decisions would be drawn in Turkish but could be translated to other local languages if one of the parties required this (Art. 7). The local residents would perform their military services in their region, the government could nonetheless send a limited number of the local recruits to remote provinces like Yemen and Hijaz in Arabia (Art. 9). Moreover, the Hamidiye regiments would be dissolved into the Reserve Cavalry Forces (Art. 10). The Porte also promised to organize a census in the shortest time possible (Art. 11).[3]

This treaty constituted a minor Russian victory. It appeared to sanction officially the latter's sphere of influence in eastern Anatolia by securing for the Tsarist government a legal precedent for further intervention and an eventual annexation of the region. Roderic Davison, however argues to the contrary.

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Ibid., no. 586.
[3]Ibid., no. 590; Mandelstam, *Le Sort*, p. 236.

He holds that the agreement did not compromise the interests of the Great Powers in eastern Anatolia while still preserving Ottoman sovereignty.[1] The consent of the other Powers to the treaty evinced their recognition of Russian influence in the area in exchange for the establishment of their own spheres of influence in other provinces of the empire. The Armenian problem in eastern Anatolia thus ceased to be an international issue as designated in the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and reverted to being an issue between Russia and the Ottoman Empire as formulated in the Treaty of St. Stefano, which was dictated to the Porte by a victorious Russia at the gates of Istanbul at the end of Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78.

The Armenian patriarch of the time, Zaven Der Yegyayan (1868-1947), wrote in his memoirs that as soon as the agreeement for the Armenian reforms was signed, he sent a telegram of thanks to the Russian Ambassador, Michael De Giers. Zaven said that De Giers had worked very hard for the reform project. Zaven wrote that the Russian Ambassador visited the Armenian patriarchate on 23 February 1914 to return the patriarch's compliments. That day Zaven could not receive De Giers because of his priestly duties, but three days later the Armenian patriarch returned the visit of the Russian Ambassador, M. Giers. During their meeting, the Russian Ambassador urged the patriarch to send emissaries to Europe in order to meet with the inspectors-general and to win them to the Armenian cause. Zaven did exactly what De Giers said. As recorded in his memoirs, two Armenian envoys, Mosdician and Zavriev soon arrived in Europe in order to fulfill the task assigned to them.[2]

The conclusion of an agreement with Russia on the Armenian problem created a positive atmosphere between the Porte and Russia. This change in Ottoman policy was partially motivated by recent German and Italian aspirations in some parts of Asiatic Turkey. Under these circumstances, an Ottoman delegation led by Talat Bey the Minister of Interior paid a courtesy visit to the Tsar at his summer residence in Livadia, Crimea. The custom of sending delegations to the tsars when they came to the shores of the Black Sea to spend the summer had been instituted by Sultan Abdülhamid II as a part of his policy of friendship with Russia. During a reception given on this

[1]Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," *The American Historical Review* 53 (1948): p. 504.

[2]Zaven Der-Yeghiayan, Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, 1913-1922, *My Patriarchal Memoirs*. Translated by Ared Misirliyan. Barrington: Mayreni Publishing, 2002. p. 28-29. (Hereafter cited as Zaven, *Memoirs*).

occasion, Tsar Nicholas II (1899-1918) affirmed that "he was glad to see a Turkish Embassy in Livadia for he entertained the most friendly feelings for the Sultan and the Turkish nation." The Tsar said further that "he sought no favors from the Turkish Government and only expected the Turks to remain masters in their own country and not to allow strangers to gain complete control of it." "This," he declared, "would be the best guarantee of good and friendly relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire."[1]

On the eve of his return home to Istanbul, Talat offered a farewell dinner to his Russian hosts on the Imperial Yacht *Ertuğrul*, where he proposed to Russia's Foreign Minister Sazonov (1861-1927), an alliance with Russia. Sazonov related in his memoirs that after the dinner, Talat Bey suddenly proposed a proposal of alliance to him. Sazonov affirmed that he was extremely surprised by this unexpected offer. The Russian foreign minister told his Ottoman guest that he would not reject his proposal outright; nevertheless, owing to a lack of time, the matter could only be discussed later. Talat Bey agreed with Sazonov.[2]

This Ottoman-Russian rapproachment triggered an alarm among the representatives of the Central Powers in Istanbul, who immediately began to put pressure on the Porte to abandon the project. Nevertheless, the Unionist leaders did not completely exclude Russia as a potential ally in times of crises and continued to court her with diplomatic overtures even as late as August 1914.

Meanwhile, in late June, Cemal Pasha, minister of the navy, was invited to France to watch the naval manoeuvers of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. He was hoping to make use of this opportunity to discuss the possibilty of an alliance between the Ottoman and French governments, but he was disappointed in this hope, for the French were unwilling to enter into such an agreement.[3] The French did not want to commit themselves without the consent of their allies. As a result, nothing came out of this visit, and Cemal Pasha returned disillusioned to Istanbul on 18 July. The rejection of Cemal's proposal for an alliance by the French government left the Ottoman Empire with the Triple Alliance as the only military bloc on which she could rely in the event of an external threat. Said Halim Pasha was thoroughly

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[1]Sazonov, *Fateful Years* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1928), p. 134. (Hereafter cited as Sazonov, *Fateful*).
[2]Sazonov, *Fateful*, p. 137.
[3]Djemal Pasha, *Memories*, pp. 105-107.

convinced that the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire could only be safeguarded through an association with one of the two opposing military blocs in Europe. On this matter, Said Halim Pasha wrote in his political memoirs that: "the rejection by the Entente Powers of the alliance proposal made by the Porte left the latter with no choice but to turn to the Central Powers for an alliance." "Otherwise," he wrote, "we would prefer the alliance of the Entente to that of the Triple Alliance because the real threat to the empire was posed by the former."[1]

Faced with this situation, the Ottoman Empire concluded a mutual defence agreement with Germany on 2 August. This pact concluded a series of negotiations that were initiated by the German ambassador Baron von Wangenheim in mid-July. On this occasion, Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha wrote in his memoirs that toward mid-July he had been informed by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Marquis Pallavicini that the German ambassador to the Porte received precise orders from his government to offer an alliance to Turkey to which Austria-Hungary was ready to participate also. The next day, wrote Said Halim, early in the morning, Baron Wangenheim informed him that he was finally successful in convincing the German government to offer an alliance to the Porte. I congratulated him for his success wrote to Said Halim. Then the grand vizir and the German ambassador discussed the conditions and the objectives of such an alliance; both men agreed on that this alliance would be forged against Russia and would be definitely defensive.[2]

The terms of the treaty were as follows: German and Ottoman Empires commit themselves to remain neutral toward the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. (Art.1); If Russia intervenes in the conflict militarily and this intervention creates a situation of casus foederis for Germany, this same casus foederis would also be applicable to the Ottoman Empire. (Art.2); In case of war Germany would place her military mission in Turkey at the Porte's disposal and in return, the Porte, would assure the German military mission a powerful influence on the general strategy of the Ottoman army (Art. 3); Germany would undertake defending militarily the Ottoman lands in case of Russian aggression (Art. 4); the agreement would remain valid until 31 Decembre 1918 (Art. 5); finally, the parties also agreed that the treaty should remain secret and could only be divulged to the public by an ulterior agreement between the two powers (Art.7).[3]

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[1]Said Halim Pasha, *L'Empire Ottoman,* p. 13.
[2]Ibid., p. 9.
[3]See, Sinan Kuneralp, *Recueil*, p. 296.

It is important to note that this defensive alliance with Germany was signed one day after the latter declared war on Russia and Britain sequestered the dreadnought *Sultan Osman* which had been built in the Newcastle shipyards for the Ottoman navy.

On 5 August, three days after the conclusion of the Ottoman-German defence agreement, Said Halim Pasha wrote to Pallavicini, Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul to inform him of this alliance:

> Le gouvernement Impérial Ottoman ayant pris connaissance de l'acte d'accession du Gt. Impérial et R. d'Autriche-Hongrie au traité conclu le 2 Août 1914 entre la Turquie et l'Allemagne, acte notifié par la note de S. Exc. l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie en date du 5 Août 1914. Le soussigné Ministre imp. des Affaires étrangères est autorisé de déclarer que la Sublime Porte prend envers le Gt. Imp. et Rl. les mêmes engagements auxquels la Turquie et l'Allemagne se sont mutuellement obligés par les stipulations du dit traité.
>
> Said Halim[1]

On the same day, Enver Pasha suddenly proposed a similar pact to Russia without informing any of the cabinet members. He suggested to Leontief, the Russian military attaché in Istanbul, that an Ottoman army of 30,000 would participate in the war on Russia's side if the latter agreed to Greece's returning of the Aegean islands and to Bulgaria's cession of western Thrace to the Ottoman Empire. Both territories had been lost by the Ottoman Empire as a result of the Balkan wars. This unexpected move may have been inspired by many motives:

First, one may think that the Ottoman minister of war might have taken this initiative in order to disguise his real intention of casting the empire's lot with Germany. Second, Enver Pasha might have wanted to curtail the ever increasing German influence in the empire by counterbalancing it with a Russian alliance. Third, Enver Pasha might not have trusted Germany's reliability as a wartime ally, especially after Britain's entry into the Great War on 4 August.[2]

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[1]BOA, Türkgeldi collection. Dosya no. 16/6. 1334.
[2]Bayur, *Türk,* vol. 2, part 3, p. 135.

Enver Pasha's offer was taken very seriously by Russian ambassador De Giers in Istanbul who was very conscious of the need for friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire, especially in wartime when the latter controlled Russia's lifeline, the Straits. De Giers warned Sazonov of the potentially grave consequences of pushing the Ottoman Empire into the enemy's arms.[1] Sazonov, however, gave little thought to De Giers' repeated warnings and was not receptive to an alliance with the Porte. Instead, he wired to Giers that Russia could only guarantee the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire if the latter accepted to demobilize her army and take over all German economic concessions in Asia Minor, including the Baghdad railway.[2] Sazonov's policy was designed to gain time until Russia built her Black Sea fleet and imposed a sort of protectorate over the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war.[3]

In fact, Russia was attempting to restore the 1833 Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi,[4] and thereby gaining control over the Straits and having free access to the open sea.[5] Moreover, Russia would create an autonomous Armenia in eastern Anatolia under her control and use it as a stepping stone to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf and as well as a base for exerting pressure on Turkey's eastern flank.

On 9 August, while the Russo-Ottoman talks were still in progress, an event of crucial importance took place. Two cruisers from the German Mediterranean Squadron, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, were chased by the warships of the Entente into the entrance of the Dardanelles where they asked permission to enter Turkish waters in order to find a safe haven. The arrival of the German warships exacerbated the divisions among the Ottoman cabinet members over their position on the war. The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* were

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[1] *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917, d'après les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères à Petrograd.* Translation by J. Polonsky. (Paris: Payot, 1928), no. 5, 628, 630, 650, 652, 693. (Hereafter cited as *Documents russes*).

[2] Ibid., no. 5, 1873, 1896. For more information on the Baghdad railway see Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers*. See also Louis Bagey, *La question du chemin de fer de Baghdad, 1893-1914* (Paris: Les Editions du Rieder, 1936).

[3] Sazonov, *Fateful*, p. 129.

[4] For the text of the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi, see Noradounghian, *Recueil*, pp. 229-231. This treaty, signed on 8 July 1833, constituted the price that Sultan Mahmud II had to pay to the Russian Tsar for protection against Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt, whose army after defeating the Ottoman armies several times was in a position to threaten Istanbul and put into peril the very existence of the House of Osman. By this treaty Russia established her control over the Straits and assumed the role of protector of the Ottoman Empire. For the best analysis of this treaty see Philip E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934).

[5] I.V. Bestuzhev, "Russian Foreign Policy February-June 1914," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (July 1966): pp. 93-112.

soon afterwards taken inside the Dardanelles on Enver Pasha's personal orders.[1] Although he had agreed to provide refuge to the two German warships, Grand Vizir Said Halim changed his mind and furiously protested before the German ambassador against the untimely arrival of the ships.[2] Said Halim's concern was largely based on speculation that if the allies declared war on the Porte, it would be because of the German warships. Bulgaria would take this as an opportunity to march on Istanbul, placing the Ottomans in a perilous situation since the latter could not defend both the Dardanelles and Thrace. Therefore, Said Halim Pasha told the German ambassador, the arrival of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* would have to be delayed at least until the conclusion of an Ottoman-Bulgarian defence pact.[3]

These arguments did not impress Wangenheim, who remained instransigent during his conversation with Said Halim. Indeed, the German ambassador even disclosed his country's aims concerning the use of these two cruisers in the Black Sea against the Russians.[4]

The Ottoman cabinet, after long hours of deliberations, finally decided to allow the German ships to stay in the Marmara by changing their status: in other words, the cruisers would be bought for the Ottoman navy. Halil Bey, President of the Ottoman Senate made this proposal, and both the Ottoman and German governments agreed to it.[5] Later Cemal Pasha, then minister of the marine, noted in his memoirs: "It was not a real, but merely fictitious sale. We were informed that as the Emperor could not sell a single ship in the navy without a decree from the Reichstag, the real sale could not be carried out until the end of the war and the Reichstag had conveyed its assent."[6] Thus, on 16 August, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* hoisted the Ottoman flag and were renamed the *Yavuz Sultan Selim* and the *Midilli;* however, the crew remained German and under the command of Admiral Souchon, who was now appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman imperial fleet, thus replacing Admiral Limpus who had arrived in Istanbul in 1913 as head of the British naval mission and had been appoined commander-in-chief of the Ottoman navy.

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[1]Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 30. (Hereafter cited as Trumpener, *Germany*); Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 79-80.
[2]Trumpener, *Germany*, pp. 30-31.
[3]Ibid., p. 31.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşenin Anıları* ed. İsmail Arar (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), p. 190.
[6]Djemal Pasha, *Memories*, p. 120.

The appointment of a German admiral as commander-in-chief of the Ottoman fleet was another step taken by the Unionists to increase the empire's involvement in the war. In fact, the real planner and instigator of the Ottoman Empire's participation in the war, besides the Central Powers, was Enver Pasha. He slowly but persistently worked through his machinations in order to attain his goal that would prove to be tragic to the Ottoman State. Talat Bey supported him, because he was convinced of the correctness of his choice. Enver Pasha's principal opponents were Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha and Cavid Bey, minister of finance. The animosity between Enver Pasha and the grand vizir had already existed in January 1914 when the latter threatened the government with his resignation if Enver Pasha was appointed to the ministry of War.[1] This was a threat which Said Halim Pasha did not carried out despite Enver Pasha's appointment to the said ministry. In Said Halim's opinion, the wisest policy regarding Turkey's entry into the conflict would be to wait until the right moment came for the Porte to cast its lot with the victorious side. He felt this moment had not yet come. As for Cemal Pasha, he was indecisive and almost ready to be carried along by the strongest current. The first serious confrontation among the advocates of these different positions occurred on 16 September during a cabinet meeting when Said Halim Pasha objected to Enver's wish to authorize Admiral Souchon to take the fleet to the Black Sea for naval manoeuvers. According to the grand vizir, such an action could easily provoke an incident with the Russian navy and thereby drag the Ottoman Empire into the war. Said Halim ended by threatening the cabinet with his resignation if the operation was carried out. Faced with the grand vizir's determination, Enver and Talat took a step backwards and agreed to postpone the manoeuvers.[2]

On 27 September, one day after British warships forced an Ottoman torpedo boat to return to the Dardanelles (the vessel was leaving the Straits and heading for the Aegean Sea), Britain declared that any warship carrying an Ottoman flag would be considered an enemy vessel. Enver Pasha responded by closing the Straits to navigation by laying mines.

On 1 October Admiral Souchon asked the Ottoman High Command for permission to take the fleet to the Black Sea for necessary manoeuvers; he also asked Wangenheim to communicate this request to the Porte. For obvious reasons, Said Halim Pasha was at first reluctant to grant Souchon permission;

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[1]Archives of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, Correspondance Politique, Turquie -1914, D.P 1/3445. From Moncheur to Davignon, 3 January, 1914.

[2]Ulrich Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities." *The Journal of Modern History* 34 p. 371. (Hereafter cited as Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry").

however, the grand vizir finally gave way though with still much reticence, when given a guarantee by the German ambassador that "since Admiral Souchon was the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman fleet, he would not take any action without receiving an order from Enver Pasha and, even in the case of an encounter with the Russian fleet, the admiral would immediately return to the Bosphorus."[1]

In late September, there had been some border skirmishes between Ottoman and Russian forces near Eleşkird in eastern Anatolia, in which both sides suffered losses.[2] These were harbingers of the approaching war on the Caucasian front. In the meantime, mobilization of the Ottoman forces was slowly and painfully advancing, but preparations for war were far from being complete.

On 30 September, at the proposal of Enver Pasha, the Ottoman government asked Germany for a loan of the equivalent of five million Turkish liras in gold. The German government welcomed the request and replied that the loan would be secured "as soon as the Ottoman Empire entered the war" on the side of the Central Powers.[3]

Did Said Halim know about this condition made by the German government? As the grand vizir of the Ottoman Empire and head of the cabinet, he might have been expected to have known. Nevertheless, he continued to believe in the possibility of avoiding immediate entry into the war by playing for time. Enver, however, while determined to enter the war on Germany's side, took great pains not to alienate Said Halim whom he wanted to stay on as grand vizir until the empire entered the war. Therefore, even as late as 22 October, he did not categorically oppose Talat's idea to send a delegation to Germany, headed by Halil Bey, to persuade the German government of the necessity of delaying Ottoman participation in the war for another six months.[4] It is possible that Enver Pasha agreed to this latter move in order to disguise his real intention and not to cause a cabinet crisis on the eve of the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war. For already on 11 October,

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[1]Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: İnkilab Kitabevi, 1943), vol. 2, p. 31. (Hereafter cited as Sabis, *Harb*).
[2]Ibid., p.18.
[3]Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry", p. 374. Strangely, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin who played a central role in the negotiation of the loan, never mentions this episode in his memoirs.
[4]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 3, part 1, 230; Sabis, *Harb*, vol. 2, p. 39.

Enver, Talat, Cemal, and Halil had informed the German ambassador that once the two million Turkish liras arrived in Istanbul, they would enter the war.[1] Halil Bey, however, changed his mind next day and joined the group which advocated postponement.

On 20 October, General Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission to the Ottoman Empire warned the Ottoman government that if there were any further delays to Ottoman involvement in the war, "he [would] return to Germany with all the German military personnel after making useless the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* thus leaving Ottoman Empire defenseless in the face of a Russian invasion."[2] The following day, Enver and his German adviser Bronzart prepared a war plan without informing the Ottoman general staff and the cabinet. On 22 October, Enver Pasha set the plan in motion by verbally authorizing Admiral Souchon, again leaving Ottoman officials completely in the dark, "to search for the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and attack it, without making any declaration of war." This verbal instruction was repeated in writing three days later.[3] The same day, unaware of these late developments, Grand Vizir Said Halim commissioned Halil Bey to go to Berlin to explain to the German government the reasons for the Ottoman delay.[4]

Meanwhile, the Ottoman fleet entered the Black Sea under the command of Admiral Souchon in order to implement the written order issued by Enver Pasha only two days after it was issued. Souchon, however, exceeded the terms of his orders and headed north to bombard Russian ports, instead of merely searching for the Russian fleet.

On 29 October, the Ottoman fleet, which included the *Yavuz (Goeben)* and the *Midilli (Breslau)*, began to bombard Sebastopol, Novorissisk, and Odessa, destroying these cities' military and civil facilities and sinking several vessels. When informed of the situation, Said Halim Pasha was extremely distressed. He ordered an immediate end to these operations, but by the time the order had been issued, the fleet was already on its way back to Istanbul.[5] To protest against this *fait accompli* realized without his consent Said Halim Pasha decided not to participate in the *Kurban Bayramı* (Feast of Sacrifice)

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[1]Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry", p. 376.
[2]Sabis, *Harb*, vol. 2, p. 32.
[3]Carl Mühlmann, *Deutschland und die Turkei* 1913-1914 (Berlin: Dr. Walter Rotchild, 1929), p. 102. Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry," p. 378.
[4]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 3, part 1, p. 230.
[5]Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry", p. 378.

ceremonies in the Palace and sent a short note to the Sultan asking to be excused for not be able to participate to the ceremonies because of his indisposition.[1] Cemal Pasha describes the bombardment, Said Halim's reaction to it and the subsequent developments in his memoirs. Indeed, after the news of the bombardment of the Russian ports by the Ottoman fleet reached Istanbul, Said Halim Pasha became very nervous. The grand vizir was strongly opposed to Ottoman participation in the war and told Cemal Pasha that he would not take any responsability for the action. Furthermore, during the Bayram festival the grand vizir declared that he would resign since the attack meant a declaration of war. Nevertheless, the members of the cabinet reminded him that he himself signed the treaty of alliance with Germany. Therefore, he more than anyone should be perfectly aware of the consequences of such a military alliance. In the end, Said Halim Pasha conceded and decided to remain in the cabinet.[2]

Ali Fuad Bey (Türkgeldi), the first secretary of Sultan Mehmed V (Reşad), also commented on these events in his memoirs: on the eve of the Feast of Sacrifice, he was woken up by the Chief Chamberlain Tevfik Bey and informed about the Black Sea attack. He wrote that they both tried to phone the ministers of war and navy, respectively, Enver and Cemal Pashas, but were unsuccessful in their endeavours. Next morning Said Halim Pasha did not come to the palace to participate in the Bayram ceremonies. Instead, he sent a note to the office of the First Secreteriat that owing to an illness, he would not be able to attend the ceremony. Tevfik Bey related that he submitted this note to the sultan who sent the second chamberlain Nüzhet Bey to the grand vizir's office in order to learn the reason for his absence.[3]

The reaction of the grand vizir, as we have it from two different sources, seems to confirm that he was kept completely in the dark by his colleagues, and that he was genuinely dismayed at the turn of events. Said Halim Pasha reacted to this situation by not participating in the Palace ceremony. Instead, he decided to tender his resignation. After the ceremony, the ministers went to his residence and succeeded in changing his mind: "During the second day of Bayram, I went to visit Said Halim Pasha at his residence, with two other palace officials, Tevfik Bey and Salih Pasha. The grand vizir

[1]BOA, Türkgeldi collection Dosya no. 5/ Gömlek 322.
[2]Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs*, p. 131.
[3]Türkgeldi, *Görüp*, pp. 129-130.

accepted us in private and said: 'The Germans want to involve us in the war. Yes, we have to enter, but not at a date which they choose; rather, at one that is more opportune for us' ".[1]

Even after the attack of the Ottoman fleet on the Russian ports, Said Halim Pasha hoped for a peaceful settlement of the affair. To that purpose, he told De Giers, the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, that "the incident occurred against his will and that he still hopes to settle the problem peacefully and to check German influence."[2] Following this interview, De Giers in a letter that he sent to Sazonov on 30 October 1914, wrote that Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha offered him his sincerest apologies on the Turkish attack. According to De Giers, Said Halim Pasha assured him that the incident happened totally against the will of the Porte and that he would restrain the Germans. When the Russian ambassador told him in return that he received orders from St. Petersburg to leave the Ottoman capital, Said Halim vehemently objected to it and proposed to write to St. Petersburg to arrange the situation. Nevertheless, wrote De Giers, "I do not doubt his sincerity but his power." Giers also wrote to Sazonov that the fall of Said Halim and Cavid from the government is very near.[3]

The grand vizir also tried in vain to persuade the British and French ambassadors to conclude a political agreement. French ambassador Bompard recounted the developments which followed the Black Sea attack in an article he later wrote about the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I and Said Halim Pasha's desperate and humiliating attempts to prevent the conflict. Bompard wrote that as soon as news the bombardment reached the ambassadors of the Triple Entente, they agreed to communicate to the grand vizir their joint decision to ask for their passports and leave the Ottoman capital unless the Porte agreed to sent away all German military members. Bompard visited the grand vizir on the evening of 30 October. He wrote that: "I found Prince Said Halim deeply depressed (profondément abattu)". According to the French ambassador, Said Halim implored him to stay and promised to arrange the situation. Bompard told him, he would do so only if the Porte would sent away the Germans. Said Halim told Bompard that he would deliberate on this issue with other members of the cabinet.

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[1] Ibid., p. 130.
[2] *Documents russes*, no. 1619.
[3] Ibid.

The efforts of the grand vizir to prevent the war were futile. Following the departure of the ambassadors of the Triple Entente, these powers declared war on the Porte: Russia on 2 November, Britain and France three days later.

In his memoirs, Mehmed Cavid Bey, minister of finance, wrote that after deciding to withdraw his resignation, Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha, asked him about the possibility of forming a peace cabinet. Cavid Bey's reply was: "I told him that the formation of such a government could not be possible for two reasons: first, it requires the consent of the Central Committee of the CUP, which was openly pro-war; secondly without the participation of Enver and Talat, such a cabinet would not be viable."[1]

On 1 October 1914, the Ottoman government repealed the capitulations. This decision was communicated to the governments of the Western Powers on 9 September 1914. In his biography, *(Tercüme-i Hal)*, Said Halim Pasha wrote that the abrogation of the capitulations was one of his main political aspirations since his early years in opposition to the Hamidian regime.[2] When the Ottoman government made this decision, Said Halim Pasha exchanged some diplomatic notes with the governments of the concerned Powers. In response to the European governments' protest, Said Halim Pasha stated that these capitulations were granted by the Ottomans in the past in order to facilitate trade relations and should not be considered as an established right (*droit acquis*).

In a letter answering the note communicated by Marquis de Garroni, Italian Ambassador to the Porte, on 11 December 1914, Said Halim Pasha congratulated the Italian government for its decision to remain loyal to the agreement reached by the latter and the Ottoman government concerning the future of the capitulations. In the treaty of Lausanne signed between Italy and the Ottoman Empire, both powers agreed in principle to discuss the matter in a conference (Art. 8). Said Halim stated also that his government was determined to replace the existing capitulary regime which provided exclusive privileges to the foreign nationals at the expense of Ottomans by a regime based on international law.

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[1]Cavid Bey, *Birinci Cihan Harbine Türkiyenin Girmesi, Maliye Nazırı Cavit Beyin notları, Tanin,* 19 November 1944. p. 44, (Hereafter cited as Cavid, *Memoirs.*)
[2](Tercüme-i Hal).

Ironically, most of the resistance to the abrogation of the capitulations came from Germany. Although an ally of the Ottoman Empire, the German government demonstrated a strong opposition to the suppression of the capitulations by the Ottoman government. On this occasion, Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha, wrote a letter to Hakkı Pasha, Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, urging him to increase his diplomatic pressure on the German government in order to persuade the latter to stop its opposition to the abrogation.

Writing to the embassies of Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands to justify legally and economically the Porte's decision to abrogate the capitulations, Said Halim stated that the Porte like any other sovereign power has the legal right to repudiate any previously signed treaty. Said Halim declared that it is one of the basic rules in international law that the commercial treaties are subject to modifications in the course of time. It is also legally inadmissible that a treaty could contain any clause which would assure its continuity forever by preventing the rights of the parties to terminate it.

Said Halim Pasha also wrote to the minister of foreign affairs of Spain in order to explain him the historical origins of the capitulations and to refute his objection to the abrogation of the latter by the Porte. The origins of the capitulations, stated the grand vizir, is found in the edicts promulgated by the Ottoman sultans in the past centuries to encourage trade. Nevertheless, he added, with time this benevolent act of the sultans was considered by the foreign powers as an entitlement.

> L'origine du régime des capitulations se retrouve dans des firmans, actes de souveraineté ottomane spontanées accordant aux étrangers des facilités spéciales favorables lorsqu'ils résident dans l'empire. Ces facilités inspirées par l'esprit de l'hospitabilité ont été considérées comme des droit acquis, et par la suite des temps lorsque certains traités ont été consacrés, ils ont été interprêtés dans un sens tellement extensif que même les textes des clauses relatives ne le comportaient pas [...][1]

[1]BOA, Hariciye Nezareti Bab-ı Ali Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası, HR, HMS, ISO, no. 34611.

During the war, the Ottoman armies fought on many fronts: in the Caucasus, Iraq, Palestine, the Dardanelles, Galicia, and Macedonia. As soon as hostilities began, the British landed troops on the Persian Gulf coast and occupied Basra (22 November). Meanwhile, Sultan Mehmed V declared *jihad* on 11 November. Nevertheless, this call failed to attract the support of the Muslim subjects of the Entente powers, the majority of whom remained loyal to their colonial masters.

The unwillingness of the Muslims living under Western colonial rule to support the Ottoman war effort and their aloofness to the call of *jihad* could be explained by the unpopularity of the Unionist leaders of the empire among certain pious Muslim circles who accused them of "personal impiety".[1]

The Unionists twinned their Pan-Islamic war agenda with a Pan-Turkist one; therefore, on December 1914, in the dead of an eastern Anatolian winter, Enver Pasha launched an offensive on the Caucasian front in order to conquer the Caucasus and Turkestan and to liberate the Turkic peoples of these regions from Russian rule. The Ottoman army, however, was dangerously ill-equipped and poorly commanded, and was operating in extreme climatic conditions (temperatures of -20° C and snow reaching one metre in depth). Defeat was almost certain in the face of an enemy which was much better equipped and commanded. The so-called Sarıkamış campaign ended in a complete disaster: 70,000 casualties out of an army of 90,000; most of the soldiers froze to death even before confronting the enemy.[2]

On 11 January 1915 the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Germany was renewed by a second treaty concluded between Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha and German ambassador Baron von Wangenheim. According to terms of this treaty, the two parties would reaffirm their agreement to bring mutual military assistance with all their force to each other in case of an attack upon one of the parties by either Russia, France, Britain, or by a coalition formed by at least two Balkan powers; Germany would assist Turkey militarily, if the latter were engaged in war with Britain and another European power; the present agreement would enter into force from its signature and would remain valid until 8 July 1920 in accordance with the stipulations of

[1]Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 95. (Hereafter cited as Kayalı, *Arabs*).

[2]Sabis, *Harb*, p. 159; according to Larcher, the Ottoman losses totaled 90,000 out of an army of 190,000 soldiers (this seems to be an exaggeration).

the agreement concluded between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Another clause which prorogated even further the duration of the treaty until 8 July 1926 was not even denounced by the contracting parties.[1]

After a disastrously abortive attack against Russian positions accross Sarıkamış in eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman military leaders decided to organize a campaign against the British in Egypt. The expedition was conceived as part of a Pan-Islamic war strategy and aimed to liberate Egypt from British occupation. It was commanded by Cemal Pasha, then governor of Syria. The German military advisors were also very much in favour of the campaign.[2] The former khedive, Abbas Hilmi, also exhorted Unionist leaders to such action. A general uprising by the Egyptian population against the British was also expected as the Ottoman army marched through the Sinai Desert in order to cross the Suez Canal. The Egyptian campaign however was aborted just before it reached the canal. On 3 February 1915, the Ottoman forces, on reaching the eastern bank, were forced to retreat. The failure of the operation was due to a lack of careful preparations: the Ottoman expeditionary force was inadequately equipped and supplied to fight a much superior enemy force. The collapse of the Egyptian campaign also meant for Said Halim Pasha the end of his dream of one day becoming the khedive of Egypt.[3]

Encouraged by the Ottoman reverses in the Caucasus and Egypt, the Allies decided to strike a fatal blow at the heart of the Ottoman Empire by forcing their way into the Sea of Marmara through the Dardanelles. Indeed, the Dardanelles campaign, with its target of capturing and occupying the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, had two other objectives: first, it aimed to oust the Ottomans from the war; and second, it was to establish a supply line to the Russian army in order to support the latter's efforts in the field against the Austro-German armies. The campaign lasted for almost a year and resulted in a complete fiasco for the Allies. After failing to force their way through the Straits, the British (mostly Australians and New Zealanders) and French forces tried to occupy the Gallipoli peninsula by landing troops on 25 April 1915. The defence of the Dardanelles was organized by the German General Liman von Sanders. The Allied forces soon decided to retreat when faced with the heroic and stubborn resistance of the Ottoman army. In his memoirs, Said

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[1]Sinan Kuneralp, *Recueil, pp. 313-314*. Also see Carl Mühlmann, *Deutschland*. pp. 96-97.
[2]Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1928), p. 43.
[3]Cavid, *Memoirs*, p. 72.

Halim Pasha praised the role played by Mustafa Kemal in the defence of the Dardanelles and wrote that, his victory at Anafarta over the British was decisive for the latter in deciding to end the Dardanelles campaign and to withdraw.[1]

While the Ottoman armies were victoriously resisting enemy attack at Gallipoli, a government crisis was taking place in Istanbul. Using the successful military situation to consolidate their position in the government, Enver Pasha and Talat Bey were trying to isolate Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha and reduce his authority. In June 1915 Talat Bey began to put pressure on Said Halim in order to compel him to relinquish the foreign affairs portfolio. Talat Bey's aim was to secure the appointment of his close friend and protégé Halil Bey as the minister of foreign affairs, thus establishing his control over the cabinet.

At first Said Halim Pasha refused to comply and threatened to resign from the grand vizirate if continued to be pressured on this matter. Ultimately, he could not withstand the ever increasing pressure put on him by Talat Bey. Said Halim Pasha was compelled to leave the ministry of foreign affairs on 24 October 1915.[2] By expanding his influence in the cabinet, Talat Bey was also planning to check Enver Pasha's insubordination to the central committee of the Union and Progress Party. Having forged a new alliance with the Germans, Enver Pasha was acting independently of the cabinet and did not always comply with government policy.[3]

After the Sarıkamış disaster in January 1915, the Ottoman government felt vulnerable along the eastern front where a sizable Armenian population dwelled. The Porte was highly suspicious about the latter's loyalty in the event of a renewed Russian offensive and an eventual occupation of the region by the Tsarist armies. On 26 May 1915, Talat Bey, minister of the interior, submitted a bill to the cabinet asking for the adoption of a special law regarding the deportation of the Armenian populations living in areas adjacent to the war zones. The zones in question were located mainly in the eastern and southeastern provinces of the empire. The apparent purpose of this bill was to prevent the Armenians in these provinces from collaborating with enemy

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[1]Said Halim, *L'Empire Ottoman,* p. 54.

[2]Bayur, *Türk*, vol. 3, part 2, pp. 398-399. To Bayur this occurred "upon the harsh words of Talat Bey" (Talat Beyin bazı sert sözleri üzerine) ; Bostan, *Said Halim*, p., 66. Although Bostan wrote that Said Halim Pasha resigned "after being threatened by Talat Bey" (Talat Beyin tehdidi üzerine), he did not specify the nature of this threat.

[3]Ibid., p. 400.

forces, especially with the Russian army, and from operating behind Ottoman lines. The French military officer, Commandant M. Larcher, author of the book *La Guerre turque dans la Guerre Mondiale* wrote as follows on this matter:

> La population arménienne de la zone des opérations faisait ouvertement cause commune avec les Russes. Une partie des chrétiens du Vilayet d'Erzeroum avait dès décembre 1914, émigré en Transcaucasie. Des volontaires franchissaient les lignes turques pour aller s'enrôler dans les bataillons arméniens organisés par les Russes.[1]

On 27 June 1915 Armenian Patriarch Zaven paid a visit to Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha in order to seek his intervention in halting the deportation of his community. During his audience with the grand vizir, the Armenian patriarch lamented bitterly about the deplorable situation of the Armenians who suffered the hardships and misery of deportation. He said to Said Halim that the Armenian community of the empire faced annihilation if the deportations continued. In his answer to the patriarch the grand vizir stated that he agreed with him on the present miserable condition of the empire's Armenians, but this was caused primarily by the subversive action of the Armenians against the Porte and by the intervention of some Great Powers on their behalf. The Armenian patriarch, although accepting the existence of some isolated acts of uprising, refused categorically the accusation of a general Armenian rebellion against the Ottoman government. The grand vizir stated that entire batallions were formed by Armenian subjects of the empire ready to take up arms against the Ottoman government in cooperation with the enemy. Again the Patriarch Zaven told Said Halim that more than a million people including women and children had perished in the deportations and personally he would prefer to this situation the massacres committed during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid where women and children were spared. To these accusations Said Halim Pasha replied that the Ottoman government has no intention of exterminating the entire Armenian community of the empire. But, he added, these measures were necessary in order to prevent the Armenian rebels from collaborating with the enemy. The grand vizir explained, "This is a simple "tedbir" not a "ceza", (this is a simple necessary measure to take, not a punishment). Said Halim told Patriarch Zaven that the government decision on the deportation of the Armenians was irreversible; however, he added, it was also the government's duty to assist the migrating people in their needs.[2]

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[1]Larcher, *La Guerre Turque*, p. 395.
[2]Zaven, *Memoirs* pp. 77-79.

The proposed bill was adopted by the government on 30 May 1915 and issued on 1 July 1915 as the Temporary Law of Deportation. Although Said Halim had endorsed the law as head of cabinet, he later affirmed during his interrogation by the Post-War Inquiry Commission that "he did not know that the deportations would lead to the massacres and insisted that the plight of the Armenians was caused by the misapplication of the deportation orders." Curiously, Said Halim Pasha also affirmed during the same hearings that "following the massacre of the Armenians, commissions were formed; these commissions carried out their duties well. But the Ministry of Interior prevented me from publicizing the results of the investigation despite my every insistence. Then it became evident that as long as Talat Pasha remained at the Ministry of Interior, nothing would come out of these investigations."[1]

On 5 June 1916, the Bedouin troops of Sharif Husayn attacked the Ottoman garrison in Medina; the long contrived Hijazi revolt had finally broken out. Husayn's confrontation with the Unionists had began in 1908 when the latter unsuccessfully attempted to secure the appointment of his rival, Ali Haydar, as sharif of Mecca. Thanks to Abdülhamid II's intervention, Husayn had obtained the sharifate.[2] The sultan, as *Khādim al Ḥaramayn al sharūfayn* (servitor of the two holy cities), could not allow the Committee to encroach upon his sacred domain without compromising his prestige and authority as caliph. Before deciding to take up arms against his Ottoman overlord, Husayn engaged in a long correspondance with the Porte and the British authorities in order to determine which would act in his best interests.[3] The correspondance with the British was carried out in secret, so as not to raise any suspicion among Ottoman officials.

Husayn's disagreement with Istanbul was over Hijaz's autonomy. Since his appointment to the amirate in 1908, Husayn had resisted the centralizing efforts of the Unionists. Their efforts were rewarded in the summer of 1910, when Medina became an independent *sancak*, thus removing the holy city from the Meccan amir's jurisdiction and placing it under Istanbul's direct control.[4] In making this administrative change, the Unionists were attempting to reduce

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[1] *Harp Kabinelerinin İsticvabı* (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1933), p. 293 (Hereafter cited as *Harp*). For Talat Pasha's explanations on the deportations and massacres of the Armenians, see his memoirs, "Posthumous Memoirs of Talaat Pasha," *Current History, A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times* 15 (October 1921-March 1922), pp. 287-295.

[2] C. Ernest Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca al-Husayn ibn-Ali and the Origin of the Arab Revolt," *From Ottomanism to Arabism* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 4-5. (Hereafter cited as Dawn, *Ottomanism*)

[3] Ibid., p. 31.

[4] Kayalı, *Arabs*, p. 160.

the amir's sphere of authority and to check his influence in the Hijaz. Nonetheless, Husayn still retained his power and influence in Mecca and the surrounding areas. The situation was just the opposite for the Ottoman governor who found himself powerless before Husayn's increasing popularity. In order to establish its authority, the Unionist government appointed on 15 January 1914, a new governor to the Hijaz, namely Vehib Pasha, who was also the commander of the military forces in the province.[1] His mission was to implement the Law of the Provinces and to extend the railway from Medina to Mecca. Husayn was strongly opposed to these projects and asked the Porte to delay the governor's appointment. In the interim, he instigated a Bedouin revolt in Mecca and its vicinity.

In Istanbul, Talat Bey, the minister of interior, wanted to use force to restore order in Mecca and to depose Husayn, but the grand vizir intervened personally and prevented such an action from taking place. Said Halim succeeded in convincing the cabinet to reach a peaceful settlement of the crisis by accepting the demands of the amir: no change in the political status of the Hijaz; and no extension of the railway to Mecca. The position taken by Said Halim in this crisis clearly indicates his political view. As he wrote at the time: "The old, decentralized Ottoman political system is better suited to the realities of Muslim countries than the European-inspired centralizing administrative model of the Tanzimat."[2]

In early July of the same year, Abdullah, son of Husayn, travelled to Istanbul in order to discuss the political situation in the Hijaz. His first stop was the residence of Said Halim Pasha, who immediately arranged for him an appointment with Talat and Enver Pashas. Abdullah's meeting with the latter was courteous but inconclusive. Enver behaved very politely toward the amir's son but did not act upon the issue at hand; instead he shifted the responsibility to the minister of the interior who was in reality the most powerful man in the empire. In the presence of the grand vizir, Talat Pasha bluntly told to Abdullah that the Porte was determined to construct the railway from Medina to Mecca even if were to require changing the governor of Hijaz every month; he also threatened him by saying that if Amir Husayn refused the Porte's decision on this matter, he would be replaced.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 81.
[2] Said Halim, *La société ottomane* (in typescript) p. 7
[3] Abdullah ibn Husayn, King of Transjordan, *Memoirs of King Abdullah* ed. Philip Graves (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), pp. 119-120.

Husayn responded to these uncompromising terms with a policy of evasiveness which he maintained during the first two years of the war, that is until his revolt in June 1916. He engaged in secret negotiations with the British in order to ensure his political interest in case of an eventual Allied victory all the while remaining in constant contact with the Ottoman government.

Most Middle Eastern historians have erronously called the revolt of the amir of Mecca the Arab Revolt. In fact, it can safely be said that of all the Arab provinces of the empire, none participated in Husayn's rebellion except the Hijaz. At best, in Syria and Iraq some intellectuals who had earlier been involved in political activities continued to participate in political clubs and secret associations whose aim was Arab autonomy; however, their activities remained isolated and did not gain popular support. The masses in these provinces remained loyal to the Ottomans until the end of the war.[1]

This being said, the effect of Husayn's revolt on Said Halim's political career was fatal. When the amir of Mecca, a key symbolic figure in Islamic officialdom, joined forces with an enemy upon whom the empire had declared *jihad*, Islamic ideology was dealt a severe blow and Said Halim, a leading proponent of this movement, was largely discredited in the cabinet. Consequently, he resigned his position as grand vizir on 3 February 1917 and was replaced by Talat Pasha who represented the Turco-Centrist tendencies within the CUP.

Before tendering his resignation, Said Halim Pasha send a short note to his brother Abbas Halim informing him of his intention.[2]

After his resignation, Said Halim Pasha withdrew to his *yali* at Yeniköy, where he spent most of his time reflecting upon the social and political problems afflicting the Muslim world and writing extensively on these issues. Politics still continued to keep him occupied, for he had retained his seat in the Senate. During his grand vizirate, Said Halim Pasha was decorated with the highest Ottoman order, the *Murassa İmtiyaz Nişanı*. He also received the order of the *Aigle noir* from the German emperor and the order of *Saint Etienne* from the emperor of Austria-Hungary.[3]

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[1]Dawn, *Ottomanism*, p. 2. See also, William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 157-158.
[2]Said Halim Pasha, private papers in the possession of his family.
[3](Tercüme-i Hal).

On 8 October 1918, the strongman of the CUP, Talat Pasha, resigned from the grand vizirate. This signaled the end of an era during which the CUP had ruled arbitrarily over the Ottoman Empire and sealed its political destiny. On 14 October, a new government was formed by Ahmed İzzet Pasha (1864-1937), an able army commander who had served as chief of staff since 1908, and as minister of war from June 1913 to June 1914 (the time from the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Pasha to the appointment of Enver Pasha as minister of war). The CUP was still the major political force in the country and continued to dominate the political arena. Moreover, Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha retained respectively complete control over the army and the fleet. Accordingly, the new government included many Unionist figures like Cavid Bey, Hayri Efendi, and Rauf Bey. Despite the Unionist factor, Sina Akşin rightfully argues that "[i]t would be incorrect to label this cabinet as a rearguard Unionist cabinet."[1]

On 30 October 1918, the Ottoman Empire officially declared an end to the hostilities with the Allied Powers by signing the Armistice of Mondros. On 3 November 1918, Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha fled the country on board a German submarine. On 4 November, during the seventh session of the Senate, Çürüksulu Mahmud Pasha proposed that commissions of inquiry be set up to investigate the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the war, and that the Treaty of Mutual Defence Alliance signed with Germany on August 1914 and other confidential political documents be published. They would also take any necessary measures to punish the authorities responsible for the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war.

Çürüksulu Mahmud Pasha's proposal came after the submission of an earlier motion to the President of the Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Mebusan Reisi*) by a deputy named Fuad Bey (Member for Divaniye) who requested the trial of Said Halim and Talat Pasha's cabinet members before a high court.[2] Said Halim Pasha defiantly invited the president of the Senate to form a high court to examine and judge his deeds and actions as grand vizir. During the same session (4 November), a special eight-person committee was created in order to examine these requests. The commission decided to submit the affair to a special department of the Chamber of Deputies called the "Fifth Department" (*Beşinci şube*) for examination. From 5 November to 21 December 1918, the Fifth Department heard the cases of all members of the

[1] Sina Akşin, *Istanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1976), p. 27. (Hereafter cited as Akşin, *Istanbul*).
[2] *Harp*, p. 7.

Ottoman war cabinets with the exception of Talat, Enver, and Cemal Pashas who had all fled the country and Şeyhülislams Hayri and Muza Kazım Efendis. The heart of the investigation was the ten points which figured in Fuad Bey's motion. These were posed as questions by the investigating committee to Said Halim Pasha during his interrogation. Each question is followed by Said Halim Pasha's answer.

1) Entering the war without reason and at an improper time.

Said Halim Pasha: "I was not in favour of entering the war. Our position was good; we had adopted an armed neutrality and by this neutrality we were helping our allies and compelling the Balkan nations to remain neutral. Furthermore, necessity dictated that we concentrate our troops along the empire's frontiers in order to confront any impending disasters. I tried to preserve the status quo as long as I could. Nevertheless, our allies wanted to drag us into the war. When they saw that I resisted their threats and pressure tactics, they resorted to a series of faits accomplis. The first one was to make the warships *Goben* and *Breslau* enter our waters without informing us. The action subsequently jeopardized our neutrality and forced me to plead to the ambassadors of the Entente and to inform them that we bought the ships. While they knew the real nature of the affair, they nonetheless accepted our explanation. Not having succeeded the first time, the Germans then staged a second fait accompli which caught me completely unawares [...]

As for the Black Sea incident, it happened in the following manner: one day, our fleet came across the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and fired on it; our ships went on to bombard the [Russian] ports. How could this happen? I never allowed our fleet to enter the Black Sea! Allow me to explain to you what happened. The admiral and commander-in-chief of the fleet came to me and asked permission to take the fleet to the Black Sea for important naval manoeuvres. According to him, the Sea of Marmara being a calm sea, was not suitable for naval manoeuvers and firing exercices. Upon his insistance, we granted permission on the condition that the warships would not enter the Black Sea as a single unit but go in one by one to perform manoeuvers at the entrance of the Bosphorus and then return by the evening. The fleet accepted this arrangement and acted accordingly. Since cabinet was in control of the situation, we felt that everything was safe. Upon being informed of the incident, I exclaimed: "You are playing with the life of the country." The armed attacks being contrary to the policy I had been pursuing for three months, I immediately handed in my resignation. I did not, however, retire

(*istifa ettim fakat çekilmedim*). When asked to withdraw my resignation, I accepted on the condition that the Imperial government offer reparation and compensation to the injured parties. My proposal accepted, I immediately sent an official statement to the Entente Powers through the diplomatic channels of the Ministry of War. It read: "We would like to preserve our neutrality. Since this episode was an accident, we are, therefore, ready to compensate you for any damages as assessed by a commission." Unfortunately, this offer bore no fruit. Feeling dutybound as I did, especially when my country was on the brink of disaster, I remained in the cabinet.

As I said, our attempts to compensate came to nothing because they (the Allied Powers) chose a radical approach to the problem. At first, I thought that they wanted us to remain neutral and that they would show leniency and would agree to settling the affair peacefully. Indeed, this was my impression when talking to the ambassadors. However, their replies, which were being kept at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed otherwise. In spite of this setback, I did not consider the situation hopeless. I subsequently convened the members of the cabinet and the Central Committee to my house: I told them that since this incident had unintentionally drawn us closer to war, we should at least stay non-belligerent. I told them that we should renounce such aims as the reconquest of Turan, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers; I added that every nation goes through three stages of historical development: an era of expansion, an era of stagnation, and an era of decline. While I hoped that ours was not an era of decline and realized that it was certainly not an era of expansion, I felt that ours was an age of stagnation. I suggested that in keeping with our policy of neutrality, we should limit ourselves to protecting our borders. In summary, despite my efforts, the situation showed no signs of improvement.

My unfortunate experience has strongly convinced me that a grand vizir wields little power: he does not have any authority over the cabinet and is completely at the mercy of his ministers who do whatever they want without informing him. For instance, the offensive campaign in the Caucasus which led to the disaster of Sarıkamış had been planned and executed completely outside of my knowledge. Notwithstanding this event, I did not resign because I saw that if I did, the grand vizirate would pass into the hands of incompetent persons, thus putting the country in great jeopardy.

Also, some cabinet members whom I felt were trustworthy did not wish to see me resign: they were of the opinion that my presence had a

dissuasive effect on certain persons. I therefore remained as grand vizir. However, the situation soon degenerated into personal rivalries, and later developments including a personal quarrel with Talat Pasha (who incidentally coveted my position), left me with no choice but to step aside".

After Said Halim Pasha completed his answer to the first question, the president of the investigative committee, Aptullah Azmi Efendi (the deputy of Kütahya), and several other deputies asked further questions in order to clarify some issues related to the first question. President Azmi Efendi asked Said Halim Pasha to explain the matter of the mutual defense agreement with Germany. Said Halim Pasha responded that the idea of a mutual defense alliance with Germany was first discussed between the German ambassador and himself on the 14th or 15th of July 1914. He added that the alliance had been concluded before the outbreak of the war and hence its intention was not to commit the empire to any large-scale military operations.

Another question raised by a deputy representing Tekirdağ, Harun Hilmi Efendi, dealt with the nature of the treaty signed with Germany. Said Halim Pasha reiterated that the nature of the Germano-Ottoman military agreement of 2 August 1914 was not offensive but defensive. Concluding a defensive or military alliance, argued Said Halim Pasha, does not necessarily imply entering a war. He said, "For instance, Italy had been a member of the Triple Alliance for thirty years and had benefited from this pact. This did not oblige her later to enter the war on the side of her allies; the same was true for Romania after being an ally of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for twenty-five years. In the end, alliance treaties are important but even more important is the intelligent use of them.

From that perspective Said Halim Pasha acknowledged that the empire's involvement in the war was untimely.

The second accusation was as follows:

2) Giving false information to the General Assembly about the reason for the declaration of war and on the course of the war.

Said Halim Pasha refused to assume responsibility for the Ottoman participation in the Great War and stated that he relied on the Ministries of War and Navy in this matter.

3) Rejecting the Allied Powers' advantageous offers after the Ottoman declaration of war and mobilizing and involving the nation in war without securing any pledge or guarantee from Germany.

Said Halim Pasha refuted these allegations and affirmed that "the only tangible offer made by the Entente was to guarantee the empire's territorial integrity against the Allies (The Triple Alliance) on the condition that we stayed neutral." "Nevertheless," he continued, "this proposal did not mean very much to us since our intention was in any case to stay neutral. Our real concern was not the Allies but Russia."

Just the same, Said Halim Pasha hotly denied that the "Ottoman Empire got involved in the war on the German side without securing any pledges, guarantees or tangible promises from the latter." "For this issue," he continued, "you have to see the Alliance Treaty."

Another of the complaints was his

4) Leaving the war effort in the hands of incompetent officials who committed outrageous acts contrary to the science of war and whose sole aim was to line their pockets at the expense of the nation's survival.

Said Halim Pasha refuted this accusation by affirming that "he was not responsible for the military campaigns and other military matters, including the appointment of army commanders: they fell out of his sphere and were decided singlehandedly by the Ministry of War." (Enver Pasha, the minister of war, had acquired a very good reputation through his efforts in establishing the constitutional regime of 1908 and his exploits in Tripoli (Libya) and Edirne.) Assisting the minister were the German military advisory team and the German military staff. For the most part, war strategies and campaigns were planned and pursued not by the civilian branch of the government but by the office of the chief of staff.

The fifth accusation was as follows:

5) Issuing temporary laws, regulations, and orders which ran completely against the principles of law and humanity, and the letter and spirit of the Ottoman Constitution, thus reducing the country to sheer and utter chaos.

Said Halim Pasha answered these accusations by stating that these laws and regulations were issued during the war in order to protect the army's rear and its supply lines from threat of seditionist attacks committed by the empire's subjects. He also added that these extraordinary measures were requested by army commanders who, because of these threats, wanted to transfer the Armenian population living in the eastern provinces to other regions. Said Halim stated that, "transferring people did not mean exterminating them."

That being said, the former grand vizir acknowledged that some abuses and wrongdoings had been committed by some agents mandated by the government to execute these measures, "but", he continued, "the government which ordered these measures could not be held responsible for these isolated, unlawful acts."

"During my grand-vizirate", Said Halim declared further, "I tried to carry out reforms in the six provinces. When the British government refused to carry out the empire's request to appoint two English governors-general to these provinces, two officials, one Dutch, the other Swedish, were appointed for the positions. We subsequently started negotiations with the ambassadors of the concerned states in order to determine the legal system of these provinces."

"Soon after," he added, "the Great War broke out. Consequently, the reforms which were initiated in earnest by the Ottoman government were interrupted. We had every intention to carry them out as soon as the war ended. Unfortunately it did not happen." The former grand vizir continued, "After the Armenian massacres, commissions were formed and investigations were made. However, the ministry of interior prevented me from publicizing the results in spite of all my insistence. It then became evident that as long as Talat Pasha remained at the Ministry of Interior, nothing would ever come out of these investigations. Those responsible for the massacres had to be punished, but it would have been very difficult to have settled the matter justly during the war. This could have provoked a revival of hostilities between the two sides again. Besides, it was obvious that justice which would have been meted out by those implicated in these crimes would have not looked very fair."

After Said Halim Pasha had terminated his explanations on the Armenian issue, two deputies from the Arab provinces of the empire, Nuri Bey of Kerbela, (Iraq) and Ragıp Neşeşibi Bey of Jerusalem, (Palestine), started to interpellate him on the acts and deeds of Cemal Pasha in Syria. When they

asked if these actions were carried out by goverment decree, Said Halim Pasha denied categorically that the draconian measures carried out by Cemal Pasha during his governorship in Syria took place with the approval of the imperial government. These events, he stated, "happened completely outside the cabinet knowledge. No communication took place between these provinces and the Porte concerning these events. Nevertheless, when I later learned about the horrible events in Syria, I did my best to save lives". Moreover, Said Halim affirmed that these two events, the Armenian massacres and the Syrian affair, had aroused his indignation and later were among the principal reasons for his resignation.

6) Keeping on reserve those who qualified for a military exemption and withholding information about living conditions in parts of the empire under enemy attack.

Said Halim Pasha disavowed these charges on the ground that these were purely military matters and that during the war the army high commander and the Ministry of War kept these issues extremely confidential, to the point that even he, the grand vizir and head of the cabinet, was not informed in time.

A seventh accusation was that of:

7) Rejecting repeatedly the peace proposals offered by the Allied Powers during the war years (especially those made after the collapse of Russia) and thus pushing the country to the brink of disaster.

Said Halim Pasha dismissed that particular accusation by stating that no serious peace offer was proposed by the Entente Powers during his office. The only overture mentioned was one made three days before the Allied fleets launched their attack on the Dardanelles: this was a non-official attempt made through the intermediation of a certain Mr. Whithall, an English merchant, living in Athens. Apparently Mr. Whithall sent a message to Talat Pasha, then, the minister of interior, through the intercession of the chief rabbi. He proposed a meeting between him and an Ottoman representative. "I learned this overture from Talat Pasha. In the end, nothing came out of it."

8) Causing damage to the national economy by protecting and encouraging black marketeering.

Again, Said Halim Pasha dismissed any responsibility for these charges and argued that any kind of wartime economic measures were decided and carried out by the Ministry of Interior.

9) Violating freedom of the press and curtailing all forms of communication without any legal foundation along with preventing European newspapers from circulating in the country.

Said Halim Pasha rejected that charge by stating that imposing censorship on a country in wartime is a standard security measure which incidentally was also enforced in most warring European states such as Britain, France, and Austria-Hungary.

The final accusation was:

10) Allowing administrative chaos to reign and backing bands of brigands who ruined the country through their many crimes.

Said Halim Pasha affirmed that his government had nothing to do with the creation of the secret organization called Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and its illegal activities. "On the contrary," he added, "As soon as I learned the existence of this organization, I demanded its immediate dissolution from Enver Pasha."

On 10 November 1918, Grand Vizir Ahmed İzzet Pasha ceded to pressure exerted by the Palace and tendered his resignation. The fall of the İzzet Cabinet meant that Sultan Mehmed VI (Vahideddin) (1918-1922) could not be accused by the Allied Powers of keeping a pro-Unionist government in power.[1] The new government was formed by Tevfik Pasha on 11 November 1918.[2] The next day, the first Allied occupying troops entered Istanbul, and in the process dramatically altered the existing power structure. As the real masters of the situation, they attempted to establish their complete control over the Ottoman central administration. To achieve their goal, they began to encroach on the Ottoman government's authority and occupy many strategic posts in the capital, including ports, railway stations, military barracks, hospitals, and even certain civilian buildings that the occupation forces

[1]Edgar Pech, *Les Alliés et la Turquie* (Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1925), pp. 10-11.
[2]Akşin, *Istanbul*, p. 78.

considered useful. On 19 November 1918, under these frustrating and difficult circumstances, the government of Tevfik Pasha managed to obtain, though with difficulty, a vote of confidence in the Parliament.[1] On 2 December 1918, the government reintroduced censorship (one of the ten accusations brought against the government of Said Halim Pasha during his interpolation in the Parliament). Meanwhile, a new opposition was emerging in Parliament against the government which cooperated with the occupation forces. The most outspoken representative of this opposition was a newly formed political party called Teceddüd Fırkası (Renovation Party). Founded on 8 November 1918, this party was in fact an extension of the CUP as its members were mostly ex-Unionists.[2] The harsh opposition by this nationalist-oriented party to Tevfik Pasha's submissive policy persuaded Sultan Mehmed VI, with the support of the Allied Powers, to dissolve the Parliament on 21 December 1918.

On 25 December 1918, the government issued a decree designed to bring to justice the persons involved in the Armenian deportation. On 12 January 1919, Tevfik Pasha's government resigned. The same day the task of forming a new government was once again given by the sultan to Tevfik Pasha. Obviously this was a tactic devised by the sultan and his grand-vizir to rid the cabinet of certain ministers who were suspected to have a nationalist agenda and to form a cabinet more loyal to the sultan.

On 21 January 1919, Sultan Mehmed VI announced to the British high commissioner his intention to punish the Ottoman officials who were accused of mistreating British prisoners during the war.[3] On 30 January 1919, thirty Unionists including several well-known figures such as Ziya Gökalp, Hüseyin Cahit, Emmanuel Karasu, Tevfik, Rüşdü, and Rahmi Bey (former governor of İzmir) were arrested by the government.[4] On 1 February 1919, the Ottoman government was presented with a list of twenty-three people who were accused by the Allied Occupation authorities of mistreating British war prisoners. The occupation authorities demanded that the accused be brought to trial.[5] The next day the government decided to arrest a total of 32 people who were alleged to have committed war crimes. Among them figured the former Grand Vizir Said

[1] Ibid., p. 91.
[2] For the Teceddüd Fırkası see Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye de Siyasi Partiler*. vol, 2 *Mütareke Dönemi* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988).
[3] Akşin, *Istanbul*, 150; Bilal Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri* (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), p. 34. See also, Bostan, *Said Halim*, p. 81.
[4] Ibid., p. 81.
[5] Ibid., p. 82.

Halim Pasha. On 12 February 1919 the French High Commissioner in Istanbul, General Franchet D'Esperey, demanded that the Ottoman government hand over a group of Ottoman intellectuals and former politicians, including Said Halim Pasha, Hayri Efendi, Hoca Ali Galip, Ömer Naci, and Yunus Nadi to the occupation authorities. Grand-Vizir Tevfik Pasha, however refused to comply.[1] On 24 February 1919, General D'Esperey renewed his request. As a result, the government prepared a draft decree on 1 March 1919 so as to be able to bring to trial these former cabinet members. Sultan Mehmed VI, however, refused to sign the draft decree with the excuse that it was against the constitution. Under these circumstances, the government of Tevfik Pasha tendered its resignation on 3 March 1919.

The appointment of Damat Ferid Pasha to the grand vizirate and the formation of a cabinet dominated by the Liberal Entente Party and supported by the sultan heralded the beginning of a new era.[2] The new government soon demonstrated its intention to adopt a subservient policy towards the Allied Powers: in the hope of obtaining lenient peace terms at the Paris Conference, it initiated an oppressive and harsh policy against any nationalist opposition. In his political memoirs, Said Halim Pasha described Damad Ferid Pasha as "the most incapable and ludicrously criminal head of government in the history of the civilized world." (C'est bien le fantoche le plus grotesquement criminel et en même temps inepte qui a été improvisé chef de gouvernment dans l'histoire du monde civilisé.)[3] According to Said Halim Pasha, It was because of Damad Ferid's complete incompetence and servile policy to Britain that the Ottoman Empire failed to secure better peace terms at the Paris Conference in 1919.[4]

In March 1919, as its first move, the new government established a court martial in order to bring to trial the Unionist politicians and the former Ottoman officials who were accused of having committed war crimes and particularly of having ordered and carried out the deportation and massacre of Armenians.[5] On 14 May 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later Atatürk) visited his close friend Fethi Bey in his cell at Bekir Ağa Bölüğü Prison along with other Unionist political prisoners.[6] Here he also visited the former Grand Vizir

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[1]Ibid., pp. 82-83.
[2]Akşin, *Istanbul*, p. 196. See also Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım, Milli Mücadeleye Giriş* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967), vol. 5, p. 1509.
[3]Said Halim Pasha, *L'Empire Ottoman,* p. 44.
[4]Ibid., 74.
[5]Ibid., p. 197.
[6]Bostan, *Said Halim*, p. 86.

Said Halim Pasha. On 15 May 1919, under the protection of the Allied fleets and amid the cheers of local Greeks, the Greek army landed and occupied İzmir where they committed atrocities on the Muslim population.[1] On 16 May 1919, faced with national anger fueled by the Greek atrocities in İzmir and subsequent popular demonstrations, the government of Damad Ferid resigned. On 19 May 1919, the day that Mustafa Kemal Pasha landed at Samsun in order to lead the National Liberation Movement, the sultan again entrusted the formation of the new cabinet to Damad Ferid. The same day the British authorities in Istanbul decided to exile most of the Unionist detainees including Said Halim Pasha to Malta.[2]

On 22 May 1919, in order to achieve this plan, the Allied forces occupied Bekir Ağa Bölüğü prison and on 28 May, they embarked sixty-seven Unionist detainees including Said Halim Pasha on the ship *Princess Ena* in order to send them to Malta.[3] On 29 May 1919, Said Halim and eleven other prominent Ottoman Unionists landed on the island of Limni (Limnos) in the northern Aegean Sea. The former remained there at the port of Mondros until his deportation to Malta on 22 September 1919.[4]

During his stay in Limni, Said Halim Pasha wrote a letter, dated 4 June 1919, to General Blumberg, the commander of the British forces on that island. In his letter, the former grand vizir, after expressing his gratitude to the British government for saving him from the oppression of the present Ottoman government, requested not to be considered as a prisoner of war and asked to be allowed to live freely outside the Ottoman Empire. On 20 July 1919, he wrote another letter to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, using extremely flattering language toward England, praising her role in and contributions to the development of the Muslim world. Young Turkey, he declared, "came into being as a result of Western intellectual and ideological influences." Therefore, he wrote, "she is a devoted admirer of Western civilization and in particular of Britain to whom the Muslim world is indebted for its progress and development."[5]

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[1]For an eyewitness account of the Greek occupation of İzmir, see Refik Bey, *İzmir fecaii* (n.p), 1919. See also Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, vol. 6. See also Bilge Umar, *İzmir de Yunanlıların son günleri* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1974).

[2]Bostan, *Said Halim* p. 86.

[3]Ibid., p. 87.

[4]Ibid., p. 88.

[5]A copy of this letter was kindly provided to me by Rukiye Kuneralp from the family archives of Said Halim Pasha.

> La Jeune Turquie est née des idées et conceptions occidentales, elle est donc naturallement assurée d'une grande et sincère admiration envers la civilisation moderne et occidentale et donc particulièrement envers l'Angleterre qui est sans conteste la puissance à qui le monde musulman est redevable de son relèvement et de son progrès actifs.[1]

Turkey, wrote Said Halim, realized perfectly that she needed a long period of peace in order to recover from a series of military setbacks, but, he lamented, the Porte could not resist the forces which irresistibly dragged the Ottoman Empire into that infernal war. Nevertheless, declared Said Halim, Young Turkey is totally conscious about the constructive mission played by England in Egypt and sincerely believes that Britain would assure the political independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

According to Said Halim, western ideas today dominates Turkey's intellectual life. Yet these ideas constitute a striking contrast to what Said Halim wrote in his political writings and memoirs. In the latter, the former grand-vizir harshly criticizes Britain's colonial policy towards the Muslim world and held England responsible for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. In his memoirs, Said Halim Pasha wrote that the essence of British policy in the Middle East was to destroy the Ottoman Empire and to establish her hegemony all over the Muslim world.

In his work entitled *Malta Sürgünleri*, Bilal Şimşir made some harsh judgements on the character of Said Halim Pasha: based on these letters and these letters alone, he attacked his integrity and pictured him as a coward and a spineless person.[2] One must remember that Said Halim Pasha wrote these letters while he was in prison and facing an uncertain fate at the hands of the enemy. Therefore, it would be unfair to agree with Şimşir's harsh judgements and facile conclusions on the pasha's character.[3]

Said Halim was detained on Limni until 22 September 1919, then deported to the island of Malta where he was confined as a prisoner of war at Camp Polverista. The former grand vizir stayed in Malta until 29 April 1921. His liberation was assured, among a number of other prominent Ottomans detained in Malta, by diplomatic pressure exerted by the government of Ankara

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[1]Ibid.
[2]Bilal Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri*. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976). pp. 254-262.
[3]For a valid criticism of Şimşir's accusations on Said Halim Pasha, see Bostan, *Said Halim*, pp. 91-100.

on the British government and by subsequent negotiations. In an agreement signed by the British and Ankara governments on 16 March 1921, sixty-four of the prominent Ottomans detained in Malta were released in return for British prisoners held in Ankara.[1] After being released from Malta, Said Halim Pasha went to Italy. Neither the Ottoman government nor the British would permit him to return to Istanbul; nor could he enter Egypt, equally under British occupation. In Italy, Said Halim Pasha established himself in Rome where on 6 December 1921, he was assassinated by Arshavir Shiragian, an Armenian militant and Dashanktsutiun member.[2] His remains were brought to Istanbul on 29 January 1922 and buried ceremoniously in the garden of the *Türbe* (mausoleum) of Sultan Mahmud II, next to the tomb of his father.[3]

Ali Kemal Bey (1869-1922), a prominent liberal figure of his time and a political opponent of the CUP, wrote after the assassination of the pasha that Said Halim was the victim of his own ambitions and the manipulations of the CUP.[4] According to Ali Kemal, Said Halim, who was himself a nonentity, was brought to the grand vizirate by the CUP because of his social and family background and his personal fortune. During most of his grand vizirate, wrote Ali Kemal, Said Halim acted like a puppet being manipulated by the powerful leaders of the CUP like Talat.[5]

Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to agree with this harsh and unjust criticism of Ali Kemal on Said Halim Pasha. As I have shown on many occasions in this work, it would be unfair and incorrect to label Said Halim as a mere figurehead, let alone a puppet at the hands of powerful Unionist leaders like Talat. During all his grand vizirate, Said Halim Pasha struggled very hard to balance and curb the growing influence of the Turkist and Centrist wing of the Commitee like Talat and Enver.

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[1] Ibid., p. 102.

[2] Arshavir, Shiragian. *The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot.* Translated by Sonia Shiragian (Boston: Hairenik Press,1976). p. 109. See also, Jacques Derogy, *Opération Némésis* (Paris: Fayard, 1986).

[3] Bostan, *Said Halim*, p. 105.

[4] İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, p. 1915.

[5] Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF SAİD HALİM PASHA

The social and political thought of Said Halim Pasha, which is the chief subject of this chapter, cannot be understood independently of his political career, which was marked by critically important events and milestones in the late history of the Ottoman Empire. It may be said that Said Halim Pasha developed his ideology in response to the paradigms of late Islamic history which occupied a central position in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Although Said Halim Pasha presents his political theory as an ideal model for a pristine Muslim society, his ideas bear the indeniable imprint of the political theories of the European Enlightenment thinkers, in particular those of Montesquieu and Rousseau. One of the most important concepts that Said Halim borrowed from Montesqieu's thought is the principle of the separation of powers.

It was in Said Halim's view that, while for the Western world all roads lead to Rome, for the Muslim world, all roads lead to Mecca. Therefore, as he argued in his *Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane,* each of these worlds should follow a different path, a different direction, and a different destiny in order to fulfill a different mission in the general evolution of humanity. In this statement one can see the influence of the ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau, according to whom every society develops its own peculiar institutions which thrive in different climates.

The dichotomy Islam versus West that Said Halim made the focal point of his political theory is not an original Islamic concept. In classical Islamic doctrine the other is not a Westerner but a *Kāfir* or an unbeliever of any origin. For centuries Muslims divided the world into two spheres: *Dār-ul Islam*, the lands where şeriat or the law of Islam rules over; and *Dāral Ḥarb*, the rest of the world. Islam as an anti-thesis of the West is in fact a modern concept which has been developed by the nineteenth century European orientalists in order to assert the moral, intellectual and material superiority of Europe over Islam. After the collapse of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, Europe was still no more than a geographical concept, even for her inhabitants. Henri Pirenne in his ground-breaking work, *Muhammed and Charlemagne* argued that the emergence of Christian Europe was a consequence of the Muslim expansion of the seventh and eight centuries, Nevertheless, for Charlemagne and his successors the followers of Muhammad were not the

only foes. In the ninth and tenth centuries, Christian Europe was under constant attack from three sides: from the south by Muslim Arabs, from the north by pagan Vikings and from the east by Hungarians; the invasions led by the two latter groups proved in fact to be much more destructive to Latin Christendom than the Muslim invasions. To the European mind, the concept of a distinct West with its own peculiar social and political order developed only between twelfth and fourteenth century.

According to Said Halim every nation has its own way of feeling, thinking and acting and every nation has a particular mentality which is peculiar to it.

The fundamental dissimilarity between East and West, wrote Said Halim, is that Europe, even after being converted from paganism to Christianity, kept her political and social institutions (ex. feudalism), whereas the East after espousing the Muslim faith abandoned her pre-Islamic political and social institutions.

Thus, it is a blatant error to believe that social and political institutions developed in the West can ever be imported into and adapted by Muslim countries.[1] This, he wrote, is because the entire social order of Islam is based on the fundamental principle of the absolute sovereignty of the *şeriat*, which he defined as "la reconnaissance la plus éclatante de la vérité fondamentale."[2] The *şeriat,* asserted Said Halim, is in perfect accordance with the laws of nature. Indeed, he declared it to be nothing less than the natural law itself revealed to humankind by the Prophet. This Islamic conception of natural law is quite different from the Western one, which postulates that natural law could also be autonomous from divine will.[3]

Said Halim declared that by suppressing all ancient superstitions and prejudices, Islam enabled man to use his intellectual capacities without any hinderance; thus the coming of Islam could be said to have paved the way for a scientific revolution to which, historically, Muslims made a considerable contribution.[4]

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[1]Said Halim Pasha, *Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane* (Rome: Imprimerie Editrice Italia, 1921), pp. 3-4. (Hereafter cited as Said Halim, *Les institutions*).
[2]Ibid., p. 5.
[3]Mardin, *The Genesis*, pp. 86-89.
[4]Said Halim, *Les Institutions*. p. 6.

And yet, he continued, although man has proven himself capable of discovering the laws of nature (physics and chemistry) and understanding them objectively, he has completely failed to discover moral and social laws through his own efforts. This, he argued, was due to man's incapacity to remain objective when examining and understanding the laws governing humanity.[1] For this reason, the Prophet revealed these moral and social laws to humankind and urged Muslims to try to learn and discover scientific knowledge themselves, even if it meant travelling to China to obtain it.

Said Halim was opposed to the principle of national sovereignty and deplored that some Muslims considered it preferable to the principle of *şeriat*. His concern was that the moral and social principles included in the *şeriat* would be relegated to an insignificant position in a modern/nation state on the one hand, and the legal system on the other. Said Halim assumed that their conviction stemmed from an enchantment with Western power and materialism. He wrote:

> Éblouie par la puissance et la prospérité matérielles de la société occidentale, la mentalité susmentionnée se plaît à attribuer cette puissance et cette prospérité, objet de son admiration sans bornes, à l'effet miraculeux du principe de la souvernaineté nationale, et n'aspire par conséquent qu'à la substituer à la souveraineté du Chériat, s'imaginant qu'elle lui attribue bien à tort.[2]

Expressing strong disagreement with this argument, he declared it to be unfounded: to his mind, this form of sovereignty emulates earlier forms of authority evolved in the West such as the Church and kingship.

Nor did he believe that sovereignty derives its legitimacy from an incontestable right; instead, it imposes itself by an act of usurpation. "A real and indisputable right," he said, "is born only after the accomplishment of duty. It is something to be deserved; otherwise, it is nothing but injustice and usurpation."[3]

It is not surprising that Said Halim, like Rousseau, criticized the theory of natural rights, particularly the right of being born free. For him, "nothing is more false and anti-liberal than advocating that man possesses certain rights which can be called natural." The only aspect which he perceived as natural is man's ability to adapt himself to his environment. He said:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 7-8.
[2] Ibid., p. 9.
[3] Ibid., p. 10.

> On croit en général faire preuve de grand libéralisme à prétendre que l'être humain vient au monde pourvu de certains droits naturels entre autres celui d'être libre. Or rien n'est plus faux je dirai même de plus anti-libéral. L'homme n'a aucun droit naturel que la faculté de s'adapter à son milieu, c'est-à-dire d'observer les lois naturelles auxquelles sont soumises son existence morale et physique et de s'y conformer, autrement dit de remplir des devoirs que lui imposent ces lois naturelles.[1]

"Man," he continued, "acquires rights by his own efforts; he takes his place in society first by receiving a thorough education and acquiring many virtues. It is only after these achievements that he earns his status in society."[2] On this issue, Mardin wrote, "that Islamic natural law could not be conceived of as anything but the revealed law of God and as the imminence of God in nature."[3]

Said Halim did not consider the future of national sovereignty promising. Instead, he believed that this political concept was doomed to failure. Far from equating it with democracy, he recognized its inherent tendency towards the tyranny of majority: "How can a regime be called democratic," he wrote, "when it receives its support from only fifty percent plus one of all votes cast?"[4]

Said Halim's rejection of the concept of complete and unconditional national sovereignty was no doubt a response to the nationalist political leaders who declared on 23 April 1920 in Ankara that sovereignty belongs to the people without any condition. According to Said Halim, the concept of national sovereignty could only be accepted in its restricted form and only if it subjected itself to the pre-eminent sovereignty of the *şeriat*.[5]

As a viable alternative to the concept of national sovereignty, he advocated a socio-political system founded on the sacred law of Islam, *şeriat*. In his view, it is a perfect and ideal system; based on the precepts of Islam, it eliminates all class struggles and social inequities by creating the most genuine solidarity that humanity has ever witnessed. This solidarity, he said, was responsible in his day for uniting an extended family of nearly 400 million Muslims of different races, living in diverse climates and distant lands.

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[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Mardin, *Genesis*, p. 89.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p. 12.

In his opinion, political authority had, until then, enjoyed an unprecedented period of high esteem thanks to the achievements of the Islamic social regime. This high esteem was derived particularly from the fact that this form of governance was built on the principles of the *şeriat*. which gave it an infallible legitimacy and absolute impunity. "Throughout history," said Said Halim, "Muslim peoples were deeply convinced that any acts of injustice and oppression they suffered could not be blamed on the rule of *şeriat,* but could only be explained by the corrupt and tyrannical rule of Muslim rulers and governments."[1]

According to Said Halim, the real cause of Muslim decline laid in the misunderstanding of the Prophet's sayings by conservative Muslim scholars in their study of *ilm*. These scholars reduced the latter concept to the level of religious and legal knowledge, thus leaving out natural and positive sciences.[2] This led to the development of a certain scholasticism which thereafter had a detrimental effect on the development of the Muslim world; indeed, it severly discouraged all intellectual activity other than in religious sciences. The anathematization of natural and positive sciences and their exclusion from the curriculum of Muslim institutions of learning rendered Muslims completely incapable of acquiring the knowledge necessary to discover the secret forces of nature or of exploiting them for their economic welfare and material progress. It was as a result of this that the economic state of the Muslim world had deteriorated and Muslim countries became weak and vulnerable to external threat. Ultimately, wrote Said Halim, by showing a total disinterest in natural and positive sciences, Muslim nations were themselves responsible for their own economic and political breakdown.

The chronic depression into which the Muslim world of his day had plunged itself was forcing Muslim rulers to ponder the causes of this situation and to find some possible remedies. Their constant failure to remedy the problem with solutions based on traditional methods ultimately convinced them that the precepts of *şeriat* were incompatible with material progress.

According to Said Halim, this false diagnosis divided the Muslim elite into two diametrically opposed groups. The first group, consisting of pious Muslims led by the conservative ulema, argued that since the nature of material progress clashed with the commandments of the *şeriat*, Muslims should renounce material prosperity. The second group, partisans of full

[1]Ibid., p. 13; Said Halim, *Pan-Islamisme*, p. 8.
[2]Ibid., p. 16.

Westernization, advocated the position that material progress should have precedence over fidelity to the *şeriat*.[1] The former, according to Said Halim, sought to resuscitate the splendor of the Islamic past without realizing that it could not be achieved without a prosperous economy and a materially advanced society. While he declared this expectation illusory, he equally condemned the Westernist ambition of creating a materially advanced society at the cost of alienating it from Islamic principles. Both views, he asserted, are erroneous because, far from condemning economic prosperity and progress, Islam encourages them.[2]

Although the advocates of Westernization in Muslim countries were always insignificant in number, said Said Halim, this small minority represented the majority of the educated class who, thereby, exerted a strong influence on the decision-making process and determined the destiny of Muslim society.[3] Its power derived mainly from support provided by the Western powers through the medium of their agents in Muslim lands.

The main channel for the spread of Western ideas in Muslim countries, according to Said Halim, was education. The Muslim elite had become acquainted with Western ideas either by studying abroad or attending schools established by Western powers in Muslim countries. The main purpose of the latter was to impregnate Muslim minds with Western ideas and values.[4] In this way, the West was able to extend its hegemony over Muslim countries by penetrating into their intellectual and cultural spheres. The result of Western cultural domination, according to Said Halim, was the alienation of Muslim intellectuals from their own culture and society because they soon found themselves incapable of understanding the real meaning of their religion. Indeed, some became completely indifferent or even hostile to it. In other words, they lost faith in the principles of their religion.

> Formés dans ces conditions, ces intellectuels ne purent plus juger et comprendre leur religion et les vérités morales et sociales qu'elle leur enseigne qu'à travers une mentalité plus ou moins occidentalisée. Ils perdirent donc la foi en leur religion, la croyance en la perfection de ses principes moraux et sociaux leur témoignant une indifférence pleine de dédain et parfois même une animosité violente.

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[1] Ibid., p. 17.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., p. 18.
[4] Ibid.

> Cette intellectualité occidentalisée ne comprit donc jamais suffisamment ni le caractère ni la nature du mal qu'elle voulut guérir pas plus qu'elle ne comprit la société dont elle s'efforçait en vain à réaliser le relèvement.[1]

Although he reserved his most severe criticism for the Western-minded Muslim intelligentsia, Said Halim also attacked the pious conservative Muslims. He did not see them as being the saviours of the Muslim world, given their narrow interpretation of Islamic principles and their scholasticism. Nevertheless, he considered them to be worthy of praise for their devotion to the *şeriat* and for their contribution to the development of the science of *fiqh*.

> Quant aux partisans du Chériat, subjugués et trompés par la scolastique que je viens de signaler, ils ne furent naturellement pas plus heureux que les autres à sauver le monde musulman de sa décadence. Mais ce fut grâce à eux que ce monde cessât d'étudier, de méditer, de commenter en un mot de se nourrir des vérités du Chériat, de leur consacrer toute sa pensée, tout son coeur et toutes son intelligence. Il finit par se créer ainsi toute une science basée sur le culte du Chériat où l'homme n'observe, ne compare et ne conclut que par ses vérités, une science dont le but est d'apprendre à l'homme de se conformer au Chériat dans toutes les manifestations de son être moral et de l'appliquer par tous ses actes.
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> Cette science qui est propre à l'Islam et qui est connue sous le nom de Fikh est certainement ce que l'esprit humain a pu produite de plus considérable et de plus parfait dans le domaine de la science morale et sociale.[2]

Said Halim felt that *fiqh* is the most remarkable creation of the human mind. In it, Islamic intellectual achievement finds its ultimate expression through its embodiment of Islamic principles, traditions and ideals, allowing Islamic values to be preserved through the centuries and enabling Muslim peoples to resist the corruptive influences of foreign domination:

> C'est grâce à elle que le monde musulman put garder intact ses conceptions, ses principes et ses traditions, son esprit et son idéal islamique à travers les siècles et la mille vicissitudes [sic] de la domination étrangère qu'il échappa ainsi à la décadence morale et sociale ce qui eut été irréparable.[3]

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[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid., pp. 18-19.
[3] Ibid., p. 20.

After paying homage to the ulema for their efforts in preserving and developing the science of *fiqh*, Said Halim stressed the importance and necessity of acquiring positive sciences and modern techniques from the West in order to ensure the recovery of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, said Said Halim, acquiring Western knowledge and technology did not mean that Muslims must also adopt the economic principles of these countries or the system regulating their labor relations,[1] especially since, as he asserted, these rules are contrary to the *şeriat*. Instead, these economic regulations should be derived from the *fiqh*. If this were done, Muslim economic development would not be accompanied by the troubled and painful social upheavals that have plagued the West.[2]

SAID HALIM'S VIEWS ON THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN SOCIETY

In his work entitled *Les institutions politiques dans la société musulmane,* Said Halim Pasha offered a critique of Western social systems. These systems are in constant change, he said, and these changes reflect the unstable nature of Western social structure. The source of this instability is the continual struggles which occur among the different social classes making up Western societies because of their varying needs and aspirations. These, in turn, are a direct consequence of that society's material and technical evolution.[3] Therefore, said Said Halim, unlike the Islamic world, the West has never had a constant and immutable social idea capable of inspiring and guiding its evolution. On the contrary, its continually changing social ideas are generated and transformed by its social evolution which in turn is shaped by its material development. As he saw it, the Western society of his day had not yet reached its ideal stage where its moral and social principles would take on their final and immutable form.[4]

In Western societies, wrote Said Halim, social ideas change according to the needs and interests of the ruler, ruling groups, or classes. These ideas represent the values of the predominant members of society; they ensure their prosperity which is always realized at the expense of other groups. Originally, Western societies were dominated by a spiritual authority, the Church. Later, this power was secured by royalty and henceforth became temporal. As rightly expressed by Said Halim the rivalry and political struggle between the Church

[1] Although Said Halim did not mention openly these principles and systems, one could think that he meant Liberal and Marxist economic theories.
[2] Ibid., p. 21.
[3] Ibid., pp. 22-23.
[4] Ibid., p. 23.

(papacy) and the temporal rulers constituted the keystone of the political developments in the West during the middle ages.[1] The grasp of this crucial issue by Said Halim clearly demonstrated his ability to understand the main characteristics of European history from its origins in the early medieval period. That being said, Said Halim mistakenly labeled the temporal rulers of the medieval West as secular. In fact, in their struggle for power both popes and kings claimed divine sanction in order to legitimize their rule. Like the popes who declared themselves the vicars of God, medieval monarchs declared themselves *Rex dei Gratia* or king by the grace of God to legitimatize their power by God's will. Therefore as pointed out by Ulmann, in medieval Europe the politico-legal standpoints of both kings and popes were identical. It was theocratic.[2] According to this doctrine which would become the dominant ideology in the West until the days of the French Revolution in 1789, sovereignty belonged only to God and could be entrusted by him to both ecclesiastical and temporal rulers in order to govern men's lives in this world. This doctrine was first expounded by Saint Augustine (354-430) in his writings and more particulary in his famous *City of God*.[3] Monarchical rule, said Said Halim, eventually prepared the ground for the rise of an expanding merchant class which favored the cultivation of the so-called "democratic ideas." This period, which constituted the latest phase in the evolution of the Western nations, declared Said Halim, was characterized by a vast economic development and the prevalence of material values over moral and social ones. The prodigious industrial development which arose as a result of this capitalist expansion, constituted what was then the very foundation of the Western socio-economic structure, he asserted.[4]

This interpretation of European history clearly indicated Said Halim's familiarity with Marxist discourse and its influence on his understanding of history.

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[1]For a good introduction to the political struggle between spritual and temporal powers during the Medieval Ages in the West, see J. A. Watt, "Spritual and Temporal Powers" in J. H. Burns ed., *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp 367-427. See also, Walter Ulmann, *The Growth of the Papal government in the Middle Ages: A study in the ideological relation of clerical power* (London: Methuen & Co.Ltd., 1955); and Brian Tierney, *The Crisis of Church & State* (Engelwood: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

[2]Ulmann, *A History* , pp. 53-55.

[3]Herbert A. Deane. *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). p. 172.

[4]Said Halim, *Pan-Islamisme,* p. 22.

After underlining the role played by the bourgeoisie in the evolution of Western society, Said Halim stressed the rising power of the working class as a socio-political reality. Even though, he affirmed, it was the bourgeoisie who were the architects of industrialization, this phenomenon was actually realized and sustained by the labour of the proletariat. The working class, he said, aspired to take over the political authority by overthrowing the capitalist-bourgeois regime and by abolishing its institutions in order to impose its own rule and establish its own institutions.[1]

Commenting on the concept of liberty and equality in the West, Said Halim was no less critical in his analysis of the instability and variability of Western political ideas. It would be nothing but an illusion, he declared, to believe that man in the Western society of his day enjoyed a degree of liberty and equality never before attained by any other society in history. As a matter of fact, he affirmed, the degree of liberty and equality that man enjoys in any society is determined by the level of social justice reached in that particular society which in turn is assured by the social solidarity and by the stability of the social structure.[2]

However, he continued, in Western society solidarity only occurs among the members of a certain social class. In fact, he asserted, it was impossible to change in any society the age-old values and mentalities laden with deep-rooted anti-liberal and anti-egalitarian prejudices simply by decreeing so-called liberal laws. Change can only come with the implementation of proper moral education, carried on with patience and intelligence over the generations. The assiduous application of such a curriculum would liberate man of his traditional prejudices of class and caste and would cause him to embrace the idea that all men are equal regardless of their origins or social position, that it is only by merit that they can distinguish themselves.

According to Said Halim, Western democracy has its roots in the aristocratic regime of Europe. Therefore, argues Said Halim, since Muslim societies never had such an aristocracy in their past, it would be unrealistic for Muslim societies to adopt Western democratic institutions.[3]

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[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid., p. 24.
[3] Said Halim, *Buhranlarimiz ve son eserleri*, p. 26.

Observing the Muslim world of his day, he stated that the most common words were reform, progress, development, and independence. Nevertheless, no one had as yet seriously attempted to discover the roots of the decline affecting the Muslim civilization. Indeed, far from urging a more careful study of the past, most so-called reformers advocated a clean break with the heritage of Muslim civilization. In condemning such views, Said Halim was criticizing both the reformist Ottoman sultans of the nineteenth century and such advocates of complete Westernization as Abdullah Cevdet during the Second Constitutional Period.

The decline of the Islamic world, he asserted, became more evident only when its peoples fell under the domination of Christian nations. Their weakened state was noted by the colonialist powers who eventually conquered them. Muslim nations could not defend themselves against these invaders armed with technologically advanced weaponry and "infernal war machines".[1] It was European scholars who first began to analyze the causes of Muslim decline. As such, Muslims became aware of their decadence thanks to studies written by Western scholars. But, he pointed out, Western scholarship and Western knowledge of Islam were far from being objective. On the contrary, they were laden with prejudices formed during Christian Europe's long history of conflict with Islam.

> Malheureusement, les Occidentaux se trouvaient affligés d'une animosité atavique lointaine et en quelque sorte inconsciente envers tout ce qui est musulman et particulièrement envers sa religion.[2]

Moreover, argued Said Halim, as outsiders, orientalists could not fully understand the problems of the Islamic world. Consequently, their powers of observation were incapable of grasping the essence of Islamic ethos. Thus it was not surprising that they would have attributed the causes of decline to the deficiencies of Islam, a conviction reinforced by the general backwardness of the Muslim world.

One of the most illustrious critics of Islam who Said Halim referred to, without once mentioning his name, is Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a French thinker and orientalist. According to Renan, Islam as a religion had always been an enemy of science and progress and had persecuted them wherever and

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[1]Said Halim, *Essai sur les causes de la décadence des peuples musulmans* (Constantinople: Imprimerie F. Loeffer, 1918), p. 14 (Hereafter cited as Said Halim, *Essai)*
[2]Ibid., p. 4.

whenever it came into power. Renan defined Islam as "the most heavy chain that humanity has ever carried" ("La chaîne la plus lourde que l'humanité a jamais porté").[1] Morever, sciences which once flourished in the lands under Islamic rule had nothing to do with Islam, asserted Renan. On the contrary, they developed in spite of it, by enduring and resisting its persecution. The case of European science which developed in defiance of the Catholic Church, was foremost in Renan's mind and was unquestioningly projected onto Islamic history as an equivalent paradigm.

These Western thinkers, according to Said Halim, for lack of any other common quality among these backward nations, blamed their religion as the major cause of their backwardness vis-à-vis Christian nations. This superficial and erroneous conception, he asserted, comforted orientalists and caused resentment among Muslims, a situation which undermined all possibility of dialogue between Islam and the West.[2]

However, the problem of underdevelopment had, in his opinion, nothing to do with religion itself but needed to be viewed as a sociological phenomenon.[3] This paradigm was valid for the Muslim world as well as for the West. According to Said Halim, religions are molded by the diverse customary and cultural characteristics of their adoptive lands. Just as historical and social developments in Christendom engendered Catholicism and later Protestantism, similar developments gave birth to Sunnism and Shi'ism in Islam. Furthermore, within the same religious denomination one can detect different characterstics: for example, Catholicism in Germany is different from Catholicism in Spain or Italy. The same is true of Islam where different schools adapted themselves to various local realities and developed distinct characteristics. Turkish Sunnism for example is distinct from its Arab variety, while Shi'ism in Iran differs from that in India.[4] This phenomenon of cultural diversity in Islam and the peculiarity of every local Muslim culture on which Said Halim laid much importance corresponds to the concept of *Iklimiyya* of medieval Muslim scholars. Several scholars of Islam had tackled the problem of unity in diversity in Islam: according to von Grunebaum, "any study of the Islamic world as a whole will sooner or later come up against the problem of relation between the Muslim civilization and the local cultures of the area

[1]Ernest Renan, "Islamisme et la science" Conférence faite à la Sorbonne, le 29 mars 1883. in Henriette Psichari ed., *Oeuvres complètes d'Ernest Renan* (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1947-1961), vol.1, p. 956.
[2]Said Halim, *Essai*, p. 5.
[3]Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[4]Ibid., p. 8.

which in the course of time have become technically islamized."[1] To Grunebaum, "the problem of relations between coexisting layers of a universal and provincial civilizations is by no means peculiar to the Islamic world."[2] Clifford Geertz has also studied the problem of diversity throughout Muslim cultures. In order to corroborate his thesis, Said Halim pointed out the disparity between the Christian nations of Europe and the Orient. Although both regions belonged to the same religion, the former were economically and technologically more advanced than the latter. It might be said that what Said Halim lost sight of, or deliberately overlooked, is that the ascendance of Christian Europe occurred only after the Church's authorithy was challenged in both the public and political realms. This process of emancipation of the European mind from the shackles of Church dogma led to the Renaissance, evolved during the Enlightenment, and matured in the age of Positivism. In fact, as expressed by Antony Black, "the medieval European church-state relationship was unique, and the West had a problem felt not so acutely elsewhere, because of the particular way Christianity had become institutionalized and the sort of polities which, partly as a consequence of this, had developed there."[3] Said Halim underlined that the rise of the Church as an institution undermined the adaptability of Christianity and led to the rigidity of social classes and to harsh conflicts between the Church and aristocracy, between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie, and between the capitalist bourgeoisie and the laborers. This conflict occurred among nations adherring to Christianity and among different Christian churches. Said Halim acknowledged the existence of similar divisions within Islam. Nevertheless, he believed that the spirit of inclusiveness and egalitarian principles of the *şeriat* prevented the rise of a Church within Islam. He also saw a greater degree of social cohesiveness and peace in Islamic societies.

According to Said Halim, the West's mis-diagnosis of the Muslim world's ailments rested on a poorly-constructed question. Indeed, by focusing on the religious aspects of culture alone, the true nature of the problem became distorted. The backwardness of the Muslim world, he asserted, was not rooted in religious but in socio-historical factors. Consequently, the question

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[1]G. E. von Grunebaum, "The Problem: Unity in Diversity" *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 17 (Hereafter cited as Grunebaum, *Unity*).
[2]Ibid.
[3]Anthony Black, *Political Thought in Europe: 1250-1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 42.

should not be: Does Islam as a religion prevent its adherents from achieving progress?, rather, it should be: Why are Muslim nations unable to take advantage of the immense benefits of their religion?[1]

For Said Halim, the decline of Muslim societies could be explained by the influences of their pre-Islamic heritage. He argued that since the nations which adopted Islam were heirs to old and distinct civilizations, it was inevitable that their respective ancient histories would still exert a strong influence in their Islamic period. To him, this phenomenon prevented Muslim nations from fully comprehending and implementing the religious tenets of their faith, thus depriving them of the blessings of Islam.

> La décadence des peuples musulmans, comme toutes celles qui la précèdèrent [sic] et lui succéderent [sic] provient donc de ce que les peuples musulmans n'ont pas su ce qu'ils devaient oublier et sacrifier de leur passé pour assurer leur avenir.[2]

The decline of the Muslim peoples, he asserted, was due to their failure to renounce their pre-Islamic legacy, which shackled their progress. This same legacy prevented them from comprehending the maxims of their faith. Consequently, he argued, a paralysis had set in, leaving Muslim societies inert between this pre-Islamic legacy and a genuine Islamic ideology, constituting a continuous hindrance to the development of Muslim societies. To Said Halim, the only way to achieve progress was for Muslims to swing the pendulum in favor of genuine Islamic principles:

> Il s'est établi de la sorte un équilibre stable entre l'influence de leur passé préislamique et celle qu'exerça sur eux l'Islamisme, ce qui les empêche de progresser. Il importe donc de rompre cet équilibre au profit de l'influence islamique pour que les peuples musulmans puissent continuer leur évolution vers le progrès et la prosperité.[3]

This view is flatly rejected by Ziya Gökalp who affirmed that a society's national culture (*hars*), far from being the cause of its decline, constitutes its most vital force. In his words, "every nation originally possesses a national culture whose strength assures her success and prosperity."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 9.
[2] Ibid., p. 11.
[3] Ibid., p. 12.
[4] Ziya Gökalp, *Hars ve Medeniyet* (Ankara: Diyarbakır'ı Tanıtma ve Turizm Derneği Yayınları, 1972), p. 21. (Hereafter cited as Gökalp, *Hars*).

Said Halim, who did not accept that Turks had a rich cultural heritage of their own, believed that they benefited more from Islam than did the Iranians or the Arabs, whose civilizational legacy weighed heavily upon them. Said Halim's view was the antithesis of Gökalp's teachings concerning the richness and vigor of the old Turkic culture. If, said Gökalp, the Turks were able to remain independent and to build great empires throughout history, it was because of their national culture.[1]

Said Halim's ideas on this topic to a large extent reflect those of Ibn Taymiyya who was opposed to the detrimental effects of pre-Islamic influences on Islam.

As for the decline of Islamdom, Said Halim also differed from some other Ottoman Muslim thinkers of his time. For instance, Ahmed Rıza believed that the decline of the Muslim world was due not only to the aggression and invasion of Muslim lands by Christian European powers since the Age of the Crusades but also to incursions made by Ilkhanid Mongols and Ghaznevid Turks. Ahmed Rıza argued that Crusaders along with Turco-Mongol invaders stopped and disrupted the flourishing of Islamic civilization. Rıza compared this event to the destruction of the Roman Empire by the Barbarian invasions.[2] Said Halim considered the invasion of Muslim countries by Western Christian Powers not as the cause but as the result of Muslim decline:

> La décadence du monde musulman n'apparut dans toute sa réalité et toutes ses conséquences que lors les peuples musulmans se trouvèrent subjugués par les peuples chrétiens. L'infériorité évidente de leurs conditions générales attira l'attention de ses envahisseurs...[3]

Also, according to Said Halim, it was the mutual hostility between Islam and Christendom perpetuated throughout centuries by long and frequent warfare and the contempt that Muslims harbored against the Christian West that prevented them from becoming fully acquainted with and benefiting from the scientific and technological achievements of the West.[4]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 22, 63.
[2]Ahmed Rıza, *La Faillite morale de la politique occidentale en Orient.* (Paris: Librarie Picart, 1922), pp. 133-134.
[3]Said Halim, *Essai,* p. 3.
[4]Said Halim, *Essai*, 13; Said Halim Pasha, *Le fanatisme musulman, sa signification réelle* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1910), p. 6.

The pink marble palace of Said Halim Pasha in Cairo designed by Antonio Lasciac Bey.



Said Halim Pasha's Yeniköy yalı designed by Petraki Adamanti.

In fact, Islam, during its period of expansionism, had continually absorbed the science and knowledge of other civilizations. In the past, the Hellenistic cultural and scientific heritage had been incorporated into Islamic scholarship via a systematic translation from Syriac and Greek.[1] A vast number of works covering fields as wide as medicine and philosophy, mechanics and natural sciences had been translated into Arabic and had helped Muslim scientists and scholars build a brilliant civilization. Said Halim acknowledged this historical phenomenon by referring to the famous *ḥadīth* as those that advocate seeking knowledge even if it were in China or commited to learning from the cradle to the grave. Also, he is critical of the scholastic interests of Muslim scholars because it brought about a distancing from other sources of knowledge.

During the period of the Crusades, Muslims in the Middle East borrowed much of the military technology and certain architectural styles found in castles and fortifications from the Frankish knights.[2] Yet even in this period, it can be safely said that as far as scientific and cultural achievements were concerned, Muslims far surpassed Christians.[3]

By the early modern era, Western Europe had more to offer to Islamdom than it had in the middle ages. Firearm technology, especially cannon casting as it existed in the early fifteenth century, was among the first in a series of Western technologies to be successfully adopted by the Ottomans.[4] The quick recognition by the Ottoman sultans of the pivotal role of artillery in modern warfare enabled them to create one of the most formidable armies of the early modern era, and consequently establish their rule over three continents in a short period of time. The adoption of Western gunnery did not encounter any serious resistance from the ulema, who in fact sanctioned it on the grounds of

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[1]For a brilliant study on the transmission of Hellenistic and Roman knowledge to Islam, see Franz Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

[2]Lynn White, "The Crusades and the Technological Thrust of the West." in V. J Parry and M. E. Yapp ed., *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (London: University of Oxford Press, 1975), pp. 97-112.

[3]George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1931), pp. 32, 114-115, 144-145; Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), p. 221.

[4]To find out more about this quick and easy adoption of European firearm technology by the Ottomans, see Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, "Ottoman Science in the Classical Period and Early Contacts with European Science and Technology." in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, ed., *Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World.* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1992), pp. 1-48; see also Djurdjica Petrovic, "Firearms in the Balkans on the Eve of and After the Ottoman Conquests of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, ed., *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East.* (London: University of Oxford Press, 1975); V. J. Parry, "Barad." *EI2.* (Leiden, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 1061-1066.

a Qur'anic verse and which considered it as a way to fight the enemy with every possible means including those possessed and used by the enemy.[1]

In that context, one could argue that it was only when Muslim world proved unable to respond to the scientific revolution unfolding in the West during the seventeenth century that it went into stagnation and decline. Nevertheless, the decline since the seventeenth century is a classically problematic argument.[2] As expressed by Linda Darling, "the rise of the West was thought to be paralleled by the decline of the Ottoman Empire".[3] According to Darling, "as more research emerges on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, the concept of decline appears increasingly inadequate as an explanation".[4] She argued that, "what were formerly regarded as the signs of Ottoman decline are now interpreted as manifestations of a worldwide currents of change".[5]

Like Abduh before him who argued that the reforms of Muhammed Ali had divided Egyptian society, Said Halim accused the Tanzimat statesmen of creating through their Westernizing reforms a gap between the elite, who had adopted European mores, and the masses, who had remained loyal to their traditional faith. Therefore, while the Westernized elites of Muslim countries espoused the Western way of life and adapted it to their local Muslim environment, the masses continued to live according to the principles of their religion, acclimatized to their local cultures, be it Egyptian, Turkish, or Persian.[6] Being thus deprived of their elite's intellectual and social guidance, Muslim populations lost their orientation and their evolution was interrupted.[7]

According to Said Halim, the decline of religion had proven to be fatally detrimental to Muslim societies, because unlike the Christian West, the social structures of Muslim countries are based on religious principles. Therefore, any attempt to decrease the role of the religion in Muslim societies would unravel the social fabric and bring about their ruination. He wrote:

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[1] *Qur'an*, 8 *(enfal)*: 60.

[2] For the controversy of the Ottoman and Islamic decline see also Roger Owen, "The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century - an 'Islamic' Society in decline? A Critique of Gibb and Bowen's *Islamic society and the West*" *Review of Middle East Studies* 1 (1975): pp. 101-112; see also, Douglas A. Howard, "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" *Journal of Asian History* 22 (1988): pp. 52-77.

[3] Linda Darling, "Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?" *Journal of European Economic History* 26 (Spring 1997): p. 157.

[4] Ibid., p. 158.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Said Halim, *Essai*, pp. 17-19.

[7] Ibid., p. 26; Said Halim, *La société ottomane*, p. 3.

> L'irréligion dans l'Islamisme acquiert une importance autrement plus considérable que celle qu'elle présente dans les sociétés chrétiennes. Dans la société musulmane, l'irréligion, c'est la négation de la morale établie, de la société constituée. Elle représente la démoralisation et déchéance de l'individu, la désorganisation et corruption de la société ; elle est donc anti-morale et anti-sociale. L'irréligion est par conséquent la calamité la plus mortelle qui puisse attendre le musulman et la société musulmane.[1]

As a remedy to this social dilapidation, Said Halim prescribed the "Islamization" of Muslim society and its institutions. This Islamization, declared Said Halim, would cover every aspect of society, by inoculating it with high, pristine Islamic values and by purifying it of any corruptive pagan elements inherited from a pre-Islamic past. Although Said Halim recognized the distinctiveness of every Muslim country inside Islamdom, he considered nationalism as one of the detrimental notions which had survived in a latent form in Muslim societies centuries after their conversion to Islam. Spurred, however, by the injurious impact of Western ideas, nationalism constituted in his eyes a fatal threat to Muslim polities. Said Halim qualified nationalism as a destructive ideology and considered it as one of the major causes of World War I.[2] Said Halim made a distinction between Islamdom at large and its different parts — for instance, the difference between Iran and the Ottoman Empire — each of which he saw as a different political unit. Each unit should be bound by the general principle of Islam but also responsive to its more specific reality.

In conclusion to his analysis, Said Halim ended his discourse over the future of the human race on an optimistic note. Once humanity survived this catastrophic event, it will adopt internationalism. In the West, he declared, socialism will create this internationalism, whereas in the East, the Muslim lands will be united by Islamic internationalism.[3]

THE ISLAMIC POLITICAL REGIME

In Said Halim's opinion, the ideal political system is one which corresponds best to the social order found within a society. It is also one which represents and interprets a society's patterns. This represents exactly

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[1] Said Halim, *Essai*, p. 25.
[2] Said Halim, *Islamization*, p. 10.
[3] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

Montesquieu's ideas on the nature of the best political system. As the French thinker stated: "Il vaut mieux dire que le governement le plus conforme à la nature est celui dont la disposition particulière se rapporte mieux à la disposition du peuple pour lequel il est établi".[1] The ideal Islamic political regime can only be established if it conforms to this definition; thus each individual aspect of this regime has to be in perfect accord with the fundamental qualities of the Muslim society where it applies.

According to Said Halim, the most inept political regime is the one which forces the society it governs to change its social regime. On this issue he wrote:

> Un régime politique qui met la société qui l'adopte dans la nécessité de changer son régime social, est le régime le plus mauvais, car il est le plus despotique que l'on puisse concevoir, et tout le libéralisme dont il pourrait bien se prévaloir ne serait que du despotisme déguisé, le plus excessif, le plus trompeur et le plus nuisible.[2]

The ideal Muslim society, asserted Said Halim, is one which submits itself to the sovereignty of the *şeriat*. In such a society, it would be incumbent on every person to fulfill the obligations required of him or her by the rules of the *şeriat* Similarly, one is entitled to expect that others fulfill the same duties. As for government, its main function is to assure the implementation of these rules. Indeed, every Muslim should require of his or her government the secure establishment of the *şeriat's* authority. In this aspect Said Halim's political theory is very much reminiscent of Ibn Taymiyya's thought, who equally declared that the sovereignity of the şeriat must be paramount in any Muslim society. In his work entitled *Siyasa sharia* Ibn Taymiyya described the ideal Islamic government as one which functions completely according to the rules of the *şeriat*.

According to Said Halim, the Islamic political regime is representative.[3] Unlike its Western counterpart, Muslim society has not experienced any of the classic rivalries typical of Western political systems, because all its members basically hold to the same values and ideals which were sufficiently well developed, inclusive and broadly appealing to the

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[1]Montesquieu, *Œuvres Complètes*. Ed. Edouard Laboulaye (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1876), vol.3. p. 99.
[2]Said Halim, *Crise Politique*, p. 8.
[3]Said Halim, *Les Institutions,* p. 30.

Muslim masses. Here we have to remember that Said Halim constrasted the *şeri* principles to Western principles, pointing to the secterianism of the latter. Consequently, the nature of this national representation would assume different forms. In the political system outlined by Said Halim, the ideal Islamic Parliament would be composed of members who unanimously share the same political conviction, that is, to serve the *şeriat:*

> Dans le Parlement musulman il n'y aura donc pas de communiste ni de socialiste ni de républicain, ni de monarchiste mais des hommes nourrissant le même idéal, poursuivant le même but, celui d'appliquer de leur mieux les sages commandements du Chériat et ne différant entre eux que par le choix des moyens de servir cet idéal commun.[1]

For Said Halim, the main function of this Parliament would be the supervision of government deeds and actions. The drafting and passing of legislation, which constitutes the major function of parliaments in the West, would not, however, be the task of this body in an Islamic context and polity. Instead, promulgating legislation would be the duty of a special body of legists, the ulema or doctors of law. In Said Halim's eyes, this corresponds to classical Islamic legal doctrine and practice. On this issue Said Halim wrote:

> La représentation nationale chez nous ne peut prétendre à monopoliser le droit de légiférer et doit se contenter du droit de proposer les lois qu'elle juge utiles.
> Par conséquent, la sagesse la plus élémentaire semble nous commander de confier la tâche forte et importante et délicate d'élaborer les lois du pays à un corps de légistes choisis.[2]

In the Islamic legal system, the discovery of God's law is conferred upon a technically trained corps of jurists called the *fuqahā*. According to Wael Hallaq, "it is exactly for the purpose of finding the rulings decreed by God that the methodology of *uṣūl-al fiqh* was established".[3]

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[1] Ibid.
[2] Said Halim, *Crise Politique* I, p. 28.
[3] Wael Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 16 (1984) pp. 3-41. For more on *uṣūl-al fiqh* see Wael Hallaq, A *History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh*. (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997).

By way of comparison, it may be noted that in the Ottoman Empire the formulation of positive law was carried out mostly through the *iftā'* institution namely by the *fetva* issuing activities of the *müftü*s. On this issue, Hallaq rightly wrote that: "[t]he decisions of the qāḍīs do not appear, to any noticeable extent, to have been taken into account in *furū'* works, whereas as we have seen *fatwās* provided the primary source material for the elaboration and expansion of *furū'*."[1] Confirming Hallaq's opinion, Gerber also wrote that the *Iftā'* institution played a major role during the classical period of the Ottoman Empire for the evolution of the Islamic law.[2] Besides this, there were also *nişancıs* (legal experts) in Ottoman bureaucracy who prepared and enacted *kanun*s or imperial decrees in order to supplement *şeri* legislation. In March 1838, however, a new legislative council, the Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye, the Supreme Council of Jucidial Ordinances, was created by the imperial edict of Sultan Mahmud II.[3] The principal reason for its creation was the preparation and promulgation of new laws and regulations in order to meet the needs of an expanded bureaucracy which the traditional Ottoman Imperial Council could no longer manage. In their deliberations, all members of the Meclis-i Vala participated freely as no regard was given to rank. This was a novel concept for Ottoman bureaucracy, since the deliberation and decision-making processes in traditional councils were usually dominated by the opinions of senior participants. The intent of this new practice was to increase the new council's efficiency through the contributions of all participating members.

In 1854, a new legislative council called the Meclis-i Ali-i Tanzimat, or High Council of the Tanzimat, was created in order to alleviate the workload of the Meclis-i Vala.[4] The mandate of this new council, unlike its predecessor, was not limited to the examination of matters submitted to it by the Council of Ministers; it also had the power to deliberate on any other issue it deemed appropriate. The supervision of the Porte's activities was another prerogative of the Council of Tanzimat that its precursor, the Meclis-i Vala, did not have. This practice constituted an initial step in the development of the consultative bodies in the Ottoman Empire and in the creation of a representative regime.

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[1]Wael Hallaq, *Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). p. 192.

[2]Haim Gerber, *State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective*. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994). pp. 79-112.

[3]For the development of legislative institutions during the Tanzimat period, see Stanford J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reform Movement Before 1876," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1 (1970): pp. 51-83.

[4]Ibid., pp. 63-69.

The opening of the first Ottoman Parliament on March 19, 1877 constituted the crowning achievement in the struggle for constitutionalism within the Ottoman Empire. Its success was to a great extent due to the decade-long work of Young Ottoman intellectuals and politicians, who were opposed to the domination of the Porte and the autocracy of Sultan Abdülaziz. Young Ottoman intellectuals, and in particular Namık Kemal were the first to advocate parliamentary rule and representative government in the Ottoman Empire. Young Ottoman thinkers also advocated the importance of the upholding of Islamic legal principles, the *şeriat*, not unlike Said Halim. They also claimed that the practice of representative government could be found in the activities of the consulting bodies of the Ottoman sultans during the previous centuries.[1] In the minds of the Young Ottomans, legislative activities and Parliament found their legitimacy in the practice of *shūrā* of early Islam.

The new Parliament was bicameral. It was formed by the House of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) and the Assembly of Notables (Meclis-i Ayan). Members of the former chamber were elected for a four-year term by the officials sitting on administrative councils located in provincial capitals, *sancak*s and districts, while members of the latter were appointed directly by the sultan.[2] Since one of the main principles of the Tanzimat was to consider all subjects of the empire as Ottoman, regardless of their religious affiliation, establishing parliamentary quotas for membership based on religious affiliation was inconceivable. However, the problem of under-representation of the empire's non-Muslim communities had to be addressed and was eventually resolved by assigning a disproportionately high number of deputies to the European provinces.[3]

When the first Ottoman Parliament opened it was composed of members coming not only from different parts of the empire but also from different social backgrounds: pashas and bankers were sitting alongside with shopkeepers and artisans.[4]

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[1]Mardin, *Young Ottomans*, p. 134.

[2]For the establishment and the procedures of the first Ottoman parliament, see Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period, a Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1963). (Hereafter cited as Devereux, *First Ottoman*).

[3]Devereux, *First Ottoman*, pp. 141-143.

[4]Ibid, p. 147.

One of the basic prerogatives of the Ottoman Parliament was to assist the legislative process. Bills were submitted by either the government or by the chamber itself. After the period of discussion ended, the bill was put to a vote and was either adopted or rejected. In the case of rejection, the bill was considered null and void. If adopted, the bill was scrutinized article by article and, if necessary, amended by the chamber. Once the amendments were completed, the bill was again submitted for the consideration of the deputies, who would give their opinion on the amendments and then hold a vote on every article. After the final vote in the Parliament, the sultan's *irade* was necessary for any bill to become law (Article 53).[1]

In addition to its legislative function, another important prerogative of the Ottoman Parliament was its assumption of control over the activities of the Porte. In many ways, this duty was considered even more important by the architects of the Constitutional Regime than the legislative one. For example, it gave Parliament control over the budget. Furthermore, deputies had the right to question members of the government; they could even press charges against them. Once impeachment proceedings were sanctioned by the sultan, accused government members were required to stand trial in the Supreme Court. (Art. 31).[2]

The role of political authority in Said Halim's thought is very much reminiscent of that expounded by medieval Muslim thinkers. Like them, he considered that the concept of authority occupies a primordial place in Muslim society, not only because it issues from the *şeriat,* but also because it brings the *şeriat* into force.[3] Also like these medieval thinkers who placed the institution of the caliphate at the center of their political thought, Said Halim constructed his political theory with authority vested in the head of the state.

Speaking about the last aspect of Islamic political thought, Said Halim followed a long line of Muslim thinkers who since early Abbasid times have been preoccupied with the problem of authority in Islam. It was Ibn al-Muqaffa who first advised the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur to establish a firm grasp over religious affairs by codifying Islamic law and implementing it

[1]Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasaları*. p. 17.
[2]Ibid, p. 174.
[3]Said Halim, *Les Institutions*, p. 33.

under his jurisdiction.[1] His ideas reflected the old and deeply held Sassanian theory of statecraft in which the monarch held supreme authority over the Zoroastrian clergy of ancient Iran.

Another Islamic thinker preoccupied by authority in Islam was al-Jahiz (776-868). A Mutazili thinker, he defended the necessity of a strongly entrenched imamate on national grounds.[2]

As for the foundations of medieval Islamic political theory, they were laid by al-Mawardi (974-1058), a famous Muslim jurist. In his magnum opus, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya,* he expounded the basic principles of Islamic political theory.[3] The prime importance of his work derived from its systematic discussion of the prevailing Islamic legal theory and its application to the current political situation. Unlike Mutazilite thinkers such as al-Jahiz, who saw the role of the imamate in rational terms, al-Mawardi considered the institution a *şeri* obligation. According to al-Mawardi, the imamate derives its legitimacy from the Qur'anic verse "O you who believe, obey God, obey the Prophet and those among you in authority." By basing his doctrine on this verse, al-Mawardi argued that the imamate's existence is made necessary not by reason, but by revelation.[4]

Mawardi's stature in Islamic political thought is immense: he is the first Muslim thinker to propose an Islamic constitutional theory in order to regulate power relations. Hanna Mikhail in his important work on Mawardi rightfully asserted that he is "the first Muslim to undertake a comprehensive deduction of elements of Law that pertain to government."[5]

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[1]For the political thought of Ibn al-Muqaffa, see Gerlad Edward, "Ibn al-Muqaffa: Political and Legal Theorist and Reformer". (Ph. D. diss., John Hopkins University, 1987). See also Charles Pellat, *Ibn al-Muqaffa: conseilleur du Calife* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1976).

[2]For Jahiz, see Charles Pellat, *The Life and Works of Jahiz* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

[3]al-Mawardi, *Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyah wa al wilayat al diniyah* (The Laws of Islamic Governance) (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996); see also al- Mawardi, *Les statuts gouvernementaux ou règles de droit public et administratif* (Alger: Adolphe Jourdan, 1915).

[4]al-Mawardi, *Les statuts*, p. 6.

[5]Hanna Mikhail, *Politics and Revelation: Mawardi and After*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), p. xxx.

Ghazali's theory of authority in Islam, however, derived its impetus from the Sassanian dictum *dīn wa dawla* (religion and state).[1] This adage expresses the mutual relationship that exists between the spiritual and temporal forces. The spiritual power legitimizes the temporal power (*shawka*), while the temporal power reinforces the spritual. This dualism in Ghazali's political theory represents a basic divergence from the thought of his predecessors and especially from Mawardi.

The problem of designating the imam as the source of authority in Muslim society led to the development of many controversial theories among the *fuqahā*. These can be classified into two main doctrines: the succession of the Imam by *naṣṣ* (text) or succession, by *ikhtiyār* (election.)[2]

The designation of the imam by *naṣṣ*, a method adopted by the Shi'i jurists and theologians, derives its legitimacy from a sacred text, a verse in the Qur'an, a *ḥadīth* or the testamentary will (*waṣiyya)* of the ruling imam. The historical basis of this theory is grounded in Ali's designation by Muhammad at *Ghadīr Khumm* as his successor.[3]

The theory of designation by election (*ikhtiyār)* is supported not only by the Sunni *fuqahā* but also by the Kharijis. The historical basis for this theory can be traced back to the election of Abu Bakr as *Khalīfat Rasūl Allāh*.[4] or deputy of the prophet of God. His election was assured by a *shura* of five electors following the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

In Sunni political theory, the electors of the imam are called the *ahl al-ḥall wa al 'aqd* (those who loosen and bind). They are among the prominent members of the Muslim community such as the ulema or the *umara*. Following the conclusion of an election, the electors ratify their choice by the act of *bay'a*, an oath of allegiance to the imam.

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[1]For the political thought of Ghazali, see Henri Laoust, *La politique de Gazali* (Paris: Geuthner, 1970) (Hereafter cited as Laoust, *La Politique*); see also Leonard Binder, "Al-Ghazali's Theory of Islamic Government," *Muslim World* 45 (July 1955): pp. 228-241.

[2]Laoust, *La Politique*, p. 240.

[3]For the event of *Ghadīr Khumm*, see L. Veccia Vagliere, "Ghadir Khumm" *EI2* (Leiden, 1965), pp. 1015-1017.

[4]For the election of Abu Bakr, see Wilfred Madlung, *The Succession to Muhammad: A History of Early Islam* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also, M. A. Shaban, *Islamic History: A New Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), vol. 1.

According to Said Halim, authority in Muslim society should not be invested in an executive council where many people participate in the decision-making process; rather, it should be concentrated in the hands of one person. To his mind, dividing executive decisions among many people or groups who may be working at cross-purposes will paralyze government. Thus, he asserted that, in a Muslim political system, supreme authority should be entrusted in one person elected by adult suffrage.[1] He believed this was possible because the possession and exercice of the right to govern does not entail mass participation, whereas the possession of the right to exercise power can only be obtained through this participation. Only the delegation possesses this last right, which it receives as a mandate from the nation through general elections. Said Halim concluded that Muslim societies should be governed by heads of state directly elected by the nation and that these heads of state should have an exclusive right to hold the executive power.[2]

While according to Said Halim the *şeriat* constituted the only legitimate basis for a Muslim regime, he made no mention of an imam or caliph; instead, he spoke in terms of a head of state and his electors. In Said Halim's political theory, the electing body would not be limited to a distinct group of prominent members of society, such as the *ahl al ḥall wa al 'aqd*, envisioned by medieval jurists; nor would it be limited to Parliament; instead, it included the whole nation.[3]

As far as Said Halim's constitutional theory is concerned, the head of state represented an authority that emanates from the *şeriat*, an authority delegated to him by popular election.

> Représentant par la volonté nationale l'autorité qui émane du chériat [sic], le Chef d'État est donc personnellement responsable à la fois envers le Chériat et envers la nation tandis que ses représentants sont responsables envers ceux du Chériat.[4]

In his comments on the deposition of Abdülhamid II in April 1909, eight months after the proclamation of the Constitution, Said Halim stated that "it is not by staging a successful coup against a tyrant that people gain their liberty, but by creating a social environment that discourages the

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[1] Said Halim, *Les Institutions*, p. 33.
[2] Ibid., p. 34.
[3] Ibid., pp. 34-35.
[4] Ibid., p. 35.

emergence of such despotism."[1] This was a very important point for him, because "as long as the social causes which engendered and fostered the seeds of tyranny and absolutism" continued to exist, society would produce new autocrats to replace the old ones.

It is interesting to note that other intellectuals in Ottoman society held views similar to those of Said Halim. Prince Sabaheddin conceded that Hamidian despotism was due not to just one or two persons, but was the result of "our way of life and social defects." Abdullah Cevdet also advocated the same point of view, asserting that "the real issue is not to depose Abdülhamid and replace him with a new sultan, but to realize a social transformation". Ultimately, they all felt that the sultan ought to be personally responsible toward both the *şeriat* and the nation.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE ISLAMIC REGIME

In Said Halim's view the role of political parties in Islamic societies is bound to be different from the one played by political parties in the Western world. Whereas in the West parties serve the interests of different social classes and have as their goal the establishment of the domination of one social class over another, thereby subverting the existing social order; in Islamic societies, their function is to preserve the social institutions created by Islam:

> Alors que dans le régime politique occidental le rôle des partis politiques est de changer, de transformer constamment l'état social qui existe, le rôle de ces mêmes partis dans le régime politique musulman consiste au contraire à conserver les institutions sociales que l'Islamisme a créées.[2]

Thus, he asserted, political parties in Muslim countries do not play a significant role in political life like their counterparts in Western countries do. To him, this characteristic of the Muslim regime constitutes a clear indication of its superiority over its Western counterpart, for with no need to challenge or alter established social principles, the role of political parties would consequently be minimal. In Said Halim's opinion, political institutions have to be in harmony with social and ethical principles prevailing in a society. Therefore, Said Halim reflected that whereas Islam advocated egalitarianism, solidarity and social justice, concepts which to him represented a genuine

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[1] Said Halim, *La Crise politique*, part 2, p. 2
[2] Ibid., p. 37.

democracy, Western political principles advocated defense of personal and group interests. These concerns were less mature in Said Halim's eyes. Therefore, Said Halim concluded that political parties would have to be different in an ideal Islamic society and cannot be the same as their counterparts in the West if they wanted to be successful.

Said Halim's opinions on partisan politics may seem contradictory when one considers his tenure as CUP president from 1913 to 1917. However, his criticism of the CUP and how it governed provides us with a clearer view of his political theories. Said Halim felt that the CUP had to loosen its tight hold over government in order to let the latter develop its own independent character and pursue a national and unifying policy. From his perspective, a government run by one party or a cabinet formed by one party can only represent a part of a nation and not its whole; therefore, it cannot claim total national support for any of its decisions. One-party governments also render the impartiality of the policy-making process suspect.

In Said Halim's opinion, the weakness of the Young Turk government was ultimately caused by it being CUP-dominated:

> Une dernière cause de faiblesse du Gouvernement Jeune Turc c'est qu'il est un Gouvernement de parti et un Gouvernement de parti ne s'attire pas la sympathie et la confiance unanimes parce qu'il ne peut jamais être ni assez juste ni assez impartial.[1]

Excessive party discipline imposed on government members, he argued, deprives them of their smallest freedom of action and strips them of their initiative. Thus, party discipline undermines individual talents such as problem-solving. In the end, the strict adherence by government members to the party line can only result in mediocrity.

It was his firm belief that a political regime may be considered imperfect when its values do not represent the characteristic values intrinsic to the society over which it rules.[2] This reflected his view that political regimes are products of societal and historical evolution and that each political entity embodies the socio-cultural values of its society.

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[1]Said Halim, *Le Gouvernement*, p. 9.
[2]Said Halim, *La Crise politique*, p. 1.

Thus, Said Halim argued that the parliamentary regime that had been reestablished by the Revolution of July 1908 had proven itself to be unsuited to the realities of the Ottoman Empire. Far from being beneficial, he stated, this form of government had disturbed the social peace and threatened the political existence of the empire. In his opinion, any political regime that forces a society to change its social institutions is the worst, for such institutions are not, like merchandise, items that can be easily imported from abroad. Instead, social and government institutions are the products of a long process of social evolution which are developed by every nation and by every people; they evolve according to the needs and wants of their environment.

What makes a government corrupt, according to Said Halim, is the absence of a real and efficient control mechanism. Lack of accountability would cause even the most liberal regime to degenerate into tyranny. If the former Ottoman regime had become arbitrary, he argued, it was because of the inability and unwillingness of the Ottoman society to exert its control over government despite this being the social and political duty of every Muslim.[1]

For him, a Western type of parliamentary model is not always the best guarantee of efficient control over the executive branch of the government, especially if citizens lose their interest in the nation's politics. Like Namık Kemal before him, Said Halim argued that in the past, when sultans ruled autocratically, this control was exerted by the ulema and the statesmen who monitored the sultan's deeds.

Like Abduh, Said Halim complained about the unconditional adoption of Western institutions by Muslim countries and urged them instead to borrow from the West only what is useful and only that which could be adapted to a Muslim society. Said Halim called this process the "orientalization of Western civilization,"[2] an idea which corresponds to his conviction that traditions borrowed from the West had to be orientalized before applying them to the realities of the East.

For him, it was an unquestionable fact that the Westernist policies of the Tanzimat statesmen that had been applied to the problems of the Ottoman Empire had caused more harm than good by replacing Ottoman customs,

[1] Ibid., p. 9.
[2] Ibid., p. 12.

usages, political and social institutions, feelings and beliefs with those imported from the West. Instead of adopting these Western values indiscriminately, Said Halim felt that, Muslims should compare and contrast them with their own in order to critic and reform their traditions.[1]

A radical change in the political system of a country, argued Said Halim, can only be justified by a similar change in the socio-political values of the society itself. In his opinion, the constitutional regime of 1908 could not represent the Ottoman society of that period since society itself had not undergone a comparable transformation.[2] Said Halim believed that Ottoman society remained almost unchanged during the Hamidian regime.

Said Halim's argument did not reflect the realities of that period when, in spite of an oppressive government, many underground ideological movements and schools of thought permeated and secured a significant audience in certain circles of Ottoman intelligentsia. On the other hand, during this same period, (approximately the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth centuries), the economy and infrastructure of the empire underwent a very significant transformation.

Throughout Sultan Abdülhamid II's thirty-three year reign, European capitalism penetrated deeply into Ottoman territory and established a firm control over the empire's economy. This dominance was institutionalized in 1882 by the creation of the Ottoman Public Debt Commission (Osmanlı Dûyun-u Umumiye Komisyonu), which operated under the terms of the *Muharrem Kararnamesi* (Decree of *Muharrem*) issued by the sultan on November 23, 1881.[3] In the three succeeding decades, the Public Debt Administration played an important role in the development of an embryonic industrial base. One of the most important achievements of the Hamidian administration was the creation of a vast railway and highway systems which ushered in a new era of communications for the empire. Although some lines had been previously built in western Anatolia and Rumeli, they covered very short distances and only connected a few port cities to their agricultural hinterlands (for example, the İzmir-Aydın railway built in 1866 and the Bursa-Mudanya line built in 1873). In 1888, the imperial government, assisted by

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[1]Ibid., p. 13.

[2]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[3]For the Ottoman Public Debt Commission, see Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929). See also Charles Morawitz, *Les finances de la Turquie* (Paris: Guillamuin et cie., 1902).

the Public Debt Administration, increased the empire's railway network from a total of 1,780 kms to 5,883 kms.[1]

The rapid expansion of the railway network opened up many regions of the empire to foreign influences, for not only did transportation bring goods and merchandise, but it also brought new ideas. Consequently, many corners of the Ottoman Empire were exposed to the inevitable winds of change blowing from Europe.

The other important achievement of Hamidian modernization was in the field of education. From 1878 to 1907, the number of *Rüşdiyes,* (high schools), the backbone of secular education, rose from 300 to 619.[2]

All of these achievements, as Niyazi Berkes puts it, "were sufficient to make futile all efforts to remain hostile to change."[3] Contrary to what Said Halim argued, the social fabric of the empire had been significantly altered by the impact of these modernizing measures. Modern professional schools established by the Hamidian regime became the alma maters of the new professional elite who, discontented with the old system, soon aspired to replace it with a new one. Indeed, the Young Turk Movement began among students of the Imperial Medical School. This modernization had also undeniably exerted a very important impact on the social values (as fundamental aspects of the social fabric).

THE SENATE

The institution of the Senate in Said Halim's view had been developed in the West as an aristocratic institution designed to defend the rights and privileges of the upper class. In Western political systems, the role of this institution has been to moderate and restrain the "democratisation" of society by preserving and defending aristocratic values, thus assuring social equilibrium. For Said Halim, such an institution does not have a *raison d'être* in the Islamic political system, since Muslim society is based on legal and social egalitarianism.[4] The evolution of Muslim society must, therefore, occur

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[1]Shaw and Shaw, *History,* pp. 226-227; for more information on the railroads in the Ottoman Empire, see V. Pressel, *Les chemins de fer en Turquie d'Asie* (Zurich, 1902); and Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers.* See also Paul Imbert, *La rénovation de l'Empire ottoman, affaires de Turquie* (Paris: Librairie Académique, 1909).

[2]Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi.* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 1980), pp. Berkes, *The Development,* p. 271.154, 167.

[3]Berkes, *The Development,* p. 271.

[4]Said Halim, *Les Institutions,* p. 38.

under the guidance of a national assembly assisted by a legislative corps; both are inspired and guided by the *şeriat*. Said Halim's argument about the weakness of class struggle in Islamic societies was closely connected to the principles of social equality and social justice embedded in the *şeriat* as he understood it.

The architects of the first Ottoman constitutional regime, however, considered necessary exactly what Said Halim dismissed as an institution improper for an ideal Islamic regime. The main reason for the establishment of the Ottoman Senate was, as in the case of most upper chambers, to provide some form of checks and balances on the activities of the lower house. The members of the Ottoman upper chamber were nominated by the sultan and were his representatives; they constituted one third of the deputies.[1]

The role played by the Senate was mostly a formal one since the constitution empowered the sultan with the right to veto any proposed legislation. Nevertheless, as the parliamentary system of the empire was modeled on those operating under the European monarchies, most of which had bicameral systems, the Ottoman Parliament also had an upper and a lower house.

According to Said Halim then, Western and Muslim societies had different social and political dynamics because of their historical backgrounds and religious systems. Consequently, it would be an error for Muslims to adopt Western models of development. Western political and social institutions such as aristocracy and democracy do not have exact equivalents in Islamic history and social consciousness he asserted. Indeed, social transformation in Islamdom has traditionally followed different patterns. Thus, while Christian Europe's history has been marked by continual class struggle, such social upheavals were far less dramatic in Muslim societies, according to Said Halim.

[1]Devereux, *First Ottoman*, p. 227.

CONCLUSION

Both a Muslim thinker and an Ottoman statesman, Said Halim Pasha developed his social and political ideas in response to Islamdom's internal decline and to the threat posed by aggressive European imperialism to Islamic nations. He carried on the struggle against this imperialism throughout his political career, first as minister of foreign affairs and then as grand vizir of the Ottoman Empire. Yet in spite of all his efforts, Said Halim witnessed the twilight and demise of the last great Islamic empire.

According to Said Halim, the fundamental problem in the Muslim world consisted in an incorrect diagnosis of the problems afflicting Muslim societies and an even more disastrous prescription for their remedy. He deplored Muslim rulers who had believed, over the previous hundred and fifty years, that the development of their countries meant direct incorporation of Western institutions. Nevertheless, in many respects Abdülhamid's time constituted an exception to this policy. Although Abdülhamid continued to expand and modernize the Ottoman educational system, he did not blindly adopt the Western, especially French, system like his predecessors. Instead, Abdülhamid preferred to place emphasis on the Islamic character of the Ottoman educational system.[1] To Said Halim, the policy of the Tanzimat's statesmen and rulers of slavishly adopting Western institutions, especially the educational ones was a fatal error: the masses had never understood or accepted these Western institutions and had instead clung to their traditional Islamic values. The result was widespread alienation among the Muslim subjects of the empire. Worse yet, the pursuit of Western reforms by the ruling class had left Muslim societies with no Islamic authority to turn to for guidance and enlightenment. Said Halim concluded that the only group which benefited from Westernization was the European imperialist powers: their strategy, he speculated, was to create a Muslim clientele among the elite that would make it easier for them to penetrate and control the governments and economies of Muslim societies. If the latter wanted to halt their decline, declared Said Halim, they had first to grasp Islam's true message and purify themselves of their pre-Islamic past.

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[1]Benjamin Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman 'Secular' Schools." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (2000): p. 375.

Many aspects of Said Halim's social and political thought bear a close resemblance to the ideas expounded by Muslim modernist thinkers of the nineteeth and early twentieth centuries. For example, like Namık Kemal before him, Said Halim advocated the establishment of an Islamic parliamentary regime. (It should be noted in passing that when Said Halim was writing on this topic, the Ottoman Empire had already experimented with this form of government, first in 1877-1878 — prior to the Hamidian autocracy — and then immediately after the 1908 revolution.) Also, like Abduh, Said Halim worried about the negative effect that Westernizing reforms would have over Muslim society.

After the collapse of the Hamidian autocracy and the proclamation of the Constitution in July 1908, Ottoman politics became dominated by three main ideologies, Westernism, Turkism and Islamism, each vyed for political supremacy. Islamism was the official ideology during Sultan Abdülhamid's thirty-three year reign. Abdülhamid used Islamism as an instrument to justify his autocratic rule as sultan-caliph over the Muslim peoples of the empire and as a shield against the penetration of European political ideologies such as nationalism and liberalism. In the following era, the Second Constitutional Period, Islamism, despite its ideological factions, was to change. Islamist thinkers of this period were almost unanimous in calling for a representative regime as their Young Ottoman forerunners had done.

Although an Islamist, Said Halim did not hesitate to collaborate with the secularly inclined centrist wing of the CUP to serve his country. His grand-vizirate coincided with one of the most critical periods of late Ottoman history. Among the many challenges that he faced was Russia's involvement in the Armenian Question. With an eye on eastern Anatolia, Russia took advantage of a weak Ottoman Empire by creating unrest among the Armenian population in the region. Said Halim fought unrelentingly against these Russian aspirations and frustrated St. Petersburg's schemes for Anatolia with skilled diplomacy. At the same time, in April 1915, Said Halim Pasha also opposed, though unsuccessfully, the draconian measures adopted by Talat Pasha to solve the Armenian problem in eastern Anatolia.

Said Halim Pasha's role in his country's involvement in the First World War was also decisive. The rapproachment with Germany, which led to the signing of the Ottoman-German Mutual Defence Agreement of 2 August 1914 was initiated by him in early July, during private conversations with Baron von Wangenheim, the German ambassador to the Porte. Said Halim was

strongly convinced that the empire's security in a general world crisis could only be assured by its alliance with one of the rival military blocs, the Triple Alliance or the Entente. Since the Entente turned down all overtures made by the Porte, the imperial government had no other choice than to become a signatory to the Triple Alliance. Nevertheless, unlike Enver Pasha who advocated immediate entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, Said Halim Pasha considered that the terms of the military agreement with Germany did not necessarily oblige the Porte to do so. His aim was to make the Ottoman Empire a non-belligerent ally of the Central Powers. He called this "armed neutrality". Such a policy, Said Halim explained in his political memoirs, would have rendered a great service to the empire's allies, since armed neutrality would have obliged the Entente Powers to concentrate large numbers of their forces along Ottoman borders, in Egypt, and in the Caucasus. This tactic, according to him, would certainly have eased military pressure on her allies. Unfortunately, Said Halim Pasha was not strong enough in the cabinet to prevent the empire's being dragged into the war by the bellicose Enver Pasha. Said Halim's failure to prevent the empire's participation in the First World War epitomized not only the demise of the last multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Muslim empire, but also the failure of Pan-Islam, an ideology that he advocated in face of the rising ethnic nationalism in the Muslim world.

مؤلفی

پرنس محمد سعید حلیم پاشا

بحران فکریمز

ایکنجی طبع

سبیل الرشاد کتخانه‌سی نشریاتندن

دارالخلافه ـ حقوق مطبعه‌سی

۱۳۳۷

Cover page of *Buhran-ı fikrimiz*, second edition.

ESSAI

SUR LES CAUSES DE LA DÉCADENCE

DES PEUPLES MUSULMANS

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CONSTANTINOPLE
Imprimerie F. LŒFFLER, Péra, Tâkè Djadessi 585—587

1918



Note of Said Halim Pasha to his brother Abbas Halim Pasha
announcing his impending resignation.

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INDEX

AHMET ŞEYHUN

SAİD HALİM PASHA:

OTTOMAN STATESMAN AND ISLAMIST THINKER (1865-1921)