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A DEFENCE of NATURAL and REVEALED RELIGION:

BEING AN

ABRIDGMENT

OF THE

SERMONS

Preached at the LECTURE founded by

The Hon^ble *Robert Boyle*, Esq;

VOL. II.



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TRUTH and EXCELLENCY

OF THE

Christian Religion

Asserted against

Jews, Infidels, and Heretics.

PART II.

HAVING shewn that the *Christian* Religion is in no Respect either inferior to, or inconsistent with the Doctrine of *Moses*, and the Prophets, I proceed,

2. To shew that it enjoins nothing as necessary to be believed or done, which, when rightly understood, is repugnant to the Dictates of right Reason.

The main Objection against receiving the Christian Revelation seems all along to have been drawn from its containing and requiring our Belief of some Matters, which very wise Men have found themselves unable clearly to perceive, and to account to their own Reason for. The refuting of which, as it will at once take off the most plausible Pretence of the Enemies of Christianity for not believing; or of

Heretics for corrupting and misinterpreting the Scriptures of the New Testament, I will take care to do it by observing the following Method.

I. I will explain to you in what Sense and Respects the Mysteries of the Gospel can be said really to exceed our Comprehension.

II. I will offer some Considerations which prove, that their being thus incomprehensible by us, is no just Bar to our believing them.

III. I will answer as distinctly as I can, the principal Arguments made use of to insinuate, that they are not to be believed, because not to be comprehended by us.

Having established the general Part of the Argument, I shall afterwards descend to some particular Points of Faith and Practice, and shew that these have such Evidence as the *Jews* ought to assent to; and are no Way repugnant to the so much boasted Wisdom of an improved, tho' still mere natural Man.

I. I shall explain to you in what Sense and Respects the Mysteries of the Gospel can be said really to exceed our Comprehension.

1. Now it is readily admitted on both Sides, that several Things believed in the World, are of so abstruse a Nature, that no Man by the Strength of his own Discourse could ever have found them out. And therefore all, who embrace Revelation, do likewise agree in confessing, that these Things neither were, nor could be known, but by God's express Declaration. Upon this Acknowledgment St. *Paul* infers the unavoidable Occasion for a Revelation from above in Points peculiar to Christians, and attributes these Discoveries to God. Upon the same Account our Adversaries are content to have these Doctrines thought *mysterious:* Only herein we differ, that they allow this Title to belong to them, with regard to their being obscure before such Revelation, which

they now think has made them clear; whereas, we say, that this Revelation notwithstanding, we have not a full and clear Perception of them.

2. A *second* Sort there are, of which, tho' we have Notions sufficiently distinct to serve the Purposes of Life, yet we cannot account for their Causes or Effects, or answer the Difficulties against those Notions, the Truth whereof we nevertheless can see no just Reason to call in Question.

3. Those Things are out of our Reach, of which we have no *Ideas*. But no Man in his Senses ever took upon him to maintain, that any Doctrine which Men are thus ignorant of, is a proper Object of Faith. The *Mysteries* of Religion which command our Belief, may have Depths which it is not possible for us to sound the Bottom of; but still so far is our own Knowledge necessary, that even in these Cases we be able to explain our Meaning by some such common Notions, as may render the Words in which those Mysteries are expressed, intelligible.

4. A *fourth* Sort of Things there are, that lie beyond the Reach of human Comprehension; of whose Nature though we have some, yet we have not an adequate Knowledge of. This is plainly our Case with Regard to Beings of an abstracted and incorporeal Nature, where we have no sensible Ideas to lead us into a full Understanding of them.

5. But to come nearer to our present Case, I add, that several Propositions may exceed our Comprehension, in regard that although they be really true, yet the immediate Ground of that Truth may not be discernable by us.

Now it is to be observed, that the Controversy at present depending, does properly concern such revealed Truths, as exceed our Comprehension, either as we have some, but very confused *Ideas* of: Or such as though we understand the Terms, yet we

cannot account to our ſelves for the Manner of their Agreement, when they make up one entire Propoſition.

Having thus explained in what Senſe ſome Articles of Faith exceed our Comprehenſion, I proceed,

II. To offer my Reaſons why this is no juſt Bar to our believing them.

1. The *firſt* of theſe ſhall be taken from the Nature of Faith itſelf, which is, properly ſpeaking, that Aſſent of the Mind to any Thing upon the Teſtimony of another. And is thus diſtinguiſhed from that which Evidence of Senſe, and Experience, demonſtrative Proof, or probable Argument produce in us.

From hence we may diſtinguiſh all Manner of Evidence into two Sorts, *internal* and *external*. I call that *internal* Evidence, which induces our Aſſent by Motives ariſing from within the Matter itſelf, termed for this Reaſon the *Evidence of the Thing*. I call that *external*, which moves us by Conſiderations taken from without, and is properly called *Evidence of the Teſtimony*. Concerning the Truth whereof, ſuppoſing no juſt Cauſe to doubt, that ought to be eſteemed ſufficient for creating the Aſſent of *Faith* or *Belief*.

Now Faith in a religious Senſe owns no leſs Motive to determine it, than the Teſtimony of God himſelf. And ſince 'tis certain that his Goodneſs and Wiſdom, and Truth can never ſuffer him to be deceived, or deceive others, the Word of ſuch a Being muſt give us the ſtrongeſt Belief imaginable.

2. Let it be conſidered, that the only Qualification which gives any Thing a Right to our Aſſent is the Truth of it. Conſequently whatſoever we have Reaſon by any manner of Means to think true, our Minds have Reaſon upon that Account fully to acquieſce in. Conſequently again, admitting that there be ſome Things which exceed our Compre-

Comprehension, they are notwithstanding entitled to our Assent, except it could be proved that they cannot be true, merely because we cannot comprehend them. But the Truth of the Thing depends not in any Degree upon the Capacity of the Person that considers it.

3. The present Argument will be strengthened yet more, by observing how it comes to pass that we think ourselves warranted to be confident of the Truth of those Things which we most firmly believe. How do Men know that they see or hear any of those Objects, that strike their Eyes and Ears? Is it because their Senses and their Reason tell them so? But how are they assured, that they do not deceive them? The Answer they would make, would be, that Man and all Nature is the Workmanship of a most wise, and good, and powerful Creator; that these Faculties are implanted in us on purpose to represent Things truly; and therefore as it were a most impious Reflection upon the Wisdom and Power of God, to suppose that he could not frame these Faculties sufficient for the Purposes they are to serve; so it is a no less blasphemous Imputation upon his Goodness to imagine that he would not. This therefore is a sufficient Argument, that Things are as they appear to be.

But then I observe, that we have the same Security for our Assent to Articles of Faith, even those beyond our Comprehension. For here too the Ground of our Assurance rests all at last upon the Perfections of God, who revealed them, who is too glorious for Man to comprehend as he is.

4. Now the Christian Doctrines, alledged to be above our Capacity, are such as concern either the incommunicable Perfections of the divine Nature, or the Decrees of the divine Providence in the Redemption of Man. And shall we, with these poor Faculties, which the meanest of God's Creatures is

an over-match for, be so vain as not to allow God, either to be, or to do any Thing, but what we can account for? As his Doings are so transcendently great, what shall hinder him from publishing those hidden Excellencies which we could never have found out? And if he actually has done so, shall we not take his Word?

Nay, had these Doctrines not come from God, they would never have been known, being too remote from the View of any Faculty upon Earth to have discerned, or ever thought of otherwise. So that how strange soever it may be to advance the Credibility of such Mysteries, upon the confessed unconceivableness of them, yet both Reason and the Apostle bear me out in so doing. *What Man knoweth the Things of a Man save the Spirit of Man, which is in him? Even so the Things of God knoweth no Man, but the Spirit of God.*

5. Another Consideration which renders our Belief of the most mysterious Doctrines highly reasonable, is the Nature of that Assent required on these Occasions. Where we are capable of perceiving the Object propounded, there it is necessary our Faith should be explicit, and distinct: But where the Object is dark and confused, it suffices that our Faith be implicit and general, because we cannot believe more than we have evidence for: If therefore we study to know as much as we can, to receive whatever appears to come from him, this is all that God expects from us; and this can never be unreasonable, unless it be unreasonable to own God infallible.

In a word, if Faith in general be an Assent upon Testimony, and the Ground of *divine Faith* be the Testimony of God: If the Object of this Faith be revealed Truth, and the Truth of any Object do not depend upon the Capacity of the Person contemplating it: If the Power of comprehending be the Gift

Gift of a Being we cannot comprehend: If the Christian Doctrine disgusts upon Account of the glorious Nature and wonderful Decrees of that very Being: And if the Degrees of Faith are proportioned to the Degrees of the Evidence, then I have proved, that allowing some Parts of the Christian Revelation incomprehensible, yet this will not bear us out in refusing to believe them.

III. I come now to answer some of the principal Reasons brought to prove, that Things which cannot be comprehended, ought not to be enjoined, as necessary to be believed by us.

All which I hope I shall confute, if I can make out these five Propositions that follow.

1. That there is a real Difference between Things *above*, and Things *contrary* to Reason.

2. That requiring our Assent to Things *above* Reason, does not usurp upon Reason, or take away the Use of it in Matters of Religion.

3. That in order to render the most assured Faith in these Cases a reasonable Act, it is neither necessary or lawful so to interpret Scripture to our common Notions of Things, as to make all the Doctrines delivered there, familiar and intelligible to us.

4. That the Doctrines of this Kind are wrongfully imputed to Priestcraft.

5. That the ill Consequences pretended to rise from these Doctrines, and the Offence said to be taken at them, are neither truly charged upon the Maintainers of them; nor if they were, are these a sufficient Reason for giving them up?

1. I am to prove, *That there is a real Difference between Things above, and Things contrary to Reason.*

That those Things do really differ from each other, of which we conceive Ideas plainly different is certain. Now he that declares a Thing to be *above* Reason, implies no more, than that he does not see

how it can be; but he that pronounces a Thing *contrary to Reason*, implies that he perceives either such an Inconsistence in the Thing itself, or such an Incongruity with other acknowledged Truths, as shew him, that it cannot be.

Again: To be above human Reason means only, that we cannot know perfectly what we affirm to be so; leaving it undetermined whether Beings of a more extensive Understanding may not understand it more perfectly. But to be *contrary* to Reason infers, that neither we, nor any larger Capacity whatsoever can know it to be true. For Reason in the several Sorts of Minds differs only in Degree, but cannot contradict itself; and consequently whatsoever is indeed *contrary* to the Reason of one Mind, cannot but be so to the Reason of all. So that as much Difference as there is between being possible to be true, or false, and being impossible to be true; so great a Difference there is between the Idea of a Thing *above* Reason, and that of a Thing *contrary* to Reason.

Take indeed Reason for understanding in general; there is no Truth which some intelligent Mind or other does not comprehend; but to say this of the human Mind is too vain to be cherished by them, who observe the Methods of our Attainment to Knowledge, or other Creatures both below and above us.

1. As to the first of these, some Things are known at first View; others give us Labour to search out: Those we call self-evident, and the Knowledge of them Intuition; these we call Consequences, and the Knowledge of them is termed mediate, from that third Idea interposed between Matters not clear of themselves, for representing the Agreement, or adjusting the Differences of the Matters enquired into, by their Agreement or Disagreement with itself.

If

If then there be some Things in Nature of which we have none but confused *Ideas*; and if there be others, of which though we have Ideas sufficiently distinct, yet can we not discern all their Properties fully, because destitute of a third Idea, which should illustrate their Properties, then have we a very plain Account both that some Things may be above our Reason, and whence it is that they may be so.

Now that some Things there are in Nature, of which we have but very dark Ideas, without appealing to spiritual Substances, I instance Matter, which though we converse with every Moment, yet neither Sense can descry, nor Reason define what it is precisely.

Again: That some Things there are, of which we have distinct Ideas, but far from a full Knowledge, for want of some third Idea capable of opening them to us, is so far from wanting a Proof, that the greater Part of our Ignorance in the Secrets of Nature seems chiefly owing to this very Cause.

What hath been argued from the Operations of our own Minds, would be strengthened by a Comparison between other Beings and ourselves; here we should remember that though we are Creatures indued with Life, Sense, and Reason, which has set us a good way above the other Part of the Creation, yet we must not imagine that our Minds are as capacious as Angels. We are not so absurd as to deny many Appearances and Effects, which depend upon material Causes, because they do not manifest themselves to our Senses; and is it less absurd to deny, that Angels, but especially God himself, may have a more comprehensive View of many Things, which Faculties, so limited as ours, are not by Nature fitted to perceive?

As we find Objects whose exceeding Brightness is not only useless, but painful to the Eye of the Body, why may there not be others too gloriously dazzling for that of the Mind? In

In a Word, it is moſt reaſonable to think, that God has ſet Bounds to Mens Underſtandings, as well as to their Senſes.

And thus much is ſufficient to make good, that there is a real Difference between Things *above* and Things *contrary* to Reaſon. And conſequently, that whatſoever is not *contrary* to Reaſon, is poſſible to be true; and if true, may be aſſented to as ſuch, notwithſtanding it neither be, nor can be comprehended by us. I proceed now,

2. To ſhew, that requiring our Aſſent to Things *above* Reaſon, does not uſurp upon Reaſon, or take away the Uſe of it *in Matters of Religion.*

For Reaſon's Buſineſs is the ſame here, generally ſpeaking, as in other Caſes, to diſcern I mean, and be anſwerable for the Sufficiency of the Motive inducing our Aſſent. Only we add withal, that the particular Thing Reaſon is to regard in Matters of Faith, is the Evidence upon which we are moved to receive them, which is the Evidence of Teſtimony. And conſequently it is not the Condition of the Thing revealed, but the Certainty of the Revelation, that makes the proper Subject of our Enquiry. And upon this we are content that Reaſon ſhould exerciſe herſelf. For is it not poſſible for him who made us to communicate his Will and Nature, and to inform Men with thoſe hidden Treaſures of Knowledge, which they could never have found out themſelves, and ſuch as are greatly for their Profit to know? All which in Effect is but to debate whether it be not reaſonable to believe divine Revelations in general.

Let Reaſon then enquire again; whether Miracles be not Signs of a divine Power? Whether a Being of Truth and Goodneſs would atteſt a Lie by ſuch Wonders? Whether thoſe who wrought ſuch Works ought not to be received, as ſent by him? Whether the Old and New Teſtament be not the

Writings

Writings of those Persons, and the Facts related their Doings; and what Assurance we have that they are not corrupted? All which is in Effect to enquire whether the Christian Religion in particular be the Invention of Man, or a Revelation from God.

Let her read those Books with all imaginable Circumspection, observe their mutual Agreement, and the Sense of the Church of all Ages upon all the material, and some confessedly obscure Passages. For this again is in effect but to examine, whether the Mysteries, which some labour to explode, have all along been esteemed essential Parts of Christianity itself.

Let the Precepts of this Religion be brought to the Test, and Men will find no one Doctrine in all this whole System unworthy of God to impart, or of Men to receive. For this in *Matters of* revealed Religion, is the only Enquiry proper to the Thing itself, and that which when we once are satisfied in, our Duty then is to rest for the Belief of it upon Miracles and the Characters of a divine Revelation. These are the Terms upon which the Gospel asks our Belief; and therefore there is no need for those Clamours upon that plausible Head of commanding Men to exclude from Religion, the only Faculty by which God intended we should discern Truth from Falshood.

Having shewn that the requiring our Assent to Things *above* Reason, does not usurp upon Reason, or take away the Use of it in Matters of Religion: I come,

3. To shew, that in order to render the most assured Faith in these Cases a reasonable Act, it is neither necessary or lawful so to interpret Scripture to our common Notions of Things, as to make all the Doctrines delivered there familiar and intelligible to us.

That

The Neceſſity of ſuch Accommodations of Scripture, proceeds upon theſe Principles. "That it "can never be reaſonable to receive Things not "evident, and ſuch as cannot be explained, much "leſs ſo, if they appear to us impoſſible and ab-"ſurd, by contradicting ſome already received "Dictates of Reaſon, and if they cannot be recon-"ciled to ſome certain and acknowledged Truths."

To which I reply in the following Particulars.

1. Then, I own, that nothing which is not evident, hath a Right to our Aſſent: But then I muſt obſerve, that the Evidence required in the Aſſent of Faith is not that of Matter, but that of Teſtimony. 'Tis farther granted, that the Darkneſs of the Matter is not of itſelf an Argument for believing, but a good one to ſuſpend our Belief, till ſome other Motive caſt the Scale. But I have proved that the Evidence of a divine Revelation is of weight enough to end the Suſpence, and fix our Belief. And I muſt add that the Obſcurity of ſome Things are, tho' not direct, yet accidental Proofs of their being revealed, becauſe not poſſible to be the Invention of Men.

2. As readily will it be granted, that we cannot be obliged to receive any Doctrine *contrary* to Reaſon; becauſe whatever is contrary to Reaſon, is contrary to Truth. But as Reaſon and Revelation come from God, and therefore cannot contradict each other, he then that proves any Doctrine to be contrary to Reaſon, does in Effect prove that Doctrine not to be of God; and therefore ſuch Doctrine being deſtitute of that proper Motive of Aſſent I am contending for, cannot poſſibly be a proper Matter of Faith.

3. But then we ought to make a difference between a Thing being really contrary to Reaſon, and its ſeeming to be ſo; for many Things there are, but how they are, we are not able to tell: Theſe,

These, tho' not possible to be explained as to the Manner, are not rejected as to the Thing. So that 'tis a Principle by no Means peculiar to Religion, but even to Philosophy, and all Sort of Science, that a Thing's being inexplicable, does not presently infer, that it is either impossible in itself, or absurd to be believed by us.

The received Dictates of Reason are excellent Rules as far as they go; but they who use them, should consider upon what Views they were established, and to what Sort of Subjects they extend. For to vary from these, is not to go against Reason, but against the Men, who by a wrong Application, make them Occasions of Reasoning amiss. That *nothing can be made out of nothing*, is a received Dictate of Reason; but they who from thence deny that God made the World out of nothing, draw a false Consequence from a Rule applied to a supernatural, which is only true of natural Productions, in a settled Course of Causes and Effects.

So again, for supposed or real Difficulties; all agree they ought not to take Place in Bar to positive Proofs, sufficient in their Kind; because such Proofs are the proper Evidence of Truth, and it is not possible for a finite Understanding to foresee or answer all the Consequences that may happen to be charged upon Opinions thus establish'd.

For as some are charged wrongfully, from general Maxims too rashly made, or improperly applied; so even when rightful, were these allowed to overthrow positive Evidence, but small Progress could be made in Knowledge. We could not many Times assent or dissent at all to either Side of a Question, one Part of which we know must needs be false, and one be true, because we may never at this Rate be able to satisfy ourselves, which of the two is false, and which is true.

That Matter, for Example, is or is not divisible without

without End, is a disjunctive Propoſition, the Parts of which are contradictory, and cannot both be either true or falſe. And yet take which Side you will, it is incumbered with inſuperable Difficulties.

Suppoſe now that God ſhould reveal which Side of it is true; were it reaſonable to be determined by ſuch a Declaration or not? They who ſhould deny it, would pay but very ſlender Reſpect to divine Revelation in general; they who grant it, allow that ſome Things may reaſonably be believed, notwithſtanding any Difficulties to the contrary.

They come at laſt to this, that in ſome Caſes the Point in Queſtion is not, whether explicable or not, comprehenſible or not, but whether it be ſaid by God or not. Which with Regard to the myſterious Truths of Chriſtianity is to aſk whether they be expreſly contained in, or fairly deduced from Scripture.

2. That the bringing down to our own Capacities ſuch Scriptures as contain myſterious Truths, is not only a needleſs, but an unlawful Expedient. The very Plea our Adverſaries urge, *That Scripture is not the Words, but the Senſe of the Text*, directly condemns this Method of proceeding; for every Time we depart from the obvious Importance of the Words, we impoſe a new Scripture of our own. And what an Inſolence is this, to uſurp God's Authority? What becomes of the Obedience of Faith, when we break thro' all the Laws of Interpretation by forced Conſtructions, and bend thoſe ſacred Oracles, purely becauſe we reſolve to admit nothing for the Word of God, but what ourſelves think fit for him to tell us?

But is not this done in ſundry Paſſages without Blame, where God is ſaid to have Hands, and Eyes, and Paſſions, and the like? And does not the Church of *England* maintain, *that this is my Body*, could not be meant literally, becauſe ſuch

Meaning

Meaning is absurd? Yes; and when the like Absurdities can be shewn to follow the Doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Satisfaction of the Son of God, we will agree to forsake the literal Sense in the Places that mention these two. But in other Places the Scripture represents God as an omnipresent and impassible Spirit, and these are sufficient to explain the metaphorical Sense of those Expressions which are suited, not to the Dignity of his Nature, but to the Infirmity of ours. I come now to answer,

4. That Objection which imputes all incomprehensible Doctrines to Priestcraft.

One would fancy by the Commonness of this Objection, that great Advantages and Revenues arose to the Clergy from it; but with no Reason; for how is it possible to think that the Mysteries should turn to Account, supposing the Preachers of them insincere? What do these Men, in Effect, but teach their Hearers not to think too high of their own Abilities? And is the persuading Men, that they are not near so wise as they are willing to believe themselves, an undertaking so very acceptable, that we should hope they would gratify us for it? O! but by this Means we extol our Character above the Laity, to whom these Mysteries are represented inaccessible? What? when we own ourselves, as well as they, unable to comprehend them? But this makes bold Men Masters of their own Consciences, by imposing Absurdities under the venerable Name of Mysteries? What? when they tell them nothing has a Right to their Assent which is not revealed? When the Scriptures are told to be the Rule of Faith; when they are exhorted to try their Teachers Doctrines by this Rule, and to take all reasonable Measures to satisfy themselves in the divine Authority of those very Scriptures? But still I ask, what they who first published these Doctrines proposed

posed to get by it? Nothing but Insults and Persecution; and this our Enemies themselves confess, when they urge this Objection,

5. That the requiring Men's Assent to Points they cannot comprehend, gives great Offence to Adversaries and Strangers, and hinders the Conversion of Multitudes to the Faith. But,

1. I deny, that these Doctrines give any just Offence, because, as I have proved, nothing contrary to Reason is advanced in them. The Offence then in this Case, is not given, but taken, and the Hindrance to People's Conversion, not in the Temper of the Doctrines, but themselves.

2. I deny that such Offence is a sufficient Cause for giving up these Doctrines.

If Religion were to be served up according to Men's Palates, there would be as many different Faiths as Persons, and the Consequence would be, there would be no Religion at all. In a word, 'tis by no Means the Business of Religion to humour, but to correct the sickly Appetites of Men; and considering the miserable Depravation of our Nature, it is for the Honour of such Doctrines, that they create Disgust; were they less good, they would be better liked.

In the mean while, this is God's own Institution. The Ministers of the Gospel have it in Trust only, and must be accountable for their faithful Use of it; and both they and their People must remember whose Authority it stands upon, and submit to it at their Peril.

Having answered some of the principal Reasons brought to prove, that Things which cannot be comprehended ought not to be enjoined as necessary to be believed by us; I proceed, according to my Promise before, to consider some particular Points of Faith, *viz.* the *Trinity*, *Incarnation of the Son of God*, and the *Satisfaction* made for the Sins

of the World, by the Sacrifice of his Death; and shew that these have such Evidence as the *Jews* ought to assent to, and are no Ways repugnant to the so much boasted Wisdom of an improved, tho' still mere natural Man.

And the Points I shall speak to with Regard to them, are these three.

I. That these Doctrines are delivered to us in the New Testament; consequently ought to be believed by *Christians*.

II. I shall examine how far they are agreeable to the Scriptures of the *Old* Testament, and the Sense of the ancient Synagogue; consequently, whether they be just Matter of Offence to the *Jews*.

III. I shall shew, that they contain nothing repugnant to the Principles of natural Reason.

I. That these Doctrines are delivered to us in the New Testament. First of the Trinity; and here I will shew,

1. That the *Father*, the *Son*, and the *Holy Ghost*, are so distinguished from each other in Scripture, as justifies our believing them *three Persons*.

2. That such Names, *&c.* are attributed to them as prove each of them to be *truly God*.

3. That notwithstanding all this, the Scripture is most expres's in the Unity of the *Godhead*; from whence it will follow, that these three Persons are the *one living and true God*.

1. The Distinction between *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, is evident from these few plain Passages. See *Luke* i. 34, 35. *Matt.* iii. 16, 17. *Luke* iii. 21, 22. *John* i. 32, 33. *John* xiv. 16. xv. 26. *Rom.* viii. 11. *Matt.* xxviii. 19. 2 *Cor.* x. 14. 1 *John* v. 7.

2. The same Attributes are ascribed to *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, as prove each of them to be God.

Concerning the Father here is no Controversy.

Concerning the Son, we find the same divine Perfections affirmed of him as the Father; as *Eternity*. See *John* v. 26. *Heb.* i. 11, 12. *Omniscience*, see *John* x. 15. v. 20. *Rev.* ii. 23. *Power*, see *John* v. 21. 19. *Heb.* i. 2. 10. *Psal.* cii. 25. *Heb.* i. 3. *John* v. 22, 23. All which Texts justify us in believing not the Father only, but the Son also to be God.

The same Inference we shall be warranted to make concerning the blessed Spirit, if the Force of these following Places be duly considered. See *Acts* v. 3, 4. xiii. 1, 2. xx. 28. *Ephes.* ii. 20, 21, 22. *Matt.* ix. 32. 1 *Cor.* ii. 10, 11. *Rom.* viii. 11. 1 *Cor.* xii. 4. 11. 2 *Cor.* xiii. 14. *Matt.* xxviii. 19. 1 *Cor.* xii. 12, 13. And yet it is no less evident,

3. That there neither are, nor can be more Gods than one. This is the constant Voice both of Reason and Scripture. See *Mar.* xii. 29. 32. And the Christian Doctrine is so far from intending to possess Men with any Notions to the contrary, that it prevents them, and affirms the Belief of our Saviour's Divinity consistent with that fundamental Article. See 1 *Cor.* viii. 5, 6. *John* xvii. 3. And all the Texts that ascribe the essential Perfections of the Godhead to the Son and Holy Ghost, admitting no other Reconciliation, either with those other Passages, which so fully assert the Unity of the divine Essence, or with the Principles of Reason, to which a Plurality of Gods is an insupportable Contradiction; than that of confessing, that each of those to whom the incommunicable Excellencies of the Godhead are ascribed, must needs be God; yet so, that notwithstanding the different Characters by which they are represented to us, or the different Relations they stand in to each other, this Godhead of them all is entirely, indivisibly, inseparably, one.

II. The next Point to be treated of, which concerns the *Incarnation of the Son of God*, is so closely

allied to this, that it will be expedient to produce our Evidence for that also, before I go to vindicate the former from that Offence, which it hath been so heavily taxed with giving.

To prove this, St. *John* begins his Gospel with a most accurate Account of the *Word:* That this *Word was in the Beginning*, that it *was with God*, that it *was God*, that *it made all Things*; that this *Word was made Flesh*, *dwelt among us*, even *Jesus Christ*. To the same Purpose we have the Word of Christ. See *John* xvii. 5. vi. 51. xvi. 28. vi. 62. iii. 13, 14. xiv. 9, 10, 11. x. 30. *Mar.* xiv. 61, 62. *John* viii. 58, 59. *Rev.* i. 8. 17, 18.

The Apostles speak of him in such a Style as will admit of no Ambiguity. Such as, *the Lord from Heaven*, the *great God*, the *true God*, the *only Lord God*, and *over all God blessed for ever.*

To him are given the essential Perfections of God. See *John* ii. 19. x. 18. *Matt.* ix. 4. xviii. 20. xxviii. 20. *Heb.* i. 13. 1 *Cor.* xv. 27, 28.

In a Word, whatever hath already been urged for the Divinity of the Son of God, is by Vertue of his personal Union with our Nature true of the *Man Christ Jesus*; who when in the *Form* of the meanest *Servant* was still as truly in the *Form* of *God*, and thought it not Robbery to be equal *with God.*

But as there have been Objections against the Texts here produced, or others to the same Effect, I shall lay down two or three general Reflections, which may shew the Reasonableness of receiving such Passages in their natural Signification, and the Vanity of those Shifts, which draw after them a Train of as gross Consequences as any of those imaginary ones, which they are pretended to be called in for necessary Remedies against.

1. Then, the Importance of any Doctrine, and our Obligation to receive it, we cannot better judge

of, than by the Frequency, the Solemnity, and the Variety of Methods made use of for inculcating it. Let us see how far this appears to be the Case of the Articles now under Consideration. Had the Son and holy Spirit been only once or twice mentioned in Terms capable of giving some Countenance to the Belief of their Divinity, the Sense of those Texts might have been left to those governed by the more general Current of Scripture.

Had they the Names of *God* and *Lord* attributed often to them, but no where the peculiar Attributes of God, it being certain, that those Names are often understood figuratively, much might have been alledged for softening the supposed Harshness of such Expressions. Nay, on the other Hand, had those Perfections been ascribed to them, but the Names and Titles peculiar to God no where, a Jealousy for his Honour might have restrained us from placing the Name of God on them.

But now when every Writer, and the whole New Testament apply to the Son and Holy Ghost Titles peculiar to God alone; when the most literal Import of those Places is justified by the divine Excellencies affirmed of them, no less than of the Father, unprejudiced Men must believe it.

For sure the Apostles would not have taken so many several Ways for establishing them, were not these Articles essential Parts of the Christian Religion.

2. If the Scriptures are a Method of Instruction, designed for all Conditions and Capacities of Men, 'tis reasonable to think, that Care is taken to express Matters of the greatest consequence so, as the Subject would bear, consequently that either the Letter should not be forsaken, unless Necessity required it: Or else, that where no such Warning appears, Men should not be trepanned into Error by sticking to the natural Construction. But here we find it directly otherwise. For

For the Letter of the Scriptures naturally incline us to think the Son and Holy Ghost God, and to worship them with the Father; but if the Son and Holy Ghost be not by Nature God, then the whole Design of the Scriptures is evacuated, and that Idolatry, which God designed to destroy, established.

Let us then see whether any Provision hath been made against so dangerous an Error, as the literal Construction, upon this Supposition, must involve Men in. Were they sufficiently warned against this Sense by other Texts of Scripture, which inculcate the Unity of the Godhead? No; because those of the New Testament as well affirm the Unity of the Godhead, as the Distinction of Persons: And consequently the Acknowledgment of three divine Persons cannot be inconsistent with the Acknowledgment of one God.

Nor are our Adversaries Method of Construction a sufficient Warning for this Purpose; for these consisting of critical Niceties, are too full of Subtilty for the Vulgar to understand. I appeal then to any sober Judgment, whether it was the Part of prudent (not to say divinely inspired) Writers to express themselves so, as must defeat the great Aim of all revealed Religion, if their Words be taken in their most natural Sense; and ensnare the greatest Part of their Readers in Creature-worship.

In a word, whether in a Point of such Importance, their true Sense can be supposed to turn upon such Niceties, as can be no Preservative against Idolatry to the unlearned, who cannot understand them, and are so wretchedly trifling, as only provoke the Contempt of Men of Letters that do. Nor,

3. Have all their Evasions yet got over the Difficulties they find themselves pressed with from those Places, which give Command or Example for worshiping and praying to Christ, *John* xiv. 14. xv. 7. v. 23, *&c.* and therefore to justify our Compliance

in these Matters, a new Distinction hath been brought to our Relief. The Exaltation of our blessed Lord to God's right Hand, is made the Ground of our Adoration. But how? Not (as the Truth is) that his human Nature hath a Right to this by its inseparable Union with the divine, but that the pretended Man *Christ Jesus* is made a God by Office and Dignity; and a Creature in Consideration of exemplary Obedience is promoted to a Right of receiving that Homage, which is the incommunicable Prerogative of God. And thus do these Men make the New Testament lay the same Foundation for Idolatry with that of the *Pagan* Theology, which deified Men for their extraordinary Merits.

4. I observe, that if the Arguments brought against the literal Meaning of those Texts which declare for the Divinity of *Jesus*, prove any Thing at all, they prove too much. It strengthens our Interpretation, that those, with whom Christ conversed, understood his Words then, as we do now. See *John* v. 17, 18. vii. 58, 59. x. 31, 32, 33. *Matt.* xiv. 61, 62, 63, 64. The *Jews* in these Passages did not think that no more was intended by his being the *Son of God*, than being so by Office and Adoption; or by being *before Abram*, than only the eternal Decree of God to send him, or *one with the Father*, but by Consent.

Nor did Christ at any Time retract what he had said, or explain it in a different Sense. He suffered his Disciples to call and think him such a Son of God, as the *Jews* abhorred him for pretending to be; he frequently repeats such Professions himself; and he knew that they who believed these Declarations, would own him and worship him, as God; and they who did not, would detest him as an Impostor.

Suppose now that Christ was not truly God, how can we imagine it possible for God to adopt him, and

and to give such Testimony to a Person of this unparallelled Presumption, to such an Invader of his Prerogative.

Our Adversaries must either own him that very God they are so loth to confess, or not allow him to be that excellently good Man, which nothing but Obstinacy can, and yet their own Methods seem to make it so necessary for them to deny.

The *Jews* and *Gentiles* seem to act more consistently to their own Principles, in rejecting the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, yet have they by no Means been consistent with the Truth; nor indeed with their own Principles, as I will shew.

To begin with the *Jews* then. The Intimations of these Matters, which they seem to have had before the Preaching of the Gospel, and the exact Agreement of the Gospel with those Notions. And first as to the Trinity.

1. One Intimation of this kind hath been thought the Manner of the Old Testament so frequently expressing God by a Noun or Attributes in the plural, joined with a Verb in the singular Number. See *Gen.* i. 1. xx. 13. *Deut.* v. 26. *Josh.* xxiv. 13. *&c.* *Job* xxxv. 10. *Psal.* lviii. 12. cxlix. 2. *Isa.* liv. 5. *Jer.* x. 10, *&c.* Which though it does not infer more Gods than one, yet some have thought it a fair Hint for inferring more Persons in God than one.

That this is not a necessary Form of Speech they think appears from the singular Noun being used in these very Books. See *Deut.* xxxii. 15, 17.

Such Intimations again have those Texts been look'd upon to be, where God is introduced speaking in such Forms as these. *Let us make Man in our own Image. Let us go down and confound their Speech.*

Such likewise are those other, where Mention is made of God more than once in the same Text,

and under different Capacities; as *Jehovah raining down Fire upon Sodom from Jehovah. Jehovah ſending, and Jehovah ſent.* With ſundry others of the like Nature. Now the *Jews* own that the Word *Jehovah* is peculiar to God alone, and never applied to Creatures, though ever ſo excellent.

It hath been further obſerved, that the *Holy Spirit* is mentioned in the Old Teſtament as a Perſon; as when he is ſaid to *ſpeak by the Prophets to ſend the Meſſiah*, 2 *Sam.* xxiii. 2 *Iſa.* xlviii. 16. lxi. 1. And ſome learned *Jews* have underſtood the Beginning of *Geneſis* in this Senſe; expounding the *Spirit of God which moved upon the Face of the Waters*, not by *Air*, or *Wind*, but by ſaying, that this is the *Spirit of the Meſſiah the King*.

Once more, the ſame hath been ſuppoſed yet more fully intimated by ſeveral Places where the Name of God is thrice repeated. See *Pſal.* lxvii. 6, 7. *Deut.* vi. 4. *Jer.* xxxiii. 2. *Dan.* ix. 19, *&c.* As alſo by the Doxology of the Seraphim. *Iſa.* vi. 3. *Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hoſts.*

I would not lay more Weight upon theſe Intimations than they will fairly bear; but in what follows concerning the *Incarnation of the Son of God*, we have much better Ground to go upon. And here I will direct you to ſome Paſſages of the Old Teſtament undoubtedly belonging to the *Meſſiah*, and ſpeaking of him as very God, which are expreſly attributed to Jeſus in the New. Compare *Pſ.* ii. 7. xlv. 6, 7. cii. 25. with *Heb.* i. 4. to 10. *Pſ.* cxth is applied to Chriſt. *Heb.* i. 13. The third of *Malachi*, where *Jehovah* is ſaid to come to his Temple, confeſſed by the *Jews* to predict the *Meſſiah*, is applied to *Jeſus* by himſelf, St. *Mark*, and the Father of St. *John the Baptiſt*, *Luke* i. 76. The ancient Paraphraſts of the Old Teſtament ſay, the *World* was made by the *Word* of God. And St. *John* and St. *Paul* ſay the ſame, *John* i. 3.

Col. i. 16. The Paraphrasts say (*Onk. in Gen.* xvii. 7.) God made a Covenant between *Abram* and his Word; St. *Paul*, that the *Covenant was confirmed of God in Christ*. Compare *Numb.* xxi. 5, 6. with 1 *Cor.* x. 9. *Isa.* vi. 1. with *John* xii. 41. *Zech.* xii. 10. with *John* xix. 34. 37. *Isa.* viii. 14. xxviii. 16. with *Rom.* ix. 31, 32, 33. 1 *Pet.* ii. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

It is with great Propriety, that the Word is said by St. *John* σκηνῆν ἐν ἡμῖν to pitch his Tabernacle in us; and that Men are said to have beheld his Glory; and again, that *Jesus* calls his Body a *Temple*. All which allude to the *Jewish* Tabernacle and Temple, which was a Type of Christ.

Such is the Agreement between the Texts of the Old and New Testament, but whether there were the like Agreement between the then Synagogue, and the Christian Church, with Relation to the Sense of those Texts; as it cannot be directly proved, it seems very reasonable to form a Judgment upon probable Presumptions.

Now such a Presumption I take this to be, that the Evangelists expressed themselves in such Terms and Sense as were well understood at that Time. Particularly, that when St. *John* spoke of the Word as a Person, it is more credible that he adapted his Expressions to the then current Language of the *Jews*, than to any *Platonic* or Philosophical Scheme, which was so foreign to the Occasion of his Writing, when he had Zealots for the Law of *Moses* to deal with.

Whereas it hath been suggested, that the Authors who are alledged to speak in Favour of these Mysteries, are spurious, it seems but reasonable that this should be proved, as well as alledged; for 'tis an easy Way indeed of ending Controversies, if every Testimony should pass for forged, that makes against Men.

A greater

A greater Difficulty is the unanimous Oppoſition now made by the *Jews* againſt theſe Articles; all of them diſclaiming either a perſonal Diſtinction in God, or any more than a mere Man in their expected *Meſſiah*: And how ſuch a general Defection ſhould be from their former Principles, is not eaſy to be accounted for. But the Caſe ſeems to be the ſame too with regard to the Sufferings of the *Meſſiah*; yet theſe were fully ſignified by the Prophets, *Luke* xxiv. 46. *Matt.* xxiv. 54. Now it ſeems very difficult to conceive, that the antient Synagogue never took the Predictions of this Matter in their true Meaning: And yet it was thought in our Saviour's Time a good Anſwer to the Signification of his own Death. *We have heard out of the Law, that Chriſt abideth ever*, and how ſay'ſt thou, that *the Son of Man muſt be lifted up?*

But when the High Prieſt aſks *Jeſus* whether he were the *Chriſt*, the *Son of the bleſſed*, the latter of theſe Phraſes ſeems to ſay, that the Meſſiah was expected to be ſuch: And it ſeems probable to me, that he adjudged him guilty of Blaſphemy for aſſuming a Title, which they, who denied him to be the Chriſt, thought it the higheſt Impiety in him to pretend to: And for foretelling that he would one Day *come in the* Clouds of Heaven, (*Dan.* vii.) in a Manner which the Prophet *Daniel* had foretold, and as they underſtood the true *Meſſiah* ſhould do. And if this be ſo, the great imperceptible Change, which hath Matter of Fact in one of theſe Articles, cannot be a good Argument for not believing the like in the other.

Further yet: Tho' no ſuch Senſe of the antient Synagogue could be proved ſatisfactorily, yet if there were at leaſt ſuch Intimations of theſe Doctrines in the Old Teſtament, as when brought to a right Apprehenſion of by the preaching of the Apoſtles, they might then, (tho' they did not before)

per-

perceive the Truth and Congruity of these Doctrines by, this were enough for the main Thing I am contending for. It being evident, that those Articles cannot justify our Infidelity, which when seen in a clearer Light, and revealed more expresly, are so far from contradicting, as rather to illustrate what we knew before. Now the very sparing Discoveries of these Mysteries in the Old Testament might (very likely) be calculated for that People's Weakness, and particularly for their Proneness upon all Occasions to Idolatry. And therefore three Persons in one divine Substance, and a God in human Flesh, were Truths reserved for the Fulness of Time, till a long disuse of false Worship which the *Babylonish* Captivity seems to have purged them from, had rendered them capable of these Treasures of divine Knowledge.

II. I come now to shew these Doctrines are not repugnant to the natural Reason of the *Greeks*.

I might say, that it is sufficient, with regard to the *Trinity*, to observe, that the Nature of God surpassing all human Comprehension, we cannot precisely determine, and are therefore rash in pronouncing any Thing to be a Contradiction in this Matter. But I reckon it a further Advantage to this Doctrine, that some very learned Heathens have made Approaches to it under the Names of *One or Good*, *Mind or Cause*, and *Soul*. Sometimes called the *Soul of the World*, at other times the *Soul above the World*. The same have been again distinguished by *infinite Goodness*, *infinite Wisdom*, and *infinite Love*. But these Distinctions are not made to imply three different Principles, but as united in one common Principle, or universal Cause.

The *first* of these was said to be derived from none; the *second* to be derived from the *first*, the *third* from the other two. In the Production of the World, the *first* was the original Mover; the *second*

cond was Architect; the *third* was the Giver of Life. But ſtill all theſe was affirmed to have but one Operation, and all Things to be produced by the common Conſent of the three.

How they came by ſuch an Opinion is not known; but ſuch Notions of God could never have met with that Approbation they did, had thoſe Sages conceived a three-fold Subſiſtence in one divine Eſſence, to be that Impoſſibility and Nonſenſe, which ſome have ſince ſo roundly charged it with. Indeed, if this Matter be well looked into, theſe loud Complaints are applied in the wrong Place: For they do not ſo much affect the Doctrine itſelf, as the unwary, becauſe often too bold and fanciful Explanations. But they who diſtinguiſh the Revelations of God from the Notions of Men, and do not draw Conſequences from a rigorous Senſe of Words, will find themſelves eaſed of all that can pretend to ſhock their Reaſon. When we ſay there be three Perſons in God, we do not mean, that they are like three Perſons among Men; but we call them ſo, becauſe we know not how better to diſtinguiſh the different Relations in which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt ſubſiſt, than by calling God who ſuſtains this three-fold Capacity three Perſons, tho ſtill theſe be one and the ſame Will, one and the ſame Operation, one and the ſame Eſſence, we ſay theſe are intirely one, they muſt be ſo, for God is infinite in Perfection, and this can be but one, and can admit of no Degrees. The Difference therefore is not in the Subſtance, but in the Communication of that Subſtance. And thus, the firſt Perſon is the Father, the ſecond begotten of his Subſtance a Son, the third proceeding from the other two, the Holy Ghoſt. Regarded thus we can ſee a Priority of Order among them, as the Cauſe is more worthy than the Effect: Nor is there any ſeparate Exiſtence here; and therefore we ſee why our Lord ſhould

ſay,

say, *I and my Father are one*; the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost then are three, considered only in their personal Capacity, and in Relation to each other; but otherwise they are one, considered in common and as God; and therefore here can be no Contradiction, because they are never said to be three and one in the same Respect.

Then, Lastly, for the Incarnation of the Son, what is there in this repugnant to natural Reason? We do not assert a Conversion of the Godhead into Man; we hold no Confusion of Substance; or assert Christ to consist of two Persons; but we say, that the Nature of Man was here assumed by the Son of God, united to his own divine Nature, not by any Conjunction of Persons, but by the same Person subsisting now, in a Manner different from that in which he subsisted before. And is not that Being, which we confess almighty, able to chuse and to effect any Mode of Existence which his Wisdom pleases? And if he chuse Humanity, may not this human Nature taken to the divine make as truly one Person, as the immaterial Soul and the fleshly Body constitute one Man? Without Omnipotence this could not be effected; and the same Power may effect the other.

The Heathens had even some Notions of this Kind, and believed that upon some very solemn Occasions their Gods might and did come down to them in the *Likeness* of Men; as we may gather from the Men of *Lystra* attempting to sacrifice to *Barnabas* and *Paul*.

Having shewn the Credibility of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation of the Son of God*, I proceed,

III. To prove the *Satisfaction made for the Sins of Mankind, by the Sacrifice of the Death of that Son*, by shewing,

I. That this Doctrine is plainly delivered in the New Testament.

II. That

II. That it carries no ſuch Diſagreement to the Revelations of the Old Teſtament, or what we are able to collect of the Senſe of the ancient Synagogue, as ſhould render it Matter of juſt Offence to the *Jews*.

III. That it contains nothing repugnant to the Principles of common Reaſon.

That Chriſt did ſuffer and die, there is no Diſpute. The Controverſy therefore turns upon the End and Efficacy of his Death and Sufferings. To prove which, I will ſhew,

1. That Chriſt ſuffered and died for the Sins of Mankind.

2. That he ſo died as to be a *Sacrifice* for thoſe Sins.

3. That this Sacrifice of his was a full Propitiation and Satisfaction for Sin.

4. That this Sacrifice was offered, and this Satisfaction made upon the Croſs.

1. That Chriſt died for the Sins of Mankind is plain. See 1 *Pet.* iii. 18. iv. 1. 1 *John* iii. 16. *Rom.* v. 8. iv. 25. *Gal.* i. 4. *Heb.* ii. 9. 2 *Cor.* v. 14, 15. *Luke* xxii. 19, 20. *Matt.* xxvi. 28.

2. That this Death was a Sacrifice for Sin. See *Epheſ.* v. 2. *Heb.* ix. 26. x. 12. ix. 28. 1 *Pet.* ii. 24. 2 *Cor.* v. 21. *Gal.* iii. 13. *Rom.* viii. 3. For a more perfect Underſtanding of which Paſſages, it will be expedient to ſay ſomething of the Nature and Uſe of Sacrifices, and thoſe Notions which the World in general had, and they who underſtood them beſt were taught by God to entertain concerning them.

That Sacrifices were Acts of Religion is univerſally allowed. But whence this Practice grew, is not my preſent Buſineſs to enquire; nor am I now concerned to conſider any ſort of Sacrifices, but thoſe only which Men under the Reproaches of their own

own Minds, and dreading the fatal Consequences of having done amiss, were led to make use of, in Hopes to make Peace with an offended Deity.

What Foundation there was for any Hopes of this Kind we shall learn from the Opinion and Practice of the *Jews*; which being built upon a divine Revelation that could not deceive them; it is of great Consequence to know how they believed and acted upon this Occasion.

It seems to have been an avowed Principle among them, that by Sin all Men actually incurred the Punishment of Death: But that God appointed Sacrifices, which should remind them what he might inflict upon them, and what might avail for obtaining Pardon, by saving the Offender's Life, upon Payment of another Life at the Altar.

In the mean while, which Way the Sacrifice became instrumental in procuring the Offerers Forgiveness; and under what Capacity the Law look'd upon it, we may know, if we attend to the Rites and Ceremonies ordained to make the very Act of Oblation significant to this Purpose, and to some Rules and Expressions relating to that Matter; those especially that concerned Atonements.

1. Then 'tis observable that in all Sacrifices of Beasts, the Owner laid his Hands (*Levit.* i. 4, *&c.*) upon the Head of them, to signify his Property in what he offered, the transferring his Right to God, the devoting it to Death for the Purposes specified in the Law. All which were a Type of Christ's voluntary Death, and let us into the Importance of these Phrases, Christ *laid down his Life for us*, that he *gave himself for our Sins, offered his own Body for a Sacrifice.*

2. As the Oblation of Christ for the Sins of the World may be expected to have had the most clear Resemblances given of it in those among the *Jews*, which were esteemed of most powerful Efficacy: So

So 'tis natural to ſuppoſe, that the Laws concerning theſe ſhould be moſt expreſs, and that others of the ſame Kind ſhould be regulated by the ſame; upon theſe Accounts I preſume it very rational that the Ceremonies preſcribed for the Sin-Offering in the great Day of Atonement ſhould be a ſtanding Rule (as far as the different Circumſtances of Perſons and Occaſions would admit) of Sin-Offerings in general.

Now there we find in the Law of the *Scape-Goat*, this Rite of laying on of Hands enjoined. See *Levit.* xvi. 21, 22.

Now the ſolemn Confeſſion of Faults in this Paſſage mentioned, is enjoined in private Treſpaſſes, *Levit.* v. 5, *&c.* And a Rule thence eſtabliſhed, that upon ſuch occaſional Sacrifices no Sin was forgiven that had not been confeſſed. And in the Service of the great Atonement, the ſame Ceremony of laying on of Hands and putting Iniquities on the Head of the Sacrifices was conſtantly practiſed, no leſs than in the Office of the Scape-Goat. Tho' theſe be not ſo punctually mentioned, nor any where ſo fully expounded as in the Laws about the latter. The confeſſion of Sin was made even at thoſe Sacrifices on which Hands were never laid; and that was therefore neceſſary to be particularly commanded in thoſe Inſtances to ſhew that Confeſſion God would never diſpenſe with, though he diſpenſed with Offerings more coſtly. But in the Sacrifice of Beaſts there was leſs Need to be particular, becauſe thus much was implied in laying the Hands on the Head of theſe Sacrifices.

3. 'Tis obſervable, that the Bodies of thoſe Beaſts offered on theſe Occaſions were burnt without the Gate of *Jeruſalem*; that every Perſon was unclean that touched them, till he was purified.

The Reaſon of which Ordinances muſt be reſolved at laſt into thoſe Sacrifices being charged with the Sins

Sins of the People, from the instant that the People were discharged of them, and consequently the same Blemish rested upon the Body of the Beast now, which rested upon the Person before.

4. All Offerings of this Kind were to be performed by the Priests as a Branch of their sacerdotal Function. Those of which any Part might be eaten, were eaten by the Priests. And even the most servile Offices about those of the Day of Atonement lay upon the High-Priest alone. The Meaning whereof the Law has given us some Insight into, *viz.* that *God gave it them to bear the Iniquity of the Congregation to make Atonement for them before the Lord.* Thus were they mediators between God and his People; and by feasting on that which expiated Sin, did constructively both take the Sin upon themselves, testify the abolishing of the Guilt by the Consumption of the Sacrifice, and express their Joy for God's Acceptance of it. In the mean while, God would not accept some Atonements but from the High-Priest.

5. To all which it makes greatly for my present Argument, that the main Reason assigned by the Law why the *Israelites* were forbidden to feed upon Blood relates to this manner of Sacrifices. See *Levit.* xvii. 11, 12.

By these five Observations we plainly discover the wondrous Elegance of the prophetic Style, in which God is said *to lay* on Christ *the Iniquity of us all:* That *he bore our Sins in his own Body on the Tree:* That *he was made Sin and a Curse for us, that this Man being a Priest must of Necessity have somewhat to offer, and that God prepared him a Body for this Purpose:* That *his Soul was made an Offering for Sin; that we have Redemption through his Blood,* and the like. These Terms are of a peculiar Energy, and being used to Men who worship God by Sacrifices, they could not upon their own

Principles but be underſtood to imply, that the Perſon who is thus declared to ſuffer and die for us, did not die only for our Benefit, but in our ſtead; by a proper ſacrifical Subſtitution of one Life for others.

For nothing leſs than this fills the Ideas of thoſe Terms of Art. Thoſe Phraſes which are otherwiſe jejune and mean, but in their proper Senſe and true Extent, do prove his Death in the ſtricteſt Acceptation of the Word a Sacrifice. Conſequently that Death was more than a Pattern of Patience, or an Inſtrument of Pardon ſo very remote, as the Confirmation of a Doctrine that publiſhed Remiſſion of Sins. For what had Chriſt peculiar to himſelf in either of theſe Reſpects? His Death was thus a Martyrdom, but how can we call it a Sacrifice? The Honour of preaching and confirming with their Lives the ſame Doctrine, was common to the Apoſtles and other Martyrs, yet theſe were never ſaid to be ſacrificed for us. Whence then is this Peculiarity of Expreſſion applied to *Jeſus* only? Why becauſe he died that Men might not ſin, and he died becauſe they had ſinned. And the Deſtruction of Sin and the Salvation of Souls were the ſure Effects of his Death. Which brings me,

3. To prove, that Chriſt was not only a real and proper Oblation and Sacrifice, but ſuch a one as is a perfect Satisfaction for the Sins of Men.

In order to which, I will,

1. Conſider the Terms in which it hath been expreſſed. And

2. The Arguments made Uſe of to prove the Efficacy and Perfection of this Sacrifice.

As to the Terms, the Scripture uſes great Variety of Language to repreſent the diſmal Conſequences of Sin: So that we are then warranted to depend upon the Means employed for taking theſe away, as ſufficient for that Purpoſe, when their Effects too are

expreſſed

expressed in Terms proportioned and directly opposite to each of these Mischiefs respectively.

Now sometimes Sin is mentioned as that which leaves a Blemish upon the Soul. And then the Words which import sanctifying, purifying, and cleansing, are used. See *Rev.* i. 5. 1 *John* i. 7. *Heb.* ix. 14. x. 29. And this Sanctification is owing to the *Offering of the Body of Jesus Christ.* (*Heb.* x. 9, 10. *Tit.* ii. 14. 1 *Cor.* vi. 9, 10, 11.)

Sometimes Sin is described as the Sore, Sickness, and Death of the Soul. And then we are said to be *healed by his Stripes*; to be *quickened by him, when dead in Trespasses*, and *to live in him who died for us.*

Sometimes Sinners are spoken of as at a Distance from, and in Enmity with God. And then they who were Strangers *are said to be nigh by the Blood of Christ.* See *Ephes.* ii. 15, 16. *Col.* i. 20, 21, 22.

Sometimes Sinners are said to be Debtors to the Justice of God, and then their Deliverance is expressed by a Release or Rescue from that Rigour by Christ. See *Matt.* xx. 28. 1 *Tim.* ii. 6. *Gal.* iii. 13. *Heb.* ix. 12. And thus we are exhorted to consider ourselves as Persons *bought with a Price*, viz. *the precious Blood of Christ.*

Thus, lastly, Christ is said to *put away Sin by the Sacrifice of himself.* Agreeably to which Saint *Paul* says, that in him we have *Redemption through his Blood, even the Remission of Sins.*

At other Times, the Phrases relating to this Matter, are such as directly answer to the Sacrifices under the Law, and the Methods then enjoined for keeping Men upon good Terms with God. See *John* i. 29. 1 *Pet.* i. 19. 1 *Cor.* v. 7. *Rom.* iii. 25. From which Places it appears, that God hath accepted the Death of Christ as a Satisfaction to his Justice.

But we have other Proofs that shew the Sufficiency of this Sacrifice. As

1. Thus much is intended by all those Passages, which extol the Innocence and Excellency of Christ's Person. See 1 *Pet.* ii. 22. *Heb.* vii. 27. 2 *Cor.* v. 21. 1 *Pet.* iii. 18. i. 19, 20.

2. The same is a necessary Consequence of this Sacrifice being so often said to have been offered *once*, and *once for all*, and to have perfected for ever them that are sanctified by it. Whereas the continual Repetition of the legal Sacrifices was rather a Remembrance, than any Abolition of Sins.

3. The like is to be gathered from those Texts which attribute to this Sacrifice such powerful Effects as no other could prevail for; and assign a peculiar Excellence to it, as the Reason of that Difference between them. See *Heb.* x. 4. ix. 13, 14. ix. 23, *&c.*

The utmost Operation of any other Sacrifices was but to rescue Men from temporal Punishments, and this only in some Instances: But the Excellence of this Sacrifice is farther magnified by the Extent of it. See 1 *Tim.* i. 15. *John* iii. 16. *Acts* xiii. 30.

Lastly. The present Point is not only established by those Texts which speak of the great Benefits accruing to Men, but of those others, which mention the Acceptance and great Recompence this Sacrifice found with God. See *Heb.* v. 7, 8, 9. vii. 25. *Phil.* ii. 9. *Eph.* v. 2. *Heb.* x. 19, 20.

IV. This Sacrifice and Satisfaction was made on the Cross.

This is evident enough, but in regard the Levitical Œconomy, particularly the Service of their yearly Atonement, is the Plan upon which St. *Paul* forms the main of his Argument for proving this Matter to the *Jews:* And in regard that Argument of his hath been made a Pretence for placing the Oblation of Christ's Blood on our Behalf elsewhere,

where, than upon the Cross, let us enquire into the Circumstances of that Expiation ordained for the *Jews*, and observe the Correspondence in which our Saviour acted to it.

Now God on this extraordinary Occasion had expressly provided, that the Sacrifices then to be offered for Atonement should be slain by the High Priest, *Lev.* xvi. 11. xv. 14, 15. that the Blood should be brought by him into the Holy of Holies; that he should not go without it at any Time, *Exod.* xxx. 10. *Lev.* xvi. 10. *Heb.* ix. 7. nor with it, but once a Year; that Part of the Blood should be sprinkled upon the Mercy Seat; that he should afterwards sanctify the Altar before the Lord by putting some of the Blood upon it; and lastly, that after the Ceremonies of the Scape-Goat were performed, the Bodies of the Bullock and Goat slain for the Sin-offering should be burnt without the Camp. *Lev.* xvi. 18. 19. 28. 29.

Now the Apostle to the *Hebrews* argues that these Things were a Figure of Christ, and accomplished in him. See *Heb.* ix. x. That the Death of those Beasts prefigured his Death for the like Purposes: That the Service of the High Priest resembled the Exercise of his sacerdotal Office in that sacrifical Act of offering himself; the Holy of Holies, and an earthly Sanctuary, into which *Aaron* and his Successors entered, was a Shadow of the Heaven of Heavens, and the glorious Presence of God into which Christ entered after the slaying of this Sacrifice; that as the Priest was not admitted into the former without the Blood of others, so he qualified his human Nature for an Entrance into the latter by the offering his own Blood: That each of these entered and acted throughout this whole Process under a public Character, and as sustaining the Person of all those whom they represented: Who therefore vertually and potentially entered with each of them:

And finally, that the burning the Sin-offering without the Camp, anſwers to Chriſt's Suffering without the Gate of *Jeruſalem*.

The Queſtion now is, in which of theſe Acts the Oblation and expiatory Sacrifice conſiſted; which muſt be in ſhedding the Blood, which was ſlaying the Beaſt before the Altar after it had been devoted and prepared for Sacrifice by ſolemn Prayers.

The bringing of that Blood into the holy Place, appears (ſtrictly ſpeaking) not to be an Oblation then made, but the Repreſentation of one already made. The High Prieſt might not enter the Sanctuary without Blood, becauſe God will have no Communion with Sinners, whoſe Pollution remains upon them. The bringing in that Blood, opened him an Entrance into the holy Place, ſignifying the Atonement actually made. The ſprinkling it before the Mercy-Seat, was a Token of Peace and Acceptance, and ſeems therefore very emphatically called *reconciling the holy Place, and the Tabernacle and the Altar*. Levit. xvi. 20. And the entire Conſumption of thoſe Beaſts by Fire without the Camp, denoted the taking clean away thoſe Sins for which they had been ſacrificed, ſo that no Part of the Guilt or Puniſhment remained among the People, who had been ſanctified and reconciled to God by their Death.

See now, how the Apoſtle draws this Parallel, when Writing to the *Hebrews*, who were qualified to judge of the Strength of his Diſcourſe, and the Pertinence of his Applications; yet theſe are the Men he addreſſes himſelf to, in Diminution of the Moſaical, and for advancing the Chriſtian Sacrifice. See *Heb.* ix. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26.

From theſe Places it is plain, that Chriſt at his Death ſtood in the Place of the Sin-offering on the great Day of Atonement.

That

That there was a Resemblance between the Circumstances of those Sacrifices sufficient to convince the *Jews* that the ultimate End of both was the same, and the former an Image of the latter: Only with this Allowance, that Christ being Priest and Sacrifice both, he was typified under this two-fold Character; in some Respects by the Beast slain, in others by the Person that slew it. As the *Priest*, he both entered himself, and opened a Passage to others into the holiest of all, in vertue of the Atonement made by that Blood, which made him a *Sacrifice*.

That this Oblation of the Blood was made but once, correspondent to the Rites observed in the Levitical Expiation; that his Suffering without the Gate answered to the burning of the Bodies without the Camp, which was the concluding Ceremony of the Service of Atonement: Consequently, when this Suffering was over, the Atonement was also over, as well in one, as in the other Case.

But now it is not possible to reconcile all this with the Notion of Christ's Oblation made in Heaven. For what is there in his Ascent thither, or Continuance in the Presence of his Father of an expiatory Nature? What, that is not more properly a Reward deserved by the Things he had done before than any new or meritorious Act of his own? What, which we are able to render any Account of in Congruity with the *Jewish* Expiations, and the Scriptures, where this Matter is professedly treated of, unless we understand his Oblation and Satisfaction for Sin antecedent to it? Does not the Analogy drawn by St. *Paul* infer this? Do not *Jesus* his own Words upon the Cross, *it is finished*, in a very probable Construction declare it? But we have other Arguments to determine us. We have the Reason of the Thing, the Relation it bears to its Types under the Old Testament, the various Ways of expressing the Efficacy of this Sacrifice in the

New, which carry no Alluſion to thoſe Types; St. *Paul* telling the *Coloſſians* that our *Peace was by the Blood of the Croſs*, and to that Croſs *Chriſt nailed the Hand-writing that was againſt us.*

And no body ſure need be told, that 'till Satisfaction was made, and the Ranſom accepted, neither could the Obligation we lay under to the Curſe of the Law (which is implied in the former of thoſe Expreſſions) be cancelled; nor the Enemies of Souls to whom ſinful Mankind were become a Prey be conquered and diſpoſſeſſed, which ſeems to be intended by the latter.

And therefore, we ſhall do well to underſtand thoſe Texts, which ſpeak of Chriſt's eternal Prieſthood, and the Exerciſe of that Character in Heaven, not of any Oblation of himſelf for the Sins of Men properly made there, but rather of that other Branch of the Character, which is imploy'd in Bleſſing and Interceſſion; which he makes not in a ſuppliant Way, but in a Method becoming the Majeſty of a glorified Saviour, and therefore ſo the Aſker as to be at the ſame Time *the Author* of eternal Salvation to all for whom he intercedes.

In one Word, the Notion of his Prieſthood infers a Sacrifice: The Eternity of that Prieſthood implies the Unity of his Sacrifice: The Unity of that Sacrifice is a Mark of that Excellence; and that ſuch Excellence, as it muſt needs have wanted, had it not been a ſufficient Satisfaction for Sin. Which Satisfaction, though declared and atteſted to by other after Acts ſuited to the Continuance of an unchangeable Prieſthood, was yet really made by the voluntary ſhedding of Chriſt's Blood upon the Croſs.

Having ſhewn that the Satisfaction made for the Sins of Mankind by the Sacrifice of Chriſt is a Doctrine plainly delivered in the New Teſtament, and conſequently that it ought to be believed by *Chriſtians:* I come, II. To

II. To shew, that it carries no such Disagreement to the Revelations of the Old Testament, or what we are able to collect of the Sense of the ancient Synagogue, as should render it Matter of just Offence to the *Jews*.

In order to which, I shall consider,

1. Whether the Sacrifice of Christ be that only perfect Sacrifice, of which the legal of old were Types and Shadows. And

2. Whether it can be made appear from the Writings of the Old Testament, that the *Messiah* was to suffer for the Sin of others.

The former I have already considered,

I only add now, that when we call the *Levitical* Sacrifices, Types and Shadows, I do not mean they had no Efficacy upon the Parties concerned, for 'tis sure they had some, though not so much as the *Jews* fancied. For the due adjusting this Matter, it will be necessary to consider, that the Guilt and Impurities by which that Law was violated, are represented as exposing the Offenders to Inconveniences of two different Sorts.

By the one they became obnoxious to the Wrath of God in this and a future State, and had their Consciences defiled.

By the other they fell under a legal Incapacity of civil Converse among, or religious Communion with their Brethren.

Now the latter of these was effectually removed by the Sacrifices assigned to expiate for Uncleanness; whereby Men forfeited all Right to those Privileges and Ordinances, which God had made the Mark of his peculiar People.

But for the former, the Purging of the Conscience, this was reserved for a yet more powerful Sacrifice, which the Blood shed in others did represent, and in this Capacity was acceptable for; look then upon those Sacrifices as Conditions of civil

civil and ecclesiastical Communion, and they had a present Efficacy; but look upon them as reconciling Sinners to God, and averting spiritual Punishments, and they were typical, having no Power but in Vertue of their Antitype, which was Christ. And indeed the then Church of God being a *Shadow of good Things to come*, even those Advantages, which Sacrifices did preserve or restore, bore some Regard to the Rewards and Punishments of another State; and they had much of Figure and Prospect of Futurity, even in those Things, where they had most of Force for securing some present Good.

2. That the *Messiah* was to suffer and die for the Sins of the World, and to reconcile Men to God, might be established upon the Foot of those many Prophecies applied to the Death of *Jesus*, and the Circumstances of it. See *John* xiii. 18. *Matt.* xxvi. 31. xxvi. 53, 54, 55, 56. xxvii. 35. *John* xix. 23, 24. *Mark* xv. 27, 28. *John* xix. 28, 29, 30. *Psal.* lxix. 22. *Luke* xxiv. 26, 27. 44, 45, 46.

But the End and Effect of those Sufferings which make the principal Part of our Enquiry, are most expresly signified by the two remarkable Prophecies of *Daniel* and *Isaiah*. See *Dan.* ix. and *Isa.* liii.

And now let any sober Interpreter of Scripture say, whether a set of Phrases so significant in the *Old*, and made such Use of by the Writers of the *New* Testament, can with any Colour of Reason be imagined not to carry that Sense I am contending for.

'Tis indeed out of Question, that the false Expectations the *Jews* had conceived of a temporal *Messiah*, have greatly blinded their Eyes in this Dispute, and particularly in the Articles relating to his Sufferings and Death; yet several of their own Authors declare, that the liii[d] of *Isaiah* had been so interpreted antiently by many of their *Rabbies*, and that their Interpretation was right. And

And thus I think I have proved, that the Christian Doctrine concerning the Sacrifice and Satisfaction for Sin in the Death of the Son of God, imports no such Disagreement, either with the Revelations of the Old Testament, or with the Collections we are able to make of the Sense of the antient Synagogue, as should render it Matter of just Offence to the *Jews*.

III. I come now to consider that it contains nothing repugnant to common Reason and the Nature of Things.

And here I would first ask what Contrariety to Principles already received, could be alledged by the antient *Greeks* for their so irreconcileable Aversion to this Doctrine. Sacrifice was esteemed the most essential Part of their Religion. Was it that we declare the Sins of them in whose Behalf our Sacrifice was offered to have been charged upon the Sacrifice itself? No; for their own Historians assign this Reason, why many Nations held it unlawful to eat the Head of any Beast, because they were wont by that significant Ceremony of laying their Hands on the Head of Beasts to be sacrificed to transfer their Guilt, and so render that Part polluted and execrable. Was it that the Life of one Creature is most absurdly imagined to be given and accepted in Exchange for another? Nor this, for they were wont to imprecate upon their Sacrifices whatever Mischiefs they confessed their own Wickedness to have deserved, and to their shedding their Blood, imputed their Pardon. Was it that the putting one Man to Death for other Men, was new and hateful for its Barbarity? Not so neither, for many *Pagans* dealt in human Sacrifices. Was it the unparallelled Extremity of our Saviour's Sufferings that gave them Offence? No; because they themselves, upon emergent Occasions, put the Persons they sacrificed to the most exquisite Torment.

Did

Did the Excellence or Innocence of *Jesus* check them? How should it be, when they sacrificed the most unblemished Virgins, and noble Youths, and such as were of extraordinary Virtue, Beauty, and Family. Was the voluntary Offering of such a good Man's own self for the Benefit of the Public, a Doctrine uncouth to them? I appeal to prophane Story, what immortal Glory so generous an Action was thought to merit, and how beneficial to those for whom these heroic Souls so magnanimously, so charitably devoted their own Persons. Lastly, was it a Contradiction that a Person esteemed divine, should suffer Death, or that any who had actually died, should be worshipped with divine Honours? The Absurdity of this Objection hath been sufficiently exposed, and the very ill Grace with which it needs must come from them, who worshipped *Saturn* and *Bacchus*, *Hercules* and *Æsculapius*, and many others.

From all which the *Greeks* of old ought not to have called that *Foolishness* in our Religion, which they had the Confidence to applaud for Wisdom in their own.

But yet let no Man from hence imagine, that the Doctrine of Christ's Sacrifice and Satisfaction can need the Ignorance and Errors, the Prejudices or Superstitions of the *Heathen* to keep it in Countenance. Even they who profess the strictest Reverence for the one true God, who in Tenderness to his Honour have boggled to embrace this Doctrine have not as yet shewed, that it bears hard upon that absolute Dominion, Righteousness and Goodness of a supreme, just and merciful Being, which all Christians ought to acknowledge as first Principles.

The Sovereignty and Dominion of God, it hath been said, will sufficiently account for laying upon Christ the Sufferings he sustained, which therefore will be looked upon as mere Afflictions, and the

Effect

Effect of a Creator's Right over his own Creature. That the considering these as Punishments, is neither warranted by any Arguments capable of being drawn from Sacrifices, nor agreeable to that Justice of God, which forbids us to suppose any innocent Person punished by him; nor would these Sufferings even thus be a Satisfaction for the Sins of others, since nothing less can avail for this Purpose, than enduring the same in Quality and Degree, which the Offenders themselves were obnoxious to: And when it does avail, the Release must be absolute, without leaving the Party satisfied for under any future Conditions of attaining the Benefit accruing by that Satisfaction. But Christ was innocent, and therefore could not so be a Sacrifice, as to bear the Punishment of Sin: And what he did bear, neither was that Punishment which Sinners owe to God's offended Justice, nor does it so restore them to God's Favour, but that they may by failing in their Duty be still in no Degree the better for it. And therefore this Sacrifice is not a true and proper Satisfaction.

The Force of this Argument shall be considered in the following Particulars, and then I shall conclude this Point.

1. Then, admitting that it were never so reasonable to resolve the Sufferings of Christ into the Dominion of a Creator over his own Creature; I would ask whether the Innocence and Excellence of his Person, which are objected against our esteeming those Sufferings a Punishment, may not equally be objected against the inflicting them by Vertue of that Dominion?

No, say our Adversaries, because this offers no Violence to the Justice of God, which is blasphemed, when a Person, perfectly innocent, is represented as an Object of God's vindictive Power; but not so, when the same Person is made the Object

ject of his sovereign, and merely afflicting Power. But is not infinite Goodness as essential to the divine Nature, as infinite Justice? And can it consist with this Perfection to use an absolute Power to the grieving an innocent Person? The Sufferings in themselves are still the same, by whatsoever Name you call them. And it is not a nice Distinction between Punishment and Affliction, that can alter the Nature of the Thing. The same Innocence therefore, which with regard to the Justice of God is said to forbid our believing Christ to have suffered in the Way of Punishment, seems, in Regard to the Goodness of God, with equal Reason to forbid his Suffering at all. And the Refuge taken in God's absolute Dominion assaults us with Difficulties as great in one Way, as in the other.

So that some other Method must be found out, agreeable to that Harmony of the divine Excellencies, which never so proceeds in God's Dealings with any of his Creatures, as to save the Honour of any one Attribute by acting in Prejudice of any other.

And such Agreement we conceive there is in punishing the Son of God for the Sins of Men. For the clearing whereof I proceed to observe,

2. That the proper Distinction between Afflictions and Punishments seems to be founded in the impulsive Cause, and the End of them. It is not pretended, that all Sufferings have in Strictness the Nature of Punishments: Nor can those have that fall upon a Person wholly innocent, and therefore must be mere Afflictions: But when Sufferings are undergone for Sin, when they plainly signify God's Intention of making those Offences exemplary, in order either to reclaim the Guilty, or deter others, or to vindicate the Honour of his Laws. In such Cases they have the proper Nature of Punishments. Now we read in Scripture, that Christ *died for our Sins,*

Sins, that *he died for all, that they which live should not live unto themselves*, but *be crucified with Christ, and live unto him who died for them.* Thus have we Sin the plain impulsive *Cause*, and the reclaiming Men from Sin, the End of our Saviour's Sufferings.

3. Whereas it hath been urged against the Argument taken from Sacrifices, that it can be but of little Weight, both because the transferring of Guilt from the Man, to the Beast, was not real, and because the Creature sinning and the Creature suffering were of different Kinds. The Objection is insufficient in both Parts. The Intent and Efficacy of the Levitical Sacrifices I have already explained; and what Sense the rest of Mankind had of this Way is known. 'Tis true, the Expiation of the Guilt was, in regard of the then Sacrifices, made in Appearance only, because tho' the Translation of that Guilt was so far real, as to discharge the Person offering; yet what was thus discharged fell upon the Beast mediately only, but ultimately upon Christ typified by the Beast slain. And of this they seemed to have some Intimation in God's accepting Sacrifices differing in Kind from the Persons, of whose Pardon they were appointed the Instruments; while he reserved the Work of an universal Atonement for the one offering of the same Kind with Sinners. Now this was the Condition of Christ's Sacrifice, and therefore of his only, because his only was a perfect Sacrifice. As the Benefit of his Sufferings is ours, so the Nature in which he suffered was ours. The Punishment of Sins laid upon him, was the Punishment not of any one Man, but of human Nature, that had sinned. Consequently the Advantage of his Death must regard all of that Nature, in which he died. In Vertue hereof he suffered as the Representative of Mankind, the Person of the Son of God subsisting in the Nature of Man. And this makes Way for an Answer to

the next Queſtion, Whether Sufferings could be agreeable to that Juſtice, which forbids us to ſuppoſe an innocent Perſon capable of being puniſhed by God. For,

4. Here we muſt diſtinguiſh between the ſame Perſon conſidered by himſelf, and when repreſenting others. Since ſuch a one's Innocence, though it renders him incapable of Puniſhment ſtrictly ſo called in the former of theſe Reſpects, yet hinders not why he may not be a juſt Object in the latter; becauſe the Law looks altogether upon his repreſentative Capacity. Conſequently if they in whoſe Place he ſtands be guilty, the Recompence due to that Guilt is devolved upon his Proxy. And the Queſtion is, whether it be juſt to admit of Proxies; and that ſuch a Proceeding is reaſonable, appears from the general Practice of Mankind, from the Hints we have of it from divine Inſtitution, and the concurrent Senſe of them who had not the ſame Intimations from God in the Caſe.

The general Practice of Mankind is beſt diſcerned by their Laws, which as they hardly make Guilt and Puniſhment ſo exactly of the ſame Extent, as not to involve ſome others in ſuffering, who are allied to the Offender; ſo it is ſure, the moſt civilized Nations have thought it no Hardſhip to include others by their own Conſent. Nay the Law of Nations put Hoſtages in War to Death, though the Breaches of Faith, by which they ſuffer, neither be their own Act, or even done with their Knowledge.

Moſes forbid any but *clean* Beaſts to be brought to the Altar; yet the Bodies of theſe Beaſts were pronounced unclean, from the Inſtant of their being Sacrifices for Sin. The *Heathen* too choſe Perſons of moſt unblemiſhed Character for Sacrifices, yet when once devoted, they loaded them with all Marks of Horror and Deteſtation. So far hath it been from a general Imagination, that either

human

human, or divine Laws were represented as unjust, when they have been said not necessarily to confine Punishment to the Offender's own Person, but to allow a Commutation of Sufferings.

Now for the Equity of such Procedure there seems to be but three Things necessary,

1. That the Party give his Consent.

2. That he hath a Right thus to dispose of himself.

3. That the Ends of Punishment be answered by such transferring of it.

Suppose Consent, and the Party suffering cannot receive Wrong; suppose full Power of giving that Consent, and no other Party receives Wrong; suppose the Ends of penal Laws are served by such an Expedient, and the Public receives no Wrong. Of the two *former* there is not so great a Question; but it will be necessary to say something to the last.

The Necessity of Punishments proceeds from a Necessity of Laws. And hence Penalties are proportioned not merely according to the Nature of the Fact, but according to the ill Consequences of it. The better then any Laws are, the more necessary to be observed, and the more excellent the Person whose Authority is injured, the more needful is a public Reparation for such Breaches of Duty.

But all these shew how reasonable it is, that God should require Satisfaction for Indignities offered him, who desires it no farther than it brings the Guilty to a due Sense of their Fault, discourages the like Violations, or vindicates the Honour of his Government.

Now hence it follows, that if these Views can be attained by an Equivalent from another Hand, nothing forbids such Compensation. And as the Reverence for Laws is the true Aim of Punishments in general, as the Detriment sustained directs the Measure of Punishments in particular, so is the Prospect

of promoting the one, and preventing the other, a ſufficient Ground of accepting the Subſtitution of one, in the Room of him, who was guilty.

Apply this now to the Redemption of Mankind by the Death of *Jeſus Chriſt*. And ſee and adore the Wiſdom, Equity, Condeſcenſion, and Mercy of *his bearing the Sins of many*. See *Heb.* ii. 14, 15, 16, 17.

Next, it was entirely his own Inclination and Conſent. He ſuffered, becauſe he choſe to ſuffer: To a Mind therefore thus diſpoſed, thoſe Sufferings were no Injury.

And this makes good the *ſecond* Qualification mentioned in a vicarious Puniſhment: Right in the ſuffering Party to give ſuch Conſent.

Again: The Ends of Puniſhment were likewiſe hereby fully ſatisfied. For as the Dignity of the Party provoked, and the Goodneſs of the Laws violated aggravated the Offence, ſo the Severity of the Puniſhment, and the Excellence of the Perſon ſuſtaining it, do raiſe the Value of the Compenſation.

But *5thly*, 'tis urged againſt all our Reaſonings upon Chriſt's bearing our Puniſhment, and ſo ſatisfying for our Sin, that this cannot be, becauſe he never underwent the Puniſhment in Kind, which the Wicked muſt have endured themſelves. True, for thoſe Puniſhments, which make the Sinners Hell, are the reſult of perſonal Guilt, and could not fall upon an innocent and divine Perſon, ſo neither were they neceſſary to the accompliſhing Chriſt's Deſign. For beſides that, the temporal Sufferings of ſuch a one out-weighed even the eternal ones of all Mankind, we muſt conſider, that God as the injured Party, and ſupreme Governour, had a Right to appoint ſuch Satisfaction as he thought fit, and would ſuffice for the Purpoſes of Satisfaction. And this was as compleatly done by Chriſt, as if he had

ſuffered

suffered the Miseries of the Damned: Nay more compleatly, for as our Lord's Death is fitted to work in us a just Sense of our Offences, so it was no less needful, that his Resurrection should give us the comfortable Assurance of his not dying in vain. All which is of Importance to be considered, because it furnishes an Answer to the last Objection.

6. Which pretends the asserting Christ's Sacrifice for Sin to be inconsistent with the Doctrine of God's free Grace, and the Benefit of this Satisfaction being still left conditional, both which are acknowledged to be so plainly delivered in Scripture.

Now this Objection takes its Rise from want of duly distinguishing between a personal, and a vicarious Punishment; where Men themselves undergo a Penalty equal to their Crime, no more can be required of them. But where a Penalty is incurred, by which the Deserts of the Malefactor are never equalled. In such a Case, if God accepts the Punishment of another instead of the Offender's own, it is no Derogation to his Mercy to suspend so vast a Benefit upon what Terms he thinks fit; and the same Ends of Government, which require such a Satisfaction, may be supposed to limit it, to whom and how he pleases. That God gave his Son, and that this Son gave himself to die for the Salvation of Men's Souls, was great Grace. That the effectual Rescue of these Souls should depend at last upon Faith and Obedience to such Laws, as vindicate the Honour of God, reform the Manners of Men, and tend to their Happiness, is still the Effect of Grace: That Christ should merit for us those Assistances, by which we are inabled to perform the Conditions of Salvation, and that we should be saved at last, and our imperfect Services rewarded for the sake of this suffering Redeemer, is a Grace worthy of God. So that here can be no Ground for complaint. For is it so, that a holy God hath

taken care to prevent the Practice of it in our own Persons, as well as to make the Punishment of it exemplary in the Person of Christ? Is it so, that he hath not proclaimed a Liberty to all manner of Licentiousness, by making this Redemption absolute? We see how far the Method already chosen is from taking away Wickedness out of the World, what must then have been the Consequence, had Men been left lawless, and secure? Would it be for the Advantage of so unspeakable a Mercy to have it obtruded upon rational Creatures? And is it not a Reparation due to so highly provoked, and yet so good a God, that his Justice should be glorified in the Ruin of those Wretches, who will not glorify his Mercy by their own Endeavours to be happy? Upon other Terms the Laws of God must have been exposed to bold Defiance.

Nor is it indeed in the Nature of a vicarious Punishment to have the Matter otherwise. The Sacrifices both of the *Jews* and *Gentiles* were all understood to imply Mercy in the Acceptance, Sorrow for past Faults, and better Care for the future. The Rigour of the Law is not executed, except in the very Letter of the Sanction. And since this ordained every Malefactor's own Death, all short of that is the Lawgiver's departing from his Right. And he who does so, must be at Liberty to do it upon what Conditions he pleases, and he is good and merciful in taking up with any Thing less than the Forfeiture in Kind; for any Thing but that is in Regard of them, for whom it is accepted, less than was his due. So far is the Freedom of God's Grace from being diminished by them who say, Christ made a full Satisfaction for the Sins of the World; but at the same Time say, that tho' God *declared his Righteousness* in making the Blood of Christ a Propitiation, yet he declared his Forbearance and Mercy too, by giving Sinners Pardon and Hope thro' Faith

Faith in that Blood of his. So admirably well chosen a Method is this of displaying the Riches of his Grace, by making *Jesus Christ the Wisdom and Righteousness, and Sanctification*, as well as *Redemption to us*.

Having vindicated the Doctrines of the Christian Religion in Points of Faith, I come now to consider the Perfection and Reasonableness in Points of Practice.

The End of which Precept, being to secure a due Demeanour towards our Neighbour, our selves, and God, I shall under each Head of this Division single out one Duty, the hardest of Digestion in its Kind, presuming, that if this be cleared from the Prejudices taken up against it, the rest may sufficiently recommend themselves.

That to *our Neighbour*, which I will insist upon, is *forgiving and loving our Enemies*.

That to *ourselves*, denying some lawful Enjoyments, and abstaining from even the Appearance of Evil.

That *to God*, is taking *up our Cross*, that is, parting with all we have, and Life too, when the Love of God, and Conscience of our Duty, require it from us.

1. I begin with the *forgiving and loving our Enemies*.

Some Countenance, I own, is given to the Exceptions of revengeful Men, by the Consideration of that Passion, which puts them upon the Exercise of this Disposition. For Anger being a natural Affection of the Mind, is not in itself sinful; but upon just Occasions to be commended. See *Exod.* xxxii. 19. *Psal.* lxix. 22. cix. 6——17. cxxxix. 19---22. *Mark* iii. 5. *Ephes.* iv. 26, 27. And in Truth this Passion seems to have something more to say for itself, than many, because proceeding always upon an Apprehension of wrong received, and

a Desire of Right. But yet no Commotion of the Mind ought to be more strictly guarded than this, which is so apt to run People into Excesses of all Kinds.

'Tis true, we sometimes find the Philosophers decrying an Insensibility of just Provocations as a Mark of an abject Soul. But yet the same Moralists are upon no Occasion more profuse of their Praises, than where they speak of Persons who could with a generous Contempt overlook and forgive Injuries, and shew themselves above them.

And the same Authors always treat Revenge with a just Contempt, and term it the natural Result of Cowardice and Fear. See *Juven. Sat.* xiii. ver. 189. And certainly if the Happiness of this Life and true Greatness of Soul consist in that inward Tranquillity, which flows from a sort of Self-sufficiency, and unmoveable Security, the revengeful Man is of all others the most miserable; for all his Thoughts are one continual Rack, and in meditating Mischief to others he does but whet a Sword against himself, whether his evil Purposes miscarry or succeed.

The same Heathen Moralists tell us, that whereas not only avoiding the Scandal of a tame Soul, but giving Check to the Insolence of encroaching Men, is made the Pretence for gratifying our Revenge, this End is likewise most effectually compassed by Measures directly contrary. For the returning Evil for Evil is good for nothing but to multiply Quarrels.

They tell us yet once more, that no other Man's doing an ill Thing can justify our doing the like by way of Return. And that of two such Offenders, the worse is he, that gives the second Blow, because he saw that the other was guilty of what did not become him, and yet in the midst of his Conviction, takes the same Liberty himself. See *Max. Tir. Dissert.*

Dissert. ii. They add, that Kindness will do more to soften the most rugged Temper, than the severest Rigour.

But this Spirit of Revenge they saw was least of all to be endured in a public Capacity, as that which snatches the Sword of Justice out of the Magistrate's Hand, in whose common Umpirage for redressing of Wrongs, all Law, Government, and even Society itself subsists.

Another Motive they have urged to Clemency, is the Example of the Deity, joined with the Condition of human Nature; from whence they argued, that Creatures who lived upon the continual Bounty of an offended God, should have Compassion on those who cannot be under the like Obligations to them.

Those who being all of the same Frame and Materials, may claim to have the Nearness of the Relation remembred by them, who are ill-natured or proud enough to forget it; and ought to be treated with the same Tenderness and Respect for the sake of some inherent and original Endearments, which they can never absolutely forfeit, so long as they are Men.

To such noble Heights did the Heathen Moralists carry the Duty of Forgiveness, and putting up of Injuries. And though their Reason did not by its own Light attain to the Knowledge of every moral Virtue as prescribed in the Gospel, yet nothing is prescribed there, which Reason will not approve, when it is rightly stated: And all our Religion hath done in this Matter is only to bind faster upon Men's Consciences what uncorrupted Reason might suggest, and what corrupted did not; to furnish more forcible Motives for the Practice of, by rendering it more easy to be performed, and therefore more reasonable to be commanded under this, than it could be under any other Institution whatsoever.

1. Then, it will contribute greatly to the Advantage of this Duty, to have it rightly ſtated. For Chriſtianity does not, as ſome have miſtaken the Matter, require us to be inſenſible of any Provocations, nor exact the ſame Degree of Affection to the worſt, as to the beſt Men. But this it does; it conſiders the firſt impetuous Motions of Paſſions to be mechanical, and therefore orders us to keep a ſtrict Guard upon theſe. It allows a juſt Indignation, where the Glory of God, the Good of the Public, or the Security of our Perſons are concerned; but it would have us put up little Injuries, rather than be contentious. And when we may uſe Law for a Remedy, it forbids us to pervert it to an Inſtrument of Revenge: But when our Ends are anſwered, and Reparation made, we muſt not delay to be pacified; and as our Enemies are to be ſought with all Chriſtian Methods, ſo muſt they be received with Joy and Forgiveneſs. And this I take to be the true Meaning of loving our Enemies; ſo to lay aſide all old Grudges, as not to be wanting in any Expreſſion of common Courteſy, or true good Nature or Chriſtian Charity toward them. In a word, to make them after Injuries received and forgiven, thus far the ſame to us, as if the Injury had never been done. And much of the Difficulty thought to encumber this Command, would vaniſh, did we but carefully obſerve the Difference, between that Love, which is a Matter of Command and common Right, and that which is left at large to be the Effect of Freedom and Choice, of Favour and Diſtinction.

I ſhall now proceed to ſhew, that Religion hath made better Proviſion for, and laid ſtronger Engagements to the Practice of this Duty, and conſequently rendered it more reaſonable to Chriſtians, than it can be by Vertue of any other Inſtitution, upon theſe three Accounts.

1. As

1. As its Doctrines are best contrived for disposing Men to this forgiving Temper.

Nothing blows up the Coals of Contention, like false Notions of our own Worth, and a Disdain of those with whom we converse.

This Pride the Gospel teaches us how to cure, by ascribing every good Quality we have to God, and consequently, that Humility and Modesty are Ornaments to all our other Virtues. 1 *Cor.* iv. 7. *Rom.* xii. 3. *Phil.* ii. 3. *Rom.* xii. 10. *Rom.* xv. 1. 1 *Cor.* xiii. 7. *Gal.* vi. 1. *Ephes.* iv. 31, 32.

2. Another Advantage peculiar to the Christian Religion, with Regard to this Duty, is, that it cuts off all Pretences from farther Inconvenience, which the Fears of Men are so apt to hearken to, and betake themselves to Methods of Rigour and Revenge, for what they esteem the necessary Prevention of, as it enjoins the strictest Gratitude, and so would bind those to us, whom we have at any Time forgiven, in the closest Engagements of Love. Or if Men are so brutish, as not to be overcome with Good, in such Case Christianity provides a good Defence, for by prescribing all those Offices of Kindness, which gain the Affection of others, it restrains the Wickedness of bad Men, by fear of injuring good Men, as sure to have the Assistance of others, who will not be restrained by any other Regard to their Duty. But if this Refuge should fail us too, Religion quiets our Jealousies and anxious Distrusts by the fullest Assurance, that God is the Protector of his Oppressed Servants. See *Prov.* xvi. 7. 1 *Pet.* iv. 19. *Matt.* x. 29, 30.

3. I only add upon this Head, that the Obligation to this Duty of forgiving and loving our Enemies is stronger upon Christians than any other Persons. For the very Foundation of our Religion is laid in the Belief and Profession of the unspeak-

able

able Love and Compaſſion of God and Chriſt towards Mankind. And we are told that notwithſtanding all that is done for us, that if we do not forgive Men their Treſpaſſes, neither will our heavenly Father forgive us.

II. I paſs now to that Part of our Duty which regards *ourſelves*. The denying ſome even lawful Enjoyments, and abſtaining from the very Appearance of Evil.

The Devil is continually repreſenting Religion as good for nothing, but to make Men their own Tormentors; as not only content to debar Men from ſinful Pleaſures, but from thoſe which are not ſo. And what is this but to mock Men with Appetites, which they are forbidden to gratify?

Now whatever Colours theſe Inſinuations may be thought to carry for unconfined Liberty in Caſes not manifeſtly ſinful; they who alledge them, would do well to conſider, that the Light of Reaſon taught many of the old Philoſophers much better. Theſe wiſer Men thought the main Buſineſs of their Lives, and the Excellence of their rational Powers, to conſiſt in the correcting, purifying, and controuling the Appetites and Paſſions of the ſenſitive Soul, and that in this no real Violence is offered to Nature, ſince it is in Effect to keep Things in their natural Order.

Upon the ſame Grounds Chriſtianity hath proceeded, only indeed carrying the Rule the higher, in Proportion as its Diſcoveries are clearer, of the great Danger of Sin, and our Proneneſs to fall from one Sin to another. Thus it not only forbids the groſſer Acts of Senſuality, but even *the looking on a Woman to luſt after her*. It commands us to break off the moſt intimate Converſations, when they are like to become an Occaſion of Sin. And yet theſe are the Terms that provoke ſuch Complaint; Terms, that are neceſſary, if we conſider,

either

either the *Nature* of Vice in general, or the present Constitution of Mankind, with Regard to it.

1. As to the former of these, it should be remembered, that Vices, as well as Virtues, are Habits of the Mind, and as such, are acquired by Preparation, strengthened by Practice, and perfected by Custom. And as all this is evident from the *Nature of Vice in general*, so is it from the *present Constitution of Mankind with Regard to it*. For if Reason did perceive the mighty Necessity of restraining our Desires, how much more may the Gospel be allowed to press that Duty, which does not only shew us our Disease, but the Malignity and true Original of it?

Another Right of imposing this Command, peculiar to the Gospel, arises from the very full Assurance and distinct Account of a future State and Judgment. That God will judge the *Secrets of Mens Hearts*, is a Doctrine which renders every wilful Advance toward Sin as necessary to be forbidden, as is the open Commission of it. And does not every Man's own Reason bear Witness to the Equity of such a Law? And can we think it strange, that our Saviour should speak of *Mens committing Adultery in their Hearts*, or the Apostle *of Eyes full of Adultery, and that cannot cease from Sin*; and consequently, that both should make the best Provision possible to prevent the very first kindling of such impure Desires? Nay, is not this a soft and merciful, as well as a wise Command? For what does it in Effect, but order us to be safe, while we have it yet in our Power to be so? For it is much easier to keep out of the Way of Temptations, than to combat with, and conquer them.

III. It remains now, that we examine into the Reasonableness of the third Instance, which is the Command of *taking up our Cross*, or being content to part with any Advantages, even this Life itself, when

when the Love of God, and Conſcience of our Duty, ſhall require it from us.

And here we find ourſelves attacked with the fundamental Principle of Self-preſervation, which neceſſarily determines a Man to conſult his own Safety and Conſcience, whereas the Doctrine of the Croſs obliges him to loſe even his very Perſon and Life.

This we are told is a *hard Saying*, and he muſt be more or leſs than Man, that can bear it.

Such is the Objection; but in anſwer to it, I ſhall ſhew, how far the Light of Reaſon carried ſome Heathens hereunto; and then ſhew, that it is exceeding equitable, and may juſtly be expected from Chriſtians.

Self-preſervation, is certainly the firſt and moſt commanding Principle of Nature; and to do the Objection founded upon this all poſſible Right, I ſhall obſerve one remarkable Difference between natural Principles, and moral Duties: Moral Duties gain upon our Minds by Arguments proper to incline the Affections; and this in ſuch a Way, as leaves the Will at Liberty to refuſe or comply with them: But natural Principles engage us by their own Force, and leave no Room for Choice; and could the Doctrine of the Croſs be proved to carry in it any real Contradiction to natural Principles, it muſt be accounted an abſurd Command. For this ſuppoſes God obliging us to reject a Principle, which he hath implanted in our Nature, and by ſo doing made irreſiſtible.

As ſure then as perfect Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, and Truth, cannot but be conſiſtent with itſelf, ſo ſure it is, that what God hath enjoined any Man in the Goſpel, cannot oblige him to go contrary to thoſe common Meaſures and Motives of acting, which the ſame God impreſſed upon every Man at his Creation. And in Truth, the Difficulty we are upon

upon is magnified, because it is mistaken, it is the Language of carnal Men, who know no Happiness, and provide only against bodily Dangers. Falling herein short of wiser Heathens, who tell us, that the Mind is more peculiarly the Man, and consequently the Perfection of this noble and better Part, is the proper and ultimate Happiness of his Nature: And that this was perfected by Virtue, which ought by all Means to be preserved, by setting ourselves above the World, and disdaining all its Menaces and Flatteries: That Virtue must expect to encounter the Spight of bad Men, but they could only hurt the Shell of us: The Man remains untouched, so long as his Innocence is preserved. Nay the Stoics represent their wise Man unconcerned at the Loss of his Estate and Life, as Things in no Degree necessary to his real Happiness.

How admirable a Sense of their Duty, how exalted Notions of Virtue had these Men? How far above those sordid Wretches, who take the Body to be their chief Care? Indeed I do not justify the highest of their Flights; but yet this must be said, however, that their allowing so little for the weak Sides of human Nature, is a great Reproach to some among us, who complain of a Dispensation suited to our natural Powers, and requiring no Proofs of our Sincerity, which the Assurance of a future Recompence, and the Encouragement it gives to our Obedience, will not account for, even when most painful or costly to us. What therefore their Philosophy could not do, the bringing in of a better Hope did: And the Notions and Practices, which in them to entertain was even wonderful, for us not to entertain, were inexcusable. To lay down this Life, when they were doubtful of another, might be thought to grate hard upon Self-preservation; but to do this when Men know the Immortality and Value of their Souls; to rejoice *in the light Affliction*

fliction which is but for a Moment, when they are thoroughly perſuaded *that it worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal Weight of Glory.* This is not to deſtroy, but to ſave ourſelves: 'Tis what if we do not do, not only Religion and Reaſon, but our own Practice will condemn us, becauſe 'tis what we eſteem our Wiſdom to do in the Affairs of this World every Day.

Theſe Conſiderations are ſufficient to prove, that the taking up the Croſs, as ſtated and preſcribed in the Goſpel, is far from being an unreaſonable Command.

Having conſidered the principal Exceptions, that our Adverſaries on any Hand have taken againſt the Chriſtian Religion, I proceed to the ſecond general Head.

II. That the Chriſtian Religion as repreſented in the new Teſtament, is really more for the Glory of God, and the Good of Mankind, than (ſo far as appears to us) it could have been, had Matters been ſo ordered, as the ſeveral Objectors muſt, upon their own Principles, be ſuppoſed to deſire they ſhould be.

That my Meaning in this Argument, and the Influence it ought to have, may be underſtood, I ſhall premiſe the following Conſiderations.

1. That ſuch Proof of theſe Means of Salvation being wiſer and better than any other, is no neceſſary Motive to our Obedience; becauſe they are ſo advantageous to us, that our Compliance were due to them, though the Conditions were liable to Objections.

2. That in all Matters, which bring ſufficient Evidence of a divine Appointment, it is not only a pious, but a moſt reaſonable Preſumption, that they are ordered after the beſt Manner, being Appointments of a moſt perfect Being.

3. Admitting that the Chriſtian Religion were

not in all Points so wisely ordered, as might be, yet if it does not appear so to us, our Obligation to obey it is the same, as if it could not possibly have been better. Because the Standard, by which we are to form our Behaviour, is the Judgment of our Conscience, resulting from that Light, which Reason and Revelation do, or if duly attended to, would minister to the Mind. If then we are not capable of discovering any just Ground of Dissatisfaction, the Case is the same, as if there was no Ground.

4. If those, which have all along been reputed the principal Exceptions to our Religions be demonstrably for the Advantage of it, we may fairly conclude, that all the other Points are so likewise.

The Reason is, because Christianity hath never wanted Enemies in Abundance, whose Malice was as little likely to spare it, as was their Subtlety to overlook any Advantage that could be taken against it.

5. Though the Appeal I am now making to our own Reason be not so necessary, that the want of Satisfaction in it can bear us out in Disobedience, yet certainly the having such Satisfaction ought to be acknowledged a very powerful Encouragement to our Obedience.

Upon this Account it is that I do not content my self with proving the Principles of the Christian Religion to be above all just Exception, but I will shew that the Glory of God and the Good of Men is more promoted by the Gospel, as it now stands, than they could have been by such Models, as the several Sorts of Adversaries must by their respective Principles have been led to erect in its stead. As thus:

The *Jew* says his Law is perpetual; the Gospel declares it void.

The *Jew* expects a conquering, and the natural Man thinks, if any be necessary, he ought to be a glorious

glorious Meſſiah; the Goſpel deſcribes him to have made a quite different Figure during his Abode upon Earth.

The Man of Reaſon quarrels at any thing that is impoſed as an Article of Faith, which he cannot comprehend; the Goſpel requires the Belief of ſundry that are ſuch.

The natural Man alledges, that we ſhould practiſe nothing but what Nature directs, or gives into; the Goſpel exacts ſeveral Duties, that bear hard upon human Nature.

This is the State of the Caſe. And the Queſtion ariſing upon it is whether the Excellencies of God be not more conſpicuous, whether we have not a plainer Feeling of his Goodneſs, and find a greater Tendency to our own Happineſs and the general Benefit of the whole World, in the Methods of Salvation propounded in the New Teſtament, and whether ſo many more Inconveniencies do not attend thoſe oppoſite Pretenſions, that, were we at Liberty to make it, we ſhould be manifeſtly Loſers by the Exchange.

In the Diſquiſition of it I ſhall keep to my former Method in my firſt Propoſition, and treat the Subjects in the ſame Order they came before you then. For which Reaſon I begin,

1. With the Abrogation of the *Levitical* Law.

It was indeed for God's Honour to reſcue a choſen Generation of Men from the Idolatry and Wickedneſs of a degenerate World: And by his peculiar Laws, and a diſtinguiſhing Providence in their Favour, to get himſelf a Name. It was likewiſe a great Benefit to Men, that, in the very worſt of Times, Truth had a little Spot of the World left to take Root in, and bud and grow, 'till in the *Fulneſs of Time* it ſhould *fill the* whole *Earth with the Knowledge of the Lord*. But was it not a more illuſtrious Evidence of the Power, Wiſdom, and

Goodness of God, that Truth was no longer confined to so narrow a Corner of the World as *Judea?* But if the *Jewish* Religion was not to be annull'd after the Bounds of Truth were to be enlarged, how could the Duties of that Religion be discharged? How could all the Men of the World appear thrice every Year before the Lord at *Jerusalem?* How should the Sacrifices of Atonement, Purification, and Thanksgiving be offered there only, or where would Herds and Flocks be found for Offerings, upon a Supposition that the Messiah's Business is to convert all Nations to the *Jewish* Religion? For nothing can be plainer from the Prophets, than that a vast Increase of the Church, is a certain Mark of the Messiah's Days. But when he came, was he to offer any Sacrifice for the Sins of Men or not? Say he was not, and the Difficulty still remains of so many millions of Proselytes observing the Prescriptions of the Levitical Institution.

Say he was, and what Confusion would the Continuance of that Institution produce? So that either it is more for the glory of God, and the good of Mankind that few should be saved, rather than many, and the true God known only by one People, rather than all; or else it must be granted, that the *Jewish* Œconomy is so far from being better calculated for the Days of the Messiah, as not to be practicable, without giving up the Notion of all Nations coming into the Church of God.

II. *The Meanness of that Figure which the Messiah made during his abode upon Earth.*

This was a *stumbling Block* to the *Jews*, and to the *Heathens Foolishness*. The *Jews* insisted upon a conquering *Messiah*; the *Infidels* in general require such Magnificence as is, (they presume) agreeable at least to the Wisdom of God, and necessary to prove him the signally chosen of God by his Successes, and the distinguishing Favours of Providence.

The *Jewiſh* Part of this Objection hath been accounted for already. The prudential Part of the Argument comes now to be conſidered; in which I agree with the Objectors, that the *Meſſiah* ought to bring unexceptional Teſtimonies of Favour and Authority from God. But I affirm, that ſuch our *Jeſus* actually brought, and thoſe much more to his Purpoſe, than any which our Adverſaries demand, could poſſibly have been; which will appear to any that ſhall ſeriouſly conſider the Ends of his coming, and the Suitableneſs of the Manner in which he came to thoſe Ends.

The Ends of the *Meſſiah*'s coming, the Scriptures expreſly declare to be the *taking away Iniquity*; *bringing in everlaſting Righteouſneſs*; and by both theſe Effects, becoming an *univerſal Bleſſing to Mankind.*

But *Iniquity* cannot be taken away, except the Guilt, the Puniſhment, and Power of Sin be removed. Everlaſting *Righteouſneſs* cannot be brought in, except by the laſt and beſt Scheme of Religion: Nor can theſe Bleſſings be univerſal, except the whole World may ſhare in, and be the better for them. Now theſe are the natural Conſequences of what *Jeſus* did and ſuffered, but they could not have reſulted from the Character of a triumphant *Meſſiah.*

Enough hath been ſaid before to prove the Wiſdom of God in reconciling Sinners to himſelf, by laying upon his Son the Iniquities of us all. Admit but this, and you ſee the Neceſſity of the *Meſſiah* being made ſuch an Example of Suffering, as ſhould declare God's Indignation againſt Sin, and be accepted as an Equivalent for a whole World of Tranſgreſſors. Now how a *Man of Sorrows*, *&c.* See *Iſa.* lii. might anſwer this Deſign, we eaſily conceive. But that a glorious and proſperous Prince ſhould be incapable of it, is certain.

Next,

Next, as to *bringing in everlasting Righteousness*, by settling a most perfect Religion; the Question is, whether the Character of a suffering, or a prosperous Messiah would convince Men most. And this is an Effect which depends upon *Evidence* and *Example*.

The Point to be proved in Matters of Religion is, that they proceed from God: But the Evidence by which alone this Proof can be made good, must consist of Marks that are certain. Now 'tis plain that worldly Greatness is no such Mark, it being often possessed by bad Men; and the greatest Tyrants have had a Renown for Conquests. And therefore this is a Figure, which had the *Messiah* made, could contribute nothing to his Glory, as a Preacher of Righteousness, nor prove one whit, that either his Doctrine or Authority was divine.

By the Reason our Saviour's Afflictions were no Reflection on his Character and Virtue; since the same Arguments which vindicate God's Providence with Regard to the Sufferings of good Men in general, are sufficient to confute all the Blasphemies which *Jews* and Infidels have vomited against Christ's Sufferings. The rather, for that the wisest Philosophers allow'd none to account himself truly happy, who hath not endured the Extremity of Pain and Reproach; so that upon these Mens Principles, by how much Christ was more afflicted than others, by so much more perfect was his Virtue.

But Christians have more to say in the present Dispute. For it may be argued, with Regard to Christ himself, that the more obscure his Life, and the more ignominious his Death was, the greater the Credit of his Doctrine. Had God indeed left his Innocence without Witness, the Calumnies of his Enemies might have discouraged us in giving in our Names to one so scornfully treated of Men, so seemingly forsaken of God. But when his Suffer-

ings were so contrived as to cast a stronger and brighter Lustre, by setting off his Miracles, this presents us with a different View of the Case.

2. The other Thing conducing to the Success of any Doctrine is *Example*. The Influence of which is greater in Proportion as the Duties enforced do thwart the Inclinations of human Nature. Now the practical Virtues of Christianity are Humility, Meekness, Charity, Forgivenéss, Purity, Peace, Patience and Contentedness. And the governing Principle is the Discovery and Persuasion of future Rewards and Punishments. In Comparison of which every Thing and every Event here ought to be of very little Consideration.

Now judge whether a General dealing in Battles be a fit Preacher of Peace and Love to Enemies? Whether a Person of the most exquisite Splendor and Prosperity be one at all suited to persuade Equanimity and Submission under Poverty, Heavenly-mindedness, and Contempt of the World.

Whatever Force the Discourses of such a one might carry must be entirely from their own Weight; and a great deal of this would be eluded by the Reflection, how free Men are to give that Advice, which their own happy Condition brings them under no Necessity of following.

But when a Teacher asks no more of his Disciples than he practises himself, when Men in Poverty exhort to Contentedness, and Men barbarously used to Meekness, and to their Precepts add their Practice, it makes the deepest Impression, being a Motive of Persuasion exactly suited to the Constitution of human Nature. I cannot therefore but conclude, that when God sent his Son to establish the best Religion, it was a Design worthy his divine Wisdom, that he should not only *speak as never Man spoke*, but do and suffer as never Man did and suffered; that by submitting to this, he left us an Example to follow

follow him in those Virtues, from which Flesh and Blood is most averse, convinced us that the Good and Evil of this Life are not a Mark of God's Love or Hatred, assured us, that no Obloquy here can prejudice our great Concern above. And what could Pomp and Prosperity in the *Messiah* contribute to the Advancement of his Doctrine, like to this; in which when Men stand most in need of Religion to support them under Afflictions, they can look back upon the like in *Jesus*, and rest upon not only a Promise of Reward, but this exemplified in such an Instance, as is a sure Pledge of their Hopes, and in the Contemplation of his Glories, presents them with a Prospect of their own.

3. Can any Thing be clearer, than that the *Messiah* was foretold as an *universal Blessing?*

Yet I think this Prediction utterly impossible to be made good in a conquering *Messiah.*

For let the Consequences be never so beneficial, which arise from Blood and Slaughter, 'tis evident, that Multitudes must perish to make these Conquests glorious.

This, I think, were enough to prove, that the Victories assigned to the first coming of the *Messiah* must be spiritual, for no other can in their Nature be universal.

The Advantages of this World are so ordered, that the Gain of one Person or People is the Loss of another. But the Benefits, in which the Souls of Men are concerned, never interfere, and no one has the less for others sharing in them. 'Tis therefore in Respect of Pardon of Sins, Peace of Conscience, Ability to do well, and Recompence in Heaven, to them that do well, that the *Messiah*'s coming was Matter of great Joy to all People. 'Twas with Regard to the Enemy of Souls, that he *led Captivity captive, and gave Gifts unto Men.*

And the Graces of his Spirit are the Gifts he

ſhed abroad in the Day of his Triumph. Satan bound up, the Priſons of Death unlocked, and the Kingdom of Heaven opened, Idolatry confounded, and Truth eſtabliſhed, theſe are the Conqueſts of the King of Saints, not obtained by ſpilling the Blood of others, but by ſhedding his own; and are ſuch as bring Woe to none but ſuch as bring it upon themſelves. And therefore what Calamities ſoever may be fit to attend his ſecond Coming, yet it ſeems agreeable to Reaſon, that his firſt Appearance ſhould be full of Love. A Bleſſing tendered to every Nation. And in this Accordingly Chriſt ſuſtained the Character of a King meek and lowly, a Reconciler and Redeemer, a Preacher of Righteouſneſs, a Prince of Peace. Characters which were anſwered by the mean Figure of *Jeſus*, but ſuch as could not be maintained by ſuch Grandeur as they contend for in their *Meſſiah*.

Thus, I think, I have ſhewn that the mean Figure which the Meſſiah made during his Abode upon Earth, was no juſt Exception againſt him.

III. I come now to juſtify, nay to prefer the Goſpel-Diſpenſation, upon Account of thoſe Articles of Faith, which ſurpaſs our Comprehenſion.

1. If there were no Doctrine in the Goſpel, but what we were able to account for, Faith would not be a religious Act. But when inſtead of the Quality of the Matter revealed, we depend intirely upon the Authority of the Perſon revealing, this renders our believing him, whom the Father hath ſent into the World, *the Work of God*. This gives us a rational Account of the Streſs laid upon Faith in the New Teſtament, as procuring good Acceptance of, and great Rewards for all thoſe virtuous Acts, which flow from a Principle ſo agreeable to the Duty we owe, as the bringing every Thought in Obedience to the Majeſty we ſerve.

2. Theſe Doctrines ſeem to be manifeſtly for the Dignity

Dignity of Religion: They impress a greater Awe and Power upon our Minds than they would do, if we were perfectly acquainted with them.

3. The Wisdom of such Mysteries seems greater in the Christian Religion, than in any other, because more necessary to the main Design of it. For this was to repair the Breaches made upon our Nature by *Adam*'s Fall; the Cause of which was, a vain Desire of being as wise as God. And could a better Check be found for this, than opening a new Scene of Wonders, such as might make us think meanly of ourselves, and represent our Maker so lofty, as to convince us of the infinite Distance between us and him?

4. These Doctrines, when rightly considered, will naturally have great Influence upon the practical Part of our Duty, which is always more or less, in Proportion as our Affections are moved and wrought upon. Now,

The astonishing and unconceivable Perfections of God, and his Love to Mankind which *passeth Knowledge*, is a boundless Ocean of Goodness, in which the Mind is most delightfully lost; and the less we feel ourselves able to see the End of it, the more rapturous our Devotions grow. The Torments and Rewards of a future State excite our Diligence the more, to avoid the one, and obtain the other, because they cannot be comprehended. In a word, we could not have known these Things more perfectly, except they had been less; and if they had been less, our Zeal would have been less eager.

From all which it appears, that the Gospel is in this Regard also more wisely contrived, than without such Mysteries it could have been.

That the Nobleness and Usefulness of these Doctrines abundantly justifies that amazing *Series* of Miracles wrought to establish the Belief of them, which if nothing had been revealed beyond the

Reach of human Reaſon, might perhaps have been thought a needleſs empty Pomp, without any anſwerable Effects to warrant ſo much Ceremony and aſtoniſhing Preparation.

IV. 'Tis objected, that the moral Duties carry inſuperable Difficulties in them.

But this is only objected by wicked Men, whoſe Eyes the God of this World has blinded, whoſe Underſtandings are depraved, and whom the Heathens would have taught the Reaſonableneſs of thoſe Virtues they reproach. The Queſtion then before us, is not whether theſe be not rational in themſelves, but whether the Goſpel might not have condeſcended more to our Infirmities, and would not have been a wiſer Inſtitution by abating ſome of its Rigours in this Particular. For ſatisfying this Enquiry, I deſire that theſe Conſiderations may be attended to.

1. The Objection itſelf ſuppoſes both Duty and Reward, and quarrels not at our Happineſs being ſuſpended upon ſome, but only thinks it ſuſpended upon too hard Conditions: But can we have the Confidence to expect an incorruptible Crown, and ſhall we be at no Pains to obtain it? Has not the Goſpel aſſured us of this State of future Happineſs, between which, and all that we can do or ſuffer for it, there is no Proportion, and ſhall we murmur that the Terms of our Obedience are raiſed together with the Certainty and Greatneſs of the Expectation? Sure it is fit that he, that promiſed Happineſs, ſhould require what Terms he pleaſes of attaining it. But,

2. The very Diſpoſitions and Habits, now required by God, are in their own Nature neceſſary to make us happy, conſidered either in a public or private Capacity. In the former, as every Luſt tends to the Violation of Society. In the latter, as much as we give Way to Appetite, ſo much we

part

part with of our Ease, Liberty, and Virtue. But this is more plain with Regard to the next Life. For Heaven will have no Relish to wicked Men, they will meet with no Objects adequate to their impure Desires. Its Pleasures are intellectual, to be acquired by Pains and prudent Restraints, while we live in Bodies of Flesh; and therefore every Advance in Virtue, is a Step by which we climb nearer to the Regions of Glory.

These are our best Expedients for all the true Happiness we have in this World; and they are indispensable Preparations and Predispositions, for all we can hope for in the next.

3. If it be objected, that some of these Commands no Christian punctually fulfills. I answer, that God's Laws ought to be a Rule of perfect Goodness, spurring us on to daily Improvements; but especially that no Height is too much, where express Allowances are made for Infirmities. And the Rewards and Punishments at last shall go, not according to the Extremity of the Command, but according to the Sincerity of them who live under it.

And this in Fact is the Case of the Gospel. It bids us be perfect, but withal it bids us not be discouraged at our involuntary Imperfections, as having a merciful Judge; and upon Repentance, it supports us with a Propitiation for Offences, and Mercy thro' Faith in the Blood of a crucified Redeemer.

4. The Wisdom of these Laws is evident in the great Efficacy they have had upon the World. Witness the illustrious Patterns of all Virtues, the primitive Christians. And if they have not the same Influence now, it is because Men are not so considerate in the true Principles of Religion, nor so much in Earnest about the great Affairs of their Souls. I come now to consider the last general Head.

III. That the *Success the Gospel met with in the World*

World is an unanſwerable Argument of its Doctrine coming from God.

In Proof whereof I ſhall ſet myſelf to conſider how this Concluſion is warranted:

1*ſt*, By the Afflictions and Perſecutions.

2*dly*, By the mean Condition, and natural Endowment of the firſt Planters of it.

1*ſt*, By the Afflictions and Perſecutions of the firſt Chriſtians.

And here I ſhall ſhew, that no other Method could have been ſo effectual to convince every ſober and impartial Man of the Certainty of the Chriſtian Doctrine being divine. And that Chriſtianity had great Service done it, by being eſtabliſhed upon Perſecutions, upon theſe following Accounts.

1. The firm Belief of its Doctrines.

2. The Union of its Profeſſors.

3. The Power of its Influence upon their Lives and Actions.

1. Its Doctrines were the more firmly believed by this Manner of propagating them.

For all Truth in general gains this conſiderable Advantage by being contradicted, and warmly withſtood, that it is more throughly ſtudied, more cautiouſly received, more vigorouſly and fairly vindicated.

Credulity, and Love of Eaſe make Men willing to take Things upon Truſt, even in Affairs of the laſt Importance, and believe and act as the reſt do. Or if ſuch do ſtumble upon Truth, yet is the Bottom ſo ſandy, that the Building is ſhaken with every Blaſt of Doctrine.

This is the Condition of too many Men's Belief: But then it is generally ſo at ſuch Times as bring Advantage with it. Heretofore, when every Thing lay at Stake, no Queſtion can be made, but good Care was taken to ſee on which Side the Ballance would incline to. Our Paſſions and Enjoyments have

have so strong an Influence upon every one of us, that it is no easy Matter to determine against them.

So that when Men were satisfied to sacrifice these to Principles that forbid them to be indulged, and offered only future Happiness in Lieu of Fruition down in Hand: This is a violent Presumption, that the Scale of Religion is the more substantial and heavy. For since all the Bribery of Sense lies to draw us the other Way, nothing but an impartial Enquiry and well weighed Resolution could prevail for vanquishing them. And consequently God could not have consulted the Honour and Advantage of Truth more, than that it should not be possible for some Time for Men to retain this and their worldly Conveniencies together.

We see how obstinately Men set themselves to disbelieve what crosses their Wishes and Profit, and how attached they are, in Despight of Testimony and Experience, to the Opinions we are accustomed to.

And if Men be thus fixed in Matters of less Moment, what will they not be in those of the highest Concernment? How extravagant is it to suppose, where Estate, Honour and Life were in Hazard, they should not seriously present to their Thoughts every Objection that the Case would bear. Now there never was any Occasion that called for such mature Deliberation, like the first embracing Christianity. If they came in, all here below was lost; and if the Gospel should prove an Imposture, all was lost too hereafter. If they stood out, they were sure of the Advantages of this World; which is a Consideration neither like, nor indeed fit to be neglected.

And when the Choice would turn upon such Difficulties, we must conclude, that they went upon good Ground, and an invincible Persuasion of their Duty. And the more sensible they were of this, the more

more nicely must our Religion have been examined: And the greater Struggle they found before they surrendered, the more glorious were the Conquests it made over them.

And as the Truth upon these Terms would be more cautiously received, so it would be more vigorously and fairly defended. Because a Belief resulting from mature Deliberation, and chosen in Despight of Danger, is prepared for any Difficulties that attack it. 'Twas thus therefore that God chose to make our brightest Patterns so illustrious. The Malice of their Enemies was instrumental in adding to their Honour: Their Slanders and Reproaches obliged us with the incomparable Piety and Pains of Writings, which if diligently studied, would qualify us to answer all Objections of any Weight against the *Faith once delivered to the Saints*; the rather because to the same Causes we owe not the Vigour only but the Fairness and Honesty too of all their Reasonings upon this Occasion. For they, who take upon them to defend a persecuted Doctrine, defend it at the Expence of all they have, and may be sure, if any Man living may, to be depended upon for fair undesigning Argument, and a right stating the Matter in Debate.

2. These Sufferings contributed to the Union of Christians among themselves, and a mutual Correspondence throughout the Church in general. The Sense of Oppressions, the Examples of infinite Tortures, and Deaths, sustained for the same common Cause, the constant Expectation of their own Martyrdom preserved the tenderest Love, and most compassionate Regard for one another; a Charity expressed by the readiest Supplies of all Sorts, but especially of all spiritual Comforts and Assistances. Add to all this, that there was then no Greatness to be envied, the higher Post only exposed the Person more eminently for the next Sacrifice.

It

It was when the World crowded into the Church, and Christian was a Name of secular Privilege, that Ambition and Avarice, Emulation and Contention, disturbed the Peace, and deformed the Face of Christianity. Nor was ever Religion prostituted to Quarrels and Faction, till it was found worth while to make it a Trade.

3. Another Advantage arising from Persecution, is the manifesting Power of this Religion upon the Lives and Actions of its Professors.

Tho' Piety and Virtue might be expected from the Principles of Christ's Religion at any Time, yet would Men be especially quickened up to them, when they saw themselves watched by envious Eyes, that would rejoice at every Failing that might give Countenance to that Malice, which waited for a Pretence to ruin them. In this and the like Cases, Men of Conscience would be exceeding careful to adorn and recommend their Faith, to soften their Enemies, and win them over to the Belief of the Gospel, when they should see the shining of their Light, as well in living as in dying for it. And this in Fact was peculiar to the Times of Tribulation. And by this God consulted more the Honour of his Gospel, than he could have done, had *his Servants endured no Contradiction of Sinners against themselves, nor ever been called to resist unto Blood.* For since the most refined Institutions before had furnished Men but with weak Remedies in their Troubles, what could commend the Gospel more, than that it could triumph over Malice, and Disgrace, and Tortures and Death, and could inable expiring Martyrs to make sometimes more Converts by their Manner of Dying, than their Preaching had made thro' the whole Course of their Lives.

For it is to be observed, that the Influence of those good Men's Sufferings would naturally differ,

according to the different Tempers of the Persons, under whose Consideration they fell. The Lovers of Pleasure would let fall their good Intentions upon this Account: But those of purer Minds would reflect and tell themselves, that Humour, or Deceit, or slight Persuasions, do not use to carry Men in their Wits thus far; and this would make them enquire into the Reasons of such amazing Perseverance. And thus again, if Christianity did not gain the most, it would be sure to gain the best of Mankind.

From whence I infer, that a Religion thus begun, improved, and made universal, in despight of all human Oppositions, was the Word and Work of God.

II. The same Conclusion, I am to shew, does evidently result, from a Consideration of the despicable Condition, and mean Endowments of the first Propagaters of this Religion.

They who consider, that these Men had no Character in the World, no Power, nor Greatness, no Education or Art, in any Degree to recommend the Doctrines they undertook to preach, must own, that no Assistance, less than divine, could render the Apostles successful in so bold an Encounter. That no Spirit, less than divine, could give any Man the Courage to attempt it, when they knew beforehand what Censures and Reproaches, what Indignities and Barbarities, they were to undergo. To see them speak to all People in their own Languages, who were just before *taken Notice of to be ignorant and unlearned*; to see them speak undauntedly before Synagogues, and Rulers, and Kings; to rejoice in Scourgings, and triumph over Death, who just before fled at the Approach of Danger; this must be the Work of God producing so amazing an Alteration in the Abilities and Tempers, the Apprehensions and the Behaviour of such Men.

This for themselves, and the Attempt itself: Then for the wonderful Success of that Vigour they were inspired to make this Combat with. The Apostles were unprovided of those Advantages, which are proper for propagating human Inventions. These rough unpolished Men were taken immediately from their Boats to teach the sublimest Philosophy, and they taught it with an unaffected Simplicity.

They were rejected as Wretches not fit to live, and yet the most celebrated Philosophers and Orators were not all of them together so powerful as one of the least of these. They enlightened Men's Understandings, convinced their Judgments, struck an Awe into Courts of Judicature, confounded Gainsayers, charmed Enemies, converted Kingdoms, put Subtlety to Silence, reformed a corrupted World, and were the only Persons that ever triumphed over the Disadvantages of long rooted Prepossessions, implacable Malice, and Contempt. In Despite of all these, their Authority was such, that their Followers were content not only to believe, but to sacrifice their Lives and Fortunes upon the Credit of these new Masters. Now such unparallelled, such deservedly surprizing Events can be ascribed to no other Author, than God.

And, as these Considerations prove it the Lord's doing, so do they prove, that the Persons who were made the Instruments for effecting it, were persuaded of its being so. For had they any Interests of their own in View, how easily might they have enriched themselves by making a Discovery of the Cheat, had it been one? And what should hinder them from doing it, or at least from sitting still, and not opposing it, had they not known the Doctrine they preached to be not only infallibly true, but absolutely necessary to be believed and published at the Expence of all that the World holds dear. For this in very Truth was the surprizing Difference

between

between the Christian, and all other Religions in the World. For,

Whereas all other Religions, even the *Jewish* not excepted, grew into Reverence by the help of Power, nay have used Rigour and Cruelty to make others embrace them. The Gospel, quite otherwise, was planted in Weakness, and Disgrace, in Persecutions, in Tears, and Prayers, and Patience. So evidently was this Plant of God's watering, and so not to be plucked up; but when depressed most, its Growth was most prosperous.

I have now gone through the several Heads at first propounded, for vindicating the Truth and Honour, the Excellence and Wisdom, and the divine Authority of the Christian Religion; and I hope in such a Manner, as to impartial Considerers, may answer the End of this pious Institution.

Dr. *SAMUEL*

Dr. *SAMUEL CLARKE*'s

DEMONSTRATION

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DEMONSTRATION

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GOD.

ALL those, who either are, or pretend to be Atheists, who either disbelieve the Being of God, or, what is all one, suppose him to be an unintelligent Being, who acts by Necessity, which in Truth, is not to act at all, are so upon one or other of these three Accounts. Either,

1. By Reason of their Ignorance and Stupidity, never considering any Thing at all, nor making Use of their Reason. Or

2. Because being debauched in their Practice, they have corrupted the Principles of Nature, and defaced their Reason; and being under the Power of evil Habits, are resolved to hear no Reason, which would oblige them to forsake their Vices. Or

3. From false Philosophy, pretending that the Arguments against the Being and Attributes of God, after the strictest Enquiry, are more conclusive, than those, by which we endeavour to prove them.

To the two former Sorts of Atheists I shall not apply myself, the one having not as yet arrived at

the Use of his natural Faculties, and the other having renounced them, won't be argued with as a rational Creature. The third Sort, who pretend to defend their Atheism upon Principles of Philosophy, are those to whom I shall direct myself.

But before I enter upon the main Argument, I shall premise several Concessions these Men are obliged to make.

And first, whatever Hypothesis these Men can frame against the Being of God, that very Hypothesis necessarily leads them to concede that the Being of a God would be very desirable: If they argue that the Notion of a God arises not from Nature but Policy, they must confess the Belief of a God is for the Interest of Society. If they suppose that the World was made by *Chance*, and is every Moment liable to be destroy'd by it, they must allow that it is better to live in a World that is under the Conduct of a wise and good God. If they argue against a God, from the Defects of the material World, this forces them to own, that it would have been better, had it been made by a wise Being. If they argue against Providence from the inequality they observe in the moral World, this is a Confession that it would be more desirable that the World should be governed by a just God, than by mere Chance. Lastly, if they suppose the World to be eternal, and consequently established by a blind and eternal Fatality, every Man must own that Liberty and Choice is a more elegible State: So that whether the Being of God can be demonstrated or not, it must be confessed to be a Thing very desirable: And if it be desirable at least that there should be a God, these Men upon their own Principles must be desirous to be convinced of their Errors, and are bound to consider seriously the Weight of the Arguments, by which the Being of God may be proved, and are consequently obliged to exclude all Scoffers

at

at Religion out of their Number, who deride at a venture without hearing Reason.

And further, since these Persons cannot but own the Supposition of a God to be desirable, they must necessarily grant, that supposing the Being and Attributes to be more likely to be true, than not, that Men ought to live piously and virtuously, and that Vice upon all Account is inexcusable.

Thus much being premised, I proceed to the main Thing I promised, namely, to shew to such considering Persons as I have described, that the Being and Attributes of God are not only probable, but strictly demonstrable from the Principles of right Reason. And this I will endeavour to do by one plain Series of Propositions necessarily connected, and following one from another, and such as cannot be denied without departing from that Reason, which all Atheists pretend to be the Foundation of their Unbelief.

PROP. I.

1st then, *Something must have existed from Eternity.*

For since something now is, 'tis manifest something always was, or otherwise Things must have risen out of nothing, which is absurd. Whatever exists, has a Cause of Existence, either in the Necessity of its own Nature, and then it must have been eternal; or in the Will of some other Being, and then that Being must have existed before it.

That something therefore has existed eternally is most certain, but how any thing can have existed eternally, that is, how an eternal Duration can now be actually past, we cannot comprehend; and to deny it would be to assert an express Contradiction.

The Objections therefore raised against the Eternity of any Thing from our Want of adequate Ideas of Eternity ought not to be regarded.

PROP. II.

2. *There has existed from Eternity some one unchangeable, and independent Being.*

For since something has been from Eternity, either there has always existed some one unchangeable and independent Being, or there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and dependent Beings, which is impossible: For if we consider such an infinite Progression, as one entire Series of endless, dependent Beings, 'tis plain they can have no Cause from *without* of its existence, because they include all Things in the Universe; and they can have no Reason from *within*, because no one Being in this infinite Succession is supposed independent and necessary, and consequently there must have existed one immutable and independent Being.

Otherwise thus: Either there was some one unchangeable and independent Being, from whence all Things proceeded, or they proceeded from one another, without any Cause.

And if so it was possible that never any Thing might have existed; what therefore determined such a Succession of Beings? Necessity it was not; because 'twas possible, in this Supposition, that they should *not have* existed at all: And other Being there was none; therefore it must be by nothing, which is a Contradiction; and consequently there must have existed from Eternity some *one* immutable *independent* Being.

PROP. III.

3. *That unchangeable and independent Being which has existed from Eternity without any eternal Cause of its Existence, must be self-existent, that is necessarily existing.*

Now to be *self-existent* is not to be *produced by its self*, which is a Contradiction, but *to exist by an absolute*

ſolute Neceſſity in the Nature of the Thing itſelf. And this Neceſſity muſt be *antecedent*; not indeed in Time, to the Exiſtence of the Being itſelf, becauſe that is eternal; but *antecedent* in the natural Order of our Ideas, to our Suppoſition of its Being, and force itſelf upon us when we are endeavouring to ſuppoſe no ſuch Being exiſts. For Example, when we would ſuppoſe no ſuch Being exiſts neceſſarily, we always find in our Minds ſome Ideas, as of Infinity and Eternity, and to ſuppoſe no Being to whom theſe belong, is abſurd.

From hence it follows,

1*ſt*, *That the true Idea of a ſelf-exiſtent, or neceſſarily exiſting Being, is the Idea of a Being, the Suppoſition of whoſe not exiſting is an expreſs Contradiction.*

For ſince ſomething muſt exiſt by the Neceſſity of its own Nature, that Neceſſity cannot be conſequent upon any foregoing Suppoſition, but muſt be a Neceſſity abſolutely ſuch in its own Nature, implying a Contradiction to ſuppoſe the contrary.

If it be aſked, what ſort of Idea the Idea of that Being is; I anſwer, 'tis the ſimpleſt Idea we can frame of a moſt *ſimple Being, abſolutely eternal, and infinite, original, and independent.*

For he who ſuppoſes no *original independent* Being, ſuppoſes a Contradiction; and he who ſuppoſes there may be no *eternal* and *infinite* Being, ſuppoſes likewiſe a Contradiction; becauſe when he has done his utmoſt to endeavour to imagine, that no ſuch Being exiſts, he cannot avoid imagining an *eternal* and *infinite nothing.*

2*dly*, From hence it follows, *that nothing beſides our own Exiſtence is ſo certain, as the Exiſtence of a ſupreme independent Cauſe.*

For though there may be ſome Difficulty to demonſtrate ſome other Attributes of ſuch a Being, yet there is no Man, who thinks at all, but may eaſily

become more certain, that there is something eternal, infinite, and self-existent, than he can be certain of any thing else.

3*dly*, Hence we may observe, that *our first Certainty of the Existence of God does not arise from this, that in the Idea we frame of him* in our Minds, *or rather in* the Definition *that we make of the* Word, God, *as signifying a Being of all possible Perfections, we include Self-Existence; but from hence, that 'tis demonstrable both* negatively, *that neither can all Things have arisen out of nothing, nor can they have depended one on another in an endless Succession; and also* positively, *that there is something in the Universe*, actually existing without us, *the Supposition of whose not existing plainly implies a Contradiction.*

I do not here say *positively*, that the Argument drawn from our including Self-Existence in the *Idea* of God, is wholly ineffectual to prove his actual Existence, but it is far from being a clear Demonstration. The Defect of that Argument seems to lie in this, that it extends only to the *nominal Idea*, or *mere Definition* of a self-existent Being; and does not apply that *nominal Idea* to the *real Idea* of a Being, *actually existing without us.* The bare having an Idea of the Proposition, *there is a self-existent Being*, proves indeed the Thing not to be impossible: But that it actually is, cannot be proved from the Idea, unless the *Certainty* of the actual Existence of a necessarily existing Being, follows from the *Possibility* of the Existence of such a Being. Which that it does in this Case, some learned Men have thought; but it is a much clearer Way of arguing, to demonstrate that there actually does exist such a Being without us, by shewing the Contradiction of the contrary Supposition, and at the same Time the absolute Impossibility of destroying or removing some Ideas, as of Eternity and Immensity,

Immenſity, which therefore muſt needs be the Attributes of a neceſſary Being actually exiſting.

4*thly*, From hence it follows, that the *material World cannot poſſibly be the firſt, and original Being, uncreated, independent, and of itſelf eternal.*

For if the material World be all this, we cannot without a Contradiction, conceive the Form and Motion of the World to be different from what it is, than which nothing is more eaſy. There is indeed a Neceſſity of Fitneſs that Things ſhould be as they are for the well being of the World; but an abſolute Neceſſity does not appear.

For if the Form of the World is neceſſary, then it muſt be a Contradiction in Terms, to ſuppoſe any Thing otherwiſe than it is, which is abſurd.

If Motion in general of all Matter is neceſſary, then it is a Contradiction for Matter to be at Reſt, which no Atheiſt will ſuppoſe.

Mr. *Toland* has pretended to prove that Motion, (that is, a Tendency to Motion) is eſſential to all Matter: But how philoſophically this Conſideration will ſhew. Tendency to Motion, is either a Tendency to move ſome one Way at once, or to move every Way at once. A Tendency to move one determinate Way, cannot be eſſential to any Matter, but to ſomething without; and a Tendency to move all Ways at once, is either a Contradiction, or could produce nothing but eternal Reſt. But,

If the Atheiſt ſuppoſes Motion only eſſential to ſome Matter, the Abſurdity, as to the Determination of Motion, ſtill follows. And moreover he ſuppoſes an abſolute Neceſſity not univerſal, which is abſurd.

Nor is the bare Matter of the World neceſſary: For if Matter is neceſſary exiſting, then 'tis either included in the Power of Gravitation, or not: If not, then in a World merely material, where no intelligent Being preſides, there never had been any

Motion,

Motion, as not necessary of itself. But if a Power of Gravitation be included in the pretended necessary Existence of Matter, then there must be a *Vacuum*, and if there be a *Vacuum*, then Matter may not be.

But if they say Matter may be necessary, tho' not necessary every where, I answer, absolute Necessity is absolute Necessity every where; and if Matter be absent from one Place, it may be from another, or from every Place.

Spinoza, who taught that there is no Difference of Substance, but that the whole and every Part of the *material World* is a necessarily existent Being, and that the Universe is God, endeavours by an Ambiguity of Expression, to elude the Arguments by which he foresaw his Assertion would be confuted. For having asserted that all Substance is necessarily existing, he would afterward explain it away by asserting that the Reason, why every Thing exists necessarily, is, because every Thing flows from the *Necessity of the divine Nature*. By which, if the Reader understands, that he means Things are therefore necessarily such as they are, because infinite Wisdom and Goodness could not make Things but in that Order which is fittest and wisest in the whole, he is mistaken: For such a Necessity is not natural, but moral, and contrary to the Author's Intention.

Further, if the Reader understands, that God was determined, not by a Necessity of Wisdom and Goodness, but by a mere natural Necessity to make all Things as they are; this is not the whole of *Spinoza*'s Meaning, for this is supposing God as a Substance distinct from the material World, which he denies. Nay further, if any one thinks he means that all Substances in the World are only Modifications of the divine Essence; neither is this all: For God thus may be supposed an *Agent* acting upon himself at least, which he denies. But his true Meaning is, that since it is impossible for any Thing

to

to be created by another, and also impossible for God to have created any Thing different from what it is; every Thing that exists, must be a Part of the divine Substance, not as a Modification caused in it by any Will or Wisdom in the whole, but as of absolute Necessity in itself, with respect to the *Manner* of the Existence of each Part, no less than with respect to the Self-Existence of the whole. Thus the Opinion of *Spinoza* comes to this, that the material World is the only Self-existent, or necessarily existing Being. And consequently he cannot avoid affirming that it is a Contradiction, for any Thing to be otherwise than it is. He must say it is a Contradiction to suppose the *Number*, or *Figure*, or *Order*, of the principal Parts of the World could have been different from what they now are. He must say Motion is of itself necessary; or else that Motion, as a dependent Being, has been eternally communicated from one Piece of Matter to another, without any original Cause of its being, either within itself, or from without; which, with other the like Consequences touching the Necessity of the Existence of Things, do unavoidably follow from this Opinion of *Spinoza*; and consequently that Opinion, *viz. that the Universe is the necessary Self-existent Being*, is false.

I have in this Attempt, to shew that the material World cannot be a *Self-existent Being*, omitted that Argument drawn from the Impossibility of the World's having been eternal, upon these two following Accounts.

1. Because the Question is not, *Whether the World could have been eternal, but whether it could have been Self-existent*, which is very different. And almost all the old Philosophers, who held the Eternity of the World, did not mean thereby it was Self-existent, they only prove, that something must have been eternal, and that the World could not arise

from

from nothing without a Cause, which is all *Ocellus*'s Arguments amount to: Or else that the World is an eternal Effect, flowing from the essential and immutable Energy of the divine Nature, which is *Aristotle*'s Opinion: Or else that it is an eternal voluntary Emanation from the all-wise and supreme Cause, which was the Opinion of the *Platonists*: None of which Opinions will help our modern Atheists, who would exclude the supreme Mind out of the World.

2. The other Reason why (in this Attempt to prove that the *material World cannot be the first Being, uncreated, independent, and self-existent*) I omitted the Argument usually drawn from the supposed absolute Impossibility of the World's Eternity, is, because it is impossible by this Argument so to disprove the Eternity of the World, but that an Atheist will understand it to prove against any Thing's being eternal, and consequently proves nothing: That the material World is not self-existent may be strictly demonstrated; but the Time when the World was created can be only taken from Scripture.

To endeavour to prove, that there is no such Thing as infinite Time, from the Impossibility of finite Parts ever composing an infinite, is to suppose Infinites made up of finite Parts, which have no Proportion to it.

PROP. IV.

4. *The Essence of that self-existent Being is incomprehensible.*

That there is such a Being, and that Matter is not that Being, I have proved. But what his Essence is, is above our Understanding; and yet it does not diminish the Certainty of the Proof of his Being; for it is one Thing to know a Thing exists, and another to know its Essence. We are ignorant of

of the Essence of all other Things, and therefore there is no Reason to disbelieve the Being of God, because his Essence is incomprehensible.

From hence we may observe,

1. The Weakness of such as have presumed to imagine infinite Space to be a just Representation or adequate Idea of the Essence of the supreme Cause; when infinite Space is nothing but an abstract Idea of Immensity or Infinity, even as Duration is of Eternity. And it would be as proper to say Eternity is the Essence of God, as Immensity. Indeed they seem both to be but Attributes of an Essence incomprehensible to us.

2. From hence appears the Vanity of the Schoolmen, who, lest they should seem ignorant of any Thing, give us Terms of Art which have no Signification: Thus they tell us concerning the Essence of God, that he is *purus actus*, *mera forma*, Words which either mean nothing, or else express the Perfection of his Power, which is contrary to their Intention.

PROP. V.

5. *That the self-existent Being must be eternal.*

The Ideas of Eternity and Self-Existence are so connected, that because something must of Necessity be independent, it must be necessarily self-existent: And that which has no external Cause of its Existence, must of Necessity be everlasting.

As to the Manner of this eternal Existence, 'tis manifest, it transcends the Manner of our Existence; we cannot comprehend past, present, and future; the eternal on the contrary has an unchangeable Comprehension of all Things, that are past, present, or to come, as if there were no Succession at all. Thus far we can speak intelligibly of the Eternity of God.

PROP.

PROP. VI.

6. *The self-existent Being must of Necessity be infinite and omnipresent.*

The Idea of Infinity, as well as of Eternity, are so closely connected with that of Self-Existence, that because 'tis impossible but something must be infinite of itself, therefore it must of Necessity be self-existent; and because something must of Necessity be self-existent, therefore it is necessary that it must likewise be infinite.

To be self-existent is to exist by an absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing itself: Now this Necessity being absolute, and not depending on any outward Cause, 'tis evident it must be *every where*, as well as *always*, the same. For a Necessity which is not every where the same, is a consequential Necessity only, depending upon some external Cause. For a Necessity absolutely such, has no Relation to Time and Place. What therefore exists by an absolute Necessity must be infinite as well as eternal.

Hence it follows,

1. That the Infinity of the self-existent Being must be an Infinity of *Fulness*, as well as *Immensity*, *i. e.* without *Limits*, *Diversity*, *Defect*, or *Interruption*.

For if Matter could be boundless, it might have Vacuities, and therefore could not be in this compleat Sense *infinite*; but what is self-existent must be every where alike; and consequently must have a true Infinity, and *Immensity*, and *Fullness*.

2. From hence it follows, that the self-existent Being must be a most simple, unchangeable, incorruptible Being, without Parts, Figure, Motion, Divisibility, which Things imply Finiteness in their very Notion, and are inconsistent with Infinity.

But how he is infinite, we cannot comprehend,

yet that he is actually omnipresent we are as certain of, as we are that there must be something infinite.

PROP. VII.

7. *The self-existent Being must of Necessity be but one.*

To suppose two, or more necessarily existing Beings, independent from each other implies this Contradiction, that each of them may be supposed to exist alone. So that it will be no Contradiction to imagine one not to exist, and then neither of them will be necessarily existing. Therefore whatsoever exists necessarily is the one simple Essence of the self-existent Being: And whatever differs from that is not necessarily existing; because in absolute Necessity there can be no Difference of Existence.

From hence it follows,

1. That the *Unity* of God is a *real* not *figurative* Unity.

2. The Impossibility of two independent Principles; for since Self-Existence is necessary Existence, 'tis absurd that God and Matter should both necessarily exist.

3. Hence we may observe *Spinoza*'s Weakness, who because the self-existent Being was but one, concluded, that the *whole World is one uniform Substance, eternal, and necessary.* Whereas he ought to have concluded, that because all Things in the World are different, therefore *none of these Things are necessary or self-existent, but depend upon some external Cause, that is, on the one supreme, unchangeable, self-existent Being.*

That which led *Spinoza* into his foolish Opinion, is that absurd Definition of Substance, that *it is Something, the Idea of which does not depend on, or pre-suppose the Idea of any other Thing, from which it might proceed; but includes in itself necessary Existence.* Which Definition is either *false*, and then his Doctrine

trine built upon it falls to the Ground: Or if it be *true*, then neither Matter, nor Spirit, nor any *finite* Being whatsoever, is in that Sense properly a Substance, but the Self-existent Being: And so it will prove nothing to his main Purpose, which was to make us believe, that every Thing in the World, is, by an absolute Necessity, just what it is, and could not have been otherwise. For since according to his Definition of Substance, neither Matter nor Spirit, nor any finite Beings are Substances, but only Modes; how will it follow, that because Substance is self-existent, therefore all these Modes are so too? Why because from an *infinite Cause*, *infinite Effects must follow*. Very true; supposing that infinite self-existent Cause, not to be a *voluntary*, but a *necessary Agent*, which Supposition is the Question begged.

PROP. VIII.

8. *The self-existent Being, and original Cause of all Things must be intelligent.*

1. And since there are in Things different Perfections, it must needs be, that the self-existent Being, which is the Cause of all Things, must have in itself the highest Degree of the Perfections of all Things; but Intelligence is one of their Perfections, therefore the self-existent Being must be intelligent.

The Atheist cannot avoid this, but by denying, that there is an intelligent Being, which every Man can refute; or that Intelligence is only a Composition of Figure and Motion, which I will shew to be absurd.

2. Since in Man in particular there is Intelligence, there must either have been an infinite Succession of Men, without any original Cause at all, which is refuted by the second Proposition: Or else they must have had this Perception from something that had

had no such Quality. Or else it must have been produced by some intelligent superior Being. But that Perception cannot rise out of that, which had no Perception, is proved thus. Nothing can give to another any Perfection which it has not in itself; but Perception is a Perfection, and therefore not an Effect or Composition of Figure and Motion.

If any reply, that Intelligence may arise from what has no Intelligence, as Sounds, Colours, and Taste arise from Figure and Motion, which have no such Qualities in themselves: And as Figure and Divisibility are given from God, who has no such Qualities himself. I answer,

1*st*, That Sounds, Colours, and Taste, *&c.* are not the Effects of Figure and Motion, but Modifications of the Mind, and are not caused, but occasioned by the Impressions of Figure and Motion.

But should we suppose the Mind to be mere Matter, yet then the Atheist must allow not only Figure and Motion, but Perception, so that Sounds cannot be caused by mere Figure and Motion. And as to Figure and Divisibility being given by God, who has no such Qualities in himself, I answer, that Figure and Divisibility are not the real Powers, but the Imperfections of Matter. And that though no Cause can give what it has not, the Effects may have Imperfections, the Cause has not. Though therefore Figure, Divisibility, and the like, may be in the Effect, and not in the Cause; yet Intelligence cannot possibly be so.

2*dly*, It will appear, that *Intelligence is really a distinct Perfection, and not the Effect of unintelligent Figure and Motion.* And that for this plain Reason, because Intelligence is not Figure, and Consciousness is not Motion.

3. The self-existent Being must be intelligent, from the *Variety*, *Order*, and *Beauty* of the World;

and from the Fitness of all Things in it to their proper Ends. See *Boyle of final Causes*, and *Ray of the Creation.*

4. The self-existent Being must be intelligent from the original of Motion.

'Tis evident, there is now Motion in the World. If it begun in any Time, its first Mover is an intelligent Being; for unintelligent Matter cannot begin to move itself.

If Motion was eternal, it was either caused by some eternal intelligent Being, or was itself self-existent. If Motion was eternally caused by an intelligent eternal Being, this is granting the Question. If it was of itself, it is self-existent; then no Part of it could be at rest; and yet because the *Determination* of this self-existent Motion must be *every Way* at once, the Effect of it could be nothing but a perpetual Rest. Besides it must imply also a contradiction to suppose, there might possibly have been originally *more* or *less* Motion in the World, than there *actually* was; which is absurd. But if it be said, that Motion, without any *Necessity* in its own Nature, and without any external necessary Cause, has existed from Eternity, by an endless Succession; this is proved by the second Proposition to be absurd. It remains therefore that Motion must be caused originally by some intelligent Being.

From hence it follows, that since the self-existent Being is proved to be intelligent, the material World cannot be that Being, which is not intelligent.

PROP. IX. *The self-existent Being is not a necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty.*

The Truth of which appears,

1. In that it is a necessary Consequence of the last Proposition. For Intelligence without Liberty, is, in Respect of any Power and Perfection, no Intelligence at all. It is indeed a Consciousness, but it is merely a passive one; a Consciousness not of

acting, but purely of being acted upon; without *Liberty* nothing can be said to be an Agent, or Cause of any Thing. For to act necessarily, is really not to act at all, but to be acted upon. What therefore *Spinoza* asserts concerning the Production of all Things from the Necessity of the divine Nature, has no Meaning. For if by the Necessity of God he means not the Rectitude of his Will, whereby he is determined to do what is best, (as confessedly he does not) but on the contrary means an absolute Necessity; it follows, that when he says God, by the Necessity of his Nature, is the Cause of all Things, he understands him to be a Cause in no other Sense, than as if a Man should say, that a Stone is the Cause of its own falling. But his Opinion amounts to this, that all Things are self-existent, and consequently, that the material World is God. In like Manner, when they speak of the Knowledge of God, they assert this Power to be no Cause of acting.

2. If the supreme Cause is not a Being indued with Liberty, then it will follow, that nothing which is not, could possibly have been; and that nothing which is, could possibly not have been.

All which is absurd; for the Things in Nature appear plainly to be the most arbitrary that can be imagined, to be the Effects of Wisdom, and not of Necessity. A Necessity of Fitness there certainly is; but that is a Demonstration of a wise Agent.

There is no Appearance of Necessity. Motion and Gravitation might have been different; the Number of the heavenly Bodies might have been more or less, and all other Things in the World different.

It might be objected with more Plausibleness, that the supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must do what is best in the whole: But this would not serve the Purpose; for this is a Necessity not of

Fate, but of Fitness; a Necessity whose Foundation is such a Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly; or for a Nature infinitely Good, to chuse Evil.

3. If there be any final Cause of any Thing in the Universe, then the supreme Being is not a necessary, but a free Agent. Whoever pleases, may for Satisfaction on this Head, consult *Mr.* Boyle *on final Causes, and* Ray *on the Creation.*

4. If the supreme Cause be a necessary Agent, it is impossible that the Effect of that Cause should be *finite.* 'Tis plain, every Effect of such an infinite uniform Nature, acting every where necessarily alike, must of Necessity be infinite; which is absurd, and contrary to Experience.

5. If the supreme Cause be not a free Agent, then in every Effect (for Instance in Motion) there must have been a Progression of Causes *in infinitum*, without any original Cause at all. And since therefore there is no possible Way to avoid this Absurdity, but by granting that there must be somewhere a Principle of Motion and Action, which is Liberty, I suppose I have proved the supreme Cause to be a free Agent.

From what has been said upon this Head, it appears that Liberty is not in itself an absolute Contradiction, as the Pleaders for Necessity contend. For that which actually is, is not impossible, as has been proved; nay it is impossible for Liberty not to be in the supreme Cause.

The principle Argument used by the Maintainers of Fate, *viz.* That since every Thing must have a Cause, every Determination of the Will of an intelligent Being must, as all other Things, arise from some Cause, and that from another, and so on *in infinitum*, proves the direct contrary to what they intend. For since every Thing must have a Cause of its Being, either from without, or in the Necessity of its own

own Nature, and as it is a Contradiction to suppose an infinite Series of dependent Beings; therefore there must be some independent Being, and who being acted upon by nothing beyond itself, must necessarily have a Principle of acting, which is the Idea of Liberty.

'Tis true, this Argument proves only the Liberty of the first Cause: But it evinces in general, that Liberty is so far from being impossible in itself, that on the contrary it is impossible, but that it must be some where. And this being established, I will hereafter prove, that it is a Power capable of being communicated to created Beings.

PROP. X. *The self-existent Being must be all-powerful.*

This Proposition is evident. For since nothing can be self-existent but himself, the Powers of all Things are derived from him, and must therefore be perfectly subject to him.

The only Question is, what is the true Meaning of *infinite Power*.

1. Infinite Power reaches to all possible Things, but cannot be said to extend to work a Contradiction. As that a Thing should be and not be at the same Time, because that is no Power at all.

2. Infinite Power cannot be said to weaken itself, or destroy its Being.

These Things imply *natural* Imperfection, and cannot possibly belong to the necessary self-existent Being.

3. But infinite Power includes a Power of creating Matter; which is denied by all Atheists as a Thing impossible, only because they cannot comprehend it. But to reduce it to a Contradiction they are not able. For to say that something which once was not, may since have begun to exist, is neither directly, nor by any Consequence whatsoever, to assert,

sert, that that which *is not*, can *be*, while it *is not*; or that that which *is*, *cannot be*, while it *is*.

'Tis true, we who never saw any Thing *created*, but only *formed*, are apt to endeavour to conform our Idea of *Creation* to that of Formation; and to imagine, that as in all Formations there is some pre-existing Matter out of which a Thing is formed, so in Creation there must be considered a pre-existent Nothing, out of which a Thing is created, which looks like a Contradiction. Whereas the true Notion of Creation is bringing something into Being, that before had no Being; or causing something to exist now, which did not exist before.

But further, the Creation of Matter is demonstrated to be true from the Absurdity of supposing Matter necessarily existing; as I have shewn before.

4. 'Tis possible for infinite Power to create an immaterial cogitative Substance, indued with a Power of beginning Motion, and with a Liberty of Will.

This being always denied by all Atheists, I will be particular in the Proof of it.

1. Then it is possible for infinite Power to create an immaterial cogitative Substance.

That there can be a cogitative Substance, is granted by all: And that if there be any immaterial Substances, it is reasonable to believe, that cogitative Substances are those immaterial Substances. The only Thing therefore that remains to be proved is this, that immaterial Substances are not impossible. Now,

Whoever affirms they are, must affirm, that whatever is not Matter, is nothing: Or in other Words, whatever we have no Idea of is nothing. By which Argument a blind Man may demonstrate, that Light and Colour are impossible, because he can't comprehend them: If therefore a blind Man's want of Ideas be not a sufficient Proof of the Impossibility

possibility of Light, how comes our want of Ideas to be a Demonstration of the Impossibility of immaterial Substances? If the blind Man has Testimony that there is Light; so have we both Testimony and Reason to prove, that there are immaterial Substances, though we have no Knowledge of their simple Essence. For Instance, Gravitation cannot be caused by Matter acting upon the Surfaces of Matter, which is all it can do, but must be caused by something which continually penetrates its solid Substance. But in Animals, which have the Power of Self-Motion, we see such Powers, as evince them either to be the Properties of immaterial Substances; or else that Matter is as unknown to us, as Immateriality. And then how are immaterial Beings more impossible than material?

From what has been said, we may answer all Objections against the Immateriality of human Souls.

For since there may be immaterial Substances, there is all the Reason in the World to believe, that thinking Substance is such. There is one Objection of the Atheist against the Immateriality of the Soul, which is this: That seeing the only Means we have of Perception are the five Senses, and these all depend upon the Organs of the Body, therefore the Soul without the Body can have no Perception, and consequently is nothing. Now of him I would ask this one Question: Are the five Senses the only possible Way of Perception? Or are these Things arbitrary? If they are arbitrary, then the Want of these does not infer a total Want of Perception; but the same Soul, which has now the Powers of Reflection, Reason, and Judgment, which are Faculties different from Sense, may as easily in another State have different Ways of Perception. But if they say that these Senses are necessarily the only Ways of Perception, how does this appear? For suppose

Men had been created with four Senses only, they had then concluded there were but four Ways of Perception, with the same Reason as they have now to fancy there are but five. As to the Difficulty of perceiving the Union between Body and Soul, we know as much of that, as we do of the Union of the infinitely divisible Parts of human Body, which yet no Man doubts of.

2*dly*, It is possible to infinite Power, to indue a Creature with the Power of beginning Motion; which I thus prove. If a Power of beginning Motion be, as I have proved, in the supreme Cause, then it is not impossible to be communicated to created Beings, because no Powers are impossible to be communicated, but those only which imply Self-Existence, and absolute Independency.

I know the Maintainers of Fate are confident that a Power of beginning Motion, is nothing less than being independent. But this is trifling with Words; for a Power of acting independently *in this Sense*, communicated at the pleasure of the supreme Cause, is no more a real Independency, than the Power of *existing*, or the Power of being conscious, can be said to imply Independency. In reality, 'tis as hard to conceive, how *Consciousness* should be communicated to a created Being, as how the Power of Self-Motion should be so. And yet no Man doubts but that he has truly a Power of *Perception*: Therefore the Difficulty of conceiving how the Power of Self-motion can be communicated, ought not to be regarded, since we are sure we have really such a Power.

3*dly*, 'Tis possible to infinite Power to indue a Creature with Freedom, or Liberty of Will.

The same Arguments that prove a Power of beginning Motion to be possible, will prove this, *viz.* because Liberty must of Necessity be in the supreme Cause, and therefore cannot be impossible: And

becauſe it implies no Contradiction to ſuppoſe it communicated, as being no harder to conceive, than the forementioned Power of beginning Motion: And becauſe the Arguments drawn from Experience are ſtronger on the one Side, than thoſe ariſing from the Difficulty of our apprehending the Thing can be on the other. But foraſmuch as this is a Queſtion of the greateſt Concern in Matters of Religion and human Life, and conſtantly denied by Atheiſts, I will endeavour to ſhew the Weakneſs of the Arguments, by which theſe Men pretend to demonſtrate, that we have *no Liberty of Will.* The Arguments are reducible to theſe two.

1*ſt*, That ſince every Effect muſt needs be produced by ſome Cauſe, ſo every Determination of the *Will*, muſt be determined by ſome external Cauſe, and conſequently there cannot be any *Liberty of Will.*

2*dly*, That Thinking, and all its Modes, are Qualities of Matter; and conſequently, ſince Matter has not a Power of beginning Motion, 'tis impoſſible there ſhould be any ſuch Thing as Freedom of Will. Now to theſe Arguments I oppoſe,

1*ſt*, That every Effect cannot be the Product of external Cauſes:

2*dly*, That *Thinking* and *Willing* are not Qualities of Matter.

3*dly*, That ſuppoſing *Thinking* and *Willing* to be Qualities of Matter, this would not prove the Freedom of Will impoſſible.

1*ſt*, Every Effect cannot be the Product of external Cauſes, but there muſt be of Neceſſity ſomewhere a beginning of Operation. The ſeveral Parts of this Propoſition have already been proved in the *ſecond* and *ninth* Propoſition.

2*dly*, Thinking and Willing are not, nor can be Qualities, or Affections of Matter.

That there may be immaterial Subſtances, hath already

already been shewn; that Thinking and Willing are Powers different from Solidity, Figure and Motion, hath also been proved under the eighth Proposition. It follows therefore, that Thinking and Willing *may possibly be*, nay are certainly Powers of immaterial Substance; seeing they cannot be Affections of Matter, unless we will mean by Matter, not what the Word in all other Cases signifies, a *solid Substance*, capable of Division, Figure, and Motion, and of whatever Properties can arise from the Modifications of these; but *Substance in general*, capable of unknown Powers entirely different from these, and from whatever can possibly result from these: In which confused Sense of the Word, could Matter be supposed capable of thinking and willing, it would signify nothing to the Advantage of our Adversaries. In the mean Time, the Absurdity of supposing thinking and willing to be Qualities of Matter, may sufficiently appear from the Senseleſsness of Mr. *Hobbs*'s Explication of the Nature and Original of Sensation and Consciousness. *The immediate Cause of Sensation*, saith he, *is this: The Object, or something flowing from it, presseth the outermost Part of the Organ, and that Pressure is communicated to the innermost Parts of the Organ; where by the Resistance or Reaction of the Organ, causing a Pressure outwards, contrary to the Pressure of the Object inwards, there is made up a Phantasm, or Image; which Phantasm*, saith he, *is the Sensation itself.* (*Hobbs. de Sensione, & Motu Animali.*) Again: *The Cause of Sensation is an Object pressing the Organs, which Pressure is by Means of the Nerves conveyed to the Brain, and so to the Heart; whereby the Resistance or Counter-Pressure of the Heart outwards, is made an Image or Phantasm, which is Sensation.* *Leviath.* cap. i.

But this by no Means explains the real Nature of Sense or Consciousness. The Object, by communicating

nicating a Preſſure thro' the Organ to the Senſory, does indeed raiſe an Image, *i. e.* make a certain Impreſſion on the Brain. But wherein conſiſts the Power of *perceiving* this Impreſſion? Or what Similitude hath this Impreſſion to the Thought excited in the Mind? None at all. So that Mr. *Hobbs*'s Definition, that it is itſelf nothing but the Image made in the Brain, by the Preſſure communicated from the Object, is in other Words, defining *Blueneſs*, to be the Image of a *Square*. I do not miſrepreſent him in the leaſt, for he confeſſes, that all *ſenſible Qualities, ſuch as Colour, Sound, and the like, are in Objects themſelves nothing but Motion; and becauſe Motion can produce nothing but Motion, therefore in* us *alſo the Perception of theſe ſenſible Qualities are nothing but different Motions.* If then the Image of the Object made in the Brain by Figure and Motion, be the Senſation itſelf, is not Senſation, bare Figure and Motion? And are not all the forementioned Abſurdities unavoidable Conſequences of his Opinion?

Mr. *Hobbs* being aware of this Difficulty, therefore in Caſe he ſhould be too hard preſſed, he gives us a Hint, that poſſibly *Senſation may be ſomething more*, viz. a Power *of Perception naturally inherent in all Matter; only it wants the Organs and Memory of Animals to expreſs its Senſation.* But this is as abſurd as the other Opinion of Thought being mere Motion. For what can be more ridiculous, than to imagine that Matter is as eſſentially conſcious, as it is extended? From this Suppoſition, every Piece of Matter, being made up of endleſs diviſible Parts, is made up alſo of innumerable Conſciouſneſſes; which is abſurd.

Others, who would make Thinking to be an Affection of Matter, contend, that God by his Power indues certain Syſtems of Matter with a Faculty of Thinking. But this amounts to nothing.

For

For either our Idea of *Matter* is a true and distinct Idea, or it is not. If it be a true Idea, that Matter is nothing but a solid Substance capable only of Division, Figure, and Motion, with all the Effects of their several Compositions; then it is absolutely impossible for Thinking to belong to *Matter*; because it cannot arise from any *Modification* or Composition of any or all of these Qualities. But if our Idea of Matter is wrong; and by *Matter* is meant *Substance in general*, capable of Thinking, and of numberless unknown Properties besides, yet this makes nothing to our Adversaries Advantage; and is at least not *a clearer Way* of talking, than to attribute the same Properties to an *immaterial* Substance, and keep the *Idea* of Matter distinct. For I affirm,

3*dly*, That supposing Thinking and Willing could be, and really were, only Qualities of *Matter*, yet this would not prove the Freedom of the Will to be impossible. For since we have proved, that Thinking and Willing cannot be the Effects of Figure and Motion, whosoever will make Thinking and Willing to be Qualities of *Matter*, must suppose Matter capable of Properties different from Figure and Motion: And if it be capable of Properties different from Figure and Motion, then it can never be proved from the Effects of Figure and Motion being all necessary, that the Effects of other, and totally distinct Properties, must likewise be necessary.

Mr. *Hobbs* therefore and his Followers are guilty of a shameful Fallacy. For supposing *Matter* to be capable of Thinking and Willing, they contend the Soul is mere Matter; and knowing that the Effects of Figure and Motion must be all neneſſary, they conclude the Operations of the Mind must be all necessary: That is, when they would prove the Soul to be mere *Matter*, then they suppose

pose Matter not only capable of Figure and Motion, but also of other unknown Properties; and when they would prove the Will to be *necessary*, then they divest Matter again of its unknown Properties, and make it mere Solidity, endued only with Figure and Motion.

Wherefore distinguishing their ambiguous Use of the Word *Matter*, they are unavoidably reduced to one of these two Concessions. If they mean by *Matter*, only a solid Substance, endued only with Figure and Motion, then the Soul cannot be mere Matter, because, as Mr. *Hobbs* owns, Figure and Motion can produce nothing but Figure and Motion.

From whence it follows, that the Soul being something immaterial, they have no Argument left to prove it cannot have a *Power of beginning Motion*, which is a plain Instance of *Liberty*. But if they will by *Matter* mean *Substance in general*, capable of unknown Properties, then they must no longer argue against the Possibility of *Liberty*, from the Effects of Figure and Motion being all unavoidably necessary; because Liberty will not consist in the Effects of Figure and Motion, but in those unknown Properties of Matter, which these Men can no more explain, or argue about, than about immaterial Substances. The Truth therefore is, they must needs suppose Thinking to be merely an Effect or Composition of Figure and Motion, if they will give any Strength to their Arguments against Liberty; and then the Question will be, not whether God can make *Matter* think, or no, but the Question is, whether *Figure* and *Motion* in any Composition or Division, can possibly be *Perception and Thought*; which is absurd. The Sum is this: If the Soul be an *immaterial* Substance, then Mr. *Hobbs*'s Arguments against the Possibility of *Liberty*, drawn from the Properties of *Matter*, are nothing to the Purpose. But the Atheists contend, that the

Soul

Soul is nothing but mere *Matter*. Then either by *Matter* they must mean *Substance in general*, endued with unknown Properties, as well *active* as *passive*, which is to destroy our Idea of Matter, and all their Arguments against Liberty, which they have founded on the *known* Properties of Matter; or else they must speak out, as they really mean, that Thinking and Willing are nothing but the Effects of Figure and Motion, which I have shewn is absurd.

There are some other Arguments against the Possibility of Liberty, which Men by attempting to answer, have made appear considerable, tho' they are beside the Question. As for Instance, those drawn from *the Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding*; and from *the Certainty of the divine Præscience*.

As to the former, *viz. the Necessity*, &c. This is only a Necessity on Supposition; a Necessity that a Man should will a Thing while he does will it. For the *last Judgment of the Understanding*, is nothing but a Man's final determining to choose, or not to choose a Thing, which is the *Act of Volition*: Or if the *Act of Volition* be distinguished from the *last Judgment of the Understanding*, then the *Act of Volition* consequent upon the *last Judgment of the Understanding*, is not determined by *that*, as by a *physical Efficient*, but only as a *moral Motive*. But the *last Judgment of the Understanding*, is not *a physical Efficient*, but a *moral Motive*; the Necessity therefore by which the *Power of Acting* follows the *Judgment of the Understanding*, is only a *moral Necessity*, which is consistent with natural Liberty.

2. The other Argument against the Impossibility of *Liberty*, is the *Certainty of the divine Præscience*.

But if no other Arguments can prove antecedently, that all Actions are necessary, the *divine Præscience* can never do it. For Præscience has no Influence upon

upon the Existence of any Thing. All that they can object is, that Fore-Knowledge implies Certainty, and Certainty Necessity; but neither is it true, that Certainty implies Necessity; or Fore-knowledge any other Certainty than such a one as would have been, had there been no Fore-Knowledge.

1. For Certainty of Fore-Knowledge does not cause the Certainty of Things, but is itself founded in their Existence.

Whatever now is, it is certain that it is, and it was from Eternity as certain, that it would be, as it now is. And this Certainty of Event is equally the same, whether the Thing could be foreknown or not.

Now Fore-Knowledge in God is the same as Knowledge, and as Knowledge has no Influence on the Things that are; so Fore-knowledge has none on those that shall be.

2. As Fore-knowledge implies no other Certainty, than would be was there no Fore-knowledge; so neither does this Certainty of Event imply Necessity.

For let a Fatalist suppose, what he does not yet grant, that a Man has a Power of acting freely, and suppose that these Actions could not be foreseen, yet there will be the same Certainty of Event in every Action, as if they were necessary.

For Instance, suppose a Man by an internal Principle of Motion and Freedom of Will, does some Action to *Day*, which could not be foreseen *Yesterday*, was there not nevertheless the same *Certainty of Event*, as if it had been foreseen? That is, would it not, notwithstanding the supposed *Freedom*, have been as certain a Truth Yesterday, and from Eternity, that this Action was in Event *to be performed to Day*, as it is now a *certain Truth*, that it is performed. Mere *Certainty* of *Event* does not imply *Necessity*. And consequently *Fore knowledge* however

difficult

difficult to be explained, as to the *Manner* of it, implies no other Certainty of Event, than what would otherwise have been.

Having shewed the real Existence of Liberty; I will shew what is the Cause of *Evil*. All that we call *Evil* is, 1. Either an *Evil of Imperfection*, or 2. *Natural Evil*. Or, 3. *moral Evil*. The *First* is not properly an Evil, for every Perfection being the free Gift of God, it is no more an Evil in any Creature to want any Perfection, than it would have been, if they had never been created. The *Second* Kind of Evil is either a necessary Consequence of the former as Death, and then it is properly no *Evil*; or else it is counterpoised in the whole with greater Good, as the Afflictions of good Men, and then it is properly no Evil. Or else 'tis a *Punishment*, and then it is a Consequence of *moral Evil*. And *this* arises from the Abuse of Liberty, which God gave his Creatures for better Purposes; only they, contrary to his Commands, have abused what was necessary to the Perfection of the whole to the Corruption of themselves. And thus *Evil* entered into the World, without any Diminution to the divine Goodness.

Prop. XI. *The supreme Cause and Author of all Things must of Necessity be infinitely wise.*

For he who is an infinite, omnipresent, intelligent Being, must perfectly know all Things that are. And he, who is the Author of all Things, eternal, and self-existent, from whom alone all the Powers of all Things are derived, and on whom they depend, must also know perfectly all the Consequences of those Powers, that is, all Possibilities of Things to come, and what is best and wisest to be done. And having shewn, that the supreme Cause is *all Powerful*, so that he can no more be prevented by Force, than he can be hindered by Error, from effecting what is wisest to be done; therefore

therefore every Effect of the ſupreme Cauſe muſt be the Product of infinite Wiſdom. This is Demonſtration *a priori*. The Proof *a poſteriori* of the infinite Wiſdom of God, is the conſummate Excellency of his Works in the Creation of the World.

PROP. XII. *The ſupreme Author of all Things muſt be infinitely Good, Juſt, and True.*

That there are *different Relations* of Things to one another, is as certain as there are different Things in the World. That from theſe *different Relations of different Things*, there neceſſarily ariſes an *Agreement* or *Diſagreement* of ſome Things to others, or a *Fitneſs* or *Unfitneſs* of the Application or different Relations to one another, is likewiſe as certain, as that there is any Difference in the Nature of Things, or that different Things do exiſt. Further, that there is a *Fitneſs* or *Suitableneſs* of certain *Circumſtances* to certain *Perſons*, and an *Unſuitableneſs* of others, founded in the *Nature of Things*, and the *Qualifications of Perſons*, antecedent to *Will*, and to all *arbitrary or poſitive Appointment whatſoever*, muſt be owned by every one, who will not affirm, that it is as *fit* that the Innocent ſhould be *miſerable*, as free from Pain.

Now what theſe *Relations* are in themſelves, that they appear to be to the Underſtanding of all intelligent Beings, that are not imperfect or depraved in it. And by this Underſtanding of the natural Relations of Things, the *Actions likewiſe* of all intelligent Beings are directed, unleſs their Will be corrupted by particular *Intereſt* or *Affection*, or ſwayed by unreaſonable *Luſt*. The ſupreme Cauſe therefore, ſince he is *infinite* in *Knowledge*, ſo that he cannot *err*, or be deceived in the true Relations of Things; and ſince he is likewiſe *ſelf-exiſtent*, *independent*, and *all-powerful*, ſo that having no want of any Thing, 'tis impoſſible his *Will* ſhould be influenced by any wrong *Affection*, or be limited in

his Power. He must of Necessity do always what he knows to be fittest to be done, that is, he must always act according to the strict Rules of infinite *Goodness*, *Justice*, and *Truth*, and all other *moral* Perfections. In particular, the supreme Being must be good; that is, as he is happy himself, he must have an unalterable Disposition to communicate Good to his Creatures according to their Capacities. That he must be infinitely good, appears likewise from hence, that being necessarily all-sufficient, he must be infinitely removed from all Malice and Envy, which are the Effects of Want, Imperfection, or Depravation.

Again: He must be infinitely just; because the Rule of Equity being nothing but a necessary Relation of Things one to another, and the Execution of Justice a suiting of the Circumstances of Things to the Qualifications of Persons; 'tis evident, that he who knows this Rule of Equity, and necessarily judges of Things as they are; who has compleat Power to execute Justice, and no possible Temptation to deviate therefrom, must do always what is right.

Lastly. *He must be true and faithful in his Promises.*

For the Reason of falsifying is either Rashness, or Forgetfulness, Inconstancy, or Impotency, Fear of Evil, or Hope of Gain; from all which, as an infinitely wise, all-sufficient, and good Being, must be infinitely removed: So therefore, as he cannot be deceived himself, he cannot possibly deceive others.

To this Argumentation *a priori*, there can be opposed but one Objection drawn on the contrary *a posteriori*, from Experience and Observation of the unequal Distributions of Providence in the World. But the Objection is wide of the Question: For concerning the Justice and Goodness of Good, no Judg-

ment is to be made from a partial View of a few ſmall Portions of his Diſpenſations, but from an entire Conſideration of the whole, and conſequently not only the ſhort Duration of the preſent State, but all that is paſt and to come muſt be taken into the Account, and then every Thing will appear juſt.

From this Account of the moral Attributes of God, it follows,

1. That tho' all the Actions of God are entirely free, and conſequently the Exerciſe of his moral Attributes cannot be ſaid to be neceſſary in the ſame Senſe of Neceſſity, as his Exiſtence and Eternity are neceſſary; yet it is nevertheleſs as truly and abſolutely impoſſible for God not to do what his moral Attributes require him to do, as if he was a neceſſary Agent: And 'tis as much a Contradiction to ſuppoſe him to act contrary to his Juſtice, Goodneſs, and Truth, as to ſuppoſe him diveſted of Infinity, Power, and Exiſtence. The one is contrary to the *abſolute Neceſſity of his Nature*, the other to the *unalterable Rectitude* of his *Will*. The one *is a Contradiction in Terms*, the other to the *Perfections of the divine Nature*.

2. Tho' God is a free Agent, he cannot but do what is beſt and wiſeſt in the whole. Becauſe it is as great an Impoſſibility in Choice, for infinite Wiſdom to chooſe to act unwiſely, or infinite Goodneſs to chooſe what is not good, as it is natural for abſolute Neceſſity to fail producing its neceſſary Effect. Indeed there was no Neceſſity in Nature for him to create any Thing, being all-ſufficient; or to preſerve them when created, becauſe he would be ſelf-ſufficient without them. But it was fit that infinite Wiſdom ſhould communicate itſelf; and therefore it was neceſſary that Things ſhould be made, as infinite Wiſdom ſaw beſt; and that they ſhould while in Being, be governed according to the eternal Laws of Juſtice and Truth.

3. From hence it follows, that tho' God is perfectly free, and infinitely powerful, yet he cannot do *Evil:* For 'tis as impossible to suppose *his Will should choose* to do any Thing contrary to Justice, as that *his Power should be able* to do Things inconsistent with Power.

4. From hence it follows, that Liberty is not in itself an Imperfection, but a Perfection. For it is in the highest Degree in God. Every Act wherein he exercises his Goodness, Justice, and Truth, proceeding from the most perfect Choice, without which, Goodness would not be Goodness. It has been taught, that Liberty is an Imperfection, because it is the Occasion of Sin and Misery: But it is not Liberty, but it is the Abuse of it, that Occasions that Misery. Liberty rightly used is a Perfection, and the more perfect any Creature is, the more perfect their Liberty.

5. Hence we may conceive, that tho' no Creature can be in a strict Sense impeccable, yet we may conceive how God can place particular Creatures so near himself, that it shall not be possible for them, notwithstanding their Freedom of Will, ever to be seduced from the everlasting Choice of their greatest Good, which is the State of Angels.

Lastly, It follows, that the true Ground of all eternal moral Obligations, is this, that the same Reasons which always determine the Will of God, (*viz.* the necessary and eternal different Relations which different Things bear one to another) ought to determine the Will of all subordinate Beings; and when they do not, such Beings are guilty of the highest Presumption and Insolence, in acting contrary to their own Reason, in attempting the Order by which the World subsists, and in offending God, who governs all his Actions by these Rules, and therefore must require the same of his Creatures.

They,

They, who found all moral Obligations on the Will of God, must recur to the same Thing, only they do not clearly explain how the *Nature* and *Will of God* must be necessarily good.

They, who found all moral Obligations only upon Laws made for the Good of Societies, hold an Opinion that is contradictory to itself. For if there be no Difference between Good and Evil, antecedent to all Laws, there can be no Reason why any Laws should be made; to say that they were made for the Good of Mankind, is confessing that certain Things tend to the Good of Mankind; and then they were good Antecedent to their being confirmed by Laws.

I hope, from what has been said upon this Argument, that it is sufficiently clear, that the Being and Attributes of God are capable of just Proof and Demonstration.

Dr. *SAMUEL CLARKE*'s

Unchangeable Obligations

OF

NATURAL RELIGION,

AND THE

TRUTH and CERTAINTY

OF THE

Christian Revelation

ABRIDG'D.

HAVING already endeavoured to lay firmly the first Foundations of Religion, by demonstrating the Being and Attributes of God:

I proceed to demonstrate in the next Place the *unalterable Obligations of natural Religion*, and Certainty of *divine* Revelation.

But before I enter upon the Subject, I will premise something concerning the several Sorts of Deists.

1. There is one Sort of them, who, though they pretend not only to allow that there is a God, but believe him also to be the Creator of the World, yet deny that he concerns himself with the Government of it.

But this Opinion, when examined, will be found direct

direct Atheism. For although to imagine that God at the Creation of the World might or could have so ordered all the Springs and Series of future Causes, that without his immediate Interposition they should regularly have produced Effects worthy the Direction of infinite Wisdom, may be reconcileable to a firm Belief of God, and his *Providence*; yet to fancy that he created at first a *certain Quantity of Matter and Motion*, and left them to frame a World at Adventures, is certainly downright Atheism, and discovered to be false in Fact. For, not to say, that seeing Matter is uncapable of obeying any Laws, the very original Laws of Motion cannot take Place, but by something superior to Matter, *continually* exerting on it a certain Force, according to certain and determinate Laws: 'Tis now evident, that Plants and Animals could not have been formed by mere Matter, according to any general Laws of Motion: And that Gravitation, the Spring of almost all the inanimate Motions cannot be the Result of any Motion originally impressed on Matter, but must be caused by something that penetrates the solid Substance of all Bodies; and continually puts forth a Force in them different from that, by which Matter acts upon Matter. Which is a Demonstration, that the World was not only made at first, but continually depends on some superior Being, for the *Preservation* of its Frame; and that all its great Motions are caused by some immaterial Power, not having *originally* impressed a *certain Quantity* of *Motion* upon Matter, but perpetually exerting itself every Moment in every Part of the World. Which *preserving Power*, whether it be the immediate Action of God, or of some subordinate Power appointed by him, gives us a noble Idea of *Providence*. That a certain Quantity of Motion originally impressed on Matter was left to form the World, is a Proposition that leads to Atheism. For if God

be all-powerful and wise, as demonstrated, he must know always every Thing that is, and what is fittest to be done; and having Power, he can bring it to pass. And consequently, 'tis impossible, but he must direct and appoint every Thing in the World; if therefore he does not concern himself with the Government of the World, he is not all-powerful, *&c.* and therefore, that he is not at all.

If they will own God's Government over the more considerable Parts of the World, but deny his Inspection over human Affairs, as too trivial for him; this still amounts to the same. For if God be all-powerful, and all-wise, he must know all Things; so that if he regards them not, he must not know them, and consequently must not be. But human Affairs are by no Means the most minute.

Let the Deist suppose as many Systems as he pleases; our System may be as considerable as any other; and our Earth, as any other Planet, and Mankind the most considerable Creature in it: *Man* therefore has a better Claim to the particular Regard of Providence, than any Thing else in the Globe; and our Earth as just a Pretence, as any other Planet; and this System as just an one, as any System in the Universe. If therefore God has any Concern for any Part of the World, Mankind, even separately from the Consideration of the Excellency of human Nature, may as reasonably be under his Care, as other Parts of the Universe.

2. A second Sort of Deists, as they call themselves, allow that every natural Thing that is done in the World, is produced by the Power, and directed by the Government of God; but denying that there is any Difference between moral Good and Evil, they suppose God takes no Notice of the *morally good or evil* Actions of Men.

But since there cannot but be an eternal and necessary Difference of different Things, and a Fitness

or

or Unfitneſs in their Application; and infinite Knowledge muſt know, and infinite Wiſdom and Power muſt chuſe and act according to theſe eternal Reaſons, his Juſtice, *&c.* muſt be as certain as his Wiſdom and Power; and conſequently, whoever denies that God exerciſes his moral Attributes in regarding the moral Actions of Men, muſt deny his Power or Wiſdom, or both; which is abſolute Atheiſm.

But as the Opinions of theſe two Sorts of Deiſts terminate in Atheiſm, ſo doth their Practice agree with the moſt profeſſed Atheiſt. Not only Revelation, and the moral Obligations of natural Religion, but all human Conſtitutions are deſpiſed by them. Virtue, Learning, Wiſdom and Honour are ridiculed and contemned. Theſe Men therefore are firſt to be convinced of the true Principles of Reaſon before they can be diſputed with; and then muſt by Neceſſity be downright Atheiſts, or be led by right Reaſoning to the Acknowledgment of the Obligations of Morality.

3. There are a third Sort of Deiſts, that ſay, they believe a God, a Providence, and the moral Perfections of the Deity, but deny the Immortality of the Soul; who imagining that Juſtice and Goodneſs are not the ſame in God as in Men, fancy, that though there is not an equal Proportion of Rewards and Puniſhments in this Life, yet we are not ſufficient Judges of God's Attributes to argue from thence with any Aſſurance of a future State. But neither is this Opinion conſiſtent. For if Juſtice and Goodneſs be not the ſame in God as in our Ideas, then we mean nothing when we ſay God is juſt, *&c.* Thus the moral Attributes are taken away; and upon the ſame Ground the natural Attributes may be denied. Which is alſo abſolute Atheiſm.

4. The fourth Sort of Deiſts, are thoſe who ſay they believe in God, and acknowledge his divine Attributes,

Attributes, and as he created, so he preserves all Things. *That* all his rational Creatures are obliged to worship him. That Man in particular is obliged to promote the Welfare of those Parts of the World where they are placed in by universal Benevolence, in Imitation of the divine Being, to do to others as he would be done by, to obey his Superiors in all just and rightful Things, and behave towards his Inferiors with Affability and Charity. *That* Man in respect of himself, is to preserve his Being, and a right Use of his Faculties; to govern his Appetites, and abstain from what is Evil. *That*, accordingly as they regard or neglect these Obligations, they are so far pleasing or displeasing to God, who will reward or punish them, if not in this, yet in the Life to come.

But, all this, the Men we are now speaking of *pretend to believe* so far as is discoverable by the Light of Nature only, without believing any Thing of Revelation. But I believe there are but few such Deists as these. For such Men, if they would attend the Consequences of their own Principles, must be Christians: They must be sensible of a Want of some immediate Discovery of God's Will, to make the Obligations of natural Religion, and the Certainty of a future State, more plain and evident to all Capacities, seeing how little Use Men generally make of the Light of Reason. And therefore they must hope that the Christian Revelation may be true: They must be willing to be convinced, that what tends to perfect natural Religion, to secure the Hopes of a future State, and may be made appear to be worthy of God, is really a divine Revelation: But their ridiculing what is truly excellent in Religion, their loose and frothy Discourses, and above all, their vitious Lives, shew plainly that they are not real Deists, but Atheists, and consequently not capable to judge of the Truth of Christianity.

Having

Having ſhewn that whatever Pretences theſe Men may make with their Mouths, yet that in their Hearts they deny God:

I proceed to demonſtrate the unalterable Obligations of natural Religion, and Certainty of divine Revelation, by one direct and continued Thread of Arguing.

PROP. I. *That from the eternal and neceſſary Differences of Things, there naturally and neceſſarily ariſe certain moral Obligations, which are of themſelves incumbent on all rational Creatures antecedent to all poſitive Inſtitution, and to all Expectation of Reward or Puniſhment.*

1. That there are *differences* of Things is evident. That from theſe *different Relations* of different Things, there ariſes an *Agreement* or *Diſagreement*, of ſome Things with others; or a *Fitneſs* or *Unfitneſs* of the Application of different Things, is likewiſe as plain. That there is a *Fitneſs* of certain *Circumſtances* to certain *Perſons*, and an Unfitneſs of others antecedent to all poſitive Laws: Alſo, that from the different Relations of *different Perſons*, there ariſes a Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of certain Behaviour of ſome Perſons, is alſo manifeſt; for Inſtance, that *God* is ſuperior to *Men*: And that it is *fit* that *Men* ſhould worſhip him, is certain. Again, that it is *fitter* that the ſupreme Author of the Univerſe ſhould direct all Things to their regular Ends, than that every Thing ſhould go on by Chance; and it is fitter the ſupreme Governour of the World ſhould do always what tends to the Happineſs of the whole Creation, than that he ſhould make them miſerable.

Laſtly, It is infinitely more fit, that an *innocent Being* ſhould be preſerved *eaſy and happy*, than that without any Demerit of its own, it ſhould be *eternally miſerable.*

In like Manner in Men's Dealing and Converſing with

with each other, it is more *fit* they ſhould promote the *Good*, than the *Ruin* of all: It is more *fit* they ſhould be juſt and honeſt, than otherwiſe: Laſtly, it is more *fit* to *preſerve the Life* of an innocent Man, if it is in my Power, than to ſuffer him to *periſh* or *take away his Life*.

It might ſeem altogether needleſs to attempt to prove the *eternal Difference between Good and Evil*, had there not appeared certain Men, as Mr. *Hobbs*, and ſome others, who aſſert, that there is no ſuch real Difference in the Nature of Things; but that all Obligation of *Duty* to God ariſes merely from *his irreſiſtible Power*; and all *Duty to Men*, merely from *poſitive Compact*. Wherein as they have contradicted the Judgment of the wiſeſt Part of Mankind, ſo they have contradicted themſelves. For if there be naturally no Difference betwixt *Good* and *Evil*, *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*, then before any Compact be made, it is as equally juſt and good for one Man to deſtroy another without any Provocation at all, as to ſave another Man's Life, when he may do it without hazard of his own. The Conſequence of which is, that for a Man to ſecure himſelf effectually, would be, to cut off all others: But alſo that Men might kill one another even when they did not think it neceſſary for their Preſervation. And the Effect of this Practice would terminate in the Deſtruction of Mankind. Which being a great Evil, Mr. *Hobbs* confeſſes it reaſonable to enter into Compacts to prevent. By which he muſt own, that it was manifeſtly a Thing *unfit and unreaſonable in itſelf*, that Mankind ſhould all deſtroy one another. And if ſo, for the ſame Reaſon it was alſo *unfit and unreaſonable* antecedent to all Compacts, that any one Man ſhould deſtroy another *arbitrarily*. Which is contradictory to Mr. *Hobbs*'s firſt Suppoſition of there being no Difference between Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt, antecedent to poſitive Compacts.

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The principal Thing that can with any Colour of Reaſon ſeem to countenance the Opinion of thoſe, who deny the natural and eternal Difference of Good and Evil, is the Difficulty there may be to define the Bounds of Right and Wrong; the *Variety* of Opinions that have obtained among learned Men, concerning certain Queſtions of juſt and unjuſt; and the *many contrary Laws*, in different Nations, concerning theſe Matters. Which though confeſſedly true, yet *Right* and *Wrong* are nevertheleſs in themſelves totally and eſſentially different. For ſuppoſing any Nations had by a Law allowed Robbery and Murder; or that no Faith ſhould be kept with any Man, nor any *equitable* Compacts performed; no Man of Senſe would have thought that ſuch a Law could have juſtified ſuch Actions; becauſe it is plainly not in Men's Power to make *Falſhood* be *Truth*.

Now if in *flagrant* Caſes the natural Difference between Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, be undeniably evident; the Difference muſt be as eſſential in the ſmalleſt and moſt intricate Caſes, tho' not ſo eaſy to be diſcerned. For if from the Difficulty of determining the Bounds of Right and Wrong in perplexed Caſes, it could be concluded that Juſt and Unjuſt were not eſſentially different by Nature, the ſame might be ſaid, even in the moſt *flagrant*. There are therefore certain *neceſſary and eternal Differences* of *Things*, &c.

2. What theſe eternal *Differences*, *Relations*, &c. abſolutely are in themſelves; that they alſo appear to be in the Underſtanding of all intelligent Beings, whoſe Underſtandings are not imperfect or deprav'd. And by this Underſtanding of theſe natural Relations, *&c.* the Wills of all intelligent Beings, whoſe Wills are not depraved, are directed. Wherefore ſince God's Knowledge will not ſuffer him to be deceived, or his Wiſdom to be influenced by any

wrong Affection, his divine Will must necessarily determine him to do what is fittest to be done.

3. That the same *Reason* of Things that determines the Will of God to act according to Justice and Goodness, ought to determine the Wills of all rational Creatures, is very evident.

For as it is impossible for God to be *deceived by Error*, or *influenced by any wrong Affection:* So it is *unreasonable and blame-worthy*, that any intelligent Creatures, who have *Reason* and *Will* given them, should either suffer themselves to be imposed upon in Matters of *Good* and *Evil*, or *wilfully* allow themselves to be over-ruled by foolish *Passions*, to act contrary to what they know is fit to be done. For was it not for a *negligent Misunderstanding*, *or wilful Passions*, *the Reasons of Things* which God makes the unalterable Rule and Law of his own Actions, must determine the Will of all *subordinate Beings*. For originally it is as *natural* that the *Will* should be determined by the *Reason of the Thing*, as it is *natural* that the Understanding should submit to a demonstrated Truth. And it is as blame-worthy to *mistake negligently* plain *right* and *wrong*, as for a Man to believe *that twice two is not equal to four*.

He that refuses *to honour and obey God*, is as absurd as he that in Speculation denies the *Effect to owe any thing to the Cause*.

He that refuses *to deal with Men equitably*, as he desires *they* should *deal* with him, is as absurd as if he should affirm two unequal Numbers were equal.

Lastly, He that acknowledges himself obliged to the Practice of certain *Duties* to *God* and *Men*, and takes no care to perform them, is as ridiculous, as he that *affirms* one Thing at the same Time that he *denies* another; without which the former could not be true: Wherefore all rational Creatures are insolent, whose Wills are not constantly determined by the necessary Difference of Things. 'Tis acting not according

according to that Understanding and Reason which God gave for that Purpose. 'Tis attempting to destroy that Order by which the World subsists. 'Tis an Affront to God, who made Things what they are, and governs every Thing himself, according to the Laws of their several Natures. In a word, all wilful Wickedness, is the very same Insolence and Absurdity in *moral Matters*, as it would be in *natural Things*, for a Man to make Light Darkness.

Further, as it appears from the Nature of Things, that all Creatures are *obliged* to take Care that their Wills and Actions be constantly determined by the eternal Rule of Right; so the Certainty of this Obligation is confirmed by the Sense that even wicked Men have of their being under such an Obligation to observe it.

Now that the Case is thus, is undeniably manifest from the universal Experience of Mankind. For no Man willingly transgresses this in any *considerable* Instance, but he acts contrary to the Judgment and Reason of his own Mind, and secretly reproaches himself: And no Man observes it steadily, but his own Mind applauds him for his Resolution, as just and right.

Some Men indeed who have corrupted their Nature through a long Habit of Wickedness, that they might not confess themselves self-condemned, will contend, that there is no Difference between *Right* and *Wrong*. But however industriously they may conceal their Self-Condemnation, yet they cannot help sometimes discovering it. For Instance, there is no Man who commits at any Time a Murder and Robbery, but would chuse rather the Advantage of the Robbery, without committing the Murder, than by doing it, though he was sure never to be punished for it. And this plainly evinces, that the Mind of Man unavoidably owns a natural Difference between Good and Evil. But

But the Truth of this, that Mens Minds assent naturally to the eternal Law of Righteousness, appears more from the Judgments they pass on others Actions, than from what we can discern concerning their Consciousness of their own. For they may conceal the Judgment of their own Consciences. But their Judgments of others Actions, when they have no Relation to themselves, are commonly impartial; and from this we may judge of the Difference of Right and Wrong.

Virtue, *Goodness*, *Righteousness*, and *Equity*, are so lovely in themselves, that even those, who by their Lusts are led aside from the Paths of Virtue, cannot help approving them in others. On the contrary, *Vice*, *Injustice*, *Profaneness*, and *Debauchery*, are so absolutely odious in their own Nature, that however they *insinuate* themselves in *Practice*, they cannot gain the *Judgment* of Mankind.

There is but one Thing that can be with any Colour objected against what has been said concerning the Necessity of the Mind's giving its Assent to the eternal Law of Righteousness; and that is, the *total Ignorance* which some Nations have of these Obligations; which if true, only proves this, *viz.* that Men have great need to be taught in some plain as well as certain Truths, and not that the Mind of Man can ever dissent from the Rule of Right when it is distinctly proposed to it.

4. Thus it appears, that the Mind of Man cannot but acknowledge the *Fitness* of Mens governing their Actions by the Rule of Equity; and that this Acknowledgment is a *formal Obligation* to every Man to conform to it. I might now from hence deduce all the several Duties of *Morality*. But I shall only mention the *three* great *Branches* from which all the rest do naturally follow.

First, Then, in respect of *God*. There is no Fitness or Agreement in the Application of equal geometrical

metrical Figures one to another so visible and harmonious, as is the Beauty and Harmony of the Exercise of God's several Attributes meeting with suitable Returns of Duty and Honour from his rational Creatures. The Consideration of his *Eternity*, *Infinity*, *Knowledge* and *Wisdom*, demand our Admiration. The Sense of his *Omniscience* forces a Regard. As being the Creator of all Things, we pay him *Honour* and *Worship*, and his *Unity* requires it to be paid to him *alone*. His *Power* and *Justice* demand our *Fear*; his *Mercy* encourages our *Hope*; his *Goodness* excites our *Love*; his *Veracity* secures our *Trust* in him. The Sense of having received *our Being* from him, makes it reasonable that we should employ our whole *Beings* in his Service. The Consciousness of our continual Dependence upon him, obliges us to constant *Prayer*; and *every good* Thing we enjoy, demands our heartiest Thanksgiving; the Suitableness, and Proportion, and Connection of each of these, is evident. And 'tis the greatest Perverseness in rational Creatures to transgress this Order of Things. All inanimate and all irrational Things obey the Laws of the Creation, by the Necessity of their Nature. How monstrous then is it, that reasonable Creatures, merely because they are not necessitated, should abuse their *Liberty*, and make themselves alone the *unreasonable* and disorderly Part of the Creation! That a Tree planted in a fruitful Soil, should yet never bring forth Fruit, is not so unnatural, as that a rational Creature should never return the Duties which arise from the Relation of a Creature to his Creator.

Secondly, in Respect of our Fellow-Creatures, the Rule of Righteousness is, that in particular *we deal so with every Man, as in like Circumstances we could reasonably expect he should deal with us:* And *that* in general *we endeavour by universal Benevolence to promote the Happiness of all Men.*

As to the former, *viz. Equity:* Whatever Relation or Proportion one Man in any Case bears to another; the same that other, when put in like Circumstances, bears to him. Whatever therefore I judge reasonable or unreasonable for *another* to do for *me*, that I declare reasonable, that I in the like Case should do for him.

Were not therefore Men most unnaturally corrupted by perverse and false Opinions, and evil Customs and Habits prevailing against Reason, it would be impossible that universal Equity should not be practised, especially among *Equals*; where the Proportion of Equity is obvious. It would be as impossible, that a Man, contrary to the eternal Reason of Things, should desire to be profited by the Disadvantage of his Neighbour; as that he should be willing to be deprived of Necessaries to satisfy the Covetousness of another.

In considering indeed the Duties of *Superiors* and *Inferiors*, the Proportion of Equity is more complex: But still it may always be deduced from the same Rule *of doing as we would be done by*, if careful Regard be had at the same Time to the *Differences of Relation*. For Example, a *Magistrate*, in order to deal equitably with a *Criminal*, is not to consider what *Fear* or *Self-Love* would cause him in the Criminal's Case to desire; but what *Reason* and the *public Good* would oblige him to *own* was *just* for him to expect.

And the same Proportion is to be observed, in deducing the Duties of *Parents* and *Children*, of *Masters* and Servants, *Governors* and Subjects, *Citizens* and *Foreigners*; in what Manner every Person is obliged by the Rule of *Equity* to behave himself in each of these and all other Relations. In the regular and uniform Practice of all which Duties, consists that *universal Justice*, which is the Perfection of all Virtues. Which is so truly excellent, that

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the wiſeſt Men have declared, that Life itſelf is not to be put in Competition with that Temper of Mind from which flows the Practice of univerſal Juſtice. On the contrary, *Injuſtice* and *Iniquity*, and the general Neglect and Contempt of all the Duties ariſing from Men's ſeveral Relations one to another, is the greateſt and moſt unnatural Corruption of God's Creation, that rebellious Creatures can introduce.

The ſecond Branch of the Rule of Righteouſneſs with Reſpect to our Fellow-Creatures, is *univerſal Love and Benevolence.*

The Obligation to which I thus prove. If there be a natural and neceſſary Difference between *Good* and *Evil*, and that which is good is fit and reaſonable to be done; then as the Goodneſs of God extends itſelf over all his Works, ſo ought every rational Creature to do all the Good he can to all his Fellow-Creatures. Of which the Mind of Man is ſo naturally ſenſible, that the Performance of this Duty fills the Mind with the comfortable Senſe of having done the greateſt Good he was capable of, and moſt nearly imitated his Maker.

But further, the Obligation to this Duty may be deduced from the *Nature of Man.*

Next to *Self-Love*, there is in all Men an Affection for their *Children*, Relations, and Friends. And becauſe Men cannot live comfortably in independent Families, they therefore increaſe their Dependencies by multiplying Affinities; 'till by Degrees the Affection of ſingle Perſons become the Friendſhip of *Families, Towns, and Nations.* The Foundation of which univerſal Friendſhip is *mutual Love* and *Benevolence.* And nothing but Wickedneſs hinders the World from being put into ſo happy a State. Wherefore ſince Men are ſo conſtituted by Nature, that they ſtand in need of each other's Aſſiſtance to live eaſy in the World, 'tis evident every Man is

bound by the Law of his Nature to think himſel born to promote the public Good of his Fellow-Creatures, and conſequently obliged, as the neceſſary and only effectual Means to that End, to embrace them all with univerſal Love and Benevolence. So that he cannot, without tranſgreſſing the known Law of his Being, do Miſchief to any Man, but muſt *love others as himſelf*.

Thirdly, With Reſpect *to ourſelves*, 'tis evident that every Man ought to preſerve his own Being, as long as he is able; becauſe what he is not himſelf the Author and Giver of, he can never of himſelf have juſt Power to take away. He that ſent us into the World alone knows for how long Time he appointed us our Station here, and when we have finiſhed all the Buſineſs he intended we ſhould do, can alone judge, when it is *fit* for us to be taken hence.

And for the ſame Reaſon, that a Man is obliged to preſerve his own Being at all, he is bound likewiſe to preſerve himſelf as far as he is able, in the right Uſe of his Faculties. For if a Man diſables himſelf by Intemperance or Paſſion from performing his Duty, it is the ſame Thing, at leaſt for the Time, as depriving himſelf of Life. But neither is this all: Intemperance, and ungovernable Paſſions not only incapacitate a Man from performing his Duty, but expoſes him to run into the Commiſſion of the greateſt Enormities. So that all the additional Obligations which a Man is under not to commit the moſt flagrant Crimes, lie equally upon him to govern his Paſſions and reſtrain his Appetites; indeed it is a difficult Duty, but abſolutely neceſſary to be done.

Laſtly, For the ſame Reaſon that a Man is obliged not to depart out of Life, which is the general Station that God has appointed him; he is likewiſe obliged to attend the Duties of that particular

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Station or Condition of Life, whatsoever it be, with Diligence and Contentment, that Providence has placed him in.

From these three great and general Branches, all the smaller and more particular Instances of moral Obligations may be deduced.

5. And now this is that *Law of Nature* which is of universal Extent, and everlasting Duration; which was in Force before any Law was written; which is founded in the Nature and Reason of Things, to which the Reason of all Men does necessarily assent. For tho' in some nice Cases the Bounds of *Right* and *Wrong* may be difficult to determine, and the Laws and Customs of certain barbarous Nations may be contrary to one another, yet in reality this no more disapproves the natural Assent of Mankind's unprejudiced Reason to the Rule of Right, than the Differences of Mens Countenances in general, proves that there is no general Likeness. In a word, this is that *Law of Nature* which is founded in the eternal Reason of Things, and is unalterable; and which, if it had its original from the Authority of Men, and could be changed by it; then all the Laws of the most cruel Tyrants would be as just and equitable as the wisest Laws that ever were made.

6. As this *Law of Nature* is infinitely superiour to all Authority of Men, and independent upon it, so its Obligation is primarily antecedent even to this Consideration of its being the positive Will and Command of God: For in Matters of natural Reason and Morality, that which is holy and good, is not therefore holy and good, because it is commanded to be done, but is therefore commanded by God, because it is holy and good.

The Existence indeed of the Things themselves, whose Proportions and Relations we consider, depend on the Will of God, who can create and de-

ſtroy them when he pleaſes; but when Things are created, their Proportions, which are of eternal Neceſſity, are alſo in the Things themſelves abſolutely unalterable.

Hence God, tho' he has no Superiour from whoſe *Will* to receive any Law of his Actions, yet diſdains not to obſerve the Rule of Equity in all his Actions in the Government of the World. Now for the ſame Reaſon all intelligent Creatures in their ſeveral Spheres, ought to obey the ſame Rule according to the Law of their Nature, even could we ſuppoſe it ſeparate from being the poſitive Will of God.

7. Laſtly. *This Law of Nature* is obligatory antecedent to all Conſideration of particular *Rewards or Puniſhments*, is evident; becauſe if *Good* and *Evil*, &c. be eternally in the Nature of the Things themſelves, 'tis plain that the View of Rewards or Puniſhments cannot be the original Cauſe of the Obligation of the Law, but is only an additional Weight to the Practice of what Men were before obliged to by right Reaſon. Virtue is truly amiable, tho' we get nothing by the Practice of it. And on the contrary, Wickedneſs is by all means hateful, tho' the Commiſſion of it brings no Inconvenience.

Thus far is clear; yet it does not from hence at all follow, either that a good Man ought to have no Reſpect to Rewards and Puniſhments, or that Rewards or Puniſhments are not abſolutely neceſſary to maintain the Practice of Virtue in this preſent World. For tho' Virtue is really *worthy to be choſen for its own ſake*, even without any Expectation of Reward; yet it does not follow, that it is therefore *ſelf-ſufficient*, or able to ſupport a Man under all Kinds of Sufferings, and even Death itſelf, for its Sake, without any Proſpect of future Recompence.

Having ſhewn the Falſity of Mr. *Hobbs*'s Doctrines, that *there is no ſuch Thing as juſt and unjuſt in*

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the Nature of Things; that *Men, antecedent to all Compacts, are not obliged to universal Benevolence, but are in a State of War, and may do whatever they have Power to do*; and *that in Societies it depends upon the Laws, or the Will of Governors, to define what shall be just or unjust.* I shall therefore only mention a few Observations, from which some of the greatest Absurdities of the chief Principles upon which Mr. *Hobbs* builds his whole Doctrine in this Matter, may most easily appear.

1. First then, the Ground of Mr. *Hobbs*'s Scheme is this, *All Men being equal by Nature, and naturally desiring the same Things, have every one a Right to every Thing; are every one desirous to have absolute Dominion over all others; and may every one justly do whatever at any Time is in his Power, by violently taking from others, either their Possessions or Lives, to gain to himself that absolute Dominion.* Now this is the same Thing, as if a Man should affirm, that a *Part* is equal to the *Whole.* For to say that one Man has a *full Right* to the same Things, which another at the same Time has a full Right to, is saying, that a Thing may be right at the same Time that it is wrong. For Example, if every Man has a *Right* to preserve his own Life, then 'tis manifest, I can have no Right to take it away, unless he endeavours to deprive me of mine. For otherwise, it might be *Right* for me to do that, which at the same Time, because it could not be done but in Breach of another Man's *Right*, it could not be *right* for me to do; which is absurd. The State of the Case therefore is this. In Mr. *Hobbs*'s State of Nature and Equality, every Man having an *equal* Right to preserve his own Life, 'tis evident has a Right to an equal Proportion of all those Things, which are necessary or useful to Life: And consequently, so far is it from being true, that any one has an original Right to

poſſeſs *all*, that on the contrary, whoever firſt attempts, without the *Conſent* of his Fellows, or for the public Benefit, to take to himſelf more than his Proportion, is the Beginner of Iniquity.

2. To avoid this Abſurdity, Mr. *Hobbs* aſſerts, that ſince every Man has a Right to preſerve his own Life, and to do every Thing neceſſary to preſerve it, and ſince Men will in the State of Nature have *Jealouſies of each other*; therefore *every one has a Right to endeavour for his own Security to prevent and deſtroy all others, either by Artifice or open Violence, as being the only Means of Self-preſervation.* But this is a plainer Abſurdity than the former. For what can be more ridiculous, than to imagine *a War of all Men againſt all*, the directeſt Means of the *Preſervation* of all? Yes, *ſays he*, becauſe it leads Men to a Neceſſity of entering into *Compact* for each other's Security. But then to make theſe Compacts obligatory, he is forced to recur to an antecedent Law of Nature, and this deſtroys all he had ſaid before. For the *ſame Law of Nature*, which obliges Men to *Fidelity* after having made a Compact, will be found to oblige them before Compact to *Contentment*, and *mutual Benevolence*.

'Tis true, by entering into Compacts, Men agree to compel one another to do what perhaps the mere Senſe of Duty would not, without ſuch Compacts have Force enough of itſelf to hold them to in Practice. But this Compulſion makes no Alteration in the *Obligation itſelf*; and only ſhews, that Mr. *Hobbs*'s *State of Nature* is not truly *natural*, but on the contrary, is a State of *unnatural Corruption*, as I ſhall preſently ſhew.

3. Another Abſurdity in Mr. *Hobbs*'s Scheme is this: That he ſuppoſes ſome particular Branches of the Law of Nature to be originally obligatory from the bare Reaſon of Things; at the ſame Time, that he denies innumerable others, which have the

ſame Foundation of being obligatory as the former; and without which the Obligation of the former cannot be made out.

Thus he ſuppoſes that in the State of Nature, before any Compact be made, *every Man's own Will is his only Law; that nothing that a Man can do is unjuſt:* And that *whatever Miſchief one Man does to another, is no Injuſtice; neither has the injured Perſon Reaſon to complain.* And yet at the ſame Time he ſuppoſes, that in the ſame State of Nature, Men are by all Means obliged to *ſeek Peace*, and to *enter into Compacts*, to remedy the forementioned Miſchiefs. Now if Men are obliged by the original Reaſon of Things, to *ſeek Terms of Peace*, and *get out of the pretended natural State of War*; how come they not to be obliged originally by the ſame Reaſon and Nature of Things, to live from the Beginning in *univerſal Benevolence*, and *avoid entering into a State of War?* He muſt confeſs, they would be obliged to do ſo, did not *Self-Preſervation* neceſſitate them every Man to war upon others: But this cannot be true of the firſt Aggreſſor, whom Mr. *Hobbs* vindicates from being guilty of any Injuſtice; and therefore herein contradicts himſelf.

Thus again he ſuppoſes *Good* and *Evil*, *Honeſt* and *Diſhoneſt*, *are mere civil Conſtitutions. And whatever the Magiſtrate commands, is good; whatever he forbids, evil:* And yet at the ſame Time, ſome particular Things, which it would have been ſcandalous for him to have made depending upon human Laws; as, that *God is to be loved and adored.* That *a Man ought not to murder his Parents*, and the like; or elſe, which were neceſſary to be ſuppoſed for the Foundation of his own Scheme, as that *Compacts ought to be faithfully performed, and Obedience duly paid to the Civil Magiſtrate.* The Obligation of *theſe Things* he is forced to deduce from the internal

internal Reason, and Fitness of Things, *antecedent* to, *independent* upon, and *unalterable* by all human Constitutions whatsoever. In which Matter he is guilty of Absurdity. For if *to love* and *honour God*, and *perform Compacts*, be founded in the eternal Reason and Relations of Things, then for the same Reason, *universal Benevolence*, *Justice*, *Equity*, (which I have proved to be founded in the eternal Reason and Relations of Things) must needs be obligatory, antecedent to any Consideration of *positive Compact*. And consequently Mr. *Hobbs*'s Scheme falls to the Ground, by his having been forced to suppose *some particular* Things obligatory in their own Nature. On the contrary, if the Rules of Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, have none of them any obligatory Force in the State of Nature, antecedent to *positive Compact*, then for the same Reason they are of no Force *after* Compact. For if there be no Obligation of *Just* and *Right*, *antecedent* to the Compact, then whence rises the Obligation of the *Compact itself*, on which he supposes all other Obligations to be founded? If, before a Compact it was no Injustice to kill a Man wantonly, how comes it to be an Injustice, after the Compact is made, to break it? Or what makes *breaking ones Word* to be a greater Crime, than *killing a Man for no other Reason, but because no positive Law has been made to the contrary?* So that this Way also, Mr. *Hobbs*'s *Scheme* is destroyed.

4. *Mr.* Hobbs's *State of Nature*, is not a natural State, but the most unnatural State that can be imagined. For Reason, which is the proper Nature of Man, can never lead Men to any Thing else than *universal Love* and *Benevolence*; and *Wars*, *Hatred*, and *Violence*, can never arise but from extreme *Corruption*. 'Tis true, a Man may make War in his own Defence; but the first Aggressors, who upon Mr. *Hobbs*'s Principles, assault and spoil as many

many as they can master, have utterly *divested themselves of human Nature.* Mr. *Hobbs* pretends indeed, that one of the first and most natural Principles of human Nature, is a Desire of Dominion, and that this pushes Men to obtain it by Violence. But Men, following the Dictates of Reason, do not desire disproportionate Power over others; neither if it was natural to desire such Power, would it follow, that it was agreeable to Nature to use violent Means to obtain it. For since the only good Reason to desire Dominion is, that the Possessor may have more Opportunities of doing good, 'tis plain, that no Man obeying the Dictates of uncorrupted Reason, can desire to encrease his Power by bad Methods. All Violence therefore, and War, are the Effects of unnatural Corruption.

5. Lastly. Mr. *Hobbs*'s Argument that God's irresistible Power is the only Foundation of his Dominion; and consequently, that every other Being has a *Right* to do whatever he has a *Power* to do, is most notoriously false, as may appear from this single Consideration. Suppose the Devil was endued with supreme absolute Power, and made use of it to render the World as miserable as possible, would it not follow, that since Dominion is founded in *Power*, and Power is the Measure of *Right*, and consequently *absolute Power* gives *absolute Right*, that such a Government would be as *just*, as is the present Government of the World in the Hands of a good God.

Here Mr. *Hobbs* argues, that the only Reason why Men are bound to obey God, is nothing but *Weakness* or *want of Power*; because if they were all-powerful, they would not be obliged to obey him; and consequently, *Power* would give them a *Right* to do what they pleased; that is to say, if Men were not created Beings, they could not be obliged to the *relative Duty* of created Beings: But

from the Obligation to the Practice of *moral* Virtues, from which Mr. *Hobbs* endeavours to discharge them, they could not be discharged by any Addition of Power whatsoever: Because the Obligations to these Things are founded in the eternal and unchangeable Nature and Reason of *Things*, and are a Law to God himself, as well as to his Creatures.

PROP. II. *That the same eternal moral Obligations, which arise necessarily from the natural Differences of Things are moreover the express Will, Command, and Law of God to all rational Creatures.*

The Truth of this appears from what has been already laid down. For the same absolute Perfections of the divine Nature, which make us certain, that God must be infinitely holy, just, and good; make it equally certain, that he cannot possibly approve Iniquity in *others*. And the same *Beauty* of the Rules of everlasting Righteousness, which God makes the Measure of his own Actions, proves it impossible, but he must *will*, that all rational Creatures would make them the Measure of *theirs*. If God be of infinite *Holiness* and Purity, he cannot approve *Impurity* in his Creatures.

If God is himself *just* and *righteous*, he must will that his Creatures would conform all their Actions to the eternal Law of Righteousness. If he is infinitely *good*, he cannot but *will* that his Creatures should permit each other to enjoy the Blessings of the divine Goodness. Lastly; if God is himself merciful, he must *will* that all his Creatures should have *Mercy* and *Compassion* on each other. Thus from the *Attributes* of God, natural Reason leads Men to a Knowledge of his *Will*.

2. This appears in some Measure from the Consideration of God's Creation.

For God by *creating* Things, manifests it to be his *Will*, that Things *should be what they are*. So

'tis

'tis evident, it cannot but be the *Will of God*, that all rational Creatures ſhould preſerve the *Order and Harmony* of the Creation. And conſequently, whoever acts contrary to the *Reaſon and Proportion of Things*, *by diſhonouring God*, *by introducing unjuſt Dealings among Equals*, *by deſtroying his own Being*, or by *any Way corrupting*, *abuſing*, *and miſapplying the Faculties wherewith God has endued him*, is guilty of tranſgreſſing at the ſame Time the *poſitive Will of God*.

3. The Tendency of the Practice of Morality to the Good and Happineſs of the whole World, manifeſtly proves, that it muſt needs be the Will of God that we practiſe what is right and juſt. And this is the great Sin of Immorality, that it is the obſtinate ſetting up the *Self-Will* of fallible Creatures, as in Oppoſition to the eternal *Reaſon* of Things, the unprejudiced *Judgment* of their own Minds, and the *Good* both of themſelves and Fellow-Creatures; ſo alſo in Oppoſition to the *Will* of their *Creator*, *Preſerver* and Benefactor.

PROP. III. *That the ſame eternal moral Obligations, which are of themſelves incumbent indeed on all rational Creatures, antecedent to any Reſpect of particular Reward and Puniſhment, muſt yet certainly and neceſſarily be attended with Rewards and Puniſhments.*

1. For if God be *juſt* and *good*, as has been ſhewn; and if the ſame Reaſons that prove him ſo, prove moreover, that the ſame moral Obligations muſt be his Will and Law to his Creatures; it follows, that he muſt be *pleaſed* or *diſpleaſed*, as his Creatures obey or diſobey theſe Rules. And if ſo, he cannot but ſignify his Approbation or Diſpleaſure: And this can be no Way done, but by annexing *Puniſhments* and Rewards. Wherefore if Virtue go *unrewarded*, and Wickedneſs *unpuniſhed*, then God never *ſignifies* his Approbation of the one,

nor

nor his Diſpleaſure at the other. And if ſo, then we are not ſure that he is either diſpleaſed, or pleaſed at either; or *has forbid*, or commanded either. Which being ſuppoſed, deſtroys the Evidence of his moral Attributes, contrary to what has been demonſtrated.

2. The Certainty of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments* in *general* may be deduced from the Neceſſity there is, that there ſhould be ſome Vindication of the Honour of God's Laws and Government.

'Tis manifeſt, we are obliged to *honour* God; and 'tis plain we have no other Way to *honour* him, but by obeying his *Laws:* And though we were obliged to honour him in this manner, notwithſtanding, that there had been no Reward, yet 'tis becoming God, that thoſe *who honour him he ſhould honour.* On the contrary, though nothing we finite Creatures can do can diminiſh from the Happineſs of God, yet as to us, the diſobeying his Laws is a diſhonouring himſelf. Now the ſame Reaſon there is, why we ſhould honour God's Laws, the ſame there is, that Honour ſhould be *vindicated* after it has been infringed by Sin.

For no Lawgiver who has Authority to require Obedience to his Laws ought to ſee his Laws deſpiſed without taking Meaſures to vindicate the Honour of them. And the only Way by which the Honour of a Law, or of its Author, can be vindicated, after it has been infringed by willful Sin, is either by Repentance and Reformation of the Tranſgreſſor, or by his Puniſhment and Deſtruction. So that God is obliged to puniſh the obſtinate Tranſgreſſors of his Laws.

Wherefore if there be no Diſtinction made by ſuitable *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*, between the Keepers and Tranſgreſſors of his Laws, his Laws would be trampled upon: Which being impoſſible, it will follow, that theſe Things are not the Laws of God,

God, and the Consequence of this is, the Denial of his *moral Attributes*; contrary as before, to what has been proved. And consequently the Certainty of *Rewards and Punishments* is necessarily established.

Prop. IV. *That, because these Rewards and Punishments are not distributed in the present State, therefore there must of Necessity be a future State.*

1. That according to the original Constitution of Things, the Practice of Virtue does naturally tend to make all Creatures happy; and the contrary Practice, to make them miserable. This is evident in general, because the Practice of that which tends to the Benefit of the *whole*, must tend to the Benefit of every individual Part of the Creation. A *frequent contemplating the Perfections of God*, so as to excite our Love and Imitation; a *regular employing our Powers*, as they were designed, and a *due subjecting our Passions* to the Government of Reason, tend to give us such Satisfaction of Mind, as is the Foundation of Happiness. The *temperate Enjoyment* of the good Things of the World, preserves the Health and Strength of the Body; the Practice of *Justice* and *Benevolence*, promotes the general Happiness of Society: So that if all Men were truly virtuous, the Condition of the World would be very happy. On the contrary, the *Abuse of the Powers* of our Minds *inordinate Appetites and Passions*, fill the Mind with Vexation. *Intemperance* brings Diseases to the Body, and mutual *Injustice*, &c. bring Calamities to Society. So that the original Constitution of Things, establish a Difference between *Virtue* and *Vice* by their Effects.

2. But tho' Virtue and Vice are attended with natural Rewards and Punishments, yet in this present World, thro' some great and general Corruption, the Order of Things is so perverted, that Vice often flourishes in the greatest Prosperity, and Virtue falls under the greatest Calamities of Life. In all which

which Affairs, the Providence of God seems not very evident to interpose for the Protection of Righteousness; and not only so, but in his Judgments, suffers good Men to be involved with the wicked.

3. Which Things being so, it follows unavoidably, *either* that all these Notions we frame concerning God are *false*, and that there is no Providence, which is to destroy both his Attributes and Being too, or else that there must be a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*, wherein all the Difficulties of Providence shall be cleared up, by an impartial Administration of Justice. But that there is a God and a Providence has already been proved; therefore there must be a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*.

4. The *Stoics*, being not certain of a future State, and unwilling to give up the Cause of Virtue, asserted that Virtue was *self-sufficient* to its own Happiness: Whereas, as it is manifest, that it is not *self-sufficient*, they ought to have concluded the *Certainty* of a future State.

That Virtue is to be chosen for its own Sake, without any Recompence of Reward, is freely acknowledged; but it does not follow from hence, that he that dies for the Sake of Virtue, is more happy than he that dies for any other Opinion, and there be no future State wherein he may reap any Benefit of that his resolute Perseverance. The Practice of Virtue cannot be supported upon this Foot; nor is it reasonable or possible that Men by adhering to Virtue should lose their Lives, if thereby they are deprived from all possibility of receiving any Advantage from that Adherence.

Virtue, 'tis true, in its proper Seat, must be confessed to be the *chief Good*. But as the Practice of it is circumstantiated in this present World, 'tis plain it is not itself the *chief Good*, but only the *Means* to it.

5. 'Tis

5. 'Tis therefore absolutely impossible, that the whole Design of an infinitely wise and good God in all this, should be nothing more than to keep up eternally a Succession of new Generations of Men in this corrupt World, without any regular Observation of the eternal Rules of Good and Evil, and without any final Vindication of the Honour of his Laws in rewarding good, and punishing bad Men; and consequently, instead of continuing these Generations, there must be a future State of Existence of the same Persons; as that an exact Distribution of Rewards and Punishments may set all the present Irregularities right. Without this there is no Justice, no Goodness, nor any Thing upon which any Argument in *moral* Matters can be founded: Nay, tho' we should set aside all the *moral* Attributes of God, and consider only his *natural* Perfections, his Knowledge, and Wisdom, even in this View, it would appear improbable that God should have indued Men with such excellent Faculties, only to live here in the utmost Disorder for a few Years, and then perish into nothing. But then take in the Consideration of the moral Attributes of God, and it is Demonstration that there must be a *future State*.

6. It may at first seem strange why the Wisdom of God is not so clearly seen in his Government of the *moral*, as in the *Fabric* of the *natural* World. But if we consider the Matter closely, we shall find it reasonable to believe, that as the Discoveries of *later* Ages have opened Scenes of the Wisdom of the Creator beyond what Men could have imagined in *former* Times; *so* in the Conclusion of this State, Men will be surprized with the amazing Manifestation of *Justice* and *Goodness*, which will then appear to have run thro' the whole Series of God's Government of the moral World.

This is the chief Argument on which the *natural* Proof of a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*

must be founded: Yet there are other Evidences that render the Thing extremely credible to natural Reason. As,

1. There is great Reason, even from the Nature of the Thing itself, to believe the *Soul to be immortal.* The *most civilized* as well as *barbarous* Nations have always believed it, and such an universal Tradition must come from God.

And the most *learned* Part of Mankind have believed it, from an abstract Consideration of the *Nature* and *Operations* of the Soul itself. I have proved that Matter cannot produce *Thought*; that *Matter* is infinitely divisible, is acknowledged by all Philosophers; that the *Powers of the Soul* being most distant from the known Properties of Matter, 'tis putting a Violence on Reason to suppose them superadded to Matter. That 'tis absurd to suppose the Soul made up of innumerable Consciousnesses, as Matter is of innumerable Parts: On the contrary, 'tis highly reasonable to believe the *Seat of Thought* to be a simple Substance: Consequently the Soul will not be dissolved at the Dissolution of the Body, and therefore be naturally immortal. All this seems to follow from the simple Consideration of the Soul's being endued with *Sense.* But if we take into Consideration all the *higher* and *nobler Faculties*, *Capacities*, and *Improvements* of the Soul, the Argument will still become much stronger. (See *Cic. de Senectute*, *Tusc. Quest. lib.* 1.) The chief Prejudice against the Belief of the Soul's existing after Death is this, that they cannot comprehend how the Soul can have any Sense without Body, wherein are all the *Organs of Sense.* But neither can they apprehend how the Soul in the Body is capable of Sense by means of the Organs of Sense. And besides, this Argument that the Soul can have no Perception, when all the Ways of Perception that we know of, are removed, is no other Argument than what a blind Man may use

uſe to prove, that we can poſſibly have no Perception of Light.

This Conſideration of the Soul's appearing to be *naturally immortal*, afforded great Pleaſure and Satisfaction to the wiſeſt Heathens; was a great Support under Calamities, eſpecially under ſuch, as Men brought upon themſelves by being virtuous, filled them with great Hopes of what was to come hereafter, and was a mighty Encouragement to the Practice of all moral Virtue; and particularly to take Pains in ſubduing the Body, and keeping it in Subjection to the Mind.

2. Another Argument for a future State may be drawn from Men's natural Deſires of Immortality: For it is not at all probable, that God ſhould have given Men *Appetites*, which were never to be *ſatisfied*; *Deſires* which had *no Objects* to anſwer them; and unavoidable *Apprehenſions*, of what was never to come to paſs.

3. Another Argument for a *future State* may be drawn from Mens *Conſcience* or *Judgment* of all their *Actions*, *good* or *bad*. The one being neceſſarily attended with Hope of Reward, the other with fear of Puniſhment; and hence, it is not probable, that God ſhould conſtitute the Mind of Man ſo, as to paſs a *Judgment* upon itſelf, that ſhall *never be verified*; and be convicted by a *Sentence*, that ſhall never be *confirmed*.

4. Another Argument for a *future State* may be drawn from Man's being an *accountable Creature*. Man, who has in himſelf a Power of determining his own Actions upon moral Motives, and has a Rule given him to act by, which is right Reaſon, cannot but be accountable for all his Actions, how far they have been agreeable or diſagreeable to that Rule. Every Man, becauſe of the natural Liberty of his Will, *can* and *ought* to govern all his Actions by ſome certain Rule, and give a Reaſon for

them. Every moral Action being free, proceeds either from some *good Motive* or some evil one, and is either worthy of *Praise* or *Blame*; and consequently it is reasonable to be supposed, that since there is a supreme Being, from whom we received all our Powers, there will at some Time or other be an Examination or Inquiry into the Motives of our several Actions, how agreeable or disagreeable they have been to the Rule given us, and a suitable *Judgment* passed upon all. Upon these Considerations, the wisest Heathens believed that the Actions of Men would be examined after Death. (*Plato de Legibus, lib.* 10.)

Prop. V. *That, though the Necessity and Indispensableness of all the great and moral Obligations of natural Religion, and also the Certainty of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, be in general deducible from right Reason; yet such is the present corrupt Estate and Condition of Mankind in the World, that very few are able in reality and effect to discover these Things clearly and plainly for themselves; but Men have great need of particular Teaching, and much Instruction.*

1. There is naturally in Mankind great *Carelessness*, and *Want of Attention*. Some seem to have hardly any Notion of God; and less frame worthy Notions of his Perfections, and more are entirely careless to discover his Will. Few make a right Use of their Faculties to distinguish the essential Difference between *Good* and *Evil*. Fewer yet, so attend to the natural Notices which God has given them, as by their own Understanding, to collect that what is *Good*, is the *Will* and Command of God; and what is *Evil*, is forbidden by him. And still fewer consider the Importance of Things both as to *this Life* and the *next*.

2. The greater Part of Mankind are not only unattentive, but have taken up *early Prejudices*, and many

many *fooliſh Opinions*, which pervert their natural Underſtanding, and hinder the Uſe of their Reaſon in moral Matters. (*Cic. Tuſc. Queſt. lib.* 3.)

3. In the generality of Men, the *Appetites* and *Deſires* of *Senſe* are ſo importunate; the *Buſineſs* and *Pleaſures* of the World take up ſo much of their Time, that of themſelves they are backward to employ their Reaſon, and fix their Attention upon *moral Matters*, and ſtill more backward to the Practice of them. The *Love of Pleaſure* is ſo *nouriſhed* up with us from our very *Childhood*, that it is difficult for Men to withdraw their Thoughts from ſenſual Objects; and if perhaps they begin to ſee the Reaſonableneſs of governing themſelves by a higher Principle than mere Senſe, yet the *Variety of Temptations*, and Strength of Paſſions, makes them practiſe that which their Reaſon condemns.

4. But that which moſt depraves Men's Underſtandings, are *vicious Habits* and ſuperſtitious Practices, which blind the Eye of their Reaſon. So that though *that which may be known of God* has been manifeſt enough in all Ages; yet ſuperſtitious Cuſtoms and evil Actions blind and darken their Judgment, ſo that by Degrees they are unable to diſcern between *Good and Evil*.

By theſe Means it comes to paſs, that though the great *Obligations* and the principal Motives of Morality, are demonſtrable by right Reaſon, yet very few are able of themſelves to diſcover thoſe Truths; but moſt Men have great Need of particular *Teaching* and *Inſtruction*.

1. To ſtir up their *Attention*, to move them to ſhake off their Careleſſneſs; to perſuade them to make uſe of their natural Reaſon; and to apply their Minds to apprehend the Certainty of theſe Things; or they will be ignorant of them.

2. To convince them of the *great Importance* of them; to correct the falſe Notions and Prejudices,

and foolish Opinions, which deprave their Judgment; and to remove that Heedlessness of Spirit, that hinders them from practising what they seem to believe.

3. To inculcate these Things frequently; to *press* them to practise them; to persuade them to moderate their Passions, and subdue their Lusts, to despise the Pleasures of Sense; to reform their evil Habits, which tempt them to commit what their Reason may disapprove; for 'tis very possible Men may confess the Excellency of Virtue, and yet at the Return of their Temptations fall into Vice, if the great Motives of their Duty be not frequently inculcated upon them.

And this shews the great Use and Necessity of establishing an Order of Men, whose Office should be to teach and instruct People in their Duty, and exhort them to the Practice of it.

To which excellent Institution, the right Notions of God, the just Sense of the great Duties of Religion, and the universal Belief of a future State, are undeniably owing.

PROP. VI. *That all the Teaching and Instruction of the best Heathens was for many Reasons utterly insufficient to reform Mankind.*

1. There have indeed in almost every Age been in the Heathen World some good Men, who made it their Business to exhort Men to the Practice of Virtue. Instance *Job* in the Eastern Nations, and *Socrates* among the *Greeks*, and after them many others, as *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Cicero*, *Epictetus*, and *Antoninus*, who gave the World excellent Instructions, and left them Systems of Ethicks, which are now of great Value.

2. It is reasonable to suppose, that these Men were raised up by Providence, as Instruments to reprove in some Measure, and check the extreme Superstition and Wickedness of the Nations they lived among. And whatever they delivered that was

agree-

agreeable to divine Truth, was a *Light shining in a dark Place*, derived to them from that infinite Goodness, who does Good both to the *Just and Unjust*, for the Benefit of the World.

3. But then the Instructions of the best Philosophers were very small. They were never able to reform the World, nor to keep any Number of Men in the Knowledge and Practice of Virtue. With Respect to God, Idolatry universally prevailed, and the Philosophers never turned any Number of Men from it. With Respect to Men's Dealings, Honour, Interest, Friendship, and the Laws of Societies, did indeed cause *Justice* to be practised; but very few were *just* upon right Principles. With Respect to themselves, *Intemperance*, *Luxury*, and unnatural *Uncleanness*, prevailed; and this not so much in Opposition to the Doctrine of the Philosophers, as by the Consent and Encouragement of too great a Part of them. The Disciples of the best Moralists, at least the Practicers of their Doctrine, in their own Life-time were very few; and at their Deaths their Doctrine in great Measure died with them; not having sufficient Authority to support it. And indeed it was impossible that the Philosophers should ever reform Mankind with any great Success:

1. Because the Number of those who set themselves in earnest about this excellent Work were very few. The Doctrine of the greatest Part of them consisted in nothing but Words; and did not at all amend even their own Manners, much less was fitted to reform the World. For excepting one or two great Names, the Philosophers were very vicious, not only in secret, but in the most public Manner. None of them lived agreeably to their own Instructions, but were Slaves to filthy Lusts.

2. Those *few* who did sincerely obey the Law of natural Religion, and made it their Business to instruct others, were yet *themselves intirely ignorant*

of some Doctrines absolutely necessary for this Reformation.

In general: Having no Knowledge of the whole Order and State of Things, the Method of God's governing the World, his Design in creating Mankind, the original Dignity of human Nature, the Ground of Men's present Corruption, the Manner of the divine Interposition necessary to their Recovery, and the glorious End to which God intended to conduct them, their Attempt to discover Truth was fruitless. Accordingly the wisest of them confess their Ignorance; and that the very first, and most necessary Thing of all, the Nature and Attributes of God, was very difficult to them to find out in particular, and still more difficult to explain.

More particularly: The *Manner* in which God was to be *acceptably worshipped*, they were ignorant of: That he was to be worshipped was plain, but with what kind of Worship their Reason could not discover. Obedience to the Obligations of Nature, and Imitation of the moral Attributes of God they knew was the most *acceptable* Service to him: But some *external Adoration* seemed also necessary, and how this was to be performed, they could not discover. Accordingly the best of them complied with the Religion of their Countries; and notwithstanding all their wise Discourses, they fell into the Practice of the most foolish Idolatry.

But still more particularly: That which of all Things was of the greatest Importance to know, viz. *in what Method God would be reconciled to returning Sinners*, they were ignorant of. From the Consideration of God's Goodness they hoped he might some Way be reconciled; but in what Manner Revelation could only inform them. That *Repentance* would be accepted instead of *perfect Obedience*; and that God would not require something further for the Vindication of his Justice and Dignity of his Laws they could not be assured. For

For though this be the most *probable* and *only* Means of Reconciliation that Nature suggests, yet whether this would be alone sufficient for the Vindication of his Justice, and the Honour of his Laws, and for the expressing more effectually his Hatred against Sin, they cannot be satisfactorily assured. For it cannot be proved from God's Attributes, that God is absolutely obliged to pardon all Creatures upon their repenting.

There arises therefore from Nature no sufficient Comfort to Sinners. Hence the more considering Philosophers thought the Rites of their Religion could not appease the Wrath of a provoked God, but that something was wanting, though they knew not what.

3. There were other Doctrines the Philosophers were uncertain about, that were absolutely necessary in order to reform the World; *viz.* the *Immortality of the Soul*; the Certainty *of a future State*; and the *Rewards* and *Punishments in a Life to come.* And not only those of low Genius, but the very best and wisest among them, who notwithstanding the undeniable Strength of the Arguments which sometimes convinced them of the Certainty of a *future State*, yet at other Times expressed themselves with so much Hesitancy, as could not but hinder the good Influence the Belief of it ought to have had upon the Hearts and Lives of Men.

Which shews that Men wanted some more compleat Discovery; and that *Life and Immortality* could not be fully and satisfactorily *brought to Light* by bare natural Reason.

4. Those Things which the Philosophers were *most certain* of, as the *Obligations of Virtue*, and the *Will of God in Matters of Morality*, yet they were never able *to prove and explain clearly enough:* 1. Because their Discourses upon these Subjects were rather nice and subtle Disputes, than practical and useful

useful Instructions. They proved by nice Argumentation, that the *Practice of Virtue is reasonable and fit to be chosen*, rather *than that it is of plain and necessary Obligation.* And were able to deduce the *Will of God* only by such abstract and subtle Reasonings, as the Generality of Men did not understand, or were not affected by.

Another Reason why they could not *prove and explain clearly* the Things they were most certain of, was that they had no compleat and regular System of Things. Nothing could be more certain than that Virtue was to be chosen, yet they could not *satisfactorily make out* upon what *Principles originally*, and for *what End ultimately* this Choice was to be made. Hence came their multitude of different Opinions, *what was the chief Happiness of Man.* The Effect of all which must greatly hinder the general Influence which that great Truth ought to have upon the Minds and Lives of Men.

5. Even *those Things which they were able to prove and explain clearly, yet they had not sufficient Authority to inforce in Practice.* The *Truths* which they proved by speculative Reason wanted more sensible Authority to make them of Efficacy in Practice. And the *Precepts* they laid down seemed to want Weight, and to be but the *Precepts* of Men.

Hence the *wisest Instructions* of the Philosophers were not able to work any remarkable Change in the Minds and Lives of any considerable Number of Men; or make them willing to lay down their Lives for the sake of Virtue, as Christ's Disciples and Followers are known to have done. In *Speculation*, indeed, it may perhaps seem possible, that the Precepts of the Philosophers might at least be sufficient to reform Mens Lives for the *future*; but in *Experience* it hath appeared impossible for Philosophy to reform Mankind effectually, without the Assistance of some higher Principle.

They never worked any remarkable Change in the Lives of Men, as the Preaching of Chriſt and his Apoſtles did. There was plainly wanting ſome ſupernatural Aſſiſtance to make their Inſtructions to be effectually practiſed by the generality of Men.

PROP. VII. *That there was plainly wanting a divine Revelation to recover Mankind out of their univerſally degenerate Eſtate: And that both the Neceſſities of Men, and their natural Notions of God, gave them reaſonable Ground to hope for ſuch a Revelation.*

1. There was plainly wanting a *divine Revelation* to recover Mankind out of their univerſal Corruption. There was wanting ſome *particular Revelation* to diſcover by what *external Service* God might be *worſhipped* agreeably. To diſcover what *Expiation* God would accept for *Sin*. To diſcover the *Rewards* and *Puniſhments of a future State*.

In fine, there was wanting ſome *particular Revelation* to make the Doctrine of Religion *clear and obvious*; to add *Weight and Authority* to the plaineſt Precepts; and to furniſh Men with *Aſſiſtances* to enable them to overcome the Corruptions of their Nature.

2. It was agreeable to the Dictates of Nature to *expect* and *hope* for ſuch a Revelation. The wiſeſt and beſt Men of the Heathens were not aſhamed to confeſs openly their Senſe of the want of a divine Revelation, and to declare, that it was agreeable to Reaſon to *hope* for ſomething of that Nature; as we may read in their Writings.

3. This Senſe of the ancient Philoſophers is departed from by our *modern Deiſts*, who contend, that there is no need of a Revelation; that Philoſophy and right Reaſon is ſufficient to inſtruct and to preſerve Men in their Duty. But to paſs by the Barbarity of the preſent Heathens, and what the Philoſophers confeſſed of the State of the Nations, wherein

wherein they lived, I appeal to our Adversaries themselves, whether the Testimony of Christ concerning the Immortality of the Soul (notwithstanding all the Corruptions of Christians) has not a greater Influence upon Men, than all the Reasonings of Philosophers. *Whether* the Belief of a divine Revelation be not the most proper Means to awaken those, who would not be affected with all the abstract Reasonings in the World. And whether in Christian Countries the most ignorant People have not now worthier Notions of God, and a deeper Sense of the Difference of Good and Evil, a greater Regard to moral Obligations, and a more firm Expectation of a future State, than any considerable Number of Heathens ever had.

It may be pretended by modern Deists, that the Ignorance and Corruptness of the Heathen World was not owing to the insufficiency of the Light of Nature, but to their not Improving that Light. And that Deists *now*, are able to discover all the Obligations of Morality without Revelation. I answer, that supposing this true, it would not prove there is no need of a Revelation; because it is certain in *Fact*, that the Philosophers wanted some higher Assistance than Reason. And as to the great Pretences of the Deists, almost all the Things that have been said wisely by them, are plainly borrowed from Revelation. *Now*, when our Duty is clearly revealed, we not only see its Agreement with Reason, but are able to deduce its Obligation *from* Reason: But had we been destitute of all revealed Light, it would have been greatly difficult to have discovered our Duty in all Points.

What Ground have our Deists to imagine, that if they had lived without the Light of the Gospel, they should have been wiser than *Plato* or *Tully?* How are they certain they should have made such a right Use of their Reason, as to have discovered

Truth? If their Lot had been among the Vulgar, are they ſure they ſhould not have been Idolaters? If they had joined themſelves to the Philoſophers, what Sect would they have followed? Or if they had ſet up for themſelves, how are they certain, that they ſhould have been ſkilful enough to have deduced the ſeveral Branches of their Duty by dint of Reaſon? 'Tis one Thing to ſee that thoſe Rules of Life laid before us, are agreeable to Reaſon; and *another Thing* to find out thoſe Reaſons by the Light of Reaſon.

We ſee that many who profeſs to govern themſelves by the *written Rules of revealed Religion*, are yet ignorant of their Duty: And how can any Man be ſure, that he ſhould have made ſo good Uſe of his Reaſon, as perfectly to have underſtood it without Help? We ſee that Chriſtians who believe the Eternity of Puniſhments, do yet Things to which theſe Puniſhments are annexed; and how can a Man be ſure he ſhould be able to overcome theſe Temptations, if theſe Motives were leſs known, or leſs powerfully inforced? But ſuppoſe he could by his Strength of Reaſon demonſtrate to himſelf theſe Things, yet all Men are not equally *Philoſophers*, tho' all Men are *obliged to be religious*. At leaſt thus much is certain, that the Rewards and Puniſhments of another World, would not ſo influence Mens Lives by a Demonſtration of the reality of them from abſtract Reaſoning, as by one, who aſſures them by ſufficient Credentials of his having been in that other State.

4. From what has been ſaid, 'tis evident, that a Revelation is agreeable to the Hopes of Mankind; that 'tis worthy of the divine Wiſdom; and that conſidering the manifold Wants of Men, there is great Ground from the Light of Nature to believe, that God would not leave Men without ſuch an Aſſiſtance. Yet it does not follow, that God is obliged

obliged to make such a Revelation; for then it must have been given in all Ages, and all Nations. But the forementioned Considerations might give Men Hope for some Favour of this Kind, to such Men as his infinite Wisdom should chuse; at least they might dispose Men, whenever such Doctrine should come with good Evidence of its being a Revelation to embrace it with Readiness.

It has been objected, that since no Revelation has been made universally known to all, that therefore it cannot be needful to any. Now if this Reasoning is true, it would follow, that neither was *natural Religion* necessary to enable Men to answer the Ends of their Creation; because all Men have not Capacities to discover the Truths of it; and consequently, the Knowledge of *natural Religion* being, in Fact, by no Means universal, it will follow, that there is no Necessity even of that. And thus these Gentlemen must be forced to let go all moral Obligations, and recurr to Atheism. The Truth is, as God was not obliged to make all his Creatures equal, so neither is he bound to make all Men capable of the *same Degree of Happiness*, or afford them the same Means to *obtain* it.

There is Ground enough from the Consideration of the Corruption of human Nature, to be so far sensible of the Want of a divine Revelation, as that Reason, and the Light of Nature, will lead a wise Man to think it very probable, that a merciful God may afford Men some such supernatural Assistance; and consequently, such a Person will be very willing and prepared to entertain a Doctrine which has good Evidence of its being a Revelation of the Will of God. But it does not hence follow, either that God is bound to make such a Revelation, or that, if he makes it, it must be equally to all Men.

PROP. VIII. *That there is no other Religion now in*

in the World, but the Christian, that has any just Pretence or Appearance of Reason to be esteemed such a divine Revelation.

The *Mahometan* Religion was founded by a vicious Person; its Doctrines ridiculous, and propagated by Force of Arms, and not confirmed by Miracles; and its Rewards sensual, so that there is no danger of its imposing on considerate Men.

The *Jewish* Religion was founded in Expectation of a *Messiah* to come, and the Time of his Appearance was limited by such plain Prophecies, and so far elapsed in all possible Computations, that if the *Christian* Religion is false, the *Jewish* cannot be true: It being evident therefore, that either the Christian Revelation is true, or there is no such Thing as Revelation at all. It remains that we consider what positive Evidence there is to prove the actual Truth of this Revelation.

PROP. IX. *That the Christian Religion has all the Marks of a truly divine Revelation.*

The necessary Proofs or Marks of a Religion coming from God are,

1. That the *Duties* it enjoins are agreeable to our natural Notions of God, and conducive to the Happiness of Men; and its *Doctrines* be agreeable to Reason.

2. That its *Motives* are such as are suitable to the excellent Wisdom of God, and fitted to amend the Manners and Minds of Men.

Lastly, that it be positively proved to come from God.

The entire Proof therefore of this Proposition must be made by an Induction of the following Particulars.

PROP. X. *That the practical Duties which the Christian Religion injoins are all such as are most agreeable to our natural Notions of God; and most perfective of the Nature, and conducive to the Happiness of Men.*

1. The

1. The Duties of *Love*, *Fear*, and *Adoration*, which our Religion enjoins us to render unto *God*, are plainly incumbent upon us, from a Consideration of the divine Attributes, and the natural Notions of our Mind.

2. The Duties of *Justice*, *Equity*, *Charity and Truth*, which the Christian Religion obliges us to exercise towards *Men*, are absolutely reasonable in themselves, and evidently conducive to the Happiness of Mankind.

3. The Duties of *Sobriety*, *Temperance*, *Patience* and *Contentment*, which our Religion requires us to practise in ourselves, are so agreeable to the inward Constitution of human Nature, and so perfective of it, that the principal Design of all true Philosophy has been ever to recommend them to the best Advantage.

Lastly, Even those *positive and external Observances* (the *two Sacraments*) are so free from all Appearance of Superstition, and so well fitted for the End for which they were designed, that our Adversaries have nothing to object against the Things themselves, but against the Superstitions some have annexed to them. For where is the Superstition for any Member of a Society to be admitted by a plain Rite into his Profession, entitling him to all the Privileges, and charging him with all the Obligations of that Society? Which is the Design of *Baptism*. Or that it is unreasonable to commemorate the Love of their greatest Benefactor, and renew their Promises of Obedience to him? Which is the Design of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

PROP. XI. Secondly, *The Motives by which the Christian Religion inforces the Practice of the Duties it enjoins, are such as are suitable to the excellent Wisdom of God, and the most answerable to the natural Expectations of Men.*

1. The *Acceptableness of true Repentance*, and the *Assurance*

Assurance of Pardon which the Christian Religion affords us, is a most powerful Motive to sinful and frail Creatures, to encourage and support them in the Practice of their Duty. Nothing can be more satisfactory to the Mind of Man, nothing more agreeable to the Wisdom of God, than such a Declaration of the *Acceptableness* of *sincere Repentance*, and such an authentic Assurance of *Pardon* thereupon, as under the Christian Dispensation the divine Mercy has found Means to afford unto us, in such a Manner as is at the same Time abundantly consistent with the Dignity of his Laws, and his Hatred against Sin.

2. That *divine and supernatural Assistance* which Christians have Encouragement to hope for, is another powerful *Motive* to support them in the Practice of their Duty, and appears to be undeniably agreeable to the natural Expectations of right Reason, and suitable to the best and worthiest Notions that Men have ever by the Light of Nature been able to frame to themselves concerning the Attributes of God. The Effect of this divine *Assistance* was very wonderful in the primitive Times, by the sudden Reformation of more wicked Men, than all the Exhortations of Philosophers ever brought to Repentance. And even in this corrupt Age, there are more good People, than ever were found in the best Nations of the Heathen World.

3. The *Rewards and Punishments* which the Christian Religion proposes to Obedience or Disobedience, are a *Motive* perfectly agreeable to Men's natural Hopes and Fears, and worthy of God to make known by express Revelation. For by the certain Knowledge of these Things is the Practice of Virtue established upon a sure Foundation, Men have sufficient to support them in their Choice of Virtue, and to enable them to conquer all the

Temptations of the World; and to despise even Death itself.

PROP. XII. Thirdly, *The peculiar Manner and Circumstances with which the Christian Religion enjoins the Duties, and urges the Motives before mentioned, are exactly consonant to the Dictates of sound Reason, or the unprejudiced Light of Nature; and most wisely perfective of it.*

For what can be more agreeable to the Light of Nature, than to have those Duties which Nature only *hints* at *in general*, explained fully and largely; and urged with Authority upon the meanest Capacities, and exemplified in the Lives of holy Persons? What more perfective of the Light of Nature, than to have those Rewards and Punishments, which Nature only obscurely points at, described to us, most plainly and lively, than to have the Means of atoning for Sin, which only Nature discovers the Want of, plainly declared to us; than to have such a Discovery of the Heinousness of Sin, and the Necessity of Holiness, as the Death of Christ, and the Purity of the Gospel does make us? In fine, what can more effectually perfect the Religion of Nature, than the gathering together the Worshipers of God into one Body? the causing them to enter into solemn Obligations to live suitably to their holy Profession? the giving them Assurances that true Repentance shall be accepted for what is past, and sincere renewed Obedience for the future? the uniting them in one religious as well as civil Communion by a few positive Rites for mutual Assistance and Improvement? and the establishing a certain Order of Men to explain the Duties of Religion, to instruct the Ignorant, and to admonish the Wicked; to reduce those that err, to comfort the Doubtful, and to reprove the Obstinate?

The Contentions indeed among Christians about trivial Points, have given our Adversaries a plausible Occasion

Occasion to revile our Religion; but with no just Reason to do so; for notwithstanding these Differences, the fundamental Doctrines of Religion have been pressed and inculcated upon Persons of all Capacities, with an Effect infinitely more considerable, both in Extent and Duration, than by the teaching of all the Philosophers that ever lived: Which shews at least the Excellency, if not the divine Authority of the Christian Institution.

PROP. XIII. Fourthly, *That all the Doctrines which the Christian Religion requires our particular Assent to, are agreeable to unprejudiced Reason; have every one of them a natural Tendency, and direct Influence to reform Men's Manners; and do together make up the most consistent and rational Scheme of Belief in the World.*

1. That there is one only living, and true God, is not only the first Article of the Christian Faith, but also the most evident Truth that the Light of Nature teaches us.

2. That this supreme Cause of all Things did before all Ages, by his Almighty Power and Will, beget a divine Person stiled the *Logos*, or *Son* of God, in whom dwells the Fulness and Perfection of the divine Attributes, excepting Independency, or self Origination. This Doctrine, tho' not discoverable, but by Revelation, appears very consistent with right Reason. And the same with little Variation may be said concerning the *original Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father.*

3. That the Universe, and all Things therein were created and made by God through the Operation of his *Son*, is likewise very agreeable to sound Reason; for 'tis the same Thing whether God made the World immediately himself, or by the Ministration of a second Principle. And what *Plato* has said concerning that eternal Νοῦς, Mind, whom they frequently stile Δημιουργὸς, the Minister,

by whom God made the World, proves that this Scripture Doctrine is not inconsistent with right Reason.

4. That the Earth, as the Scripture tells us, was about 6000 Years since, framed out of a *Chaos* into this beautiful Fabric, and stocked with all Things as it now is, is agreeable to Reason and antient Tradition; and moreover, is evident from the Absurdities of those Accounts that pretend to greater Antiquity, the present Number of Men, the original of Arts, the Impossibility of universal Deluges, and from many more Arguments drawn from Nature and Observation.

5. That the same God, as the Scripture tells us, who created all Things by the Word of his Power, does also by his all-wise *Providence* perpetually govern and direct them. This also is agreeable to Reason, from a Consideration of the infinite Wisdom, Power, Justice, and Goodness of God, as I have before proved.

6. That God after the Formation of the Earth, created Man *upright*, and placed him in an happy State, where he lived without Labour and Sorrow: And that Sin was the Cause why the Ground was cursed. This likewise is agreeable to Reason, and from the general Opinion the antient Heathens had from Tradition, that for the Sin of Man God would let nothing grow for the future spontaneously.

7. That in process of Time for the incorrigible Wickedness of Men, God brought a general Flood, and destroyed them all, except a few Persons, is not only delivered in Scripture, but mentioned in other Histories.

8. That God, after the Flood, revealed himself to the *Patriarchs*, is very credible; and that after this, God by express Revelation gave a Law to the *Jews* consisting much in Sacrifices and Ceremonies, cannot be rejected as incredible, because such an

an Institution was necessary to keep them from Idolatry; and those Ceremonies were preparative to a more excellent Dispensation; that the *Jews* were taught by their Prophets, that an Observance of those *Rites* were not so agreeable to God as Obedience to the *moral* Law; and *that* the whole Matter of Fact relating to that Revelation, is delivered down to us in a History, which we can have no Manner of Doubt of, more than of any other antient Matter of Fact in the World.

Why God granted this Favour to this single Nation, is to be accounted for by the same Reasons, which prove that God was not obliged to make known the *Revelation of the Gospel* to all Men alike.

9. That all other Particulars of the *Scripture History* of the Old Testament are true, will appear from hence, that they are confirmed by the Testimonies of profane and unquestionably unprejudiced Authors. *Vide Grotius de verit. Christ. Rel. l.* 1. *c.* 16. *l.* 3. *c.* 16.

10. That God in the Fulness of Time should send his Son into the World; *that* he should take human Nature upon him, and therein make a full Revelation of God's Will to Mankind; to preach to Men Repentance and Remission of Sin, and by giving himself a Sacrifice and Expiation for Sin; to declare the Acceptableness of Repentance; to be a Mediator between God and Man; to procure the Assistance of God's holy Spirit; in a word, to be the Saviour and Judge of Mankind: All this when revealed, is very agreeable to Reason; as I shall endeavour to make out more distinctly, by shewing in particular, that none of the several Objections, upon which *speculative Unbelievers* reject this Doctrine, do prove any Inconsistency in the Belief of it, because it is the main Article of the Christian Faith.

1*st*, I have already proved that it is agreeable to

God's moral Attributes, that he ſhould make a Revelation of his Will.

2*dly*, It cannot be thought unreaſonable to be believed, that in ſuch a Revelation wherein God proclaims Remiſſion of Sin, he ſhould nevertheleſs have appointed ſuch a Sacrifice or Expiation of Sin, as would ſhew his Deteſtation againſt it. The Heathens were not ſure that God would forgive Sin upon Repentance; on the contrary, there was Reaſon to ſuppoſe that God would require ſome further Satisfaction; and accordingly, the general Cuſtom of ſacrificing, ſhews that Mankind did apprehend that God did require ſome further Satisfaction; and therefore it is reaſonable to imagine, he ſhould appoint ſome Sacrifice for Sin, at the ſame Time he forgives the Sinner upon Repentance.

3. It is by no Means inconſiſtent with right Reaſon, that a Mediator may by divine Authority be appointed between God and ſinful Man, to be their Interceſſor with a juſtly offended God. The wiſeſt Heathens thought it agreeable to Reaſon to make uſe of ſubordinate Dæmons, by whom they put up their Prayers to the ſuperior Gods, hoping that by the Mediation of thoſe Interceſſors, the Unworthineſs of their own Perſons, and the Defects of their Prayers might be ſupplied; and they obtain ſuch Anſwers to their Prayers, as they could not preſume to hope for on their own Account.

4. How is it poſſible, that the Son of God ſhould become *incarnate*, and become *Man?* How is it conceivable, that God ſhould condeſcend to *ſend* his *Son*, or his *Son* ſubmit to be *ſent*, to do ſo much for ſuch frail and low Creatures as Men? To this I anſwer:

1. That whatſoever Myſteriouſneſs there may be in the *Manner* of the *Incarnation of the Son of God*, there is no more Unreaſonableneſs in believing the Poſſibility of it, than in believing the Union of

Soul and *Body*, the Manner of which we know nothing of.

2. As to the Incredibility that God ſhould condeſcend to ſend ſuch an eminent Perſon, or that the Son ſhould vouchſafe to die for Men: He that conſiders, that the moſt minute Things of the Univerſe are under the Care of God's Providence, cannot wonder that the Son of God ſhould ſo far concern himſelf for Men, as to appear in their Nature, to give himſelf a Sacrifice for their Sins, and to bring them to Repentance and eternal Life. 'Tis true, no Man can ſay, but that God might, if he had ſo pleaſed, have pardoned Sin upon Repentance, without any Sacrifice at all. But this Method of doing it by the Death of Chriſt was more fit, foraſmuch as it ſhews us, that at the ſame Time God was willing to forgive Men, yet his Hatred of Sin was ſo great, that he would not take away the Guilt of it, but upon the Death of his only Son. And by how much the Dignity of his Perſon was, of ſo much greater Force is this Argument to deter us from ſinning.

Wherefore ſo far is it from being true, that the Conſideration of the Dignity of the Perſon ſuffering is a real Objection againſt the Credibility of the Doctrine, that on the contrary, that very Conſideration contains the higheſt Vindication of the Greatneſs, and Honour and Authority of God's Laws, and at the ſame Time the greateſt Inſtance of his Mercy to Men.

3. How it can be conſiſtent with Reaſon to ſuppoſe God to do ſuch great Things for ſuch *mean* and *weak Creatures* as Men are, who are but an *inconſiderable* Part of the Creation; foraſmuch as the Earth itſelf bears no Proportion to the Univerſe, and in all Probability the numberleſs Orbs of Heaven are filled with Beings more capable than we, to ſhew forth the Glory of their Maker, and more wor-

thy of his Love. To this I answer: That God's Mercy and Love is extended over all his Works; that let the Universe be ever so large, and rational Creatures ever so many, yet Man is the chief Inhabitant of this Earth, and this Earth, as far as we know, as worthy of the divine Care, as any other Part of any other System. And *that* as God governs every Thing in this World, as well as in every other Part of the Universe; so the *Logos* may have made various Manifestations of God's Will to other Creatures in other Parts of the Universe, for what we know.

5. We have already answered the Objection drawn from the Christian Revelation not being in fact universal. I shall only observe, that though the Redemption purchased by the Son of God is not indeed actually made known to all Mankind, yet as no Man denied but the Benefits of his Death extended to those who lived before him, so no Man can prove the same Benefits may extend to those who never heard of his Appearance.

11. That the History of the Life of Christ, or the new Testament, is a *true Relation of Matters of Fact*, will appear credible from hence, that many Particulars of it are confirmed by prophane and unquestionably unprejudiced Authors.

12. That God will judge the World by his Son is agreeable to right Reason, and to our Notion of the Attributes of God, and to the Opinion of the wiser Heathens. And some of their Poets have agreed, that after Death, not God, but *just Men*, were to judge others.

13. That there should be a *Resurrection* of the Body, though not discoverable by the Light of Nature, yet when known by Revelation, contains nothing in it contrary to Reason. For is it not as easy for God to raise the Body again after Death, as to create it at first? The only real Difficulty in

this Doctrine seems to arise from the Supposition of one Body's being turned into the Nourishment, and becoming Part of the Substance of another's. To which I answer, that to constitute the same Body, there does not appear an absolute Necessity, that there must be an exact Restitution of all and only the same Parts; and if there was, it is easy to imagine many ways, by which the Resurrection of the same Body may be possible.

As *First*, It is not improbable, that the *original Stamina*, which contain all the solid Parts of the Body, are themselves the *entire Body*. And that all the *extraneous Matter*, which coming in by Nourishment, fills up the Vessels, is not properly *Part* of the Body. Consequently, that the *original Stamina* may continue *unchanged*, though the extraneous Matter is in *continual Flux*.

Such a Speculation as this seems to be favoured by many Observations made concerning the *determinate Figure* in which every Body unfolds itself by Growth; concerning the Impossibility of the Body's extending itself by any Nourishment beyond *that certain Magnitude*, to which the original Vessels are capable of being unfolded, and concerning the *Impossibility of restoring* any mutilated Vessel, or Part of the Body.

2. That as there is in every Grain of Corn contained a minute, insensible, seminal Principle, which is itself the entire Blade and Ear, and as the other Parts of the Grain is corrupted, evolves, and unfolds itself visibly into that Form; so our present Bodies may be but the *Exuviæ*, as it were, of some hidden Principle, which at the Resurrection shall discover itself.

This Way also there can be no Confusion of Bodies. And many other Ways may be imagined, which may shew the *Possibility* of the Resurrection.

14. That after the Resurrection and Judgment,

good

good Men will be eternally happy, and *the evil miserable*, is very reasonable to believe: Concerning the *everlasting Happiness of the Righteous* there is no Dispute; but the *everlasting Punishment* of the Wicked has seem'd a Difficulty. But here it is to be observed: First, No wicked Man will say, it is unreasonable, that God may *eternally reject* and *exclude* those who by their habitual Wickedness have made themselves unfit for the Enjoyment of that Happiness, which he has prepared for them that obey him. And if bare *Deprivation of Happiness* was all the Punishment, they would content themselves still in their Wickedness. But is it reasonable to believe, that God will punish the most obstinate Offenders in the next World with less Afflictions, than even good Men are afflicted with in this Life; and that there will be nothing more than the *Negation of Happiness?* There must therefore be some *sensible and positive Punishment*. And whoever considers the dreadful Effects of God's Anger in the Deluge, in the Overthrow of *Sodom*, and the Destruction of *Jerusalem*, cannot but frame the most dreadful Notion of the Punishments he will finally inflict on incorrigible Sinners. As to the *Duration* of the Punishment, the Justice of God will abundantly vindicate itself, and the Wicked shall acknowledge the Righteousness of his Judgments, and condemn their own Folly; and no Man shall suffer more than he has deserved. The Heathens thought it not unreasonable, that the Punishment of the incorrigible should be without any determinate *End*. And we cannot tell what wise Designs God may serve thereby. We know not, but that as God discovered to us the Punishment of Angels, to be a Warning to us; so he may hereafter use the Example of the Punishment of wicked Men to preserve other Beings in that Obedience.

Thus all the Doctrines of the Christian Religion, tho'

tho' ſome of them be not diſcoverable by bare Reaſon, are yet, when diſcovered by Revelation, agreeable to unprejudiced Reaſon.

In the next Place, every one of theſe Doctrines tend to reform Men's Lives, and correct their Manners, which is the great End of Religion.

Particularly, What can be a more excellent Foundation of Religion, than the Chriſtian Doctrine concerning the Nature and Attributes of the only true God? What ſo certain a Preſervative againſt Idolatry, as the Doctrine, that all Things were made by him? What can be ſo ſure a Ground of Piety, as the Chriſtian Doctrine of *Providence?* What can be a more proper Motive to Piety, than that the remarkable Calamities which have happened, were ſent by God's immediate Direction to puniſh wicked Men? What a greater Encouragement to Holineſs, than that God has made *Revelations of his Will* to inſtruct Men in that Practice? What Doctrine is ſo admirably ſuited to all the Ends of Religion, as that of the *Incarnation of the Son of God?* Which Way could Men have been ſo ſenſible of God's Love, and have been inſtructed in divine Truths ſo well, as by ſending his only Son? How could the Honour of God's Laws be vindicated, and ſuch an Aſſurance of Pardon been given to Men, as by this Method of the *Son of God giving himſelf a Sacrifice for Sin.* What could be a more glorious Manifeſtation of God's Mercy; what more effectual to deter Men from Sin; and to let them ſee the heinous Nature of it, and God's Hatred againſt it, and the indiſpenſible Neceſſity of obeying God's Laws, than this expedient of *ſaving Sinners by the Sacrifice of his Son?* How could Men be better encouraged to a religious Life, than by having ſuch a Mediator to obtain Pardon for their Frailties, and by being aſſured of the Aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit, to enable them to conquer their

corrupt

corrupt Affections? In fine, what more powerful Motive to perſuade Men to live virtuouſly, than the Certainty of a future Judgment? Vain Men may value themſelves upon their ſpeculative Knowledge, right Opinions, and true Belief; but no Belief will be of Advantage to them that is ſeparate from the Practice of Virtue.

Laſtly, All the Doctrines of the Chriſtian Faith make up an infinitely more *conſiſtent and rational Scheme of Belief*, than the wiſeſt of the antient Philoſophers ever *did*, or the cunningeſt of modern Unbelievers can invent. The Philoſophers were never able to make out a coherent Scheme of Things, and the modern Deiſts cannot frame to themſelves any conſiſtent and fixt Principles, as I have before ſhewn. There indeed have been Diſputes among Chriſtians, but they have not been like thoſe among the Philoſophers *De ſummâ Re*, but only Explications of particular Doctrines, which do not affect Religion itſelf, and ought not to hinder the good Effect, which the fundamental Doctrines ought to have upon the Lives of Men.

Prop. XIV. Fifthly, *That the Chriſtian Revelation is poſitively and directly proved to be ſent to us from God, by the Miracles which our Saviour worked; by the fulfilling of the Prophecies; and by the Teſtimony of the Apoſtles.*

Firſt, the Chriſtian Revelation is directly proved to be from God, from the Miracles of *Chriſt*.

Beſides the Excellency of the Doctrine, it is of moment to obſerve, that the Author of it appears, from the Innocency of his Life, which was ſpent in doing Good to the Souls and Bodies of Men, to be no *Impoſtor*: And from the Wiſdom of his Anſwers, which he gave to moral or captious Queſtions, his occaſional Diſcourſes, the Wiſdom and Excellency of his Sermon upon the Mount, which exceeds the moſt celebrated Inſtructions of the Philoſophers, he

cannot

cannot without the extremeſt Malice be charged with *Enthuſiaſm*.

Theſe Conſiderations add Weight to his Doctrine, and make the Teſtimony concerning himſelf highly credible: But the *poſitive Proof* of his divine Commiſſion are the *Miracles* which he wrought.

But becauſe there have been many Queſtions concerning the *Power of working Miracles*, *the Extent of their Evidence*, and whether a *true Miracle* can be worked by any leſs Power than God, and whether to compleat the Evidence of a Miracle, the Nature of the Doctrine pretended to be proved thereby, is to be conſidered or no, I will ſet this whole Matter in a clear Light.

1*ſt* then: In Reſpect of the *Power of God*, and to the *Nature of the Things themſelves*, abſolutely ſpeaking *all Things are alike eaſy* to be done, which do not imply a Contradiction. 'Tis not therefore a right Diſtinction to define a *Miracle* by any *abſolute Difficulty* in the Nature of the Thing itſelf to be done, as if what we call *natural* is eaſier to be done, than that Thing which we look upon as *miraculous*. On the contrary, it is as great an act of Power to cauſe the *Sun to move*, as to *ſtand ſtill*; and as eaſy to *reſtore Life* as to give it: So that in this *Senſe*, with reſpect to *God*, nothing is *miraculous*; in reſpect to ourſelves *every Thing*; and 'tis only *Uſualneſs* or *Unuſualneſs* that makes the Diſtinction.

2. What *Degrees of Power* God may communicate to other Creatures, we know nothing of; Angels good or bad, may do what we cannot; ſo that excepting the Power of *creating*, which we cannot conceive communicable to created Beings, we are not certain that any Effect, however miraculous to us, is beyond the Power of all created Beings to produce.

There is no Inſtance of any Miracle in Scripture, which to an ordinary Spectator would *neceſſarily* imply

imply an immediate Creation of ſomething out of nothing; and conſequently, ſuch a Spectator could never be *certain* that the Miracle was beyond the Power of all created Beings to produce. There is one Suppoſition, indeed, upon which the Opinion of all *Miracles being neceſſarily the immediate Effects of the divine Omnipotence* may be defended; and that is, if God has given a Law of Reſtraint, whereby they are hindered from producing any Effect, we call miraculous. But yet it can never be proved that they are under ſuch Reſtraints perpetually, and without Exception. And without this, a Spectator that ſees a Miracle, can never be certain, that it was not done by ſome created Intelligence.

'Tis not therefore right to define a Miracle to be ſuch an Effect, as could not be produced by any leſs Power than the *divine Omnipotence*.

3. All Things that are done in the World are done either immediately by *God* himſelf, or by *created intelligent Beings*. So that all thoſe Things which we commonly ſay are the Effects of *the natural Powers of Matter*, and *Laws of Motion*, of Gravitation, *&c.* are the Effects of God's acting continually upon Matter, either by himſelf, or ſome created, intelligent Being. Conſequently there is no ſuch Thing as what Men call the *Courſe of Nature*, or *Power of Nature*, which is nothing but the *Will of God*, producing certain Effects in a regular Manner, which may be altered if he pleaſes. And if, as it ſeems probable, this continued acting upon Matter be performed by the Subſerviency of created Intelligences appointed by God, then it is within their natural Power to *alter*, if God permits, the Courſe of Nature, as *continue it*.

'Tis not therefore a right Diſtinction, to define a Miracle to be that which is *againſt the Courſe of Nature*, or the *natural Powers of created Agents*. For in this Senſe, 'tis no more above the natural Power

of

of a created Intelligence, *to ſtop the Motion of the Sun*, than *to continue it*; and yet the former is a Miracle, the latter not ſo.

But if by the *Courſe of Nature* be meant the conſtant Manner of God's acting either immediately, or mediately, in preſerving the World, then a Miracle may be rightly defined to be an Effect produced contrary to the *Courſe of Nature*, by the Interpoſition of ſome intelligent Being ſuperior to Men.

And from this Obſervation we may diſcover the Unreaſonableneſs of thoſe Deiſts, who becauſe they ſee Things generally go on in a regular Method, deny the Poſſibility of Miracles in general; whereas if they would conſider, they cannot but ſee, that Matter is utterly incapable of obeying any *Laws*; that that Order of Things which is called the Courſe of Nature, is the *Will of God* exerting itſelf upon Matter, either by itſelf, or by ſome ſubordinate intelligent Beings, according to certain Rules; but which are made ſuch by arbitrary Conſtitution, and not by any Neceſſity in the Things themſelves; and conſequently, that Miracles, excepting only that they are more *unuſual*, are in themſelves as credible, as thoſe we call *natural* Effects.

4. Thoſe Effects which are produced in the World *regularly* and *conſtantly*, *viz.* the *Power of Gravitation*, the *Laws of Motion*, of the *mechanic*, and of the *animal Powers*, prove to us in *general* the Being and the conſtant Operation, either immediate or mediate, of God in the World. Thoſe Effects which are *rare* and *extraordinary*, as if we *ſhould ſee a Stone* ſuſpended in the Air without any viſible ſupport, prove the immediate Interpoſition either of God, or at leaſt ſome intelligent Agent far ſuperior to Man, in order to bring about ſome particular Deſign.

5. Whether ſuch Interpoſition be the immediate Work of God, or of ſome good or evil Angel,

can

can hardly be discovered by the Work itself, because it is impossible for us to know how far the Power of good or bad Angels extend. The *raising the Dead* may be thought to be beyond the Power of evil Spirits, because the Souls of Men are in the Hand of God. But there are other Instances, wherein we cannot determine, that this or that is beyond the Power of Spirits; therefore there is no Reason to suppose, that all the Wonders worked by evil Spirits to be mere Delusions.

'Tis not therefore a right Distinction to suppose the Wonders which the Scripture attributes to evil Spirits, to be *mere Delusions*; for if the Devil has any natural Power of doing any thing at all, and be not restrained by God, 'tis evident he will be able by his Invisibility to *work true Miracles*. Neither is it a right Distinction to suppose the Miracles of evil Spirits *Impositions upon the Senses*, for to impose in this Manner on our Senses is to all Intents as *true* a Miracle, as making real Changes in Things themselves.

6. When any Person who teaches a new Doctrine, and works Miracles in Defence of it, these are the only possible Ways to distinguish whether the Doctrine be true. *If* the Doctrine attested by Miracles tends to *promote Vice*, then the necessary Difference between Good and Evil, is of more Force to prove the Doctrine false, than any Miracles can prove them to be true. *If* the Doctrine attested by Miracles be such, as cannot certainly be known whether it be true or false by the Light of Nature; and at the same Time, and in Proof of the direct contrary Doctrine, there be wrought more Miracles by a confessed *superior Power*, than that Doctrine which is attested by the *superior Power*, must necessarily be believed to be divine. *If* the Doctrine attested by Miracles tends to promote the Glory of God, and the Practice of universal Righteousness among

among Men, tho' it could not be discovered without a Revelation to be actually true; and if there be no Pretence on the other Side of greater Miracles, then the Miracles are divine, and the Doctrine from God; because it cannot be supposed that in these Cases God would suffer evil Spirits to deceive Men, which would be the same, as if he worked Miracles himself to deceive them.

No Man can doubt, but that *evil Spirits* have Power to hurt and destroy Mens *Bodies*, if God did not restrain them; and for the same Reason 'tis certain, that God restrains them likewise from imposing upon Mens *Understandings*, in such Cases where honest and wise Men could not discover the Imposition.

And here, at last, the Difference between those who teach that the immediate Power of God is, or is not necessarily requisite to the working of a Miracle, is not great; they that believe the *immediate Power of God*, must believe it upon this Ground, that he has restrained all other intelligent Agents from altering the regular Course of Things: And they who believe that subordinate intelligent Beings can work Miracles, must suppose that God restrains them, in such Cases where the Fraud of evil Spirits could not be clearly distinguished from the Commission of God.

And now from these Propositions it follows,

1*st*, That the true *Definition* of a *Miracle* is this: That it is a Work effected different from the common Method of Providence, either by God, or some Being superior to Man, for a Proof of a Doctrine, or for an Attestation of the Authority of any particular Person. And if a Miracle so worked be not opposed by some superior Power, nor be brought to attest a *bad* Doctrine, then the Doctrine so attested must be looked upon as divine, and the Worker of it entertained as coming from God.

2. From hence appears the Strength of the Evidence for our Saviour. The Doctrines he taught promoted the Honour of God and true Righteousness among Men: And the Miracles he worked were such, that there could be no Pretence of more or greater Miracles in Opposition to them, and therefore he had truly a divine Commission.

3. From hence it appears, how little there is in the Objection, that we prove in a Circle the *Doctrine* by the *Miracles*, and the *Miracles* by the *Doctrine*; for the *Miracles* are not at all proved by the *Doctrine*, but only the *Possibility*, the *good Tendency*, or at least the *Indifferency* of the Doctrine are a necessary Condition, without which the Doctrine is not capable of being proved by *Miracles*.

They are indeed the *Miracles* only that prove the Doctrine, and not the Doctrine that proves the *Miracles*: But then in order to this End, that the *Miracles* may prove the *Doctrine*, it is first to be supposed capable of being proved by Miracles. The *Doctrine* must first be *possible*, and then *Miracles* will prove it to be *actually true*. But if the *Doctrines are impossible to be true*, such as are all *Absurdities*, and what promotes *Wickedness*, they can never receive any Degree of Proof from all the Miracles in the World. But if Doctrines are in their own Nature probable, though they could be positively known to be true only by *Miracles*, *Miracles* prove them certain.

4. From hence it follows, that the pretended Miracles of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, and others among the Heathens, even supposing them to be true, will prove nothing against Christianity, because they were either worked to confirm no Doctrine, or else to establish Idolatry; and consequently could not be done by the divine Power.

To return therefore to the Argument. The *Miracles* of *Jesus* were to his *Disciples* sensible Demonstrations

ſtrations of his Power; and *to thoſe who lived ſince*, are certain Demonſtrations of the ſame Truth.

Secondly, The divine Authority of the Chriſtian Revelation is directly proved by the exact Completion of all thoſe Prophecies concerning our Lord.

The Prophecies concerning the Time of his Appearance, *viz. Gen.* xlix. 10. *Hagg.* ii. 7. *Dan.* ix. 24. were fulfilled. The *Prophecies* which foretold his great and beneficial Miracles, *viz. Iſa.* xxxv. 3. were literally fulfilled; that he ſhould die a violent Death, *Iſa.* liii. was accompliſhed; and that God would give him the Heathen for his Inheritance, *Gen.* xlix. 10. *Pſal.* ii. 8. was punctually fulfilled by the wonderful Succeſs of the Goſpel; and all thoſe Inſults and Afflictions he underwent, were foretold exactly. So were many minuter Circumſtances which were foretold of the *Meſſiah*, as that he ſhould be *of the Tribe of Judah*, (*Mic.* v. 2.) *that he ſhould ride upon an Aſs* in an humble Triumph into *Jeruſalem*, (*Zech.* ix. 9.) that he ſhould *be ſold for thirty Pieces of Silver*, (*Zech.* xi. 12.) that he ſhould be *ſcourged*, *buffeted* and *ſpit upon*, (*Iſa.* l. 6.) that his *Hands* and *Feet ſhould be pierced*, (*Pſal.* xxii. 16.) that he ſhould be numbered with the Malefactors (*Iſa.* liii. 12.) All which and many more Circumſtances were fulfilled in the Perſon of Chriſt with the greateſt Exactneſs; not to mention the numberleſs *typical* Repreſentations which were accompliſhed in him.

Further: The *Prophecies* which Chriſt delivered himſelf concerning his own Death and Manner of it, his Riſing again, his Aſcenſion into Heaven, the Perſon who ſhould betray him, and the diſmal Deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, are ſtrong Proofs of the Truth and divine Authority of his Doctrine.

Laſtly, He foretold the future Succeſs of the Goſpel, and what ſhould happen to ſeveral of his Diſciples: All which were punctually accompliſhed.

But as these Things are mostly only *sensible and ocular Demonstrations* of the Truth of our Lord's Doctrine to those who lived at that Time: Wherefore,

Thirdly, The chief Evidence on which the Truth of the Christian Revelation depends to us, *who live at this Distance*, is *the Testimony of our Saviour's Followers*, which in all its Circumstances was the most credible Evidence that was ever given to any Matter of Fact.

To make the Testimony of our Saviour's Followers a sufficient Evidence, three Things are required: 1. That the Apostles could not be *imposed* on *themselves*. 2. That they had no Design to *impose* on *others*. And 3. That their Testimony is *truly convey'd* to us. All which are clear enough to any unprejudiced Person.

1. That the Apostles could not be *imposed* upon *themselves* is evident, from the *Nature*, and *Number*, and *Publickness* of our Saviour's *Miracles*, because they saw the *Prophecies* of the Old Testament fulfilled in his *Life*, *Doctrine*, and *Death*. They saw him confirm his Doctrine with mighty Miracles. They saw him after his Passion by many infallible Proofs, so that had the Apostles been the *weakest Men* in the World, they could not have been deceived in so many Instances.

2. That the Apostles could not have any Design to *impose* on others is also certain, because what they taught, they confirmed by *Miracles*. They lived agreeably to what they *taught*, though manifestly contrary to all worldly Interests; and *died* with the utmost Tranquillity of Mind for the Testimony of their *Doctrine*. They were innocent and plain Men. They had no base End to serve, or *Preferment* to hope for. Their Religion taught them to expect Afflictions and Death. These Things are not the Marks of Impostors. Besides the Success of their Undertaking, that illiterate Men should be able to

preach

preach their Doctrine to different Nations of different Languages, that they ſhould all agree in their Teſtimony, and neither by Hopes or Fears diſcover the Impoſture, if there had been any, ſhewed their Doctrine to be more than human; and not a Contrivance to impoſe on the World.

3. It is very certain, that the Apoſtles Teſtimony hath been truly conveyed down to us. For they left their Teſtimony in their Writings. Which Writings have been regularly delivered down to us. Their Books were tranſlated very early into ſeveral Languages, and diſperſed through all the Parts of the World; and have been acknowledged to be the Writings of thoſe whoſe Names they bear, even by the Enemies of Chriſtianity, the moſt material Doctrines have been cited out of them in every Age, ſo that there is no Room for any conſiderable *Corruption.*

And here by the by it is to be obſerved, that the *peculiar Authority* of the Books of the New Teſtament is founded in this, that they were written or dictated by the *Apoſtles* themſelves, who as they were enabled by the Holy Spirit to preach with Authority, and ſecured from making in it any Miſtake, ſo the ſame Privilege attended them in their Writings.

Now all the Books of the New Teſtament were either *written* by the Apoſtles, or *approved* and *authorized* by them. Moſt of the Books were written by the *Apoſtles themſelves*; and the reſt approved or dictated by the Apoſtles. St. *Mark* wrote his *Goſpel with the Approbation* of St. *Peter*; and St. *Luke*'s Goſpel was a Tranſcript of St. *Paul*'s Preaching; as we are informed by *Euſebius*, *Irenæus*, and *Tertullian.*

PROP. XV. *That they who will not by the Arguments and Proofs before mentioned, be convinced of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion, would not be con-*

vinced by any other Evidence; no, not though one ſhould riſe from the Dead to convince him.

From what we have ſaid, we ſee God has given us all the Proofs of the Truth of our Religion that the Nature of the Thing would bear, or were reaſonable either for God to give, or Men to expect.

'Tis true, the Reſurrection of Chriſt, and his other mighty Works, muſt be confeſſed not to be ſuch ocular Demonſtrations of the Truth of his divine Miſſion to after Generations, as they were to thoſe Men, who then *lived*, and *ſaw*, and *converſed with him.*

But ſince the Matters of Fact are as clearly proved *to us*, as 'tis poſſible for Matters of Fact to be; he that will run the Hazard of loſing eternal Happineſs, and falling into eternal Miſery, rather than believe the moſt *credible Thing in the World*, merely becauſe he does not ſee it with his Eyes, 'tis plain he does not believe the Thing for want of Evidence; but becauſe 'tis contrary to ſome particular *Vice* of his, which makes it his Intereſt, that it ſhould not be true. And for that Reaſon alſo he might have diſbelieved it, though he had ſeen it himſelf.

And that this is the real Cauſe, is apparent from their Lives and Actions. They are Lovers of Vice and Debauchery, and therefore they are not willing to diſcern the Evidence, which would compel them to believe that which they cannot believe with any Comfort, ſo long as they keep their beloved Vices. And therefore they will not hearken to any reaſonable Conviction, which would perſuade them to relinquiſh theſe preſent Gratifications, for the future and ſpiritual Joys of Heaven.

And in this Caſe were the Proofs of Religion much ſtronger, yet ſtill theſe Men would be in the ſame Caſe, and perpetually want ſtronger and ſtronger.

'Tis true many Men, who are now conſcious and willing

willing to acknowledge, that they act contrary to all the reasonable Evidence of Religion; are nevertheless apt to imagine, that if the great Truths of Religion were proved to them by some stronger Evidence, they should by that Means be wrought upon to act otherwise. But if the true Reason why these Men act thus foolishly, is not because the *Doctrines of Religion* are not sufficiently proved, but because they themselves are hurried away by some unruly Passion, 'tis plain they might continue to act as they do, though the Evidence of these Things were greater than it is. They are willing to imagine, that if they had seen our Saviour's Miracles, they would have embraced his Doctrine; and if their Affections were not set upon this World, they would do the same *now*. But if they love the Pleasures of Sin *now*, the Case would have been the same had they lived in our Saviour's Time.

Others fancy, that if a Person was sent to them from the other World, they would immediately become new Creatures. But if God should satisfy their unreasonable Desires, there is little Room to doubt, but as they *hearkened not unto Moses*, neither would they be *persuaded tho' one rose from the Dead*. They might be terrified at first, but as soon as the Fright was over, 'tis by no means impossible, that their vicious Habits should by Degrees prevail over them. Some there are in our present Age, who pretend to be convinced of the Being of Spirits by the Demonstration of their own Senses; and yet we do not observe that they are more remarkably eminent for exemplary Piety than any other good Men.

'Tis not therefore for want of Evidence that Men disbelieve the great Truths of Religion, but for want of Integrity, and of dealing impartially with themselves: Wherefore if they will judge truly of the Reasonableness of the Christian Revelation, it is ne-

ceſſary they become impartially willing to embrace whatever ſhall appear to be agreeable to Reaſon, without intereſting their Luſts in the Judgment: And when they have put themſelves into this Frame of Mind, let them try if they can any longer reject the Evidence of the Goſpel: Indeed, Men that are of this good Diſpoſition, could not but give their Aſſent to the Doctrines of Chriſtianity, upon Account of the intrinſic Excellency of the Things themſelves, tho' the Evidence was leſs than it is: Nay, were there no other Evidence but the bare Excellency of the Truths of Religion, yet even in this Caſe it would be moſt agreeable to Reaſon to live according to the Rules of the Goſpel.

But this is not the Caſe: God has given us all the Proofs of our Religion being true, that any Matter of Fact is capable of having. Let me exhort you then to believe what we have the *moſt poſitive Evidence of.*

To conclude; we cannot ſay, but God may require us to *take Notice* of *ſome Things* at our Peril; to *inquire into* them, and to *conſider* them thoroughly. And Pretence of Want of greater Evidence will not excuſe *Careleſſneſs* or *unreaſonable Prejudices.* When God has vouchſafed us all that Evidence, which was either fit for him to grant, or reaſonable for Men to deſire; or indeed, which the Nature of the Thing itſelf to be proved, was capable of.

Dr. *HAN-*

Dr. *HANCOCK*'s

BOYLE's LECTURES

ABRIDG'D.

Dr. *HANCOCK*'s *BOYLE*'s LECTURES ON NATURAL and REVEALED RELIGION.

ACTS xvii. 23.

Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.

THESE Words will easily lead me to speak both of natural and revealed Religion, and particularly of that which is the Foundation of both, the Belief of a God.

But before I enter upon my Proof of the Being of a God, it may not be amiss to say something of that Question; whether there have been such Men as Atheists.

Of which there are two Sorts:

1. There are a Sort of ignorant People who are so buried in the Cares and Pleasures of the World, that they never think of God: Such as these the Apostle says, *are without God in the World.*

These are not the Atheists I am enquiring after; but,

2. Whether there have been Atheists who have reasoned themselves into an Opinion, that there is no God.

And here I see no Reason why we should reject the

the Teſtimonies of *Diogenes Laertius*, &c. who mention ſeveral; or why we ſhould think *Vaninus* himſelf, *Hobbs*, *Spinoza*, and others leſs than Atheiſts: For tho' they talk of God, they advance Principles inconſiſtent with the Belief of him.

I proceed therefore to diſcourſe on the Exiſtence of a God.

The firſt Proof of which I ſhall bring from the univerſal Conſent of Mankind.

And here I ſhall conſider, whether the Conſent of Mankind be ſo univerſal as is pretended.

It has been taken for granted, that there was no Nation ſo barbarous, but believed in a God.

But now it is pretended, that there are People about the *Cape of Good Hope*, and ſome other formerly unknown Parts of the World, that have no Notion of a God.

To which Exceptions we may conſider,

1. That 'tis poſſible that the Relaters of this were not well informed.

2. Accordingly, later Diſcoveries have given another Account of thoſe barbarous People.

3. That thoſe People are little better than Brutes; and 'tis no wonder, if thoſe that are fallen ſo far below the common Pitch of human Nature in all other Things, ſhould ſink below it in their Senſe of Religion, and the Belief of a God.

4. If we grant ſome barbarous Nations own no God, this is no juſt Exception to the general Conſent of Mankind in this Matter.

We believe there are ſome philoſophical Atheiſts; does it therefore follow, that Atheiſm cannot be diſproved by true Philoſophy? The *Pyrrhonian* Sect of Philoſophers denied there was any Certainty of any Thing; does it therefore follow that we muſt not believe our Senſes?

5. 'Tis poſſible that thoſe Nations that are ſaid to believe in no God, may believe one, and yet have

have no Rites of public Worſhip, and ſo be thought not to own a God.

Having thus far conſidered how Matter of Fact ſtands, as to the univerſal Conſent of Mankind in the Belief of a God, I ſhall now, as to the Validity of this Argument, propoſe theſe Things to your Conſideration.

1. That the antient *Roman* and *Greek* Writers inſiſt upon this Argument, to prove the Being of a God.

2. Whatever Original we aſſign to this general Conſent, will ſtill add Force to the Argument.

If we ſuppoſe, with ſome, it comes from a natural Inſtinct, this ſhews how natural the Belief of a God is to Mankind.

If we ſuppoſe, with others, that this Belief comes from obſerving the Excellency of the Creatures; this ſhews how cogent the Arguments are, that are taken from the Works of God to prove his Being, when all the World agrees in them.

Or if we ſuppoſe this Belief comes from Tradition; this makes it probable, that the common Parent of Mankind was created and inſtructed by God.

3. Indeed ſo general a Conſent of Mankind in this Truth is itſelf of great Weight to confirm our Belief of the Truth of it.

For what almoſt all Men conſent in, comes ſo near Demonſtration, that it is Arrogance to deny it.

But the Atheiſt endeavours to invalidate this Argument:

1. By giving a parallel Inſtance of a falſe Opinion, that has been believed as univerſally as the Being of a God.

2. By pretending to account how the Belief of a God might be ſo common, without ſuppoſing the Truth of it.

1. The Atheiſt tells us, that this general Conſent

in

in the Belief of a God, is no more an Argument of the Truth of it, than the like Consent, as to Polytheism, is an Argument that there are more Gods than one.

But to this I answer,

1. That the wisest Men in all Ages dissented from the Multitude in that Particular.

2. That in the worst Times of Polytheism, the general Opinion was that there was one supreme God; so that 'tis probable, that they looked upon the other Gods but as Mediators.

3. The Worship of so many false Gods shews there is a true one; as Counterfeits infer a real Thing.

4. That which most of all alters the Case, as to the Belief of one God, and the Belief of many, is this; that as to one, there is all the Reason in the World for it; and as to the other, there is all the Reason in the World against it. But,

2. The Atheist pretends to account how the Notion of a God might become so universal. As,

1. From Ignorance of second Causes; whereas 'tis generally Men's Ignorance of second Causes that is the Cause of Atheism. For second Causes if considered right, naturally lead us to the first Cause, that is God.

2. The Atheist tells us, that the Notion of God might come from Tradition.

This makes against the Atheist, for it is impossible there should be any such universal Tradition, unless Mankind came from one first common Parent, who was made by God, and delivered down the Belief of him to all his Posterity.

3. The Atheist tells us, this Belief might come from Fear.

But this is meer Pretence.

If these supposed Fears proceed from *without*, 'tis the same with Tradition; if from *within*, 'tis from the Conviction of a God.

'Tis

'Tis much more reasonable to believe Men's Fears proceeded from a just Belief of a God; than from a groundless Fear of they know not what.

But how comes this Fear all over the World? And how comes even Atheists themselves to be affected with it.

'Tis a vain Pretence therefore, that the Belief of a God proceeded from I know not what Fear of invisible Powers.

4. The Atheist pretends, that this universal Consent of Men in the Belief of a God, proceeded from Policy.

But if it did, it is strange that we have no Account of the Inventor of this Belief.

'Tis common indeed for Princes to encourage Sects, to serve their own Ends; but they cannot be supposed the first Authors of that Belief, which is the Ground of all Religion.

All Law-givers, that History informs us of, suppose this Belief of a God.

This Suggestion supposes, that all Men were sometime under one Government, else no one Prince would attempt it.

These Atheists say, 'tis impossible we should have any Notion of a God: If so, those Politicians would have a hard Task to beat it into the Heads of Mankind.

In short, the very Supposition is absurd in itself: For if the Belief of a God had not been grounded before in the Reason of Mankind, no Prince or Politician would attempt to establish such a Notion; nor, if all of them joined together, could they bring the Belief of a God to be so universal as it is.

Having thus spoken of the Argument to prove the Being of a God, taken from the general Consent of Mankind; I shall now proceed to insist upon some other Arguments to prove the same.

1. The Atheist must needs grant, that something

has existed from *Eternity*. For nothing can come out of nothing, without some Cause besides itself.

Now since 'tis plain that something is *eternal*, and this *eternal Existence* is a *Perfection*, sure 'tis much more reasonable to believe it to belong to such a perfect Being as we suppose God to be, than to such a dull unactive Thing as *Matter* is; which yet the Atheists believe to be *eternal*; and consequently that there must be a God.

2. Another Argument may be taken from the Impossibility of an infinite *Succession* of *Causes* and *Effects*.

As for Instance, in the Generations of Mankind, we must at last come to a Man that was not generated.

Now as to these first Parents, they must either be from *Eternity*, which none will suppose, that considers our frail Condition:

Or, we must say, they sprung out of the Earth.

Or, we must say, they were made by some superior Being.

3. 'Tis plain the Scripture sends us to the Works of God, to learn his Existence. *Rom.* i. 21. *Psal.* xix. 1, 2.

Indeed there is no Account to be given, how such a glorious and regular Frame of Things, as the World is, should come to be, without supposing an infinitely wise and powerful Being, who made and governs it.

To instance, particularly in two Parts of this noble Frame; the heavenly Bodies, and the Bodies of Animals.

1. The heavenly Bodies. Not to inquire into the Nature of those Bodies, which we know little of, the very Motions of those heavenly Bodies are so wonderful, as may convince us, that there is some infinitely wise and powerful Being, that was the Cause, and is the Director of them.

That so many vast Bodies swimming only in *Æther*, should so exactly keep their Places and Distances from the Center; that their stupendous Motions should be so regularly continued, without any considerable variation for so many thousand Years, is such a Wonder, as may force any Man to believe a God.

Astronomers may by Observation attain to a pretty accurate Knowledge of their several periodical Revolutions; but when they pretend to dive into the original Cause of their Motions, by what *internal Principle*, or by what external Force, they were begun and carried on, they are at a Loss. They tell us indeed of *Gravitation* and *Attraction*, of *Vis Centripeta's*, but they leave us as much in the dark, as before.

Another Instance of the Works of Nature, is the Bodies of Animals, particularly that of Man.

If we consider how wonderfully they are conceived in the Womb, how exactly all the Parts are fitted for the Convenience of the Body.

If we consider the Veins, Arteries, Nerves, Ligaments, the Flesh and Bones, with all their different Uses, and particularly the Circulation of the Blood; that it should receive nutrimental Particles from such a Variety of Aliment; we must confess them to be the Contrivance of an infinitely wise God.

4. Another Argument to prove the Being of a God may be taken from the *Regularity* of the *acting* even of *inanimate Creatures*.

This is certain, that whatever acts constantly in order to some End, must either design that End itself, or be guided by some Being that does so.

Now if we look upon the regular Motion and Actions of *inanimate* Creatures, we must own an infinitely wise Being that directs their Motions; or has fixt such an order of Nature, that they cannot vary from it.

Thus if we consider how regularly heavy Things descend, Plants grow, Animals are begotten, and grow up; we shall easily think there is a God.

If it be objected, that *Nature* doth this;

I ask, what do they mean by Nature?

If they mean the *particular* Nature of every individual Thing, 'tis no more than to say, that such Things are done, we don't know how.

If they mean *common* Nature abstracted from Individuals, that is but a logical Notion, and can do nothing.

If they mean by Nature any active incogitative Principle distinct from the Things themselves, it may be justly questioned whether there be any such Nature, though some Philosophers assert it; or if there be, they that assert it make it to depend upon God.

If they mean by Nature any active intelligent Principle, that so regularly guides these inanimate Creatures, then by *Nature* they mean God.

However 'tis impossible that so vast a Variety of inanimate Creatures should go on so regularly without the Direction of some superior intelligent Mind.

And thus the regular acting of inanimate Things, in order to those Ends for which they seem so well to be designed, is a plain Proof of an infinitely wise and powerful God.

Epicurus and *Spinoza* ridicule final Causes, and the latter tells us that Nature proposes no End to itself; but can any one think that the Eyes were not made for Seeing, or the Ear for Hearing; and can we not plainly see the Uses of the different Members of the Body? Even these *Epicureans* must own, that these Things could not have been made better, if the highest Wisdom had been employ'd in the making of them.

And

And therefore they are to blame to aſcribe thoſe things to Chance, in which ſo plainly appears the Footſteps of a moſt wiſe God.

Another Argument to prove the Being of a God, is the excellent *Harmony* in the ſeveral ~~Arguments~~ Parts of the Creation.

1. With reſpect to the greater or leſs Perfection of thoſe Creatures that are viſible to us.

2. With reſpect to the Subſerviency of the leſs noble to the more noble Creatures.

1. With reſpect to the Perfection of thoſe ſeveral Sorts of Beings that are viſible to us.

Some are without any Power; ſome have a Power of *Vegetation*, that are propagated from *Seeds*. A third ſort are Animals, that have Senſe, if not ſome Degree of Reaſon. And then Men, that have not only Senſe, and ſome low Degree of Reaſon, but ſuch noble Faculties as enable them to underſtand Things that are above the Reach of Senſe.

And methinks this *Climax* in the Creatures that are viſible to us, may lead us to believe that there are rational Beings of a higher Sort; and conſequently, that at laſt we muſt come to ſome one moſt perfectly rational Being, that is the Cauſe of all Things.

A ſecond Thing, in which this excellent Harmony of the Creatures appears, is in the Subſerviency that the leſs noble have to the more noble Creatures.

The Sun aſſiſts the Vegetation of Plants; they feed and nouriſh the Brutes; and both are uſeful to Men.

But ſome tell us, 'tis not likely that ſuch vaſt heavenly Bodies were made to ſerve ſo vile and mean a Creature as Man is.

But to this I anſwer, that the meaneſt Animal may be a more noble Creature than the Sun; inaſmuch, as the meaneſt Creature that has Life, is more noble than the greateſt that has not.

Now 'tis plain, that the Sun is subservient not only to the Vegetation of our Bodies, and those of inferior Animals, but even of the Plants themselves.

And this Subserviency is a Proof of an infinitely wise Author.

Another Argument to prove that there is a God, may be taken from natural Conscience.

Now 'tis plain, that Conscience of Duty, must imply a Respect to some Law, either *natural* or *positive*; and a Law must suppose a Law-giver.

Since all Men have a Sense of Duty, this must suppose a natural Conviction, either impress'd upon their Natures, or gathered by rational Collection, that there is a God.

That there is such a Sense in Mankind, appears not only from open Faults, but from secret Miscarriages.

If it be objected, that this arises from our Opinion, that there is a God, which will have the same Effect, as if there really were one.

I answer, that those who have studiously made it their Business to disengage themselves from all Sense of Duty, have not been able to do it. And that those who have upon philosophical Principles pretended to have already done it, have been worse than other Men.

So that 'tis plain, that the Notions of a God are so firmly imprinted upon the Nature of Man, or at least by an unavoidable Reasoning do so stare them in the Face, that they cannot be obliterated.

But if we consider this Matter well, there cannot be any Ground for Conscience, or moral Obligations, if there be no God.

Some may tell us these Obligations may arise from the several Relations of Persons and Things, antecedently to our supposing them agreeable to the Will of God.

But this Fitness of Virtue to the Nature of Things,

is far from ſuper-inducing any Obligation, and laying any Foundation for natural Conſcience.

We may ſee then what Friends the Atheiſts are to civil Society, who ſet Men at Liberty to do what they liſt.

No doubt there does appear a general Agreeableneſs in virtuous Actions, and it would be generous ſo far to conſult the general Good of Men, as to practiſe accordingly. But this would be a weak Incitement to Virtue without the Belief of a God.

The Atheiſts are ſo ſenſible that this is a juſt Conſequence, that they deny that there is (antecedent to human Laws) any Difference between *Good* and *Evil.*

But by their Leave, is it all one to honour our Parents, or to affront them? to love our Neighbour, or to kill him?

Is there no Obligation as to any of theſe Things, but what comes from human Laws?

Or were theſe Vices eſtabliſhed by human Laws, would it make them juſt?

But theſe Atheiſts think they ſolve the Matter, by telling us, that 'tis neceſſary for the Peace of Society, that Men ſhould enter into civil Society, and that ſuper-induces an Obligation to Juſtice and Virtue.

But if they ſecure the Peace of Society, 'tis a Sign they were good in themſelves antecedent to any civil Obligation.

But we may aſk theſe Men, Whence comes Mens Obligation to keep their Contracts?

It ſeems we muſt ſuppoſe there is ſomething good and evil in itſelf.

'Tis not all one to keep or to break them. And why may not all the other greater Inſtances of Virtue be as good as this? Or what Reaſon can be given, why we ſhould be more obliged to this, than any of the other?

The Truth is, unleſs we ſuppoſe a God, all our Contracts will ſignify nothing.

The Sum is, Virtue, *&c.* is founded in the Nature and Reaſon of things. We may be ſure, if there be a juſt God, 'tis agreeable to his Will, that his rational Creatures ſhould govern themſelves according to the eternal Rule of Reaſon. And I think that thoſe Rules that eſtabliſh the greater Inſtances of Morality, are as plain, as any Principles in Philoſophy or Mathematics can be; and therefore the Atheiſt diſſolves the very Bonds of civil Society.

Another Argument to prove the Being of a God are *Apparitions*, *Witches*, *Demoniacks*, *Prodigies*, and *Prophecies*.

Which though they do not directly prove a God, becauſe they may proceed from Beings in Power inferior to the ſupreme God.

Yet if we can convince the Atheiſt that there is an inviſible World of Beings ſuperior to Man, he will be forced to acknowledge one ſupreme Spirit, that made that inviſible World.

Of which the Atheiſt ſeems aware, for he denies the firſt Appearance of any ſuch Things.

As to *Apparitions*, both Scripture and almoſt all Hiſtory abounds in them; and therefore I think it abſurd wholly to deny them.

Nor is it neceſſary that we ſhould be able to give an Account, whether they be the Spirits of Men departed, or any other Spirits.

For what End God may permit them; or what Power they have of aſſuming Bodies; or of what Nature thoſe Bodies are.

We know ſo little of that intermediate State of Souls, that we cannot pretend to ſay much about it.

This indeed we believe, that there is no Occaſion for ſuch Apparitions now; but yet we cannot ſay,

but there may be occasion to convince an infidel Age, that there are invisible Powers.

For my Part, I cannot see why those that believe there ever were Apparitions, should deny there are any now? Or why the Atheist should deny such sensible Appearances, unless he will leave Mankind no Knowledge at all?

As to that Question, whether there be any such Things as *Witches*, that is, Persons that deal with the Devil, or have familiar Spirits, there is no great Reason to doubt.

Both Scripture and other History mention them.

As to Scripture, I confess we are told the Word in the Original signifies *Poisoners*; but what shall we say to the Witch of *Endor?* where we have an Instance of a Witch and an Apparition together.

As to the Question whether there be any *Demoniacs* or no? The Scripture is clear in that.

'Tis said indeed by some Writers, that this was a common form of Speech used by the *Jews*, for those that were distempered in their Bodies.

But when such Persons do not only discover Secrets, and declare Things past and to come; when they speak in Languages they never learnt, we cannot think such to be Mad-men, but rather are possessed by evil Spirits.

As to *Prodigies*; that such wonderful Works have often happened in the World, we have the concurrent Testimony of the best Heathen Writers. Now these do not directly prove a God, but they are an undeniable Proof of some invisible Powers, the Acknowledgment of which will naturally lead to the Belief of a God

As to *Prophecy*. We find by Experience, that the wisest Men assisted by the Power of Nature cannot tell what will be on the Morrow.

When therefore we find Predictions made by any Men come to pass, we may conclude, they

were assisted by some extraordinary Revelation.

Now of Predictions there are two Sorts:

1. Such as are foretold but a little before, and whose immediate Causes are in Being.

And these may be told by the natural Sagacity of finite Spirits, whether good or bad.

For they, by their Invisibility, may be privy to the Designs of rational Agents, and so be capable of foretelling Things beyond the Reach of the wisest Men.

And this kind of Prophecy may convince us of the Being of *invisible Powers*; and so may lead us a good Way to the Belief of a God. Or,

2. The Things foretold may be such as are to come to pass in far distant Ages: And as far as we believe any such Prophecies fulfilled, so far we must believe that there is a God.

For no finite Spirit can foretel Things at so great a Distance.

Now not to mention the Pretences made by profane Histories to some such Things; we Christians firmly believe, that there have been Men endued with such a prophetic Spirit. Witness the Prophecies recorded in Scripture.

Now I take such Prophecies as these to be a most certain Witness of the Being of a God. It being impossible for a Man without a special Revelation from an omniscient Being to foretel such Things.

As to those Miracles, recorded in Scripture, as they are certain Proofs of the Truth of our Religion, so they are of the Being of a God.

Of Miracles there are two Sorts:

1. Such as are above the Power of Nature, though not above the Power of invisible Spirits. Or,

2. Such as are above the Reach of any Creature; and so are proper only to God; and these are a direct Proof of his Being.

If

If it be asked, Why are Miracles ceased?

I answer, 'tis hard to say whether they be or no; but if they be so, 'tis because the Christian Religion is already confirmed sufficiently.

Having advanced some Arguments for the Proof of a God:

I proceed now to answer the Objections of the Atheists against his Being.

1. They assert we have no Idea of God.

But do we not find, that we have this Notion of God; that he is a Being of absolute Perfection, eternal, and the Cause of all Things?

Is not this a clear and plain Idea of God?

Nay, the Atheist must confess that he has some such Notion of a God; or how comes he to deny there is any such Thing? For if he have no Notion what is meant by the Word God, he denies he knows not what.

Nay, indeed, the Atheist in this Point confutes himself; for one Account he gives of the Opinion that there is a God, is a certain feigning Power in the Mind, whereby it can by compounding and dividing its own Ideas, form a Notion of Things impossible.

Now he must grant, that there is in the Mind a Power at least of forming an Idea of God, as well as other Things, and therefore it is absurd to say, we can have no Idea of God.

2. They say God is *incomprehensible*, and therefore nothing.

To which I answer:

1. That there is a great Difference between knowing nothing of a Thing, and knowing all that is to be known.

'Tis true we have no adequate Notion of the Essence of God, but we know many of his Attributes, and that such Attributes must belong to such a perfect Being.

2. 'Tis

2. 'Tis one Thing to know the Exiſtence, and another to know the Eſſence of Things.

Muſt we conclude we have no Bodies, becauſe we do not exactly comprehend the whole Œconomy of an Animal? Or have no Souls, becauſe we cannot diſcover the Eſſence of a Spirit?

So God is not inconceivable, though he be incomprehenſible; we may know by his Works that he is, though we ſhould not know what he is.

3. 'Tis not to be expected we ſhould comprehend the *Eſſence* of God, when we don't underſtand perfectly the Eſſence of any Thing.

We ſee, hear, taſte, and ſmell; we reaſon and move, and walk, and perhaps, if we are put to it, cannot give any tolerable Account how we do ſo.

And ſhall we think to ſearch into the Depths of the divine Nature? Or muſt we not believe a God, unleſs we can do ſo?

The Atheiſt talks againſt immaterial Beings, as unintelligible Things; but will he tell us in what the *Eſſence* of Matter conſiſts?

There is no Reaſon therefore that the Atheiſt ſhould argue againſt the Being of God becauſe we own him to be *incomprehenſible*.

3. The Atheiſt ſays, that he that calls any Thing *infinite*, attributes an unintelligible Name to an unintelligible Thing.

But if we conſider what is truly meant by *infinite* when applied to God, we ſhall find neither the *Name*, nor *Thing*, is truly unintelligible.

There's a *negative* and *poſitive* Infinity.

A *negative* Infinity:

So we ſay *Number*, *Matter*, and *Time* is infinite, becauſe we can always *add* to them.

A *poſitive* Infinity we apply to God.

By which we do not mean, that God is every Thing, for then every Thing would be God, or a part of him.

For

For God, if I may ſo ſpeak, though infinite, is as it were bounded by the Perfection of his Nature.

Nor when we call God *infinite*, do we mean that every Thing we attribute to God, is to be aſcribed to him in the higheſt Degree, but in ſuch a Degree as is conſiſtent with the higheſt Perfection.

Thus when we ſay God is infinite in *Mercy*, we mean only ſo far as is conſiſtent with his *Juſtice*.

Thus when we ſay God is infinite in Power, we mean only ſo far as is conſiſtent with the Truth of Things, and with the Excellency and Rectitude of his Nature and Will.

But becauſe this Term *infinite* is applied to the *Immenſity* and *Eternity* of God, I ſhall here take Occaſion to ſay ſomething of them.

As to his *Omnipreſence*, tho' we cannot underſtand how he is preſent in all Places, Reaſon aſſures he is ſo.

1. For it ſeems moſt rational to conclude, that the moſt perfect Being muſt be every where.

2. But then he muſt be ſo in ſome more perfect Manner than that of corporeal Extenſion; for the Eſſence of God muſt be ſimple and indiviſible.

3. The Difficulty of conceiving the Omnipreſence of God without Diviſibility, is no greater than that of conceiving a finite Spirit. For unleſs we ſuppoſe ſuch a Spirit to be a mathematical Point, the ſame Objection about Diviſibility will ſtill return.

And therefore the *Socinians*, who own finite Spirits, are wrong by ſuppoſing God to be only in Heaven as to his *Eſſence*; and every where elſe only as to his *Power*.

For beſides, that it ſeems abſurd to ſeparate God's *Power* from his *Eſſence*, and no leſs abſurd to make him finite, there will be the ſame Objection againſt the Indiviſibility of his Eſſence, as if he were omnipreſent.

Nay,

Nay, it seems as inconceivable how God's Power and Providence can be every where, when his Essence is confined, as it is how he can be every where entire.

For if he be only in Heaven, he must leave the Government of the World to an infinite Number of inferior Spirits.

Or else, that he acts by the Mediation of Matter, as the Sun in the Firmament. But the whole Scheme of Providence cannot be accounted for this Way.

For how can God be said to uphold all Things in their Being, if he be not omnipresent?

For tho' we might suppose God to keep the World in Motion by acting upon it by intermediate Matter; yet 'tis inconceivable how he can by the Influence of any intermediate Matter, conceive Things in Being, when he is not present with them.

I confess, if a positive Influx of an omnipotent Cause was required to Annihilation, as well as to Creation, this would not be so great a Difficulty.

But I rather incline to think, that without the continual *Power* of God exerting itself in *Conservation*, as it did at first in *Creation*, all Things would fall to nothing.

And if we have this Notion of a conserving Power of God, 'tis impossible to conceive it can be without his Omnipresence.

The Atheist perhaps will start the forementioned Objection against the Existence both of an infinite and finite Spirit too. But without Reason: For when such an Extension as implies Divisibility is plainly an Imperfection, and the very Ground of those Mutations, and that Corruption that material Beings are liable to: Methinks 'tis highly probable there are nobler Beings whose Essences are indivisible; and if we allow any such finite Spirits, notwithstanding this Divisibility, we may also suppose an infinite one.

As

As to the Attribute of *Eternity*, 'tis plain that God is eternal, otherwise he could not be at all, it being impossible, that any Thing that was not before, should come into Being without a Cause; and we are sure that nothing in the World can possibly be the Cause of such a Being as God.

Nay, we find the Atheists do not object against the Existence of God, because we say he is eternal; but that they may shew that there is no need of an eternal God to solve the *Phænomena* of Nature, and that they may not acknowledge him, they ascribe this Eternity to other Things. As,

1. All Sorts of Atheists agree in this, that *Matter* is *eternal*.

To which I answer:

1. That it seems very rational to conclude, that Matter did not exist from Eternity.

2. That if it did, it will be as difficult to give any tolerable Account of the regular Frame of the World, as it was before.

I. 'Tis more probable that Matter was not eternal, For,

1. 'Tis agreeable to Reason to conclude, that there is but one independent, self-existent, eternal Being.

2. The very Supposal of Independency, absolute Perfection, Omnipotence, seems to imply, that all other Beings must depend upon that one independent, absolutely perfect, eternal Being; and consequently, that Matter, as to its Existence, cannot be self-dependent, but must come from that one independent, self-existent, eternal Being, that we call God.

3. 'Tis reasonable to think the lower Being is more likely to be dependent upon some more noble.

Now Matter divested of noble Forms is the meanest of any Thing, and therefore most likely to depend

pend upon such an absolutely perfect Being as we suppose God to be.

4. 'Tis much easier to suppose that God created Matter, than that by it all Things were made.

II. If we should suppose Matter to be eternal, it will be as difficult to give any tolerable Account of the Frame of the World, without the Supposal of a God.

1. The *Epicurean* Hypothesis supposed, that all Things came not from any *Mind* and Understanding, but from senseless Nature and Chance, but most absurdly: For how irrational is it to attribute that to mere Chance, in which there appear the plainest Footsteps of the highest Wisdom.

2. 'Tis utterly impossible, that such a regular Frame, where there is such a vast Variety of noble Creatures, should ever arise from the casual Motions of the Parts of Matter.

3. How comes it to pass, that in so many thousands of Years, no new *Species* of Beings have been produced?

Chance might as well have produced Hundreds more Species of Beings, as those it has produced already.

And therefore since it has not, those that are already, depend upon the Will and Wisdom of some such intelligent Being as we suppose God to be.

4. If Chance had made the World, in all Probability Chance would long e're now have destroyed it too. For there is no Reason to think, if this World have hit into this Frame, that it should have continued so, though but for a Day, much less for so many thousand Years.

For since Matter is indifferent to all Motions, and its Motions are casual, the Motions of the Atoms, that by Chance has hit into a regular System, must still be casual, and there will be a much greater Tendency in the Motions of that System to a Dissolution,

ſolution, than there could be in the general caſual Motions of Matter, to the making it.

Indeed, the *Epicureans* talk of Gravitation in Matter, which, they ſay, is the Principle of its Motions; but how could there be any Gravitation to a Center, when probably there were no Centers; nor could the World be made by Chance, without a great many other Sorts of Motion, beſides Gravitation to ſome Center.

If the Atheiſt ſays, the preſent Frame of the World is moſt eaſy and natural, and therefore continues as it is, what Reaſon can he give why it is ſo?

I may ſay, that on this Suppoſition, there is no ſuch Thing as *Nature*. For Nature in the loweſt Senſe of it, denotes a regular State and Progreſs of Motions; but upon the *Epicurean* Suppoſition, there can be no ſuch Thing.

If by Nature we mean an intelligent Principle, that preſerves the Frame of the World, this is, what we would have the Atheiſt believe, a God.

But if the World cannot continue without ſuch an intelligent Principle, much leſs could it be *made* without it.

Another atheiſtical Hypotheſis is, that which derives all Things from dead ſenſeleſs Matter, by way of *Forms* and *Qualities*.

But if theſe ſuppoſed *Forms* and *Qualities* be any thing diſtinct from Matter, they muſt either proceed from ſome intelligent Principle, which is a God:

Or they muſt be made by ſome native Energy, that is ſuppoſed to be innate in Matter:

Or elſe they muſt be educed out of the Power of Matter, and this muſt ſtill be (if we ſuppoſe no God) by the mere caſual Motions of the Parts of Matter. And this falls in with the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*: So that there is no Occaſion to ſay any thing more of the Abſurdity of it.

Ano-

Another atheiſtical Suppoſition is, that all Matter is endued with a natural plaſtic Life, neceſſary, ingenerable, and incorruptible.

For if Matter have ſuch a ſelf-active Power as to improve itſelf into Life, Senſe, conſcious Underſtanding, and Self-enjoyment, there needs no God.

This is indeed to ſuppoſe Matter perfectly wiſe, when it has no Knowledge at all, as far as we can diſcern.

But of this I ſhall ſay more in another Place.

Another atheiſtical Suppoſition is, that there is one common, regular, and methodical (but unintelligent) plaſtic Nature, that is the Cauſe of this regular Frame of Things.

If they mean by *plaſtic Nature* the *Courſe* of Nature, they muſt return to ſome one of the three atheiſtical Opinions juſt mentioned.

If they mean by plaſtic Nature ſome active Principle diſtinct from Matter, they give up the Cauſe. For,

1. 'Tis impoſſible to ſuppoſe that any ſuch unintelligent plaſtic Nature ſhould be ſo conſtant and regular in its Operations, without depending on ſome ſuperior intelligent Being.

2. If we can ſuppoſe one vegetative, unintelligent, plaſtic Nature, why may we not ſuppoſe ſuch a rational Being as God is? 'tis eaſier to believe ſuch a Being the Author of the World, than ſuch a ſenſeleſs Nature, as the Stoics ſuppoſe.

I come now to conſider whether the World, both as to *Matter* and *Form*, may not be eternal.

Now as to this Eternity.

1. Some have aſſerted the Eternity of the World, as an Emanation from the divine Nature. But this is abſurd, as making God a neceſſary Agent, as to the Creation of the World. Some have pretended, that the World might be in the Form it now is from Eternity.

But

But this is absurd, it being hard to conceive an eternal succession of any sort of Motions, or of Generations and Corruptions, such as those of Animals on Earth: 'Tis true indeed we can easily have a Notion of the eternal Existence of such an immutable Being as God is; but 'tis very hard to apply this to any Succession of Generations and Corruptions, and therefore the World is not eternal, but was made by a wise God.

But here the Atheist objects against the Possibility of Creation, saying, that out of nothing can be made nothing.

But this is to be understood only of those Productions that are made according to the ordinary Course of Nature, none of which are made without some pre-existent Matter.

But there is no Reason at all we should carry this so far as to deny Creation out of nothing, to an infinite or most perfect Power.

And this will appear more reasonable, if we consider that we cannot prove it to be a Contradiction, because there may be some Cause of sufficient Power to produce it.

There are many Operations in Nature that are thought to be above the Power of material Beings. And this may be sufficient to convince a rational Man, that there are Substances distinct from Matter: And if we are convinced that there are such immaterial Beings, created out of nothing by some infinitely powerful Spirit, we may much more easily suppose, Matter itself was made out of nothing by the Power of God.

God also is the original of Motion.

For no number of Motions can be actually infinite; we must at last come to a Beginning of Motion.

And therefore whether it came from a Body, or from some more noble Being, that Being must have a self-moving Principle.

Now 'tis more reasonable to ascribe this Origin of Motion to such a perfect Being as God is supposed to be, than to senseless Matter.

And 'tis so far from being true, that a Spirit cannot act upon Matter, that 'tis impossible any Part of Matter can be the first Mover.

But 'tis objected, that Motion is natural to Matter. If so, it must be to all, or part.

If to all Matter, there could be no Productions, nor any fixed State of material Things.

If Motion be only natural to the more subtile Parts, we may question,

1. Where there be such subtile Particles originally in Matter? Or, whether they did not come from that Motion, that was impressed upon Matter by the first Original of Motion, which is God? Or,

2. Whether it be to the Atheist's Purpose to assert this, when 'tis plain, that this subtile fiery Matter cannot do any Thing without the Influence of some higher Being towards making the World?

3. This *Materia subtilis*, which *Cartesius* supposes to be in perpetual Motion, could never itself have been generated by the mutual Attrition of the grosser Parts of Matter without the Influence of some superior Being.

But perhaps by Motion being natural to Matter, they may mean only a Tendency to Motion.

If so, this supposes some original Mover.

But if they mean something more yet by this Tendency to Motion, and suppose this to be in all Matter, as Matter; either they must suppose an equal Tendency of the Parts of Matter every Way at the same Time, which will produce no Motion at all; or if they suppose the Parts of Matter to tend one Way more than another, they must suppose all the Parts of Matter to tend the same Way. And 'tis questionable, whether they can produce any Motion without some *Vis impressa*, which implies a first Mover.

Or

Or if we could ſuppoſe any Sort of circular Motion to be begun in Matter by any native Gravitation of it, or ſuch a Tendency of Matter directly to ſome Center, this cannot produce any ſuch Mixture of Matter as is neceſſary to the Production of Beings in the World.

But if we ſhould grant Motion's being natural to Matter, this will not ſerve the Atheiſt, unleſs he can ſhew, that the caſual Motions of Matter can frame ſuch a World as this.

So that admit what Suppoſition we will, 'tis plain the World was created, and by a wiſe God.

I come now to anſwer the Atheiſt's Objections againſt God's Omniſcience.

But becauſe the Atheiſt muſt own there is Knowledge in the World, and yet is unwilling to own a God, he muſt ſome Way or other aſcribe this Knowledge to Matter, and aſſert there are no immaterial Beings in the World.

I ſhall therefore prove God to be an immaterial Being.

1. 'Tis very unfair to diſpute againſt the Exiſtence of a Thing, becauſe we have no juſt Notion of it.

For there are many Things, that may be, and ('tis likely) really are, that we have no adequate Idea of, if any at all,

Nay the moſt obvious Things that now are, if we had been created without ſuch Faculties as give us notice of them, would have appeared impoſſible. As, what Idea would a Man born blind have of Colours?

If any ſhall ſay, we might be convinced of theſe by the Information of other Men. The Caſe is ſo here; we have the Teſtimony of the wiſeſt Men in all Ages, that there are incorporeal Beings; and we are ſure that the Faculties in ſome intelligent Beings are above the Power of Matter.

And we are ſure this World could not be made by

any Thing obvious to ſenſe, but muſt require an infinitely wiſe and powerful Being, ſuch as God is.

2. Upon Enquiry we ſhall find, that we have no juſt Notion of the true Eſſence of Matter itſelf.

3. It is the Opinion of ſome, that there are ſuch Properties as cannot belong to Body, that yet are as plain as thoſe that Senſe tells us are the Properties of it.

The obvious Properties of Matter are Extenſion, Diviſibility, Figure, Capacity of Motion, Impenetrability.

The Properties aſcribed to a Spirit are Self-Penetration, Self-Motion, and Indiviſibility. And with Reſpect to Matter, penetrating, moving, altering Matter, and being united to an organical Body.

The Indiviſibility of a Spirit, they ſay, is impoſſible to be conceived without Extenſion, or that without Diviſibility. But

'Tis clear, Diviſibility is an Imperfection; and a ſimple Eſſence, and indiviſible, muſt be more perfect than any material Things can be.

2. There is no more Difficulty in conceiving a ſimple Eſſence without Extenſion, than in conceiving the Diviſibility of Matter *in infinitum*.

Self-Motion, and the moving of Matter, is attributed to a Spirit. The Atheiſt aſcribes it to Matter.

But if Self-Motion be impoſſible, as I have proved, in Matter, there muſt be ſomething ſuch, as we call Spirit, or there could never be any Motion.

But if they object, a Spirit cannot move Matter, becauſe it is ſuppoſed to penetrate it, and cannot act upon the Surface of it.

To this I anſwer,

'Tis confeſſed, that Matter acts upon Matter by its Surface: But it cannot do this without a *Vis impreſſa*, from ſome higher Principle.

If

If we grant this, it takes off the Objection, and we ought not to ſuppoſe a Spirit cannot act upon Matter, becauſe we don't know how it acts upon it.

Nay, the Power of penetrating Matter gives Spirits a greater Power over Matter, than any material Thing can be ſuppoſed to have.

Nay, if the Atheiſt will ſuppoſe with us that Spirits have this Power of Penetration, I think they may eaſily believe, that this gives them a greater Power over Matter, than if they acted only on the Surface of it; and that there may be a cloſer Union of Spirit with Body, than there can be of any Parts of Matter between themſelves.

And this leads me to another Property of a finite Spirit, that it may be united to an organical Body.

If the Atheiſt thinks this impoſſible, I deſire him to tell us, how the Parts of ſolid Matter are ſo cloſely united?

Is it only the cloſe Contact of Surface? The moſt ſolid Bodies have many Vacuities, that are capable of being filled with more ſubtile and heterogeneous Matter.

Is it only Reſt that does it? This likewiſe is againſt Experience.

So that as far as we can judge, the Properties that are commonly aſcribed to an immaterial Subſtance, are as conceivable, as thoſe that are taken for granted to belong to Matter.

But the Atheiſt, it may be, will ſay, 'tis needleſs to ſuppoſe ſuch a Thing as immaterial Subſtance, becauſe all the Properties that are aſcribed to incorporeal Subſtance, may, and do belong to Matter.

Spinoza tells us, there is but one Subſtance which is Matter, and that Cogitation is eſſential to it.

Upon which Suppoſition every Particle of Matter muſt be an intelligent Being, if not a God.

Or if the whole Maſs of Being is God, this will make the Deity ſubject to all the Changes that can be imagined.

But as he absurdly says, there is but one Substance, so contrary to all Experience, he tells us it is indivisible.

Others say, that tho' Matter is not essentially cogitative, yet that Cogitation is nothing but the Motions of the finer Parts of Matter in organical Bodies.

Mr. *Hobbs* says, that Sense and Reason are nothing but the Re-action or Resistance of the Corpuscles of the *Sensorium*, occasioned by the Object.

From hence it will absurdly follow, that wherever there is Matter in Motion, there must be at least Sense if not Reason; for where there is Action, there is some kind of Re-action. From this Supposition it likewise seems to follow, that wherever there is the most violent Action, if there be proportional Re-action, there must be the quickest Sense and Understanding; and so for Instance, the Hammer and the Anvil must be the most sensible Things in Nature.

But after all, this Hypothesis does not reach the Question; it gives no Account of those Thoughts, those Acts of Imagination, Remembrance, Reason, Judgment, and spontaneous Motion, that begin from within, and do not depend upon the Pressure of external Objects, but come from some internal Principle; therefore I shall dismiss it as absurd.

Others pretend that Reason and Understanding is only an *Emanation* from Life.

They talk of a *Flammula vitalis*, the *Spirit of Life*, *the Breath and Blood of our Lives*, *the glowing Particles of the Blood*, but give no tolerable Account of the Matter.

For we cannot but observe that the Acts of Sense and Reason are transacted in the most remote Parts from the Heart and Lungs, and therefore seem to have little Dependence on the *vital Breath*, or the *glowing Particles of the Blood*.

The

The Brain is of a cool and flaccid Substance, and the animal Spirits seem not to be any such *hot and glowing Particles*, but rather a fine Juice percolated from the Blood into the nervous Substance, to keep the Brain in a due Temperature.

And therefore we find nothing so much disturbs the Brain in its Operations, as too great a Quantity of these *hot and glowing Particles*.

And if the Soul was such a *flammeous* Body, it would destroy the Organs.

Besides, if the Acts of Reason depended immediately upon the Motion of the Blood and Spirits, there must be the same Train of Thoughts and Reasonings in all Men, or in the same Man at all Times.

For the Motion of the Blood and Spirits in all healthy Persons is uniform, and the same Causes must have the same Effects.

But we find, by Experience, we can let our Thoughts ramble from *London* to the *West-Indies*, and therefore we are not a Machine.

But perhaps some will say, this *internal* Principle is nothing but the Motion of the finer and spirituous Parts of the Organs of the Animal.

But supposing this, still the Question will return, what is the true Cause that begins, guides, and bounds that infinite Variety of Motions of the animal Spirits, in the several Degrees of Cogitation, and the Representation of so vast a Variety of Objects to the Understanding?

Is it the Substance of the Brain? That is a senseless Thing.

Is it the animal Spirits? These have no self-moving Principle, nor can any one Particle of them, nor any Combination of them, so determine their own Motions, as to be the original Cause of Thought.

Nor can it be the Circulation of the Blood, because that being an uniform Motion, it cannot be the genuine Cause of so vast a Variety of voluntary

Motions, as must be supposed in the several Sorts of Cogitation, and the spontaneous Motions of the Body; which must proceed from some internal spontaneous Principle of Action.

But to speak more particularly of the several Acts that are commonly ascribed to the Soul.

Imagination, as it signifies the common Sense that is as it were the Treasury of the Notices of the external Senses, does in a great Measure depend on the Organs.

But we likewise find in ourselves a Power of actual Imagination, that is, not only of revolving those Images that are treasured up, but of variously diversifying, nay of forming new ones of Things, (it may be) that never were.

Now this is above the Power of organized Matter.

Memory is another Faculty in Man. Tho' this, as it is the Treasury of the Mind, may in some Measure depend upon the Organs; yet the Acts of Attention cannot be supposed to proceed from the Brain, or any subtile Matter contained in it.

The Judgment we pass within ourselves of the Truth or Falshood of Things, is a Faculty above the Power of mere Matter.

Again: Reason, or the *Power* of drawing Consequences from one Truth to another, is above the Power of the most subtile Matter.

Again: Self-reflection is above the Power of organized Matter.

Again: *Self-consciousness* is above the Power of organized Matter. Nor can we conceive how the most subtile Matter, however modified, can any more be conscious of its own Notions, than a Stone.

Self-Enjoyment is a Power in Man above the Capacity of mere Matter.

Again: The Power of *Willing* is a Power above mere Matter. For the Motions in Matter are necessary, and therefore Matter is not capable of any spontaneous Motion.

Nay

Nay even Sense itself, that seems to depend on Matter, if we consider it distinctly, will appear to arise from some higher Principle than bare Matter.

For the Impression made by external Objects upon the *Sensorium* is not properly what we call Sense, but the Perception of that Impression, by that which is the true Principle of Sensation; and Matter can no more have Sense without some higher *Sentient*, than the Soul can have such formal Sensations without the Organs of Sense.

And whether we determine with some, that the Objects of Sense are *real Qualities*; or with others, that they are only Appearances to our Faculties, 'tis the same Thing.

Besides 'tis impossible to give any tolerable Account of spontaneous Motion, without supposing some higher Principle than mere Matter.

We can move the Members of our Bodies when, and as we please; and though the Impressions of Sense may be the Occasion of these spontaneous Motions, it is impossible they should be the genuine Cause of them. There must be some higher Principle that directs the locomotive Faculty.

But perhaps it may be said, we must not argue, that 'tis impossible that Matter should have Sense and Understanding: For Matter may have Properties we know nothing of.

But it is to be observed, we do not assert here only, that we cannot apprehend how Reason and Understanding can come from mere Matter; but we have Reason, we think, positively to assert it cannot be.

'Tis objected, that if Sense cannot be supposed to be from mere Matter, but must require some higher Principle; then Brutes must have immaterial Souls, and if immaterial, they must be immortal; or else we lose one main Argument for the Immortality of the Soul.

To which I answer, that the Immateriality of the Soul has been brought as an Argument of their Immortality; and so far the Argument will certainly hold, that what is immaterial has not in itself the Principles of Corruption as Bodies have. But as whatever God created must depend upon him, for its Continuance in Being, so we may suppose God to be guided by infinite Wisdom, in giving this Immortality. And that which seems in Conjunction with their Immateriality to determine and prove the Immortality of human Souls, is, that superior Degree of Reason they have, whereby they are capable of knowing God, their Obligations to him, and of having a Sense of moral Good and Evil; and by consequence of being accountable to God.

And seeing the common Sense of Men is, that God hath established a Law for Mankind, it may well be expected that he will reward their Obedience, and punish their Disobedience to it.

And seeing this is not exactly done in this Life, 'tis reasonable to expect it will be in another, and that the Soul is immortal.

And since Brutes have none of them Knowledge in this Degree as we have, there is not the same Reason to believe their Spirits are immortal, as there is for those of Mankind.

Nor is it reasonable to expect we should determine what God does with them, for we know nothing about it.

I come now to speak of those Objections that are made against the Being of a God, with respect to this Attribute of Knowledge.

1. They object, there can be no Knowledge without the Organs of Sense; and therefore there can be no God, because he has no Organs of Sense.

But to this I answer, that this Knowledge by Sense is an imperfect Way of Knowledge, and does not throughly let us into the Nature of Things;

and therefore there is ſome other more noble Being, that by ſome more perfect Way knows Things, as they are in themſelves.

And when 'tis ſaid that we know nothing but by Senſe, 'tis falſe, for Experience ſhews us, we can form Notions of Things that have little or no Dependence upon Senſe.

And whereas they ſay, all Knowledge is but the Impreſſion of the Object upon the knowing Faculty, this is likewiſe againſt Experience, for we can have Ideas of Things that are not the Objects of any of our Senſes.

And whereas they further tell us, that there neither can be more nor leſs than five Senſes; and that theſe are all the Means of Knowledge: This is neither true, nor to the Purpoſe.

For he that gave us theſe, might have given us more or leſs. Nor are we to judge of the Poſſibility of Knowledge in the moſt perfect Being by the ſcantling of our own imperfect Ways of Underſtanding.

And 'tis probable we ſhall know more perfectly, when we are diveſted of theſe Bodies.

So that our Knowledge, and the Ways of arriving at it, ſeem to be ſuited to our preſent State.

And whereas they object, that Things are before our Knowledge, this is not univerſally true.

We have Reaſon to aſſert whatſoever is poſſible to be, or to be done, is poſſible to be known, and that whatever actually is, or is done, is actually known by ſome Being or other.

And from hence it follows, there muſt be ſome all-knowing Being, and ſuch a Being is what we call God.

Now as we have all the Reaſon in the World to believe that all Things were made by ſuch a Being, ſo we are ſure he muſt have a perfect Knowledge of them before he could make them.

Ano-

Another Objection againſt the Being of a God, is againſt his *Wiſdom*, ſo far as it may appear in the Creation of the World.

Certainly, ſay they, if God made the World, there would not have been ſo many mean, uſeleſs, and noxious Creatures as there are. To which I anſwer:

1. That ſince 'tis ſo plain in the greater Inſtances of created Beings, the World was made by infinite Wiſdom, we ſhould conclude, that the ſuppoſed Defects proceed from our Ignorance.

For to make a right Judgment of the Wiſdom of God in making the World, we muſt have Regard to the Good of the whole.

And as to Mankind particularly, we muſt conſider them not only with Reſpect to the preſent, but the future, both in this Life, and another.

And if we would make a right Judgment in this Caſe, it would require one comprehenſive View of the divine Providence, and the comparing one Thing with another, and Things preſent with future. For thoſe Things may be great, which we think mean; thoſe Things uſeful, which we think needleſs; thoſe Creatures that we think noxious, may be highly neceſſary, and beneficial to the World.

So that all that this Objection proves, is this; that we cannot dive into the Myſteries of the Wiſdom of God in the Creation of the World; and ſince there is ſo much Wiſdom viſible in it, we ſhould have the Modeſty to think, there may be Wiſdom that we cannot underſtand.

The next Objections I ſhall mention are againſt the *Juſtice* or *Goodneſs* of God, taken from the Evils and Confuſions of the World.

Now as there is an *Evil* of *Sin*, and an *Evil* of Suffering, ſo if I can give a good Account of God's permitting the one, we ſhall be able to give a better Account of the other. But

But becauſe theſe Atheiſts take away the very Queſtion concerning God's permitting Sin, or moral Evil, by aſſerting there is no Liberty, before I enter upon that Objection, I muſt ſay ſomething of *Neceſſity* and *Liberty*.

As to the Liberty of human Actions, I leave every one to prove it to themſelves. We can make a thouſand ſpontaneous Motions, and think of as many Things, how, or when, or as we pleaſe; and when we riſe, we might if we pleaſed ſit ſtill.

Let any of the Admirers of *Hobbs* or *Spinoza* tell us, if they can, the *neceſſary Cauſes* of theſe and ſuch like *voluntary Actions*. Or ſay, that we could not in the moſt minute Circumſtance do any otherwiſe than juſt as we do.

Spinoza tells us, that there is no Subſtance but God, and that Cogitation is an eſſential Property of this Subſtance; and yet when he denies Liberty to his God, he in Effect denies he has any Underſtanding at all. For Liberty is a neceſſary Conſequence of Underſtanding.

When he denies Liberty to God, he makes him an imperfect Being; for a Being that has Liberty is more noble than one that has not.

And whereas *Spinoza* ſays, if we ſuppoſe any Thing could be otherwiſe than as it is, it will follow, that the Nature of God might be otherwiſe than what it is.

This is a plain Fallacy, for want of diſtinguiſhing an abſolute Neceſſity of Nature, from an abſolute Neceſſity of Acting.

For there is in God a *Neceſſity* of *Nature*, and a *Neceſſity* of Acting.

By the Neceſſity of his Nature he is abſolutely perfect; and by a Neceſſity of Exiſtence he cannot but be.

And as to his *Actions* there follows a Neceſſity that what he does ſhould not be diſagreeable to his infinite Perfections.

But

But to assert he lies under a Necessity of Nature to do all he can do; or that he could not do any Thing otherwise than he does, must infer that God should make every Day a new World, and destroy it when he has done.

But there is no Danger of this, for all that *Spinoza* means by his God is the Universe; and by Cogitation, hardly any Thing but local Motion; and by Omnipotence, the *Power* of Matter. And his *Necessitas Divinæ Naturæ* is but the same with *Epicurus*'s Casual Motion of Atoms.

So that what *Spinoza* says, that *ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis sequi debent*, is so far from being true, that no regular Frame of Things could ever follow from the necessary or casual Motions of the Parts of Matter, without some Being of Liberty, Understanding, Wisdom, and Power, in the greatest Perfection.

Now as the Supposition of absolute Necessity is absurd, so it is pernicious to Religion.

For if God who made and preserves us, could not help it, and (it may be) must reward us, or (as it happens from the Necessity of his Nature) punish us, and cannot help it, what have we to thank him for? Especially when according to what they say, he cannot know whether he did these Things for us or no.

And if we have no Liberty, either we can have no Reason or Religion, or 'tis to no Purpose.

Having premised these Things, whereby the Atheists ascribe all Actions to an absolute Necessity, I come now to say something of the Objection made against a God, from his permitting Sin in the World.

The Sum of what they say is this: If God can, and will not hinder Sin, it cannot be reconciled with that infinite Goodness, we ascribe to him.

In answer to this; first, it is more for the Honour

nour of God to make a free and understanding Creature, than not.

Nay, if God had made no rational Creatures, he would have had no Honour by his Work, when there was no Creature that could admire it.

And as 'tis more for God's Honour that there should be free and rational Creatures, so it makes for the Perfection of the World; and if there had been no such Creatures, the World would have been but few Removes from a dead Mass of Matter.

And as to the more or less Perfection of the several Creatures, there is a great Beauty in the Order and Degrees of it.

But these Men cannot reconcile the Defectibility of rational Creatures with the Goodness of God.

Methinks it is easy to distinguish between a *Necessity* and *Possibility* of sinning.

It seems no more *necessary*, that God should put all rational Agents above the *Possibility* of sinning, than that he should put all Matter above the Power of Corruption.

God is not obliged to impart the utmost Extent of his Goodness to any Creature, nor an equal Measure of it to all.

The Extent of his Goodness is bounded by his Wisdom, and the rest of his Perfections.

Many Attributes in God, and many Virtues in Men appear more glorious by their being created in a defectible State.

'Tis enough God does not lay his rational Creatures under a Necessity of sinning.

'Tis sufficient that he deals with them as rational Creatures, and gives them a Sense of Good and Evil, and of his Justice and Mercy.

That he puts them in a Capacity of greater Happiness upon the good Use of their Reason and Liberty; and that he expects no more from them than what he gives to them.

That

That he will judge according to Equity. That they who had only the Law of Nature ſhall be judged only by that; and only they that have the Goſpel are to anſwer for the Abuſe and Neglect of it.

But the Atheiſt ſtill objects againſt the Providence, and on that Account againſt the Being of a God, from the unequal Diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſhments in this World.

Now in anſwer to this, there are theſe Things to be conſidered.

That it muſt be confeſſed, the Good and Bad are not ſo clearly diſtinguiſhed here by their proſperous or adverſe Condition, as that we may ſay, this is a good, or that a bad Man.

It muſt be confeſſed likewiſe that this has puzzled ſome very good Men.

But we reaſon wrong as to this Caſe in abundance of Things.

We are very often miſtaken in the Men we count good, or bad.

We often miſtake bad Men for good, and ſometimes judge thoſe to be bad Men, who may in the main be good Men before God.

Again: We very often miſtake the Nature of Proſperity and Adverſity; we judge of it only with Reſpect to this preſent State; whereas it ought to be judged of, rather by the Relation it has to the moſt momentous Concerns of a future State; or at leaſt with Reſpect to the more or leſs true Enjoyment Men have of what they poſſeſs in this World.

And therefore we often judge amiſs; we ſee Men rich and great, and thence we conclude that they muſt be happy. Whereas the very little that ſome good Men have we overlook, and yet they may be happier than the other.

However let them enjoy as much of the World as they will, if their Proſperity be an Occaſion of their Miſery

Misery in the next, they are not to be envied for their Grandeur.

From hence it easily follows, that God may make a greater Distinction between good and bad Men in this World than we are aware of, and make some good Men prosperous and some bad Men miserable, tho' we don't know it.

But it is farther to be considered, that tho' God does not generally in this World make a visible Difference between good and bad Men; yet he very often appears in so extraordinary a Manner in rewarding the one, and punishing the other, even in this Life, as is sufficient to vindicate his Providence.

But let us suppose that the wicked do not only live but die in the greatest Prosperity; yet as long as he that believes a just God, must believe there is a future State, when God may make good Men amends for their Sufferings here, this will account for the present Dispensations of his Providence.

Some have objected, that such a Providence as we ascribe to God, is impossible, or below God, and inconsistent with his Happiness to take Care of so many, and such little Things.

As to its being impossible for God to attend to such a Variety of Things at once, this is to measure God by ourselves. But 'tis no harder to believe that God governs all Things now, than that he made them at first.

As to its being below God to take care of such *minute* and *little* Things.

I answer, little Things, as they are part of the Creation, and make up the Beauty and Order of it, are great Things; and 'tis no more below God to govern them by his Providence, than it was to make them by his Power.

As to this Providence being inconsistent with God's Happiness, there is nothing in it. He knows

all Things knowable, and can do all Things poſſible with the greateſt Eaſe and Pleaſure.

And thus I have propoſed ſome Arguments to prove the Exiſtence of a God, and anſwered ſome of thoſe Objections that are commonly brought againſt it, but thoſe chiefly that have the greateſt Weight in them.

Mr. *WHIS-*

Mr. *WHISTON*'s

BOYLE's LECTURES

ABRIDG'D.

Mr. *WHISTON*'s ACCOMPLISHMENT OF Scripture Prophecies.

FOR the better Illustration of this Subject, I intend to discourse of the ancient Prophecies contained in Scripture, in the Order of Time, wherein they were delivered, and shew the Completion of such, whose Periods are already past. For thereby,

1. Will be demonstrated at once, the Certainty of Prophecy from the Beginning of the World.

2. The divine Authority of those sacred Writings, which have all along contained the Predictions of future Events, beyond the Reach of natural Foresight.

3. The certain Truth of the Christian Religion, as it is confirmed from those antient Prophecies, fulfilled in *Jesus*.

4. And the just Reasons we have thence to expect those other Prophecies, whose Periods are not yet come.

But before I come to the particular Prophecies themselves, I shall premise such Observations, as will be of great Use all along, and prevent Digressions in the future *Series* of my Reasoning.

I. Then, those Prophecies which relate to the *Jewish* Church, make Use of a *Year* for a *Year*.

II. Those Prophecies which relate to Christianity, make Use of a *Day* for a *Year*.

III. The Number of *Days* included in prophetic *Years*, is to be the ſame that the Computation of the Age and Nation of each Prophet does require.

IV. The particular Sort of *Year* alſo referred to by a *Day* in ſeveral Prophecies, follow the Cuſtom of the Age and Nation of each Prophet.

V. Prophecies expreſly ſaid to belong to the *Time of the End*, to the *latter* or *laſt Days*, relate, if not to the End of the World, yet at leaſt to the *Days of the Meſſiah*.

VI. Intire prophetic Number of Years, or Months, or Days, are uſed with great Exactneſs, and comprehend no more than ſix Months, or fifteen Days, or twelve Hours on either ſide; that is, they imply the Space mentioned to be nearer to that Number than the next, either over or under, according to the moſt natural Signification of the Words themſelves.

VII. Wherever any general Word is uſed indefinitely, there the moſt eminent of that Kind is to be in Reaſon underſtood by it.

VIII. The Difficulties already cleared in the prophetic Writings, are a reaſonable Indication, that the reſt will be cleared hereafter.

Taking theſe Obſervations for granted at preſent, I come to the

IX. The prophetic Stile is very often Enigmatical, but ſtrictly rational. Thus it may ſeem ſtrange that *Daniel* ſhould deſcribe *four Beaſts* making Havock of the Church of God; but when 'tis remembered that a *Beaſt* in prophetic *Stile* always denotes an Empire, and that thoſe four Beaſts denote the *Babylonian*, the *Medo-Perſian*, the *Grecian*, and the *Roman* Empires. the Wonder ceaſes, *Dan.* vii. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Thus alſo the wonderful Things of the four Kind of Locuſts, mentioned, *Joel* i. 4. ii. 25. ii. 17. correſpond to the *great Beaſts* in *Daniel*, and mean the ſame Empires. Thus alſo it appears

pears ſtrange, that *Ezekiel* Chap. xxxvii. 24, 25. ſhould foretel, 400 Years after *David*'s Death, that *David ſhould be King over Iſrael*, till we obſerve, that *David* is the moſt common prophetic Name of the *Meſſiah*; and the like is to be ſaid, as to the reſt of the prophetic Language.

X. I obſerve that the Stile and Language of the Prophets is determinate, not capable of double Intentions, and typical Interpretations.

The Reaſons of which are:

1. A ſingle and determinate Senſe of every Prophecy is the only natural and obvious one. And 'tis alſo reaſonable and neceſſary, that it ſhould be ſo. For,

2. If Prophecies are allowed to have more than one Event in View, at the ſame time, we can never be ſatisfied, but they may have as many as any Viſionary pleaſes.

3. If this double Intention in Prophecies be allowed by us *Chriſtians*, as to thoſe Predictions which were to be fulfilled in our Saviour, we loſe all the real Advantages of theſe Prophecies, as to the Proof of our common Chriſtianity, and beſides expoſe ourſelves to the Inſults of *Jews* and *Infidels*. Let us ſuppoſe that the liii. Chapter of *Iſaiah*, which is one of the moſt eminent Prophecies belonging to the *Meſſias*, did by the Confeſſion of all originally belong to *Hezekiah*, could we ſuppoſe any *Jew* or *Infidel* of competent Judgment would be perſuaded that our Jeſus was the true *Meſſias*, becauſe this Chapter could be applied to him in a typical Senſe? Or if the *ſeventy Weeks* of *Daniel* was fully accompliſhed in *Onias*, who was murthered, 2 *Macc.* iv. 34, 35, 36. would not we be eſteemed ſilly, to apply it *typically* to *Jeſus?*

Our Lord and his Apoſtles boldly applied the antient Prophecies to the proving that he was the true *Meſſias*, becauſe they were all evidently fulfill-

ed in him; and this they did with such Force of Reason and Truth, that the *Jews*, who were converted, were principally brought over by the Force of this Argument. But our Commentators, when they come to those Passages, the quoting of which by the Apostles, brought in many to the Church of Christ, are full of nothing but Evasions, in order to get rid of the great Objections which their own Notions have exposed the Christian Faith to.

4. This double Sense of the antient Prophecies has not the least Footsteps in the Writings of the Apostles and Evangelists. Whenever our Saviour or they quote the antient Prophecies, as fulfilled in the Times of the New Testament, they always quote them as in their known and primary Intention. Thus, for Instance, Saint *Peter*, *Acts* ii. 25, *&c.* when he was proving to the *Jews*, from a Prophecy in the Book of *Psalms*, that the *Messias* was to rise from the Dead, says directly, that *David* speaketh *concerning Christ, and the Resurrection of Christ*; and that the Prophecy could not at all belong to *David*.

In like manner Saint *Paul* argues, that the eighth *Psalm* is rather to be interpreted of the *Messias*, the most remarkable *Son of God*, than of Mankind in general, and that it could belong to none other but him. See *Heb.* ii. 6, *&c.*

In like Manner in his Reasoning with the People at *Antioch*, he proves that two other Prophecies concerning the Resurrection of Christ did truly belong to him alone, because the Words were not true of *David* himself, to whom otherwise they must be applied. See *Acts* xiii. 34—37.

Thus also when the *Eunuch* asked *Philip*, *Acts* viii. 34, *&c.* of whom *Isaiah* was speaking in his liii. Chapter, *Philip* immediately, and without any Enquiry after a Person under the Old Testament, to whom the Words might be in the first Place

Place applicable, *began at the same Scripture, and preached unto him Jesus.*

5. This double Sense of Old Testament Prophecies, or the making one Person or Thing a Type of the other, is I think a Stranger also to the most ancient Fathers of the Church. See *Iren. lib.* 4. *c.* 67.

They, after the Example of our Lord and his Apostles, quote the Predictions of the Prophets, as in their single and proper Sense belonging to the Gospel Dispensation.

Upon the whole, this double Sense and Interpretation of the ancient Prophecies is so absurd, that I must be obliged to go upon a more rational Foundation in my future Interpretations: And supposing the Sense of each of the old Prophecies to be one, plain and literal, to account among other Prophecies for those Proofs for Christianity, which are so frequently quoted in the New Testament.

XI. The main Aim of most of the Prophecies of the Old Testament, was the coming of the *Messias*, and the Circumstances and Characters of him and his Kingdom.

Thus for Instance the very first Prophecy, *Gen.* iii. 15. belongs directly to the *Messias*, who was to be the *Seed of a Woman* alone; and who was to *break the Head* of the old *Serpent*, that is, destroy *Satan's* Kingdom; while the Serpent *bruised his Heel*, that is, by secret Wiles opposed and persecuted him, and his Members in the mean while.

Thus also when it was promised to *Abraham*, that in *his Seed all the Nations of the Earth should be blessed*, it appears by all that follows both in the Old and New Testament, that by that *Seed* in the singular Number, was constantly understood the *Messias* himself, the Son of *Abraham*.

Thus also in the 2d *Psalm* the *Messias* is so plainly intimated, that he is expresly stiled the *Christ*,

or

or *anointed of God*, *the King whom God had set upon his holy Hill of Sion*: *The Son of God himself*, *begotten by the Father*, to whom all the *Heathen* were to submit.

In like manner *Isaiah*, that we might afterwards turn our Thoughts to the *Messias*, and his Kingdom, begins directly with the very lateſt and moſt glorious Times of it. See *Isa.* ii. 2, *&c.* The ſame Prophet has alſo ſuch frequent Reference to that glorious Time under the Name of the *Day of the Lord*, and *that Day*; that he and other Prophets very often break off the Coherence of their Prophecies, and immediately begin with *that* remarkable *Day*, as a known Indication of the Kingdom of the *Meſſias*. Nay, *Iſaiah* has him ſo perpetually in his Eye, that he makes not ſo much as a Preface when he ſpeaks of him. See *Iſa.* lii. 13, 14, 15. liii. 1, 2, 3.

In the like Manner *David* in the 72d *Pſalm*, being about to give a noble Account of the *Meſſias*, and his Kingdom, to which the whole *Pſalm* plainly belongs, begins it without a direct Deſignation of the Perſon meant. See *Pſal.* lxxii. 1, *&c.* But our preſent Copies have joined a *prefatory* good Wiſh or Prayer, for the Proſperity of himſelf and his Son *Solomon*, to whom this Pſalm was dedicated, as if it were a Part of it, to the no ſmall Diſturbance and Perplexity of the Reader; *Give the King thy Judgments*, *O God*, *and thy Righteouſneſs unto the King's Son*; which being taken as a Dedicatory εὐφημία, all is eaſy, and the whole *Pſalm* will belong directly to the *Meſſias*.

XII. The antient Prophecies of the *Meſſias* are of two Sorts: Some relate to his firſt coming, but moſt to his ſecond coming, to advance his Kingdom, and reſtore the *Jews*.

I might eaſily run over a great Number of the Prophecies of the Old Teſtament, and ſhew the Foot-

Footsteps of this double coming of the *Messiah* all along; but I refer you to other Writers, who have treated to good Purpose on this Head. See *Alix de Duplici Messiæ adventu*, &, *Mede passim*.

XIII. The Prophecies of the Old Testament, quoted by the Evangelists, do solely belong to the *Messias*; and are therefore justly alledged to that Purpose by our Saviour and his Apostles.

Now in Order to our better discovering the Meaning of these and the like Prophecies, I shall make these following Reflections.

1. Let it be noted, that the Writers of the New Testament, when they alledge Places out of the Psalms, as is done frequently, do never quote any from those Psalms which belong to *David*, or any other Person, than the *Messiah*.

Thus also the Evangelists do never quote any Prophecies, which by their Prefaces appear to have concerned any other Persons; which is a great Indication of the Accuracy, both in the first Composition of those Prophecies, and in the Citation of them by the Evangelists. Had they quoted antient Prophecies at random, and barely sought for secondary Completions, and Allusions, they might have found a great many Places to their Purpose in these Prophecies; and since they did not, 'tis plain they were careful to choose only such, as did belong to the *Messiah* and his Kingdom.

2. Commentators do frequently suppose, that a Prophecy of the Old Testament belongs to some particular Person, or Event of old Time, without sufficient Foundation, and so occasion Difficulties about the New Testament Applications without any Cause.

Thus they frequently frame or suppose Interpretations of Words, and Events, or Applications of them, in the Days of King *David*, to which they may accommodate the primary Sense of many of his

his *Psalms*, when the Expressions themselves, and the History of his Life, have not a Syllable of any such Thing. As in that remarkable Prophecy concerning the *Messias*, quoted by Saint *Paul*, *Heb.* i. 5. from 2 *Sam.* vii. and 1 *Chron.* xvii. and referr'd to, and commented on in the 89th *Psalm*; wherein, without a Word of King *Solomon*, is a famous Prediction, that the Messias should spring from the remote Posterity of *David*, that *God* would *be to him a Father, and that he should be to him a Son*; *that his Throne should be established for ever*; and that he should *build an House* or Temple for the Almighty: But all this at a Time when the People of *Israel* should be *no more removed*, nor *any more afflicted as formerly*.

Yet notwithstanding these plain Characters of the *Messias*, Commentators confound this Revelation made to *Nathan*, and relating to the *Messiah*, with another made to *David*, relating to *Solomon*, and that first Temple he should build; and so obscure one of the noblest Prophecies in the Old Testament.

Thus the Locusts in *Joel* is interpreted to be a Drought and Famine in *Judea*, though the History of that Nation is silent of any such Thing. Thus also where there appears Predictions of a Captivity and Dispersion of the *Jews* before that by *Nebuchadnezzar*, Commentators take it for granted, that the Words belong to it, without any manner of Characteristics, which should determine them to that Time; nay very often against plain Characteristics, which determine them to the Destruction of *Jerusalem* by *Titus Vespasian*, and that great Captivity and Dispersion, which has continued to this Day.

3. The much greatest Part of those Prophecies, which are alledged by the Evangelists, are plainly meant of the *Messias*, and could be true of none but him.

Thus

Thus *Deut.* xviii. *Pſ.* ii. xvi. xxii. cx. cxviii. *Iſa.* liii. *Dan.* ix. *Joel* ii. *Amos* ix. *Mic.* v. *Zach.* ix. xi. xiii. *Malac.* iii. iv. are the Places of the Old Teſtament, from whence *moſt* of the Citations of the Evangeliſts are taken, and moſt evidently belong to the *Meſſiah*.

4. Moſt of the remaining Places are taken out of ſuch Pſalms or Chapters of the Old Teſtament, as do better agree to the *Meſſias* than to thoſe of whom they are ordinarily expounded. See *Pſal.* viii. lxix. lxxviii. *Iſa.* vi. ix. xxviii. xxix. xl. xlii. xliv. xlix. lv. lvi. lxi. lxv.

5. The ſix remaining Places, which, at leaſt in the preſent Order of the Copies of the old Prophecies, do ſeem by the Coherence of the Places to belong to others than the *Meſſias*; the one half have yet theſe two Characters of being rightly applied by the Evangeliſts to him; *viz.* That the Words do moſt exactly agree to him: And that the Coherence of the Place is entire without them, if not inconſiſtent with them.

Thus that Prophecy, *Behold a Virgin ſhall be with Child, and bear a Son, and thou ſhalt call his Name Emanuel*, cannot be applied to any other than the Meſſias. Beſides the Coherence of the other Prophecy is entire without it. For when God had commanded *Iſaiah* (Chap. vii. 3.) to meet *Ahaz*, he was ordered to take his Son *Shearjaſhub* along with him, and as ſoon as he had done with that famous additional Sign concerning the *Meſſias*, he goes on with Relation to that Child of his there preſent, and the Caſe of *Ahaz* in the Circumſtances of thoſe Times. But of this more hereafter.

Thus alſo that Prophecy quoted by St. *Matthew* (Chap. ii. 15.) *Out of Egypt have I called my Son*, is not only exactly ſuitable to the *Meſſias*, but is a Prediction by itſelf, having no viſible Connection either with what went before, or what follows after in

in that Book. Thus alſo that Quotation of Saint *Matthew* Chap. xiii. 34, 35. which is quoted from *Pſal.* lxxviii. 2. The Words do moſt ſtrictly agree to our Saviour; but are ſo far from a neceſſary Part of the Series of the *Pſalmiſt*, that it is compleat without them.

Theſe three are the only Places where Prophecies are quoted by the Evangeliſts out of the Old Teſtament, contrary to the Coherence of thoſe Places wherein they at preſent appear.

As for two or three other Prophecies of conſiderable Difficulty. *That* cited by St. *Matt.* ii. *ult.* is not in the preſent Copies of the Old Teſtament, and therefore cannot be pretended to be miſapplied. *That* in *Matt.* ii. 17, 18. concerning the Slaughter of the Infants by *Herod*, is no Prophecy at all, but a poetical Repreſentation of the Miſeries of Perſons near the Place where *Rachel* was buried, and may as well be introduced upon this ſaid Occaſion of the Murder of the Infants, as on the like ſad Occaſion of the captive *Jews* gathered together at *Ramah* by *Nebuzaradan*. See *Jer.* lx. 1.

The laſt Place, which ſeems at firſt Sight the hardeſt to be accounted for, is a Citation of our Saviour's, *John* xiii. 18. This Quotation is generally ſuppoſed to be taken from *Pſal.* xli. 9. where the Words are, *The Man of my Peace, which eateth my Bread, hath lift up his Heel againſt me.* Tho' that *Pſalm* cannot be ſuppoſed to belong to the *Meſſias*, nor are our Saviour's Words the ſame with, or of the like Importance with the original: And there is no Occaſion to ſuppoſe this Place cited by him, when there is in the 55th *Pſalm* a Prophecy including entirely the Senſe of our Saviour's Quotation, to which 'tis more reaſonable to ſuppoſe the Reference made, than to the other. See *Pſal.* 12, 13.

But now, if it be wondered, that Prophecies, concern-

concerning the *Messias*, and his Characters, which are of so great Importance to be easily understood, should be so obscure, I answer, that God was obliged to make them obscure, that the Devil and his Angels, who were to be great Actors in fulfilling many of these Predictions, might not understand too much of the great Design, and so might not be able to frustrate it.

From what I have said, I conclude that the Propecies at all appertaining to the Messias, do solely belong to him.

XIV. The prophetic Language in its foretelling Events, does often use the *preterperfect* for the *future Tense*. To illustrate which, we need only read the 53d of *Isaiah*, which is in great Measure written in this Dialect.

XV. The Prophets frequently change the Scene, and suppose the Words spoken not at the same Time when the Prophecy was delivered, but long afterwards: And very often either just before, or at, or even after the fulfilling of it.

Thus *Jacob* foretelling his Sons what should befal them in the *last Days*, after his Prediction concerning *Dan* was over, seems to put himself into the Circumstances of those last Days, and to welcome that joyful News of that Salvation of God, which should restore and settle the Tribes in their own Land; *I have waited for thy Salvation, O Lord.* Thus also the 2d *Psalm* is to be understood as spoken at the beginning of the Gospel. See *Psal.* ii. 1. *when the Heathen raged, and the People imagined a vain Thing.*

In like Manner the 16th *Psalm* is fitted to the Circumstances of the *Messias* in his Troubles. So also is the 22d, the 69th, and 109th, fitted for his Use in his Passion. The 45th *Psalm* to the State of the Messias Exaltation. The 50th *Psalm* is a noble Prophecy of God's judging and pleading

with the *Jews*, of his ſeparating the Wicked from the Righteous, when he is about to reſtore them to their own Country, in the End of the World, and to ſet over them the Kingdom of the *Meſſias*. The 79th *Pſalm* prophetically deſcribes the Miſeries of the *Jews*, in their preſent grand Captivity, in Words ſo ſuited to that Condition, as if it had been compoſed at the ſame Time. Thus alſo the Caſe ſeems to be in that Place of *Ezekiel*, where he is propheſying againſt *Gog*, *Ezek.* xxxviii. 17. So is it alſo in that other Expreſſion concerning the Deſtruction of the ſame *Gog*, *Ezek.* xxxix. 8. See *Iſa.* xxvi. 20.

XVI. The prophetic Stile is not always entire, continued, and coherent, through one Series of Reaſoning, or Succeſs of Events; but is ſometimes, at leaſt in the preſent Order of the Prophecies, ſhort, abrupt, and diſturbed by the coming on of other Things of a very different Nature.

Thus for inſtance in the beginning of *Ezekiel* the ſame Viſion is aſcribed to two different Years of *Jehoiachin*'s Captivity. See *Ezek.* i. 1. But if we take the firſt Date to be a Diſlocation only, and to belong to the beginning of the xxxth Chapter of that Prophecy, which has no particular Date, and where both the Series and the Contents moſt exactly agree with this very Date, which is here ſupernumerary, the Difficulty ceaſes.

Thus alſo we find in the 10th of *Deut.* two Verſes 6, 7, inſerted about the Journeyings of the Children of *Iſrael*, which are both imperfect in themſelves, and intirely foreign to the Deſign and Series of *Moſes*'s Reaſoning in that Place; and accordingly the very next Words go on with *Moſes*'s foregoing Diſcourſe, in ſuch a Manner, as perfectly deſtroys the Suppoſition of any ſuch Inſertion at all: *At that Time the Lord ſeparated the Tribe of Levi to bear the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord.* Which

most certainly was not done at *Jotbath*, *a Land of Rivers of Waters*, whither the *Israelites* came not till long afterwards; which yet the present Insertion implies; but at *Horeb* immediately after God's writing upon the second Tables. This is too plain an Instance of a Disorder in our present Copies to be denied.

Thus also *Isa.* v. 1. affords another Instance. *Now will I sing to my Well-beloved, a Song of my Beloved, touching his Vineyard*, &c. Wherein from the glorious Times of the Messias, the Prophet proceeds without any Warning or apparent Order to the Judgments which God would pour on them long before that Time, in the Destruction of their Polity and Religion. Yet at the 16th and 17th Verses, amidst all these Threatenings and Punishments, comes in a mixture of Joy, and a Hint of the Exaltation of their *Messias*, and the Peace and Prosperity of his Kingdom. And then he immediately goes on with Threatenings and Judgments again.

Thus also in *Dan.* viii. when the holy Spirit had been describing the Miseries to be brought on the *Jews* by *Antiochus Epiphanes*, at the 9, 10, 11, and 12th Verses; in the 13 and 14th Verses *Daniel hears an holy one speaking, and another holy one answering*; and the Subject thereof is not at all about *Antiochus*, but about the Period of the final Miseries of the *Jews*, and the Conclusion of the Desolation of the *Temple*, which is not yet over; or the famous 2300 *Evening Mornings* after which the *Temple is to be cleared hereafter*.

This Prophecy comes in so absurdly, that most Commentators have mistook its Meaning, and applied it to the Times of *Antiochus*, how little soever the Facts could be made to answer such an Interpretation.

Another Example we have, in the 11th Chapter

of *Daniel*, where after the *Series* of the Vision had proceeded as far as the same *Antiochus*, comes an eminent Prediction of a remarkable *King* or *Kingdom that should do according to his Will, and exalt himself, and magnify himself above every God*, i. e. of the *Roman* Empire, as Mr. *Mede* has well explained it.

XVII. The Prophets did not sometimes understand the meaning of the Prophecies themselves, but only exactly recorded them.

Thus when the Vision of the four Beasts was shewn to the Prophet, *Daniel* vii. 15. he tells us, *one made known to him the Interpretation of the Things.* Yet in the last Verse of that Chapter he seems to hint his still imperfect Apprehension of them. In like manner, Chap. viii. 13, 14, that Vision of the *Evening Morning* was shut up for *many Days* to come. See Ver. 26, 27. And he tells us, *there was none to interpret it to him.* But, Chap. xii. 8. he says, *he heard, but understood not.* And this Observation is particularly confirmed by St. *Peter.* See 1 *Pet.* i. 9, 10, 11, 12.

Having finished my preparatory Observations, I shall proceed to the several Prophecies occurring in the sacred Writings, according to the Priority of their Delivery; only entrenching so far upon this general Rule, as to join all those Predictions together which belong to the same Event, and to consider them all at once, on the first Occasion wherein such an Event is foretold in Scripture.

PROPHECY I. Gen. iii. 14, 15. *The Lord God said unto the serpent, because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all Cattle, and above every Beast of the Field; upon thy Belly shalt thou go, and Dust shalt thou eat all the Days of thy Life: And I will put Enmity between thee and the Woman, and between thy Seed and her Seed: He shall bruise thy Head, and thou shalt bruise his Heel.*

In order to understand this remarkable Prophecy, I must premise, that by the Serpent or Dragon in the prophetic Language, is meant the Devil, see *Apoc.* xii. 7, 8, 9. xx. 2. and he is supposed to have appeared in a Dragon's Shape, when he conversed with Mankind, as the Messias and the good Angels in Scripture appeared in human Shape. And as we can give no Account whence the human Appearance of these were derived, or how disposed of afterwards, because the Scripture is silent in that Matter; so neither can we give any Account of the serpentine Appearance or Body of the Devil, without any Impeachment in either Case, of the plain Truth of the Facts so directly related to us. This therefore being the first Part of the Threatening to that Serpent there bodily present, *viz.* that he should be more *cursed than all Cattle, and every Beast of the Field; that upon his Belly he should go, and should eat Dust all the Days of his Life:* Being so immediately then to be fulfilled, that it cannot be so properly esteemed a Prophecy, I shall wave the further Consideration of it in this Place.

But then in the next Verse we have a remarkable Prophecy indeed. *I will put Enmity between thee and the Woman, and between thy Seed and her Seed; he shall bruise thy Head, and thou shalt bruise his Heel.* By the *Seed of the Woman* is meant that one eminent Person, born without the Assistance of a Man, who should one Day appear in the World, to destroy the Power and Kingdom of the Devil.

The other Prophecies concerning the coming of the *Messias* are too numerous to be considered; but the particular Circumstances of his Birth, that his Mother was to be a pure Virgin 'till she brought him forth, deserves to be here once for all consider'd, and its Completion observed in our Lord.

Isa. vii. *Ahaz* King of *Judah* being under great Apprehensions of the utter Excision of the House of

David, and the Kingdom of *Judah*, by reason of the united Forces of *Rezin* King of *Syria*, and *Pekah* King of *Israel*; God orders *Isaiah* to go and meet the King of *Judah*, and particularly commands him to take his Son *Shearjashub* along with him, and to assure the King, that if he would depend on God, that the *Israelites* should be so far from destroying the House of *David*, and the Kingdom of *Judah*, that they should within 75 Years be carried away Captives themselves; and that as the Kingdom of *Syria* should undergo the like sudden Destruction also, so in particular the Kingdom of *Israel*, which now so mightily vexed them, in a few Years, before that Child of his here present, *Shearjashub*, (to whom the Prophet seems particularly to have pointed) though he was already big enough to walk alone, should *know to refuse Evil and chuse the Good*, before he came to Years of Discretion, that Land should be *forsaken of both her Kings*. See 1 *Chron.* v. 26. 2 *Kings* xv. 29. This I take to be the *Series*, so far as belongs to *Ahaz*, and *Israel* at that particular Juncture. But then it pleased God, upon Occasion of the great Fear the House of *David* was in of being utterly destroyed, and so of the failing of God's Promises to them; and upon Occasion of the Perverseness of *Ahaz*, who refused to ask a Sign of God's Favour, when he invited him to ask it, were it never so great or improbable; to afford the most comfortable Sign of his Mercy to the House of *David* in particular, as well as to all Men in general; and to repeat more clearly the ancient Promise made on the Fall of Man, that the *Messias* should certainly come in due Time of the *House of David*; and that in that House he should be born of a pure Virgin; and should be no other than *Immanuel*, i. e. God and Man in one Person. See *Isa.* vii. 13, 14.

That this was to be some very wonderful Thing is plain; because it is so solemnly introduced by God,

God, as a Security of his Favour to the Houſe of *David*. That the Word in this Place rendered a *Virgin*, is alſo rendered ſo in all other Places; and that the Word rendered *Immanuel* is evident, becauſe in the next Chapter, *Iſa.* viii. 8. he is ſuppoſed to be the King of the *Jews*, and that Land is called the *Land of Immanuel*.

In *Jeremiah* xxxi. 22. we have a Hint of the ſame Thing. As alſo in *Micah*, where immediately after the Prediction that the *Meſſias* was to be born in *Bethlehem*, 'tis added, *Therefore he will give them up, until the Time that ſhe that travaileth hath brought forth; then the Remnant of his Brethren ſhall return unto the Children of Iſrael:* Which Expreſſion intimates thus much, that the *Meſſias* was to be born in *Bethlehem* of a pure Virgin.

And how exactly theſe Prophecies have been fulfilled in the Birth of our Jeſus, is ſo well known from the evangelical Writers, that I need not inlarge upon it. I ſhall only obſerve, that in all Places where the *Meſſias* in the prophetic Writings is introduced ſpeaking of this Matter, he always ſpeaks of his *Mother alone*, as an occult Intimation that he was to have no proper Father in this World, ſee *Pſal.* xxii. 9, 10. xxxv. 14. lxix. 8. lxxi. 6. lxxxvi. 16. cxvi. 16. cxxxi. 2. cxxxix. 13. *Iſa.* xlix. 1.

All which Expreſſions are very remarkable, and ſhew that the ſame grand Deſign was carried on all along; and that the Devil was not to have his Head bruiſed, and his Kingdom deſtroy'd by any other than the *Seed of the Woman*, or the Son of a pure Virgin.

Prophecy II. Is the Deluge in the Days of *Noah*. The Cauſe of it was the Wickedneſs of Mankind, ſee *Gen.* vi. 5, 6, 11, 12. It was threatened 120 years before it came, *Gen.* vi. 3. 1 *Pet.* iii. 20. 2 *Pet.* ii. 6. Now that there was ſuch a Deluge, is evident from the moſt ancient Records of the

Heathen Learning, from the present Number of Mankind, compared with the usual Proportion in their Increase; from the ancient Accounts of the spreading of all the present Nations of the World; from those Regions where the Ark rested; from the present *Phenomena* of Nature, and Astronomy; particularly from the Shells of Fishes, Plants, Trees, and other Remains of the antediluvian World still buried in the Sediment of the Waters of the Deluge, which composes our upper Earth; from the Exactness of the Time and Day of the beginning of the Deluge assigned by *Moses*, as being attested to by astronomical Computations, and the express Testimonies of *Berosus* and *Abidenus* corrected, and of *Plutarch* without any Correction, who says that *Osiris* or *Noah* went into the Ark *on the 17th Day* of the *Egyptian Month Athyr, in which the Sun passes the Sign Scorpio, i. e.* on the same Day *Noah* entered the Ark, *the 17th Day of the second Month.*

PROPHECY III. Is that the World should no more be destroyed, particularly by a Deluge, till the Consummation of all Things, see *Gen.* viii. 21, 22. ix. 8, *&c.* which has been fulfilled ever since. As God then promised, *Seed-Time and Harvest, Cold and Heat, Summer and Winter, and Day and Night*, hath never failed; and that original Seal of God's Goodness the *Rain-Bow* hath been transmitted down to us. And indeed, the whole Air and Importance of this Prophecy is divine. For who but the same Creator and Governour of the World that had preserved it 1656 years, that had then destroy'd it by a Flood, could pretend to grant a new Race of Men, so vast a Charter, and by his Promise secure them from a future Deluge? Who but God could so alter the Constitution of the Air after the Deluge, that whereas all former Generations had never seen any such Thing, the future should never want that Signal of God's Goodness, the *Rain-Bow?*

PRO-

PROPHECY. IV. That *Canaan* ſhould be curſed and be a Servant to *Shem* and *Japhet*: That *Shem* ſhould be bleſſed of God in a peculiar Manner: And that *Japhet* ſhould conquer part of the Countries belonging to *Shem*. For this Prophecy, ſee *Gen.* ix. 25, 26, 27. For the Completion of which eminent Predictions read *Patric in locum*. Now who could in the Days of *Noah*, when *Shem*, *Ham*, and *Japhet* were private Families, ſo exactly foretel all theſe great Events, but God? ſo that we have here another Inſtance of the Spirit of Prophecy in the moſt early Ages, and this concerning Events not come to paſs, when they were recorded by *Moſes*, and ſo leave no room for any Suſpicion of Fraud, either in their primary Delivery by *Noah*, or in their Deſcription by *Moſes* afterwards.

PROPHECY V. Is that *Abraham*'s Poſterity ſhould be exceedingly multiplied above that of other Nations. The principal of theſe Predictions are theſe, ſee *Gen.* xii. 1. xlvi. 3. *Exod.* xxxii. 13. *Jer.* xxxiii. 22. *Gen.* xiii. 16. xv. 5. xvii. 2. 4, 5, 6. xxii. 17. xxvi. 4. xxviii. 14. xxxii. 12. xxxv. 11.

Theſe are the plain Prophecies relating to this Matter. I ſhall now refer you to thoſe Places and Arguments relating to their Completion, and to omit the vaſt Increaſe of *Abraham*'s other Poſterity; I ſhall only refer you to thoſe Paſſages which relate to the Poſterity of *Jacob* alone, ſee *Exod.* i. 7. v. 9. 12. *Numb.* xxiii. 10. *Deut.* i. 10. x. 22. *Ezek.* xvi. 7. *Heb.* vi. 12. And what is ſaid of this in Scripture, is ſo confirmed by the Teſtimonies of prophane Authors, that no doubt can ariſe as to the Exactneſs of the Completion. And this alſo is another Proof of the Truth of the divine Inſpiration of the holy Scriptures.

PROPHECY VI. That in the *Seed* of *Abraham* all the Nations of the World ſhould in an extraordi-

nary Manner be bleſſed, or that God would raiſe a wonderful Perſon from his Offspring, that ſhould be a common Bleſſing to Mankind, ſee *Gen.* xii. 3. xviii. 18. xxii. 18. xxvi. 4, 5. xxviii. 14. Now that by this *Seed* of *Abraham* and of *Iſaac*, and of *Jacob* in the ſingular Number, was meant the *Meſſias*, appears from all that follow in the Old and New Teſtament relating to this Matter; and from the plain Expoſition of St. *Paul* himſelf, *Gal.* iii. 8. v. 16. I cannot here but obſerve the Accuracy and Conſtancy of the prophetic Style, which all along, till after the Days of *David*, makes Uſe of this Word in this Signification, for that Perſon, who was to be the Saviour of the World: Not once calling him the *Son* of the Woman, or the Son of *Abram*, or of *Iſaac*, or *Jacob*, or of *David*, tho' that was a more intelligible Phraſe for a ſingle Perſon than the other, and tho' the New Teſtament generally ſo ſtyles him on thoſe Occaſions, ſee 2 *Sam.* vii. 12. 1 *Chron.* xvii. 11. *Pſal.* lxxxix. 3, 4. 29. 36. In all theſe Places we ſee not only that the original Promiſe is ſtill referred to, and continued, but that St. *Paul* was perfectly in the right, when he interpreted this *Seed* in the ſingular Number to be no other than a ſingle Perſon, the Meſſias himſelf.

For we plainly perceive that this *Seed* of *David* was to be no other than a great King, whoſe Throne was to laſt for ever. And thus far we go along with the Old Teſtament in tracing this glorious Promiſe, as that the Meſſiah was to be of the *Seed of the Woman*, of a pure Virgin, ſo alſo was he to be the *Seed* of *Abraham*, *the Seed of Iſaac*, *the Seed of Jacob*, *and the Seed of David*. And tho' the Meſſiah was to be only of this ſingle Line as to his Deſcent, yet he was to be the common Saviour of the World, and in him *all the Nations* of the *Gentiles* ſhould be *bleſſed*.

Now

Now that this wonderful Promiſe has been made good, none who read and believe the Hiſtory of the New Teſtament can doubt, ſee *Matt.* i. 1. 20. *Luke* i. 27. iii. *Matt.* xv. 24. *Heb.* xi. 9. *Mark* xvi. 15. *Col.* i. 23.

PROPHECY VII. That the Poſterity of *Abraham*, *Iſaac* and *Jacob* ſhould poſſeſs the Land of *Canaan*; ſo that tho' they ſhould be expelled thence for their Sins, yet their Title ſhould endure; and they ſhould be reſettled in it; and there continue in Peace to the End of the World, ſee *Gen.* xii. 7. xiii. 14, 15, 17. xv. 18, 19, 20, 21. *Exod.* iii. 8, 17. *Gen.* xvii. 7, 8. According to theſe original Promiſes, that this Land of *Canaan* ſhould be to the Children of *Iſrael* an *everlaſting Poſſeſſion*, are the Prophecies all along alſo, ſee *Deut.* xxx. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. *Jer.* xxx. 3. Now as to the Completion of theſe Predictions, it has been as remarkable and exact as the Predictions themſelves, ſee *Numb.* xxi. *Deut.* ii. and iii. *Joſhua.* The *Iſraelites* enjoy'd this Land for above a 1000 years; and that when for their Wickedneſs, God ſent the Tribes of *Judah* and *Benjamin* into Captivity, he declared it ſhould be but for 70 years, which accordingly was true; and they continued 600 years together, till by their Rejection and Murder of the *Meſſias* they were again doomed to a more laſting Captivity begun by *Titus Veſpaſian*, and continued to this Day. And tho' the ten Tribes carried away captive by *Salmanaſſer*, and the Body of the two Tribes by *Titus*, are not now in *Canaan*; yet ſince the Period of their final Reſtoration is not yet come, their preſent Caſe is ſo far from an Objection againſt theſe ancient Prophecies before us, that it would be a great one againſt the others, if it were ſo. And he who conſiders that this Prediction before us has hitherto been exactly fulfilled in all the Periods already paſt, cannot doubt of the fulfilling of what remains

to

to come in its proper Season, and will not question but that God will ultimately and compleatly, as he promised, *give to the Seed of Abraham all the Land of Canaan for an everlasting Possession*, see *Ezek.* xxxvii. 25.

PROPHECY VIII. Is that made to *Abraham* and *Sarah* his Wife, that they should have a Son, whom they should call *Isaac*, and from whom the *Messiah* was to succeed, when they were past all Hopes of Children. See *Gen.* xvii. 1, 15, 16. xvi. 19, 21. xviii. 10, 14. And as to the Performance of the Predictions it is plain. See *Gen.* xxi. 5.

PROPHECY IX. That the Children of *Israel* should be Sojourners in a strange Land for several Ages; and that a foreign Nation should afflict them; and that this Sojourning and Affliction should last from the Time of the Birth of *Isaac* 'till about 400 Years afterwards, and that particularly this Delivery from that Slavery should be in the fourth Generation, after their Descent thither; that at the Conclusion of that Period they should return out of that Land with great Riches; and that God would punish that Nation who had oppressed them.

This Prediction has several Prophecies in it, the fulfilling of each of which I shall take Notice of in Order. It was foretold *Abraham*, Gen. xv. 12—16. xlvi. 4. that God would punish the *Egyptians*, and that *Israel* should go out with great Riches was also foretold to *Moses*. *Exod.* iii. 20, 21, 22.

That all this was accomplished is very plain. That *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, and their Children were Strangers in the Land of *Canaan* is frequently observed. See *Gen.* xxi. 34. xxiii. 3, 4, 17. xxvi. 2, 3. xxviii. 4. xxxvi. 7. xxxvi. 1. *Exod.* vi. 4. So that 'tis true, that the first Branch of the Prophecy was most exactly performed; and that *Abraham*, &c. were *Strangers in a Land that was not theirs*.

That

That the Posterity of *Abraham*, *Isaac* and *Jacob* did serve, and were afflicted by them till the end of 400 Years from the Date of this Prophecy; that after the End of that Period God did judge that Nation, that at the Exodus of the *Israelites* out of *Egypt*, they went out with great Riches, which they *demanded* and not *borrowed* of the *Egyptians*, as we falsely render the Word, is too plain to doubt of. See *Ex.* xi. 2, 3. xii. 35, 36.

And that the Exodus out of *Egypt* was really in the 4th Generation, is evident by the Genealogical Accounts of those Times. Thus *Levi* went down into *Egypt* in a middle Age, his Son *Kohath* makes a second Generation, his Son *Amram* a third, and his Children, *Moses*, *Aaron*, and *Miriam*, the fourth Generation.

PROPHECY X. Is that surprizing Threatening of the Destruction of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah* with Fire from Heaven. This severe Prophecy was at first delivered more obscurely to *Abraham*, Gen. xviii. 17, 20, 21. But afterwards to *Lot* more expressly, xix. 12, 13, 15. The Completion of this Prophecy we find *Gen.* xix. 24, 25, 27, 28. Nay, indeed this strange Judgment of God is esteemed to be so remarkable, and so proper for the Caution and Terror of the Wicked, that it is very frequently referr'd to, and instanced in, by the sacred Pen-men afterwards. See *Deut.* xxix. 23. *Isa.* xiii. 19, 20. *Jer.* i. 40. xlix. 17, 18. *Amos* iv. 11. *Zeph.* ii. 9. 2 *Pet.* ii. 6. *Jude* ver. 7. And what plain Attestation to, and Remains of this terrible Judgment have we from Heathen Authors? See *Bp. Patric in loc.* and *Le Clerk*, *Dissert. de Sodom Subvers.*

PROPHECY XI. Is that complicated one, containing indeed several distinct Prophecies in it, concerning the Posterity of *Jacob*; that it should be more powerful than the Posterity of *Esau*; and that

that the Posterity of *Esau* should serve the Posterity of *Jacob*; that the *Israelites* should have a good Land given them by God, with great Command over the neighbouring People, and particularly the *Edomites*, though they also in Process of Time should sometimes get clear of the *Israelites*.

The first Prophecy concerning this Matter we find, *Gen.* xxv. 22, 23. and afterwards more distinctly in *Isaac*'s Blessings to *Jacob* and *Esau*, *Gen.* xxvii. 27, 28, 29—39, 40.

Now that these Prophecies have proved true, I shall shew, both from the sacred and prophane History of these two Nations. For

1. 'Tis evident, that the *Edomites* and *Israelites* were all along greatly different from each other in all Things, which made them disagree perpetually.

2. 'Tis evident that the *Israelites* were in after Ages a more considerable People than the *Edomites*.

3. That the *Edomites* were conquered and made tributary to the *Israelites*, see 2 *Sam.* viii. 14. 1 *Chron.* xviii. 11, 12, 13. 1 *Kings* xi. 15, 16. And when in after Times *Edom* had recovered itself a little, then *Amaziah* made great Slaughter among them, 2 *Kings* viii. 21. And in Ages long afterwards *Judas Maccabeus* destroy'd them, 1 *Mac.* v. 65. and after him *Hircanus* conquer'd the whole Country.

4. The Land of *Canaan* was a most fat and fertile Country is evident, see *Numb.* xiii. 23, 26, 27. *Deut.* viii. 7, 8, 9.

5. That many of the neighbouring Nations were subjected to the *Israelites*, is evident from the History of *David*.

6. That the *Edomites* did enjoy a Country in a less Degree fruitful, appears also true in Fact, see *Heylin Cosmog.*

7. That the *Edomites* Way of Living was rather by War, and Hunting, than any extraordinary

Fruitfulneſs of their Ground, *Joſephus* particularly aſſures us, *De Bello, liv. c.* 15.

8. Tho' the *Edomites* were in the main to be in Subjection to *Iſrael*, yet they ſometimes recovered themſelves, and choſe them a King, 2 *Kings* viii. 20. which was a clear Completion of the laſt Branch of this Prophecy.

PROPHECY XII. Is that concerning the Exaltation of *Joſeph*, and concerning the Submiſſions he ſhould receive from his Parents and Brethren in that State of his Exaltation.

This Prediction we find twice repeated, *Gen.* xxxvii. 5——11. And at a Time of Age when there was the leaſt Probability of any ſuch Thing. But *what God had promiſed he was able to perform.* The very Methods his Brethren took to deſtroy him, God made as ſo many Steps to his Advancement; and wherever he was, made him in the Favour of Men, and at laſt brought him to the Knowledge of *Pharaoh*. *Joſeph*'s Preferments we may read, *Gen.* xli. 38——44. *Pſal.* cv. 20, 21, 22. His Brethren's Submiſſions, xlii. 6, 9. xliii. 26, 27, 28. xliv. 14. And tho' it is not mentioned that *Jacob* bowed himſelf to *Joſeph* when he came into *Egypt*, yet no doubt he paid him thoſe Marks of Honour due to his Station.

PROPHECY XIII. Is contained in thoſe very divine Dreams of *Pharaoh*, the Interpretation thereof was the Occaſion of that wonderful Advancement of *Joſeph*.

The Dreams, and their Interpretation, we may read, *Gen.* xli. And how remarkably they were fulfill'd, the following Hiſtory will moſt particularly inform us.

PROPHECY XIV. That *Shiloh* or the *Meſſias* was to come before the Scepter departed from *Judah*.

This Prediction is in *Gen.* xlix. 8, 9, 10.

By

By the *Scepter which was not to depart from Judah*, is meant Authority and Power, as we may ſee by the ſame Expreſſion elſewhere, *Zech.* x. 11. *The Pride of Aſſyria ſhall be brought down, and the Scepter of Egypt ſhall depart away.*

But that by *Scepter* is meant Kingly Power only is falſe. For whoever they are, with whom the Government of a People is intruſted, in the ſacred Style *hold the Scepter*. And ſo long as a Nation is governed by their own Laws, ſo long the *Scepter of Government* remains among that Nation.

By the *Law-giver*, I underſtand either Magiſtrates, who are ſubordinate to others; or elſe the Doctors of the Law, who by explaining it cauſed the People to obſerve it.

By the Place of the *Law-giver between the Feet* of the Tribe of *Judah*, I do not underſtand his being of the *Poſterity* of that Tribe; for no ſuch Uſe of this Expoſition does any where appear. Nor do I underſtand it with any Alluſion to the Cuſtom of the *Jews*, where the Learners ſtood or *ſat at the Feet of their* Teachers. For we are not here concerned with the Scholars, but with Teachers themſelves, who cannot be ſuppoſed in any ſuch Poſture; neither can *between the Feet* denote the latter Times of the *Jews*. Nor do I think there is any Occaſion for reading with the *Samaritan*, *Banners*, inſtead of *Feet*, for a *Law-giver* does not in any Senſe agree with *Banners*.

But methinks the foregoing Verſe, where *Judah* is compared to a *Lyon couching*, will give the faireſt Interpretation, as ſuppoſing it nothing elſe than an Alluſion to that Metaphor; and to ſignify no more than *before him*. For when a Lyon is couchant whatever is *between his Feet* is *before him*; and what moſt properly belongs to him, and is before him, muſt in that Poſture be *between his Feet*.

By *Shiloh* I underſtand the *Meſſias*: And I underſtand

derſtand it of him, becauſe the Word ſignifies the *Sent* of God, or Angel of God, *i. e.* the great *Angel of the Covenant*, as we learn from the expreſs Interpretation of the ſame Word *Siloam*, *John* ix. 7. And becauſe what goes before and follows after plainly belongs to no other Perſon but him in the whole *Jewiſh* Hiſtory.

By the *Gathering*, *Expectation*, or rather *Obedience* of the People, I underſtand the Converſion of the *Gentiles*. I chuſe rather to render the Word, here uſed, *Obedience*, than *Gathering*, or *Expectation*, not only becauſe this has alſo great Authority for it; but chiefly becauſe in the only Place beſides this, where the Word is uſed in the Old Teſtament, it can hardly ſignify any Thing elſe, but *Obedience*. *Prov.* xxx. 17.

By the Particle *and*, the *Scepter ſhall not depart from Judah, and a Law-giver from between his Feet, untill Shiloh come*, I do not underſtand, that *neither the Scepter nor the Law-giver were to depart till the coming* of *Shiloh*; that is, *not utterly to depart from Judah*. And according to this Interpetation, it has been exactly fulfilled, as appears from Scripture Hiſtory.

As to the additional Clauſe, that *the Scepter was not to depart from Judah till the Obedience of the People were to the Meſſiah*, or till the Spreading of his Kingdom into the *Gentile* World, this is ſo agreeable to the known Hiſtory of the Riſe of Chriſtianity, and its being preached and received in a great Part of the Heathen World, before the Deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, that I need only give a Hint at it in this Place. Nay, there is one remarkable Expreſſion of our Saviour's concerning this Matter, which is ſo directly to our preſent Purpoſe, that I think he had the fulfilling of this Prophecy in his Eye, when he ſpake it. I will give it in the Words of Mr. *Mede*.

"That

" That this, ſays he, is the true Application of " this Prediction, beſides the Evidence of the E- " vent, appears by our Saviour's Prophecy of this " Deſtruction of the *Jewiſh* State, *Matt.* xxiv. " 14. where after he had named ſome other Things " to precede it, he adds this for the laſt Sign. " *And this Goſpel of the Kingdom*, ſaith he, *ſhall* " *be preached in all the World, for a Witneſs unto all* " *Nations, and then ſhall the End come.* That is " the End of the *Jewiſh* State. When the *Gen-* " *tiles* by the preaching of the Apoſtles ſhould be " gathered unto Chriſt, then ſhould the *Jewiſh* " State be utterly diſſolved. For ſo it pleaſed " God, when he would reject the *Jews*, not to " diſſolve their State, till he had erected him a " new one among the *Gentiles*."

PROPHECY XV. Is that containing the Promiſes made to the Children of *Iſrael* of temporal Happineſs in the Land of *Canaan*, while they ſhould be obedient to the Laws given them by *Moſes*; and the Threatenings of temporal Miſery, if they ſhould be diſobedient to the ſame.

This is a noble Proof of the divine Original of the *Jewiſh* Law, as well as the Veracity of God, and of the Certainty of the prophetic Inſpiration of the holy Scriptures.

For the Promiſes made to the Children of *Iſrael*, ſee *Exod.* xix. 1, 3, 4, 5. *Joſ.* xxiii. 15, 16. 1 *Kings* ix. 1——9. *Exod.* xxxiv. 10. *Levit.* xxvi. Thus alſo God threatned the whole murmuring and diſobedient Generation of the *Iſraelites*, ſee *Numb.* xiv. 22, *&c.* xxxii. 10, 11, 12. *Deut.* i. 34, *&c.* *Pſal.* xcv. 10, 11. *Deut.* iv. 25, *&c.* v. 29, *&c.* vi. 1, *&c.* viii. 19, 20. xi. 8, 9. xxvi. 18, 19. And to conclude this Head, ſee *Exod.* xxxiv. 23, 24. concerning that almoſt incredible Promiſe relating to the three annual Feaſts of this Nation, ſee alſo xxviii. of *Deut.* and thence to the End of the 32d Chapter. I ſhall

I shall now proceed to the Completion of these surprizing Predictions: And this I shall do by demonstrating the exact fulfilling of these Prophecies relating to them, from the Time of their original Delivery to this very Day. And

1. That Threatning, that the murmuring and disobedient Generation, which were 20 Years old at the Exodus out of *Egypt*, should perish in the Wilderness, and not see the promised Land, we see fulfilled, *Numb.* xxvi. 63, *&c.* xxxii. 13. *Deut.* ii. 14, 15, 16. And if *Moses* was the Author of the 90th *Psalm*, it can be supposed no other than a doleful Lamentation of his upon this Occasion, see *Psal.* xc. 7—10.

After the Death of *Moses*, while *Israel served the Lord all the Days of Joshua, and all the Days of the Elders that out-lived Joshua*, they were very happy and victorious, see *Jos.* xxi. 43, 44, 45. xxiii. 14. But then as God was exact in the Performance of his Promises, when they were obedient to him, so he was as severe in the Execution of his Threatnings, as soon as they renounced his Worship, see *Judges* ii. 10, *&c.* And when, upon their Repentance, God raised up Judges to deliver them, and made them happy during the Lives of such Judges, and upon their Death, as was the usual Case, they returned to Idolatry, God returned to the Execution of his Threatenings, see *Judg.* iii. 7, 8, 9. 12, &c. *& alibi.*

Afterwards, when the *Israelites* were obstinately resolved to be governed by a King, God did not punish them so frequently as he did before, but permitted them to go on longer in their wicked Courses; but then as he was slower, so he was the severer in his Vengeance; accordingly, after the wicked Reign of *Saul*, and after the righteous Reign of *David*, *Solomon* arrives at the Throne; and after a flourishing and peaceable Beginning, he is drawn

to Idolatry in his old Age, 1 *Kings* xi. 4, &c. upon which Account God threatened to rend his Kingdom from him, and accordingly did set up *Jeroboam* over ten Tribes, and by so fatal a Division laid a Foundation for many Wars. At length all the Kings of *Israel* proving wicked Idolaters, and all the Kings of *Judah*, after the Death of good *Josiah*, God fulfills his Threatnings, and delivers them into the Hands of *Shalmanazer* King of *Assyria*, and *Nebuchadnezzar* King of *Babylon*, who led them away Captives.

All of them, who left off Idolatry in their Captivity, and undertook the Worship of the true God, were by his Providence and the Decrees of *Cyrus* restored to their own Land, and permitted to rebuild their Temple and to govern themselves by their own Laws. And 'tis a remarkable Providence to this Part of the Jewish Nation, that this Captivity so sanctified them, that they were never after liable to Idolatry. Upon this great Reformation God restores them to their own Land, and preserves them in a very eligible State, during the *Persian*, *Grecian*, and *Roman* Monarchies, till at length a corrupt Generation of *Scribes*, and *Pharisees*, and *Sadducees* debauched their Principles, and Manners; so that they were become guilty of all Crimes, even of the Murder of the Messiah and his Followers. For which Offences they soon after were utterly destroy'd by the *Romans*, and in what a miserable State they have been in since, and upon what Account so lasting a Judgment has been inflicted upon them, one need only read the 28th of *Deut.* to receive full Satisfaction, see also *Patric in loc.*

I must here make one Observation, which is this: That as God did all along in the Course of the *Israelites* Obedience perform one standing and miraculous Promise, *viz.* preserve them so by his Pro-

vidence, that none of their Enemies desired their Land, or attempted to seize it, at the going up of their Males thrice every Year to *Jerusalem*; so God threatened the *Israelites* with one Calamity so strange, that the like has never happened elsewhere to this Day. The Threatening is briefly contained in these Words: *Ye shall eat the Flesh of your Sons, and the Flesh of your Daughters shall ye eat.* Levit. xxvi. 29. But we may read it *Deut.* xxviii. 53——57. more emphatically. Which Prophecy was at first literally fulfilled when *Samaria* was besieged by *Benhadad*, 2 Kings vi. 26——30. It was next fulfilled when *Jerusalem* was besieged by *Nebuchadnezzar*. See *Baruch.* ii. 2, 3. *Lam.* ii. 20. vi. 10. The last Completion of it was at the Siege and Destruction of *Jerusalem* by *Titus Vespasian*. See *Josephus de Bello. lib.* 7. *cap.* 7, 8. Where the Circumstances were so exactly agreeable to the Words of *Moses*, that he must be an hardened Infidel indeed, that can deny it to be a most astonishing Instance of the Severity of the divine Justice, and Veracity of the divine Threatenings with Regard to the *Jewish* Nation.

Prophecy XVI. Is that famous one of *Balaam*, *Numb.* xxiv. 14, 17——24. relating to the *last Days*, or the *Days of the Messias*. And indeed no good Sense can be made of the Words of *Balaam*'s Prophecy, without keeping close to this prophetic Sense of the *last Days*. For who in the Language of the Prophets is that great Person, who is understood here, but not named? I shall see *him*, I shall behold *him*? This Way of speaking is not used elsewhere of the *Messias*; but that it is used of any other I am not sensible: Or if we will look for any Antecedent, who can *he* be but that promised *Seed*, which was to be over *many Waters*, or rule over many Nations? That great *King*, which should be *higher than Agag*, and whose *Kingdom should be ex-*

alted; of whom *Balaam* had been just before discoursing? Who can that Person be that *Balaam* expected to *see* after his Death, but our Redeemer? What eminent City is here hinted at without a Name, but that greatest of Cities (*Rome*) which in the Days of the *Messias* was to rule over the Kings of the Earth, and being without a Rival is the only one fit to be thus decyphered? What other King could *rule over*, or *subdue all the Children of Seth*, or all Mankind, but the blessed *Messias* himself? And why does this and the like Prophecies still speak of a single Person, of a particular *King*, and one distinct *Seed* in the singular Number, if a Succession of Kings, such as *David* and *Solomon*, were all along intended? These are all distinguishing Characters of the *Messias*, and without great Force cannot be expounded of any other.

As to the Completion of this Prophecy in all its Parts, we need not be large in the Proof of it. Since those Branches of it, which belong to Times already past, have been too plainly fulfilled, to leave any Room for doubt about the future Completion of such as belong to those Ages, which are yet for to come; a glorious *Star* has certainly come out of *Jacob*; a *Scepter* and Kingdom has arose out of *Israel*, which shall have no End. *Out of Jacob* is already *come* a *Seed* which was to be over many Nations; a *King* who is infinitely *higher than Agag*, and whose Kingdom is to have *Dominion* over all Things at the last. So that we have all the Reason in the World to expect that what is unaccomplished, will be fulfilled in due Time. *Balaam* will certainly see the *Messias* at the last Day. The great Person denoted here by a *Star* will subdue all Nations, and give them to his People *Israel* for an everlasting Possession.

PROPHECY XVII. Is that the High-Priests of the *Jewish* Nation should continue to be of the Family

ly of *Phineas* the Son of *Eleazar*, during the whole Continuance of the Commonwealth of the *Jews* in all future Generations.

The Prediction we read, *Numb.* xxv. 11, 12, 13. which is referred to *Pſ.* cvi. 30, 31. and long after by the Son of *Sirac*, *Eccluſ.* xlv. 23, 24, 25. and by *Mattathias*, 1 *Mac.* ii. 54. And the Completion of it is no leſs evident, if we look into the Liſt of the High-Prieſts, 1 *Chron.* vi. See Biſhop *Patric in locum.* 'Tis true, for ſome unknown Reaſons, or for ſome great Wickedneſs of the Race of *Phineas*, God ſeems once to have interrupted a little this Courſe of Succeſſion, by putting *Eli* and his Sons into the High-Prieſts Office for a while, who were of the Line of *Ithamar*, and not of *Phineas.* But then this Interruption was ſo ſhort, if it were any intire Interruption at all; which ſeems to me hardly certain; becauſe under the High-Prieſts of the Family of *Ithamar*, thoſe of the Family of *Phineas* do not appear to have been wholly excluded from that Office, and however the Dignity ſo ſoon returned into the Family, and continued while the *Jewiſh* Nation laſted. And is certainly to be reſtored to that Family again, at the future Reſtoration of that People. See *Ezek.* xliii. 19. and xliv. 15.

PROPHECY XVIII. Is that famous one ſo often referr'd to in the New Teſtament, which foretold the Coming of a great *Prophet like unto Moſes*, whom all the *Jews* were to hear under the Penalty of the divine Indignation.

See the Prophecy, *Deut.* xviii. 15——19. which is plainly referr'd to by *Philip*, *John* i. 45. by St. *Peter*, *Acts* iii. 22, 23. by St. *Stephen*, *Acts* vii. 37. Nay God himſelf ſeems to refer to this Prophecy, and apply it to *Jeſus* of *Nazareth*, when in that ſolemn Voice from Heaven, at the Transfiguration, he ſays, *Hear ye him.* And our Saviour tells the *Jews*, that *had they believed Moſes and the*

Prophets, they would have believed him, for they wrote of him. All which Applications considered together, make it not a little surprizing, that so many Christian Commentators should think of interpreting the Words of *Moses*, in their primary Sense of a Series of true Prophets, and only in a secondary Sense of the *Messias*, directly contrary to the Tenor of the Prophecy, which all along describes a single Person; that he should be like *unto Moses himself*, who was not only a Law-giver, but confirmed his Mission by Miracles; and *spake* so familiarly with God himself *Face to Face*; and was therefore so plainly esteemed much superior to the rest of the Prophets as ought to have prevented so absurd an Exposition.

As to the Prophecy itself, it seems to me too plain to need any Exposition: And as to its Completion, every Body who considers the Life and Actions of Christ, will readily own that God has fulfilled this most ancient Prophecy in our *Lord Jesus*. For *Jesus* was superior to *Moses*; he was Author of a better Law than *Moses*; he *lay in the Bosom of the Father*, and *was one with him*, which could not be said of *Moses*; he worked more Miracles than *Moses*, and the *Jews* who would not believe in him, God has severely required it *of them* and their Posterity. Thus much concerning this noble Prophecy, and its Completion.

Prophecy XIX. Is concerning the City *Jericho*, and the Curse denounced against the Person that should rebuild it.

The Prediction is mentioned in *Jos.* vi. 26. The Completion of it, 1 *Kings* xvi. 34.

Prophecy XX. Is that contained in the divine Hymn of Praise, which *Hannah* was inspired with upon the Birth and Dedication of *Samuel*, which deserves to be well observed, that we may better understand the grand Design of the antient Inspirations,

ons, which, even when they do not at first View seem to belong to any such Matter, is the foretelling the Advent and Kingdom of the *Messias*, see the *Prophecy*, 1 *Sam.* ii. 9, 10. This pious Woman was but returning Thanks for the Birth of her Son, when the Spirit of God inspires her so far, that she foretells the coming of the *Messias*, and the Settlement of his Kingdom.

PROPHECY XXI. Is that containing the Judgments denounced on the House of *Eli*, *see* the Prediction, 1 *Sam.* ii. 31——36. and the Certainty of this Prediction is confirmed by God's Revelation to *Samuel*, 1 *Sam.* iii. 11, 12, 13, 14.

First, This Prophecy was fulfilled, 1 *Sam.* xxii. 18, 19. when *Doeg the Edomite* slew 85 *Priests* of this family *in one Day*. And *Nob*, that City of the Priests of this Family, smote he *with the Edge of the Sword*.

Secondly, God said there *should no more be an old Man* in *Eli*'s *House for ever*; which is very evident as long as the History of *Eli*'s Posterity is mentioned, see *Patric in loc.*

Thirdly, God threatened that *Eli* himself should live *to see the Affliction of the Tabernacle*. How much of this sad Scene *Eli* lived to see, the History will inform us, see 1 *Sam.* iv. 10, 11, 17, 18.

Fourthly, God threatened that that Man of *Eli*'s Family whom he would not immediately cut off from his Altar, but permit to officiate there the longest of all others of it, would at last be in so sad a Condition, that if he were alive at that Time, it would consume his very Eyes, and grieve his Heart to see him reduced to such a miserable State. This was fulfilled in *Abiathar the second*, whom *Solomon* put out of the Priesthood, see 1 *Kings* ii. 26, 27.

Fifthly, God threatens that for a present Sign of the Certainty of this Threatening, so far as it related to Events more remotely future, both *Eli*'s

Sons should die in one Day, which was accomplished when the Ark was taken.

Lastly, God foretells, that instead of an High Priest of the Family of *Eli*, or *Ithamar*, God would *raise himself up a faithful* High Priest, *Zadok* the Son of *Ahitub* of the Family of *Eleazar*, of whom mention is made in the History of *David* and *Solomon*, which *should do according to all that was in God's Heart*, and God *would build him a sure House, and he should walk before his anointed for ever*; that is, the Priestood should continue in that Family during all Generations, and even when the great Messiah should be their supreme and everlasting King.

Prophecy XXII. Is that made to *David* and confirmed by an Oath, that *of the Fruit of David's Loins according to the Flesh, God would raise up the Messias to sit on his Throne for ever.*

This noble Prediction has been over-looked in all the latter Ages of the *Jewish* and *Christian* Church, and by both of them interpreted in the first and literal Sense of *Solomon* only, to the Prejudice of Christianity, to the obscuring the Meaning of Scripture Prophecy, and to the perverting the Sense of the New Testament Applications. The Places wherein this Prophecy is delivered are 2 *Sam.* vii. 1 *Chron.* xvii. and *Psal.* lxxxix. And this is so evidently a Prophecy concerning the *Messias* and his everlasting Kingdom, that one would wonder it could ever have been understood otherwise: Especially when St. *Paul* quotes it to this Purpose, and proves the Dignity of our blessed Saviour from these Words of it; *I will be unto him a Father, and he shall be unto me a Son*, Heb. i. 5.

That it refers to that Kingdom of the *Messias*, which is yet future, is plain from two famous Characters of that Time here inserted. The first is that it was to belong to a Time, when *Israel should dwell in a Place of their own, and move no more.* Which cannot

cannot belong to *Solomon*, in whose Time they were not removed out of their Land; and since whose Time all the Removals and Captivities of that Nation has been. The second of these Characters is this, that the Prophecy was to belong to a Time, when the *Children of Wickedness shall afflict them no more, as in the Beginning, and as since the Time that I commanded the Judges to be over my People Israel.* Which cannot belong to the Days of *Solomon*, since whose Reign the greatest Part of their Miseries have happened to them. Besides the Kingdom foretold is no less than *seven* times asserted in this Prophecy to be *for ever.* As if God had a Mind to secure us from any Possibility of interpreting it otherwise. And this great King is not only styled the *Seed of David*, but is foretold to proceed not of *David* himself, but of *his Sons*, or later Posterity.

But before I proceed any further, I must observe, that Part of the 14th Verse of the 7th Chapter of the 2d of *Samuel* has given Occasion to object against applying these Words to the *Messias*, and the Occasion of their Application to *Solomon.* The Words are these: *If he commit Iniquity I will chastise him with the Rod of Men, and with the Stripes of the Children of Men.* Which, I agree with the Commentators, cannot be applied to the *Messiah*; but could belong to no other than *Solomon*, if the Prophecy, as it was originally delivered, contained these Words. But that this was not the primitive Reading of this Text, is plain, because the parallel Chapter in *Chronicles* intirely omits this whole Passage. And because the *Psalmist*, in that remarkable lxxxix. *Psalm* did read in his Copy quite otherwise than we do now in ours, see Verse 30——37, which Period of the *Psalmist* is plainly nothing else but a Paraphrase on this Text in *Samuel*; and by Consequence, that it is not the *Messias*, who is supposed to commit Iniquity, but either the Posterity

of

of *David* in the next Ages, or the Christian Church in the Days of the *Messiah*. And the Texts both in *Samuel* and the *Psalmist* imply, that whatever Offences these Children might be guilty of in after Ages, yet should those Offences not at all prejudice the Certainty of these inviolable Promises, concerning the firm Establishment of the *Messias* for ever. So that our Text in *Samuel*, when thus restored to its primitive Integrity from this in the *Psalmist*, is so far from an Objection against the Application of this Prophecy singly to the *Messiah*, that 'tis a plain Argument on the same Side; as implying that the Promises to this blessed Seed of *David* of an everlasting Kindgom, were absolute; whereas that made to *Solomon* and his Posterity was conditional. See 1 *Kings* ii. 3, 4. iii. 14. vi. 12, 13. viii. 25. ix. 3——9. 1 *Chron.* xxii. 10—13. xxviii. 6, 7, 8, 9. 2 *Chron.* vi. 16. vii. 17—22. *Ps.* cxxxii. 12.

As to the Objection against the Application of this Prophecy to the *Messiah*, namely, that the Person here meant was to *build an House* or Temple to *the Name of God*, and so can be no other but *Solomon*, is no Objection at all. For sure none who reads the nine last Chapters of *Ezekiel* can doubt that in the future Kingdom of the *Messiah* a most glorious Temple is to be built, under the Conduct of the *Messias*, himself; so that this Objection is only a Sign, that the modern Commentators have overlooked a great Article of the old Predictions, and so have obscured that Part of the Prophecy before us, which belongs to it.

But that no Scruple may still remain, as if all this History of *David*'s Design to build a Temple must belong to those Times, and to the Temple to be built by *Solomon*, I will shew that the present Prophecy was delivered by a quite different Person, at a quite different Season, on a different Occasion, for

a different

a different Reaſon, and containing very different Matter from that other, which is alſo not ſeldom hinted at in the ſacred Hiſtory.

1. I ſay this Prophecy before us, which I apply to the Meſſias alone, was delivered by *Nathan*. See 2 *Sam.* vii. 4, 5. 1 *Chron.* xvii. 3, 4. The other about *Solomon* was revealed to *David* himſelf. See 1 *Chron.* xxii. 8. xxviii. 2, 4.

2. This Prophecy before us was delivered ſoon after *David* was made King, and *before* his many Wars. The other at the Concluſion of his Reign, when his Wars *were over*.

3. The Occaſion of the preſent Prophecy was this: *David* had brought the Tabernacle from *Kirjathjearim*, and then from the Houſe of *Obed-edom*, and had ſet it in a Tabernacle made with Curtains in the Hill of *Zion*, upon which reflecting how indecent it was for him to dwell in a Houſe of Cedar, while the Ark remained in a poor Tent, he determined to build a Temple for it.

As to the Occaſion of the other Revelation we cannot certainly determine what it was; yet it ſeems probable to have been a little before the Birth of *Solomon*, to explain the Meaning of ſome Things in the former Revelation. For whereas God had there only ſaid, that he had never yet revealed that he had a Deſire to have a Temple during the Times of the Judges, without mentioning whether he would require ſuch a Thing, when they were ſettled under the regal Government: Now God aſſures *David* that he ſhould expect one, only forbids him to build it.

4. I ſay the Prophecy before us gives a very different Reaſon for the excuſing of the Building a Temple by *David*, from that which alone appears in the other.

Here *David* is excuſed, becauſe God had not declared his Reſolution to have a Temple in thoſe Ages;

Ages; and because his Heart was set on a more divine Temple, which should be built him in future Ages; as the Seat of a more glorious Kingdom, than that which was so lately set up in *Israel*; without the least Intimation of any particular Unfitness in *David* for that Work. In the other the Reason why *David* could not build it was his unfitness by Reason of his Wars, and his shedding so much Blood, see 1 *Chron.* xxii. 6, 7, 8. 1 *Kings* v. 3. 1 *Chron.* xxviii. 2, 3.

5. This Prophecy before us contains a Promise of building a sure and never-failing House for *David*; a Promise of one great King, whose Throne should continue throughout all Ages. And all this in the Way of an absolute and unconditional Promise confirmed to the Psalmist by the solemn Oath of God himself, to shew the Immutability of it.

The other contains a Promise that relates to *Solomon*, and assures him that he should be a peaceable Prince, that he should immediately build God a Temple, and that the Throne should be continued in his Posterity, but no longer than his Offspring should be obedient to his Laws.

These sure are Contents sufficiently different to distinguish these two different Prophecies asunder; especially since we have seen that the one Prophecy was given to *Nathan* before, the other to *David* after the Wars; *one* upon a known, the *other* an unknown Occasion; and the *one* upon one Account, the *other* entirely upon another.

So that I conclude, that this Prophecy belongs only to the *Messias*, and that St. *Paul* was in the right in applying it only to him.

The other parallel Prophecies and Quotations asserting that Christ was to be the *Son of David*, seem to be derived from this, see *Psal.* cxxxii. 11. *Isa.* ix. 7. lv. 3. *Acts* xiii. 34. xi. 1, 10. *Jer.* xxii. 5. xxxiii. 15, 17, 20, 21, 25, 26. And in

the New Teſtament Chriſt is hence every where called the *Son of David*, *Luke* i. 32, 33. *John* xii. 34. *Acts* ii. 30.

Thus far concerning this famous Prediction itſelf, and the parallel Quotations belonging to it.

I come now to the Completion; and here I ſhall have no Occaſion to ſay much, ſince all who are acquainted with the Books of the New Teſtament muſt own that this Prophecy was fulfilled in *Jeſus*: I mean ſo far of it as does not relate to Times ſtill to come. That *Jeſus* was the *Son of David*, the Genealogies left us by the Evangeliſts demonſtrate. His true Mother being of the Poſterity of *David* by his Son *Nathan*, and his reputed Father being of the ſame Poſterity by his Son *Solomon*. That he was alſo the *King of the Jews*, and at his firſt coming ſet up his Kingdom in the World, which at his ſecond coming will be glorious and everlaſting, the New Teſtament Hiſtories and Prophecies do aſſure us. But that happy Time when, by the Exaltation of this great Son of *David*, God will *reſtore again the Kingdom to Iſrael*, being not yet come, does not properly belong to my preſent Deſign.

Dr. *TURNER's*

Dr. *TURNER*'s

BOYLE's LECTURES

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THE

Wisdom of GOD

IN THE

REDEMPTION of MAN.

THE Foundation of our Religion, as it is purely Christian, is this, that the Sins of Men are not otherwise to be forgiven, nor their Souls saved, than by the Mediation of *Jesus Christ*, and by that Expiation which he has made with God for our Reconciliation.

This Doctrine the Enemies of Christianity run down, as unreasonable, and foolish, and altogether unworthy of God. They assert, *that God is not to be worshiped by a Mediator, nor Pardon of Sins and Reconciliation to be expected by a Sacrifice of Expiation and Atonement*; that these Things are *disagreeable to the Mercy of God*, and to the Freedom of his Grace, both which are essential to him as well as Justice and Vengeance. Or at most they tell us, that *Repentance is of itself a sufficient Expiation*, and to pretend that we cannot be saved but by the Redemption and Mediation of *Jesus Christ*, is, say they, as *derogatory to the Love and Compassion and Clemency of the divine Nature, as the Worship of him by an Image is to his Spirituality.*

But in answer to such Notions I will shew, that the Doctrine of Man's Redemption, and Remission of Sins, by the expiatory Sacrifice of the Blood of Christ, is neither *unnecessary* nor *unreasonable*, but

are agreeable to the Perfections of God, and manifest his Wisdom and Goodness in our Redemption.

But before I proceed, I cannot but observe, that it is highly unreasonable, that Men should dispute the Councils and Declarations of God in a well-attested Revelation. And while there stands upon a lasting Record certain Evidence of the Divinity of the Gospel, that they will not admit God to be a better Judge than Men, what is wise, and what is reasonable, and what is necessary for the Honour of his Government. If there were not sufficient Proofs of the Truth of Christianity, this I confess were a proper Place to attack it in; or if there was any Thing trifling in its Evidence, it might not be improper to alledge the Unnecessarineſs of a Doctrine, that had but little Ground of Certainty. But after the most convincing Evidence that the Nature of Things will admit, for any Man to maintain that this is unnecessary, and that absurd, even when it is expresly declared in a well-attested Revelation, is bold and impious. For if ever any Revelation could reasonably pretend to over-rule the Judgments of Men, the Gospel of Jesus Christ may justly claim this Authority over us, in that no other was ever attested like it.

I confess it is justly made one Character of every divine Revelation, that it be worthy of God and his Perfections, whatever is contrary to this Rule is a real Objection. But there is no such Repugnancy to the glorious Attributes of God in the Redemption of Men by Jesus Christ; but on the contrary, this whole evangelical Dispensation is more for the Glory of God, the Honour of his Perfections, and his wise Government, than any other whatsoever.

In order to make clear the Wisdom of God in the Redemption of Man by Jesus Christ, it will be necessary to consider,

I. What was the primitive State of Mankind before the Fall.

II. What

II. What is the true Condition of our lapsed State, from whence the Want of a Saviour, and the Necessity of Redemption arises. And then,

III. To shew how much better the Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, and Holiness of God are display'd in this Method of Reconciliation and Salvation for Sinners, which the Gospel exhibits, than any other that Mankind can pretend to the Knowledge of.

I. What was the primitive State of Man before the Fall.

The primitive State of Man I take to be this: That as we were then put into a State of Perfection, both as to Innocency, and Happiness, both as to Righteousness, and Immortality, so it was the Covenant of God with us, to make our Happiness and Immortality the Reward of our Righteousness, and to establish us in the one, upon Condition of our Perseverance in the other, and not otherwise. That as long as we were entirely innocent, we might be compleatly happy and immortal; but upon our first Transgression we were to lose our Happiness, and become mortal; and never to be entitled to perfect Felicity and Immortality again, 'till we could in some reasonable Way of Righteousness be restored to that original State of Holiness from which we fell. And this I shall prove,

1. From the Authority of Scripture.

2. By accounting for the Reasonableness of such a Covenant, and the Necessity of such a Dispensation.

1. From the Authority of Scripture.

Gen. ii. 17. *Of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil thou shalt not eat; for in the Day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.* In which Sentence taken together with the Context there are two Things certainly implied.

1. That so long as Man preserved his Innocence, so long he should be immortal, and have the Blessings he enjoy'd continued to him.

2. That upon his Disobedience he was to become obnoxious to Misery, and die.

There are I confess two Things objected against these two Conclusions.

First, 'Tis said (see *Episcop. Inst. lib.* 1. *c.* 10.) that the Scripture which denounceth Death to *Adam*'s Sin, makes no Mention of any Promise of Immortality to Obedience. Whereas in Truth the very Denunciation of Death to Man's Transgression, implies a Promise of Immortality, if he had not sinned. For as in the general Promises of God there is always a Condition intended, though not mentioned, so also in his Threats, 'tis always supposed, that by avoiding the Iniquities, to which Vengeance is denounced, the Evils threatened may be escaped.

2. The *second* Objection is this, that as Man had originally no express Promise of Immortality, so he had no natural Right to it, but was mortal by Nature, and *might*, and must have died, tho' he had never sinned. That Man had no natural Right to an immortal State is true; but if Man had no natural Right to Immortality, yet God in threatening Death as the Punishment of Sin, must in that very Denunciation be supposed implicitly to covenant, that by not sinning he should live for ever, and have his Felicities eternal. This is the Nature of all Laws that have Rewards and Punishments annexed. The Reason of all such Laws import an Exemption from the Calamity threatened, if the Transgression be not committed.

We must then conclude, that if Man had never sinned, he had never died, never had been miserable; but that Immortality and Happiness were by that Law declared to be the Reward and Recompence of his Holiness. But,

2. The Truth of this is confirmed from the Scripture History of the Execution of that Law. The same Scripture that tells us that God instituted such a Law,

a Law, tells us also, that upon Man's first Transgression of it, he became obnoxious to Misery and Death. And the Event abundantly confirms this Interpretation: For *Adam* had no sooner transgressed, but Misery and Mortality came upon him.

But because some Men do ridicule the Books of *Moses*, and have not a just Regard to the Authority of any divine Revelation, I proposed,

2. To account for the Reasonableness of such a Covenant, and the Credibility of such a Revelation. To which End let it be considered,

1. That *Good* and *Evil* are essentially different; otherwise 'tis the same to worship God, or to blaspheme him, to love, or murder our Neighbour, to defile, or keep yourself pure. And if there be an essential Difference between *Good* and *Evil*, from hence it appears,

2. That an holy God cannot but command what is *Good*, and forbid what is *Evil*; and consequently that his original Covenant with Mankind had its Foundation in the unchangeable Nature and eternal Reason of Things.

Here I cannot but observe, that the absolute and essential Holiness of God, which is to him a Rule in all his Dispensations, was the great Reason of all his Laws against Sin. Such a Reason as did not leave it indifferent to him, whether he would forbid it or not: But such a one as may not improperly be called an Obligation to do all that Laws, and Precepts, and Commands, and Threatenings, could do to prevent it. This is no more than what was necessary for a righteous and a holy God to do. The Holiness of God consists in a natural and essential Love of Virtue, and a natural and essential Abhorrence of Vice.

A holy God must love the one and hate the other, promote the one and prevent the other; and therefore I do not see how a Being so perfectly pure,

could sufficiently attest his Abhorrence of all Sin, and especially in the Government of free Agents, without the strictest Laws against it, backed with the severest Threatenings. The want of either would look like Indifference, either in the Things themselves, or in the Will of the Governour.

And as these Considerations shew how necessary it was that God should command Virtue and forbid Vice, we may add,

3. That the advantageous Condition of Mankind in our original State, vindicated God in requiring an Obedience to the utmost Degree of Perfection. *God made Man after his own Image*, by a larger Communication of Wisdom and Knowledge, and spiritual Power, than what any Man now enjoys. For if Man had been made with invincible Infirmities, and a natural Incapacity of avoiding all the Evil that was forbid, and doing all the Good that was commanded, as we now are, this would throw all the Guilt of his Transgression upon his Maker.

As therefore 'tis certain that God made Man perfect, and endued him with a Power to preserve his Innocency, so those Powers speak out plainly what God intended by them, *viz.* to preserve by them that Perfection of Righteousness, in which he was created. And if all these Things together made it reasonable that God should forbid all Manner of Sin, under the severest Penalties, it cannot be denied, but that

4. The Execution of such a Law, by inflicting the Punishment denounced, was as necessary as the enacting it. And that in these two Respects.

1. With Respect to God. It is evidently of the greatest Moment to Mankind, in order to the Prevention of Sin, to have right Notions and worthy Apprehensions of the perfect Purity and Holiness of that God, who has forbid it, and of the Justice and Greatness of his Displeasure upon the Commission of it.

But

But I do not see how such a Sense of that perfect Holiness of God could be possibly kept up without some such Law. In that Men universally have their Notions of the Deity agreeable to the Commands they receive from him; and to the Discoveries he makes of his Approbation, or Displeasure in the Rewards and Punishments that are annex'd to them. And therefore,

2. Such an Institution was of great Use in the very Discoveries that are made therein, how much Man's Happiness depended on his Innocency, and of the miserable Fruits that must follow his Transgressions. And nothing less could seem sufficient to convince Mankind, that God was in Earnest in his Declarations against Sin, and thereby to make them serious in their Care to avoid it. And therefore the extraordinary Rigour of such a Covenant, was very agreeable to the absolute Holiness of God, and in some Sense necessary, considering his hearty Desires to prevent Man's falling into Sin, which a less severe Establishment would have less Influence to prevent.

Thus we see, that by a Law as old as the Creation, founded on the Purity and Holiness of God, and on the eternal Difference between Good and Evil, a State of Sin, and a State of Happiness are absolutely incompatible, and a Sinner can never be immortal, and eternally happy, until he can be restored to a State of Righteousness and Holiness. And this brings us to the

II. Second Thing to be considered, the Condition of Mankind in our lapsed, fallen State. What the Miseries and Calamities of it are, whereby we want a Redeemer to make our Peace, and a Saviour to deliver us.

And here I have in some Measure prevented my self, in that I have shewed you already,

1. That as the Perfection of our Happiness and

Immortality depended absolutely on our perfect Innocence and Righteousness, so with Sin necessarily entered Misery and Death. Thus the Transgression of our first Parents made the whole Race of Mankind miserable and mortal.

Some indeed object, that it is scarce Righteous in God thus to punish the whole Race of Mankind for the Sin of one single Man. And there had been some Pretence for such a Plea, if we had had, not a Covenant, but a natural Right to Immortality. And Death might have been looked upon as a Debt of Nature had it not been expresly threatened as the Punishment of Sin. But when Mankind appears to have no rightful Claim to Immortality, otherwise, than as in a State of perfect Innocency, it does not impeach God's Righteousness, to withdraw those Favours in a State of Sin, which were promised only to recompense a State of Righteousness.

2. As we thus become miserable and mortal, so likewise are we to continue such, as long as we continue in a State of Sin. And so as that we can never be restored to a Perfection of immortal Happiness, until we can be restored to such a Perfection of Obedience and Righteousness, as that from which we fell. For if God did decree that Immortality should only be the Reward of a Perfection of Holiness, such a Law demonstrates, that a State of Sin and Immortality are incompatible; and the Incompatibility of such a State as plainly demonstrates, that there is no Possibility of recovering our lost Happiness, 'till we can be restored to our original Righteousness. Which Consideration ought to be remembered, since we must add,

3. That as the Necessity of all this proceeded from the indispensable Obligations of that first Law, and the eternal Reasons on which it was founded; so the Restitution of Mankind to their original State

was

was not reasonably to be expected, but in such a Way, and on such Conditions, as are consistent with the Ends and Reasons, and Principles of that first Covenant, *viz.* the Holiness of God's Attributes, the Wisdom of his Government, and the inviolable Authority of his Laws and Constitutions. If the Obligations and Authority of the first Covenant had been such as might be dispensed with, then the Necessity of our Redemption by the Blood of Christ, and by a new Covenant of Grace in him, could not be so easily and reasonably defended, as it now may. But if the Obligations of that first Covenant be irrefragable, the Consequence is plain; no Restitution of Mankind, but in such a Way as consists with the Ends and Reasons, and Obligations of that Law. And this makes me think the Honour of God, and the Authority of his Laws, and especially of that most solemn Covenant, very much concerned in the Conditions upon which we are to hope for eternal Happiness; so upon the most serious Examination, I cannot find those wise Reasons and good Ends so well served in any other Way and Method of Pardon and Salvation, as in that of our Redemption by the blessed Son of God. And this brings me to the

III. Third general Head, *viz.* to shew how much better the Wisdom, Justice, Goodness, and Holiness of God are display'd in this Method of Salvation, which the Gospel teaches, than in any other Way that Mankind has Knowledge of. This I will endeavour to do, by enquiring,

1. Into the great Unreasonableness and Insufficiency of those other Methods, which the Enemies of Christianity mention and insist on. And then by shewing,

2. How all that either the Reasons or the Authority of that first Law seem to require, is much better performed, and more amply fulfilled by Jesus Christ,

Christ, and by the Reconciliation published in his Gospel.

1. The great Unreasonableness and Insufficiency of those other Methods, that are mentioned and insisted on by our Enemies. And they, I think, are these two.

1. That God by Vertue of his supreme Power has a Right of suspending and relaxing the Execution of his own Laws; and by that Right may pardon Sin, if he pleases, without any Expiation at all. Or,

2. That if this be not satisfactory, yet the sincere Repentance of the Sinner, is of *itself a sufficient Expiation.*

1. The first Plea is, that God by his sovereign Dominion has an undoubted Right of suspending and superseding the Execution of his own Laws, and by that Right may pardon Sin, if he pleases, without any Expiation, which we do not deny: But the Question is, whether it be equally for God's Honour, equally agreeable to the Wisdom of his Government, and the Reason of his Laws; to the Holiness of his Nature, and the solemn Sanction of his Covenants, to be reconciled to Sinners by a mere arbitrarious Remission and Pardon, and without any previous Conditions at all, as by that Expiation and Atonement which the Gospel preaches. But that this is not so, will appear from a Consideration of these three Things.

1. Such an arbitrary Remission of Sins is disagreeable to the eternal Reason, and unchangeable Authority and Obligation of that first Law, which made Death and Misery the Punishment of Sin, and Immortality incompatible with a State of Sin. Establishments that are arbitrariously ordered, may, I confess, be as arbitrariously repealed by the Lawgiver. But when the Nature of Things is fixt, and the Reason of Laws unchangeable, as founded on the

the unchangeable Nature and Perfections of God, there the Obligation of the Laws become immutable. Such, I think, was the Nature of God's first Covenant with Man. By the indispensable Obligation of which, we all become miserable and mortal. Indeed as far as can consist with the Reasons and Authority of his Laws, God is willing to be good to Mankind, but beyond this he cannot in Wisdom go; nor is it reasonable he should.

Secondly, An arbitrary Remission is absurd, and is followed by many bad Consequences. As

1. It affords, if it be allowed, a very plausible and dangerous Objection against the Necessity of a future Judgment and a future State. If we look no further than to God's sovereign Dominion and Right, he has certainly the same Power to pardon one Sin as another, and by Consequence the same Right to pardon all Sins, that he has to pardon any. And if we suppose it not unreasonable for God by his uncontroulable Authority to exercise such a Right; what is this, but at the same Time to suppose, that after all the Solemnity of his divine Laws, he may righteously reverse them all? But what Reason then can there be for a future Judgment? Or what Necessity is there of calling Men to Account? All the Necessity of it arises from the essential Difference between Good and Evil, and the indispensable Necessity of Rewards and Punishments consequent thereon. But if the Punishment of Sin be only a Matter of arbitrary Right and not of natural Justice, there can be no real and essential Difference between Good and Evil, nor any Necessity of future Rewards and Punishments. But if the Justice of God consists *in rendering to every Man according his Works*, it makes the Punishment of Sinners as necessary as the Rewards of the Righteous. And how this Necessity, and an arbitrary Recession from his Right in pardoning Sinners without

out any Satisfaction can consist together, I cannot discover.

God may indeed judge Men if he pleases, say they, or he may let it alone. And then a future Judgment is not necessary. And yet if there be no Necessity of a future Judgment, there is no Necessity of a future State: And so all our best moral Arguments for that also lose their Force.

Thus we see that the Notion of God's pardoning all Sins by an arbitrary Exercise of his sovereign Right destroys all real Necessity of God's final Judgment.

2. This Notion of an arbitrary Remission can never be reconciled with the Necessity of Holiness in Men.

For by what Arguments shall we make this Necessity appear, if we throw up the Obligation to it, which arises from the eternal Reasons of those Laws, which enjoined it. Shall we say that God has made Virtue and Justice necessary by the Laws of Nature and Revelation? But what if Mankind grows negligent of these Obligations? God, it seems, may pass by this Contempt, if he will, and is under no necessary Obligations in Wisdom, Holiness, or Justice, to do otherwise.

If this were allowed, all Sinners might live in great Hopes of Impunity; and more might be said for pardoning, than for punishing them. For God's natural Goodness to, and Love for his Creatures, will doubtless incline him to Mercy, where he is not under some strong Obligations to the contrary. And this Love would be a better Reason for the Pardon of all Sin, than what can be brought for the Punishment of any, if all depended on his Will; for we cannot suppose that a God of Mercy and Love will ever condemn Man to Misery, whom he may with equal Justice forgive. And if there be nothing in the Reason of Things, and the unchangeable

changeable Principles of Justice, that makes the Punishment of Sinners necessary, the Love of God to Mankind will make the Pardon of all Sins reasonable. And what Trifles then are God's Laws, if we may break them with Impunity; and who would torment himself in the ungrateful Severities of true Repentance, and be at the Trouble to mortify his Lusts, which he may safely indulge? And yet it must be so, if all depends wholly on God's arbitrary Exercise of his sovereign Power. For though it be said, that he may punish justly, if he will, yet we can have no just Reason to believe, that a compassionate God ever will destroy those Creatures whom he may with equal Reason, Justice and Wisdom save.

If therefore 'tis no Dishonour to God to pardon Sinners arbitrarily, Repentance and Holiness cannot be necessary, in that God may save Men without them if he will.

If then these Consequences destroy all the Necessity of Virtue and a good Life, let the World judge, which is most for God's Glory, to found the Punishment of Sinners on the arbitrary Exercise of supreme Dominion, so as to make it unnecessary to be inflicted; or on the eternal Reason and Difference of Things, which makes the Misery of the Sinner not only just, but reasonable and necessary too. Which Opinion is best, that, which destroys the Necessity of Religion, or that, which establishes it. But,

3. Such an arbitrary Remission of Sins must be dishonourable to the Holiness of God. For where is the Wisdom of enacting such Laws as there are no fixt Reasons, or necessary Obligations of ever putting in Execution? Or what can be a greater Blemish to his Holiness, than to supersede the Necessity of both Virtue and Religion? What Indication can Men and Angels have of his spotless Puri-

ty, if there be no certain Evidence of his Displeasure against Sin? And what Evidence can there be of his Displeasure against Sin, if it were agreeable to Reason and Justice to expect from him, an universal Pardon by this meer arbitrarious receding from his Right? But

4. To pardon by a meer arbitrary Exercise of Dominion and Right, has also this very great Evil in it; that it finally resolves all the Reason of the Salvation and Damnation of Men into the meer arbitrary Will, and despotic Power of God; which is what these Men will not admit of.

For what is the Reason why one Man is saved, and another damned? It must be according to them, only because in one, God will recede from his Right, and exercise an arbitrary Power in pardoning Sin, and in the other he will not. But you will say, the one repents, and the other does not. What then? Has not God, whose Dominion is universal, a Right to pardon the Impenitent, as well as the Penitent, if he thinks fit? But you will say, that the want of Repentance makes it unfit for him to pardon him. If it does, then we see, that an unconditionate Pardon by a meer Exercise of Dominion is not reasonable. But why does the want of Repentance make it unreasonable for God to pardon Sinners? It is only because he thinks himself in Justice concerned to expect some such Conditions of Reconciliation, as may make the Pardon consistent with the Honour of his Attributes and Laws, which a meer arbitrary Remission is not. Grant me this, and then we are only to consider what those Conditions are. But if you place all in the despotic Will of God, he has the same Right to pardon the Impenitent as the Penitent. And if God may justly exercise that Right out of meer Pleasure, he may, if he will, do so to the Impenitent, as well as to him that repents. So that in

short

ſhort you muſt either come to ſuch fixt Rules of Righteouſneſs, as make it inconſiſtent with God's Honour to recede from them, and this is to make arbitrary Remiſſion unreaſonable and unrighteous; or elſe you muſt reſolve all into ſuch meer Exerciſe of ſovereign Dominion and Power, as may extend to the impenitent as well as to him that repents. And if ſuch an arbitrary Exerciſe of Power were not unreaſonable, God would be under no Obligations to puniſh either; and then the only Reaſon why any Man is ſaved, or condemned, would be this only, God would have it ſo. And this looks too much like Cruelty to be imputed to a gracious and merciful God, whoſe Love for Mankind is ſo infinitely great, that nothing but the Neceſſity of Vengeance to vindicate the Honour of his Juſtice, and Holineſs, and the Wiſdom and Authority of his Government, and the eternal Reaſons and Obligations of his Covenant makes him afflict them for their Sins.

Theſe then are ſome of the abſurd Conſequences of pleading for an arbitrary Remiſſion of Sins; and I cannot but draw this one Concluſion, *viz.*

That one great Reaſon of God's dealing with us in ſuch a Method, as our Religion ſets forth, was to make us ſenſible, that he does nothing arbitrarily in the Buſineſs of our Salvation. He is ſollicitous to invite us to be happy on ſuch Conditions as are agreeable to the fixt Rules of Juſtice and Holineſs. That to this End he has entered into Covenants, that require no more than what the Holineſs of his Nature, and the eternal Reaſon of his Laws, have made neceſſary.

That the ſacred Authority of ſuch ſolemn Sanctions he will not ſuperſede: That therefore, if we are ſtill wicked, we muſt blame our ſelves; his Rules of Juſtice are fixt, according to which we muſt have our final Sentence. He will not break

through them by any Exercise of arbitrary Power, whether it be to save, or to destroy us. But

Thirdly, Besides the unreasonableness of such an arbitrary Remission, we should consider also, on what mistaken Notions this Opinion is built. And here, all they, who favour such a Doctrine, consider Justice to be nothing else but not doing wrong. For though they define it to be *a rendering to every one their due*, yet Punishment and Misery are not so due, as that it would be an Injury to the Offender to forbear inflicting them. For nothing is accounted injurious to any Man, that is to his Advantage. So although inflicting Punishment is due on God's Part, if he will; yet, as they plead, *God may recede from his own Right*, whenever he pleases. And if he does, this, say they, is not unjust, because 'tis only passing by his own Right, and is no wrong to the Offender; and if he may thus forgive Sins to any, without doing them any Wrong, his punishing, or his pardoning depends wholly on his arbitrary Will. He may punish, if he will, because the Sinner has deserved it; and, say they, he may pardon, if he will, and that without either Condition or Atonement, because in so doing he does no wrong.

This is the Sum of their arguing; and I own, that God in receding from his Right is not guilty of any Injustice to the Sinner so forgiven. But here's the Weakness of the Conclusion drawn from their Scheme, that God is considered only with respect to his Dominion; whereas in this Case he ought rather to be considered as a holy God, and as the righteous Governour and Judge of the Universe; and with Regard not to his Dominion and Right only, but with Respect to the Purity of his divine Nature, the Wisdom of his Government, and the Reason and Authority of his Laws, and an equitable, and righteous Judicature between all his reasonable Creatures.

Creatures. In that, if in the final Judgment, he ſhould be ſuppoſed to act againſt any of theſe, it will be as much a Blemiſh to his Attributes, as if he acted againſt the Right of any of his Creatures; for they are both alike inconſiſtent with his divine Attributes. Therefore there is in God a two-fold Juſtice; the one is called *univerſal*, which is nothing elſe than the univerſal Rectitude of his Nature, by which he can do nothing inconſiſtent with his divine Perfections. The other is called *particular*, by which God ties himſelf to do nothing contrary to a natural or covenanted Right, which he has granted to his Creatures. Now though the ſuperſeding the Obligation, Authority, and Execution of his Laws is not unjuſt in this latter Senſe, yet it is in the former. 'Tis no Wrong to his Creatures, but 'tis a Diſhonour to himſelf. And here lies the ſame Fallacy of our Adverſaries Pretence. If we conſider God as a righteous Judge and King, 'tis not enough that he does no Wrong to Offenders; this Juſtice conſiſts in both rewarding the Righteous and puniſhing the Wicked. And this is indeed that Righteouſneſs of God in this Queſtion to be conſidered.

I come now to the

II. The ſecond general Pretence of the Enemies of Chriſtianity, *viz.* that if an arbitrary Remiſſion of Sins be unreaſonable, if ſomething of Atonement be neceſſary, yet Repentance alone is a ſufficient Atonement to prevail with God to pardon us.

But I will ſhew you in anſwer to this, that Repentance alone cannot be a ſufficient Atonement for Sins committed againſt God. And to this End we muſt conſider,

1. What is meant by Expiation of Sins, and Satisfaction to the Juſtice of God for them. And then we ſhall ſee,

2. Whether Repentance alone can and does anſwer all the Ends and Purpoſes of it.

1. What is meant by Expiation of Sin, and Satisfaction to the Justice of God for them.

Some have the same Notion of satisfying for Sins, that they have of paying of debts; upon payment of which there is nothing more to be demanded: Nor any Place left for free Grace, and Mercy in Forgiveness. Others look upon this Satisfaction, as the only Motive to Mercy; and thereupon think it absurd, that an offended Person should *appoint a Mediator to himself, which shews him to be reconciled before-hand.*

These and many more Absurdities have been charged upon the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction, only through want of understanding what the true Evangelical Satisfaction is. To the clearing of this Matter therefore it will be necessary,

I. That we rightly explain the true Notion of Satisfaction, or Atonement in general.

II. That we shew from whence the Necessity of it, with Respect to God, arises.

III. To what End it is intended.

IV. What is necessary to answer all that End.

V. To consider how it solves all Objections about and against this Doctrine.

I. We should state the true Notion of Satisfaction, and explain what is meant by Atonement.

By Satisfaction is meant, offering the offended Person such Conditions as he may reasonably expect, in order to a Pardon of Offence. And he that offers such Conditions, upon the Acceptance of them, may be said to have satisfied for his offence. And this Atonement imports, that the Sinner is exempt from suffering the Punishment, that was due unto him. Thus by satisfying the Justice of God for Sins, no more is intended, than Offering such Conditions, in order to the Pardon of Mankind, as may be worthy of his Acceptance. What those Conditions ought to be shall be considered by and by.

II. As

II. As to the Neceſſity of ſuch Expiation, it ariſes wholly from the unchangeable Reaſons and Authority of God's Laws; and the irreverſible Obligations that the Sinner is thereby under to ſuffer Puniſhment for his Sin. For if there was no obligatory Reaſon or Neceſſity of Puniſhment, there would, I think, be no obligatory Reaſon or Neceſſity of Satisfaction.

So that the very Suppoſition of any neceſſary Satisfaction is inconſiſtent with an arbitrary Remiſſion, in that it ſuppoſes the Neceſſity of the punitive or vindictive Juſtice of God, ariſing from the unchangeable Reaſons and irreverſible Obligations of his divine Sanctions and Laws; which if they could in Reaſon and Juſtice, and conſiſtently with the Holineſs of God, be vacated, I cannot ſee how any Satisfaction could then be neceſſary.

The Neceſſity then of an Atonement ſuppoſes the Neceſſity of Puniſhment; and the indiſpenſable Neceſſity of puniſhing Sin, and of inflicting the particular Puniſhment denounced by any Law againſt it, ariſes from the obligatory Authority of that Law, and from the eternal Reaſons on which it was founded. Where the original Principles of a Law are everlaſting and unchangeable, there the Obligation of the Law muſt needs be indiſpenſable. As therefore the Reaſon of all God's Laws againſt Sin had their Original from the Holineſs of his Nature, and were intended to his Honour in atteſting his Hatred of it, and his Deſire to prevent it; the Execution of ſuch Laws muſt be as neceſſary as the enacting them. For the End of threatening Puniſhment was to deter Men from tranſgreſſing the Law, and to let them ſee that God was diſpleaſed with it. It had Regard to God's Honour, who in his eſſential Holineſs was ſolicitous to prevent Iniquity, as well as to man, who was to be reſtrained from it.

And therefore in a Law which is thus founded in the Perfections and Attributes of God, some kind of Execution of the Vengeance threatened becomes as sacred and inviolable, as any other part of the divine Sanction. And thereby the Punishment of Sin is as necessarily required to vindicate the Honour and Harmony of God's Perfections, as the forbiding it. There being no other Way of making known his Hatred of it, but by the Severity of that Vengeance he shall execute against it. And therefore when he had denounced Misery and Death against Sinners, it was necessary that the Punishments threatened should be inflicted, and no Deliverance granted to Mankind but upon such Conditions as God's Wisdom should think equivalent to the Punishment of Sin. This is what we call Satisfaction, the Necessity of which proceeds from the original Reason and Authority of God's Laws, and the Obligations that from thence arise to the Punishment of Sin. The Consideration of which will help us to discover,

III. What are the Ends to which such Satisfaction and Atonement are directed. Now the Ends must be to consult the Honour and Glory of God in the Conditions of the Salvation and Deliverance of the Sinner. All such Satisfaction supposes the Misery of the Sinner without it. Thus the whole of the Gospel Satisfaction speaks out. With Respect to Man therefore, the great End of such Atonement is our Salvation, which without such a Satisfaction, would not be effected. This is the true Intention of the Satisfaction made by the Blood of *Jesus*, viz. *that he might deliver us from the Wrath to come.* And this was sufficiently prefigured by all the Sacrifices under the Law of *Moses*. The true Meaning of which, was no more than such Satisfaction to the Vengeance or punitive Justice of God, as might make Way for Pardon to Offenders.

But

But with Respect to God, and the Reasons and Conditions on which this Deliverance is exhibited, the true End of such Satisfaction is, to consult the Honour of the offended Party, as well as the Safety of the Offenders. That the Mercy exhibited may be no Blemish to the Glory of the divine Perfections, nor derogate from the just Authority, nor violate the eternal Reason of his Laws. What comes not up to all this cannot justly be called Satisfaction. From what has been said upon this Head, we may discover the better,

IV. What it is that seems necessary to make up such Satisfaction, as seems necessarily to be required.

1. The first Thing necessary to such an Atonement must be such a Severity of Punishment antecedent to our Pardon, as shall sufficiently attest to Men and Angels, that God's Holiness is absolute, and his Hatred of Sin real; and this made it necessary for God, when Man had sinned, to bring Mortality upon him for his Sin. And if what happened under the first Covenant was, as we have Reason to believe, for our Example, and to instruct us what is to be expected under the second; we are from hence taught, that no Pardon is to be expected without such Severity of Punishment, as by bearing Witness to the Holiness of God and his Hatred of Sin, may both consult his Honour, and keep up the Authority of his Laws against it. But

2. There can be no Expiation without the Death of the Expiator. It is true, according to the Law of *Moses*, in which there was no legal Purgation of Uncleanness, without some Sacrifice of Atonement: But it's more especially true of that mysterious Administration of God in the Salvation of sinful Man, of which the *Mosaic* Law was only a Type. It's true in the Decrees and Purposes of God in his Mercies to Men, founded on the eternal Reason of Things, that without Death, by which God made

known the Greatness of his Displeasure, no Pardon is to be expected. This was the very Thing that God by the original Institution of Sacrifices intended to possess Men with a Sense of, and to prepare them by this Means for the Doctrine of Christ, and to make them sensible that there could be no Expiation of Sin without the Blood and Death of him that should undertake to expiate it.

3. Tho' this shews the Necessity of a Sacrifice of Expiation in order to our Pardon, yet it shews too, that the Blood of Beasts is insufficient to atone for Sin, *Heb.* x. 4. They were only so many Types of that meritorious Expiation made by the Blood of *Jesus*; and the Remission of Sins thereby obtained, was only a typical Remission which exempted them from the Curses and Penalties threatened by their Law; which brings me,

V. To confirm this Account by considering how it solves the Objections that have been made against the meritorious Expiation of the Death of Christ for the Remission of Sins. As for Example,

1. The Reason of this Expiation of Sins and Satisfaction to the Justice of God, is not, as our modern Infidels assert, to incite God's Piety, but to consult his Honour in shewing Mercy. And in this Distinction rightly understood, we shall see the Weakness of this Charge against the Doctrine of our Redemption. *viz.* That *to suppose the offended God to appoint the Mediator, is to shew that he was reconciled to Sinners before, and consequently destroys all the Necessity of such Mediation*, which is a meer Fallacy drawn from a palpable Mistake in the End, Reason, and Business of Mediation and Satisfaction for Sins before God. The true Purpose and Reason of which is not from a Want of natural Pity, except when thus moved by Atonement, but only to make Way for such an Exercise of Pity as may be for his Honour, and consist with the Authority of his

his Laws, and evince the essential Holiness of his Nature. Were God an ill-natured Being, and for this Reason would do nothing but what the importunate Intercession of a powerful Mediator extorted from him, the Objection might have some place.

But this is not our Case, and consequently does not affect the Mediation with God by *Jesus Christ*, which is not to move Compassion in him; but the great End of this Christian Mediation, is to make Way for such an Exercise of Mercy towards Sinners, as may be to the Glory of God, consistent with the Rectitude of the divine Nature, and no Blemish to the Harmony of his divine Perfections.

And tho' we own that God himself appointed this Mediator, yet this is not inconsistent with the Necessity of such Mediation: In that it is not inconsistent for a Person who inclines to be merciful, to exhibit that Mercy in such a Way, as may be for his Honour, and vindicate the Character of his Goodness, and the Wisdom of his Conduct. And this is what the Satisfaction for Sins by Jesus Christ seems chiefly to aim at.

2. The true Reason and Purpose of Mediation and Satisfaction being rightly understood, shews that it is no ways inconsistent with the free Grace of God in the gratuitous Remission of Sins. For in Compensation of our rude Affronts and Injuries, God has not received either from us, or from our Redeemer any such Balance, or equivalent Recompence or Advantage, as can make our Salvation a Debt unto us; but only such an Expiation of Sin, such Satisfaction to his Justice, as may make the free Exercise of his Grace in the Remission of it, without Blemish. I may add,

3. That tho' this Account of the Nature and Necessity of a Sacrifice and Atonement establishes a natural, essential, vindictive Justice in God, yet not such a one as savours of Revenge; but only such a

one as is not easily to be denied, unless we will resolve all the Necessity of punishing Sin into the meer arbitrary Will of the Almighty. And yet there is no one Thing which the Christian Doctrine of Redemption tends more naturally to confute. It convinces us, that God does nothing in the Salvation of Men, but according to the fixt Laws of Righteousness. Nor is there any other vindictive Righteousness and Justice, than what seems necessary to attest the essential Holiness of God, and this is agreeable to our natural Notion of the Nature and Necessity of Atonement. It is what comes in the stead of Punishment, so to attest God's Hatred of Sin, as to make his Mercy in the Pardon of it, consistent with his universal Righteousness and Justice; and thereby to keep up in the Minds of Men all lively Apprehensions of the Purity and Holiness of his Nature, of the lasting Obligations of his Covenants and Decrees, of the Wisdom of his Government, and the unchangeable Authority of his Laws. And thus I come directly to,

II. The second Pretence of the Adversaries of Christianity; *viz.* That if any Expiation of Sin be required, Repentance alone is it.

Which, if true, destroys at one Blow the Necessity of our Redemption by the Death of Christ, and the Wisdom of God in that mysterious Dispensation.

But that Repentance cannot expiate for all the Sins that are committed against an Infinite God, I shall endeavour to shew by these four following Considerations.

I. By shewing how disagreeable this Principle is to the Thoughts and Sentiments of our Adversaries, and to the Notions which they have delivered on other Occasions.

II. How contrary this is to the received Opinions of Mankind, as to Offences committed against all human Laws.

III. How

III. How disagreeable to the Discoveries that God has made of his Sentiments in this Affair. From all which it will appear,

IV. That Repentance alone has very little of the true Nature of Expiation and Atonement in it.

I. This Principle is disagreeable to the Sentiments of our Adversaries on other Occasions.

Among their other bitter Invectives against the Scripture, one is, that it has spoken of *David* as a *Man after God's own Heart*, who is recorded to have been guilty of Adultery and Murder. But if Repentance alone is, as they pretend, a sufficient Expiation of Guilt, why should it not be not consistent enough with this Character of a Man, who is recorded to have acted right in his habitual Conversation, save in the Matter of *Uriah*, and in that to have shewn a very hearty Repentance, by the best Evidence of an upright Heart that can be given; that of a devout Conversation all his Days after it.

But our present Business is not so much the Vindication of *David*'s Character, as to shew the Inconsistency of these Men.

They plead, when they would undervalue the inspired Writers, that Repentance is not sufficient to take off the Blemish of two single Transgressions in the Life of a Man, who was otherwise good; and yet when the Reasons of a Mediator, and an expiatory Sacrifice are to be called in Question by them, then that very Repentance, which before could not wipe off the Stain of two single Sins among Men, shall now be pleaded sufficient in itself alone to satisfy the Vengeance of a righteous God for all the vilest Iniquities of the most profane Transgressors. But

2. This Principle is contrary to the received Opinion of Mankind, as to Offences committed against all human Laws.

If true Repentance will be admitted as of sufficient

ent Force to remove the Guilt of all Transgressions committed against the Laws of Men, then by a clear Consequence, it would be unreasonable, that any Criminal should be punished, if it could be proved that he heartily repented. And what fine Work would this Notion soon make in all Countries, if it was once received? It would entitle every Offender that could give sufficient Evidence of his sincere Contrition to a Pardon, and thereby either defeat all human Laws and Penalties in such Cases, or else make the Execution of them Injustice and Cruelty.

And how will Men answer for the result of such Doctrines? How will they reconcile the Sufficiency of Repentance to expiate Sin before God, with the Justice of punishing penitent Criminals among Men? If their Conversion takes not away their Guilt, it cannot expiate; and if it does, why should the guiltless be put to Death? If they say, that the Sincerity of their Repentance cannot be known, and therefore must not be taken Notice of, for fear they should dissemble; I could answer, why should a Man that has all the Appearance of having satisfied for his Offence, and fully expiated the Guilt of it, be put to Death? What Reason then can be given, that a relenting Offender should suffer the Penalty of Death from Men? I know our Adversaries will answer, that however their Tears may avail with God in another World, yet in this World Punishments are necessary to the Terror of Evil-Doers, and to the Preservation of ourselves by the Prevention of Sinners. But then, I pray, has not God his Ends of Government to serve? Are not the Manifestation of the Holiness of his Nature, and of his Justice, and the Reasons and Authority of his Laws such Motives to the Punishment of Sin, as are eternally to be regarded, and will have Place at the last Judgment of the World, even when the Prevention of

Sin

Sin will be too late? Let these Men then account if they can, how Repentance alone, which cannot so satisfy the Justice of human Laws, as to clear the Offender, should be thought yet sufficient to appease the Justice of an offended God. But farther yet,

III. See the Sentiments of Almighty God as to this Matter.

For had there been any Sufficiency in Repentance alone to atone for Sin, why should not its Influence be seen as well in expiating the Sin of *Adam*, as of any of his Posterity? And thereby avail as effectually to the preventing of Death both in him and all his Posterity, as in delivering us from it? Why should it not as reasonably avail to the preventing our dying at all? For when the Guilt of Sin is so sufficiently expiated, and the Reasons of the Law and the Authority of the Law-giver so answered by Repentance, as that there is no further Necessity of the Execution of that Law, why should the Punishment any longer be inflicted? The only Account I can give, is, that Repentance alone is not a sufficient Satisfaction to the violated Authority of his Laws, but that a just Vindication of his Honour and Holiness does also require the Punishment of Sin, according to the Tenor of his Covenants.

And this may instruct us how it comes to pass after so perfect an Expiation as *Jesus* has made for us, that we are not yet allowed to be exempted from Death. The Reason of which is, that no true Satisfaction can be made for the Transgressions of the first Covenant, but by first suffering the Penalties threatened by it; which, if Repentance alone could have expiated, had not been necessary. And much less then can we now believe that Repentance alone should expiate the malicious Transgressions of Men obstinately wicked, only because they profess themselves contrite at last. No, if the Violation of the first Covenant required a Mediator, and Satisfacti-

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on to the divine Justice to expiate the Sin of *Adam*, the obstinate Iniquities of most other Men do much more require it. And when God did not pardon the Sin of *Adam*, nor suffer Repentance to expiate the Sin, and prevent the Punishment on him and his Posterity, even on those who never offended, how little have malicious Offenders to hope for from their deepest Humiliation without a Mediator? Or what is the Construction to be truly made of God's dealing thus with us all, but only to conclude, that in the Judgment of God, Repentance alone is not a sufficient Expiation of Sin? But that he requires a further Satisfaction. In a word, if Repentance were a sufficient Compensation for Sin, I do not see why we should be subject to Death for the Offence of our first Parents, who, as we have Reason to believe, lived to repent of it.

Let it not be said that Death is natural, and that we had died if Man had not sinned: For, as I have shewn, that however mortal we may be by Nature, yet when God enters into Covenant with us, and by that Covenant makes Death the Punishment of Sin, Immortality is certainly implied to be the Reward of Obedience. And to inflict Death even upon a repenting Sinner, is undoubtedly to declare, that Repentance alone is not sufficient to satisfy the Justice of God for the Violation of his Laws. But,

IV. Repentance alone is so far from being a sufficient Expiation, that it is neither sufficient to satisfy the Justice of God, nor does it restore us to that Perfection of original Righteousness from which we fell.

1. It is not sufficient to satisfy the Justice of an offended God. 'Tis not enough to salve his Honour, nor answer the Reason of his Laws. The Necessity of Atonement arising wholly from the Obligation that the Sinner is under to Punishment, and from the Necessity of God's doing something

that

that may atteſt the reality of his Diſpleaſure, as the only convincing Teſtimony of his eſſential Holineſs, do ſo undeniably ſuppoſe the certain Puniſhment of Sin, that there is nothing whereby God can ſufficiently atteſt his Declaration and Abhorrence of Iniquity after it is once committed, but by a Severity of Puniſhment to be inflicted either upon the Sinner, or ſome other in his Stead.

2. As Repentance alone is not ſufficiently ſatisfactory to the vindictive Juſtice of God, for that very Reaſon it alone cannot reſtore us to that original State and Perfection of Righteouſneſs from which we by Tranſgreſſion fell. Nothing leſs than what is compleatly holy and perfect in Obedience, can inherit complete Felicity and eternal Life. We are in ſuch a State of Corruption, as God by a ſolemn Eſtabliſhment has made an eternal Bar to our Entrance into celeſtial Felicity; and therefore till we can recover ourſelves from the Power, as well as from the Guilt of Sin, that we ſhall offend no more, but be reinſtated in our original Capacity of perfect Holineſs and Obedience, we are not, according to the firſt Ordinance and Covenant of God, fit for the Glories of his Kingdom. If therefore nothing in a State of Sin can be admitted to Immortality, Repentance alone can never be ſufficient to the Recovery of our loſt Felicity. We are ſtill Sinners, tho' repenting ones, and ſhall never be capable of regaining our loſt Glory, till our merciful God ſhall find out a Saviour to atone for, and a Redeemer to reſtore us. This is what the Goſpel tells us he has done by his Son Jeſus Chriſt, and how much wiſer and better a Method that is, and how much more to the Glory of God, the Honour of his Goodneſs, Juſtice, and Holineſs, and more agreeable to the Reaſons of the firſt Covenant, and the Authority of all his Laws, is the next Thing that we are to ſpeak to. This is the,

II. Second

II. Second Thing I proposed. But before I enter directly upon this, I will take a fuller View of the miserable State of Mankind by Sin, and of the Vengeance and Misery that we wanted to be delivered from on Account of our own actual Sins, as well as of the Sin of *Adam*. For as by our own obstinate Offences we are greater Sinners than *Adam* was, so consequently we must by those our greater Sins become obnoxious to some greater Punishment than that Death alone which the Sin of *Adam* has brought upon us. And what that is we are now to consider; for the clearing of which let it be observed,

First, That our Redemption, as set forth in Holy Scripture, has respect to the Sins of all Mankind, as well as to the Sin of *Adam*. *He died for all* in that *all have sinned*. And for this Reason when the Apostles speak of our Redemption by the Blood of Christ, they speak in such a Manner as includes the whole Race of Mankind wanting such an Expiation by Reason of our Sins. See *Matt.* i. 21. *Eph.* i. 7. *Rom.* v. 16. 1 *John* ii. 2. 2 *Cor.* v. 14. *Now if Christ died for all, then were all dead.* Dead not by *Adam*'s Sin alone, but in and by their own Sins, for which he died. And this Death must be understood figuratively to denote some such Misery in a State of Death, as each Man's own Offences had made him obnoxious to. 'Tis in regard to this alone that he can be said to *have died for* all Men. It must be on the Account of some such Misery as we were in Danger of, by Reason of our Sins, and must have suffered, had we not been so redeemed, and therefore we observe,

Secondly, That besides the Death brought upon us by *Adam*'s Sin, there was some further Punishment reserved for Sinners on the Score of their own personal Transgressions, had we not been thus redeemed by the Blood of Christ. This is certain.

1. From the very Scripture Phrase: For the

Words *Deliverance*, *Redemption*, and *Salvation*, suppose Misery to have been our Portion without it. But,

2. This is a Principle agreeable to common Reason also. If there be in God essential Justice, then to be sure the greatest Transgressions will always have the severest Punishment, and with the greatest Difficulty be pardoned. Consequently then, if one single Transgression of our first Parents, and that too committed rather through the crafty Delusions of the Tempter, than with a Spirit of deliberate Malice, so incensed the Displeasure of God, as to bring Death upon their Posterity, even on those that never actually offended, the obstinate Vices of wicked Men called for severer Punishment. And as they did, so also the righteous Vengeance of an holy God had made due Provision for it. And from this Misery, more than from a State of Death, we wanted to be redeemed. This seems to be very plain; the only Question to be asked is, *what* and *where* the Misery of sinful Man must have been without a Saviour? To which I answer,

3. *Lastly*, That the State of Death was that State appointed by God for Recompence to wicked Men unredeemed. For tho' all those who now *die in the Lord* may be believed not to be miserable, but to be in a State of Joy, yet a State of Death was certainly intended to be a State of Vengeance. As to the Resurrection from the Dead, if Christ had never become our Saviour, there could have been no Resurrection from the Dead: And therefore all the Torments that Mankind unredeemed could have suffered for their Sins after this Life, and without a Resurrection, must have been in a State of Death.

Now this is agreeable to the Sentence at first denounced against Man's Disobedience; which as it was not a personal Covenant made with *Adam* alone, and a Sentence to be immediately inflicted upon him,

but

but a Covenant with human Nature, and a Sentence of Mortality, that our whole Generation fell under by his Offence, so by the Severity of his Sentence God has not only attested to the World his Vengeance against Sin, but also at the same Time made Provision for the future Punishment of every Man's personal Offences, in that State of Death ordained for the Punishment of Sinners.

Our present Life is confessedly a State of Trial, and the Miseries of it rather in the Way of Discipline, than Recompence. If therefore God made any Provision for the Punishment of Sinners unredeemed, the future State of Death must be the Time and Place intended for it. Some think it in this Case sufficient to say, that by Christ and his Redemption we shall be delivered at the last Judgment on the Conditions of Faith and Repentance, from Damnation, which I grant; but then I ask further whether Mankind must have suffered any such Punishment by their Sins if there had been no Redemption given? If they had, then we have great Reason to bless God. But if Mankind could not have suffered any such like Torments, but by his Saviour, as it is plain that in these Men's Sense they could not, because without him there was no Possibility of either Resurrection, or Judgment, or future State; then I must declare, that thus understood the Words *Deliverance*, *Redemption*, and *Salvation*, cannot belong to it. It looks like Prevarication to tell us, that by Christ we are saved by Sin and Misery, to which we could not be, according to these Men, obnoxious, if no such Saviour had been given us. If this be the Case, we are so far from being delivered from the Punishment of our Sins by Jesus Christ, that by him alone we are brought to such Vengeance.

But if it be indeed *Redemption*, *Salvation*, and *Deliverance* from our Sins, that we obtain by *Jesus Christ*,

Christ, those very Words suppose and prove that there was a State of Vengeance prepared for Sinners antecedently to either our Resurrection, or Redemption; and that must be in a State of Death. See *Heb.* ii. 14. 1 *Thes.* i. 10.——In short, the Words *Mercy*, *Goodness*, *Pity* and *Compassion* to Sinners, necessarily suppose Misery belonging to those Sinners to whom that Pity is extended. And as a Covenant of Grace certainly has its Denomination from the Principle it proceeds from, and the Benefits that are tendered by it, so indeed the Declarations which the new Testament makes of the Love of God to us in sending his Son to die for us, are very great. And as God never extolls his Goodness without Reason, so we may conclude there was a Reason for all this, suitable to the Greatness of the Undertaking. In all which the Love of God to us, will be esteemed in Proportion to the Benefits we receive thereby, and to the Greatness of the Misery we have thereby avoided. Now tho' to deliver us from Death, as it is the Punishment of Sin, is a Blessing, and an Act of Grace to restore us to the Hope of Immortality; yet the Blessing is much enhanced when we reflect, that even in the Death we are delivered from, we had not been exempted from all Misery, but must have languished in the everlasting Sense of God's Displeasure, and in Degrees of Misery proportionable to the Greatness of our Sins.

If these Observations are just, there needs no Disputes about the distinct Existence of the Souls of Men in a State of Separation; in that the very Doctrine of our Redemption, if thus understood, supposes it. I come now,

To consider, what the Atonement of this Guilt, and the saving us from this Misery seems necessarily to require; and also how excellently well the several Actions and Sufferings of Christ answer to the

Ends and Reason of all that could be expected in such a Case. And here two Things are to be taken Notice of.

1. The Redemption of human Nature from the Punishment of Death, which *Adam*'s Sin brought upon us.

2. The Redemption of our Persons from the Miseries in a State of Death to be inflicted on our own actual Transgressions, and the restoring us not only to Life, but to Happiness.

1. The first Thing to be considered is the Redemption of human Nature.

Here we must make a Difference between what belongs to all our Nature in general, and what belongs to us all universally as Men, by Virtue of something done in our Nature by our Representative, deriving thereby either Good or Evil upon us, without any Regard to our own Actions, and what we do in our own Persons, and are either to suffer, or to be rewarded for on that Account.

The one is absolute and universal, and has no Dependence on our own personal Actions, either to prevent or to promote it.

The other as it is personal, so it is conditional, and will be determined this Way or that, as we do good or evil.

In the first of these was our Creation and our Fall. God made Man perfect; and the original Righteousness and Innocency of *Adam*, was the original Righteousness and Innocency of human Nature, and shews what Beings we his Offspring might have derived from him, could we have derived them without Sin.

Thus also the Sin and Fall of *Adam* was the Sin and Fall of human Nature; by which both he and we became mortal, in Regard to his, but not our own personal Offences.

In order therefore to the Salvation of all, regard must

must be first had to the Recovery of human Nature, and accordingly the first Step in the Salvation of Mankind, must be the Redemption of human Nature.

Now in this Matter two Things are to be regarded.

1. Our Redeemer's taking our Nature upon him, that he might become our Redeemer.

2. What he has done, or suffered in that our Nature, in order to the Accomplishment of that Redemption.

1. His assuming our Nature.

For so has the Wisdom and Righteousness of God ordained, that whatsoever Satisfaction is to be made to that End, it should be made in human Nature. This I take to be the first great Instance of God's Righteousness in this mysterious Dispensation, and that indeed which distinguishes it from such an Act of arbitrary Dominion, as we have seen to be dishonourable to God. That as in *Adam* our whole Nature became mortal and subject unto Misery, so in Christ our Redeemer our Nature atones for Sin, destroys Death, and rises again unto Righteousness.

For this Reason it is, that none could redeem us, but one who could take our Nature upon him. Angels therefore, though ever so beneficial to Men, yet all their Services, all their Performances, and all their Righteousness, could not belong to us, because not performed in our Nature. Nor could the Recompence of their Obedience be imputed to us as our Recompence, while done in another Nature, that we had no natural or necessary Relation to.

Upon this Consideration, Saint *Paul* asserts, that the fallen Angels have no Benefit in our Redemption. See *Heb.* ii. 11, 12, *&c.* He expressly asserts the Necessity of Christ's Incarnation to make him a fit Person for our Redeemer, who, by being cloathed in our Flesh, makes himself the Representative by

whom God has consented, that this our mortal Nature should be delivered and redeemed. On this Account he is called the *second Adam*, that is, the second Representative of our whole Kind, who was to restore us from all that Misery and Curse, which the Transgression of the first *Adam* had brought upon us.

Again: This Method vindicates the Righteousness of God in punishing *Adam*'s Sin by the Mortality of all Mankind. Many Conjectures have been made, and many Volumes written to vindicate the Righteousness of God in the Fall of Man. But nothing that has been advanced does so satisfactorily account for that extraordinary Dispensation, as the looking forward on our promised Redeemer, and considering the same Scheme and Method of Justice laid down in our first Covenant, that was intended to be religiously observed in the second. The same Rule of Reason and Equity observed in the Punishment of *Adam*'s Sin, that was intended to be observed in our Deliverance from that Punishment. The same Righteousness in bringing us under the Power of Death, that was to be seen afterwards in our Recovery of an absolute and endless Immortality. Vindicating hereby not only his Justice, but his Goodness, *in that where Sin abounded, there Grace did much more abound.*

Let the Deists of the Age try if they can devise any other Method more for God's Honour, and more suitable to his unchangeable Perfections, and the eternal Authority of his Laws. And if nothing of this can be pretended, let us close with these Overtures of Mercy which God has graciously exhibited to us by his Son.

But the Glory of God will be more conspicuous, if we,

2. Consider what Christ has done or suffered in our Nature, in order to the Accomplishment of that Redemption. 1. He

1. He fulfilled in our Nature all Righteousness, and paid an exact Obedience to that first Covenant, by the Transgression of which *Adam* fell, and Mankind with him.

He is set forth in Scripture as one who was in all Respects absolutely innocent and righteous. 1 *Pet.* ii. 22.

He was thus represented under the Law, by that Type of him, the Paschal Lamb, it was to be *without Spot or Blemish:* All which was designed to instruct us, that the Person who was to redeem us must be one of spotless Innocence. Now to this his absolute and perfect Obedience, by which he fulfilled all Righteousness, and preserved that Innocence entire, which *Adam* had lost, St. *Paul* imputes the Justification of human Nature. See *Rom.* v. 18, 19. He had before (see Ver. 12.) declared how all Mankind became mortal by the Sin of *Adam*; and now he magnifies the singular Wisdom, Justice and Goodness of God in so accommodating the Redemption of human Nature to the Rules and Methods of our Fall, that all the Misfortune which *Adam*'s Sin brought upon us, is done away by the Obedience of Christ, and our mortal and sinful Nature by his Righteousness restored to Life and Immortality. (See Ver. 15, 17.)

This is his Argument. By all which, if we mean no more than this, that the actual Obedience of Christ to that whole Law, to which the Promise of eternal Life was made, was necessary by God's Decree as previous to the Expiation of our Sins, and to make our Nature redeemable, it deserves to be taken Notice of as a remarkable Instance of the Justice and Righteousness, Mercy, and Goodness of God in our Redemption; that in every Part of it he has consulted the Honour, Authority, and Obligation of that first Law, by the Transgression of which Mankind fell; and would not ad-

mit of any Atonement, 'till the Righteousness of it had been exactly fulfilled by a perfect Obedience in that very Nature which had offended: Whereby, as in the first *Adam* we see the Guilt, so in the second we may contemplate the Righteousness of human Nature. By our having in the Person of Jesus absolutely fulfilled the original Conditions upon which the Promise of eternal Life was given, before any Manner of Pretensions are made to an Atonement for our Offences. In Consequence of which, our Deliverance from Death, and our new Title of eternal Life, become not a meer arbitrary, though a gracious and free Gift, but are in some the Merit, the Recompence, and Reward of the Innocence and Holiness, as well as of the Sufferings and Sacrifice of human Nature in the Person of Jesus Christ. But,

II. Christ Jesus was not only obedient to the Law for us, but he also suffered Death for our Disobedience to it.

The Scripture lays great Stress in his dying upon the Cross for us, *Eph.* i. 7. *Col.* i. 18. And all this was so truly in the Way and Nature of a Sacrifice of Atonement, that all the Sacrifices under the Law were so called, that they might be Types of that grand Atonement made by the Blood of Christ, *Heb.* x. 1. ix. 9, *&c.* 26. This is the Substance of our Christian Doctrine of Salvation by a dying Saviour.

And now to gratify the over nice Curiosity of some of our modern Rationalists, we must, it seems, consider what there is in this Sacrifice of the precious Blood of Christ, truly satisfactory to the divine Justice and Vengeance, and that may reasonably be allowed meritorious to the Expiation and Atonement of Sin.

Now we have already seen, that the true End and Reason of punishing Sinners is only to bear Witness

to

to God's Hatred againſt their Sins, to vindicate the Honour of his Attributes, the Wiſdom of his Government, and the Righteouſneſs and Authority of his Laws. If therefore it ſhall appear,

2. That the Death of Chriſt was truly the Puniſhment of Sin, and ſuch a Puniſhment as is found ſufficient to anſwer all theſe Ends, it may then be allowed to make a ſufficient Satisfaction and Atonement.

We are therefore to conſider the Death of Chriſt,

1. As having in it the true Nature of a Puniſhment of Sin: Which I thus prove, as from the firſt Tranſgreſſion of Mankind it was appointed for all Men once to die, ſo Jeſus Chriſt in ſubmitting himſelf to Death, ſubmitted himſelf thereby to the Puniſhment of Sin.

But then, he did not bear this Puniſhment for any Sins of his own, for he was without Sin; but he ſubmitted to die for the Sins of Mankind.

Here therefore, I muſt again make mention of our Saviour's having fulfilled in our Nature the whole Righteouſneſs of God's original Covenant and Law, as that which is primarily to be conſidered in the Meritoriouſneſs of his Paſſion. It is this that makes his Death to have in it the true Nature of a Sacrifice, that in the ſtricteſt Senſe it was wholly undeſerved by him. According to God's original Ordinance, he was not under the Law of Death, as the reſt of Mankind are, but entitled to an eternal Life, by his ſpotleſs Innocence and Purity, and by his having fulfilled the whole, upon which the Promiſe of eternal Life was made. Dying therefore in him was freely voluntary, to which he was under no Neceſſity, by vertue of any previous Decree, otherwiſe than as he gave himſelf for us, and willingly laid down his Life as our Ranſom, and the ineſtimable Price of our Propitiation.

2. Another Thing very conſiderable in this reſ-

pect is, the Greatness of our Saviour's Sufferings, and the Miserableness of his Death. For, as there can be no true Atonement for Sin without Punishment, as necessary to witness God's Displeasure against it, so consequently the greater those Sufferings are which our Redeemer endures, the greater must be their Influence to atone for Sin, because in all this we have the more certain Evidences of God's Displeasure against it, even while he pardons it. And thus every Degree of Affliction which he felt on this Account, by bearing Testimony to God's Abhorrence of Sin, makes the Pardon of our Sins more easily to be obtained, in that it may be granted without any Blemish to the Wisdom of God's Government, or to the Honour of his divine Perfections.

3. Another Thing of great Moment in this Affair is, the Greatness and Dignity of the Person suffering; for if the severer the Punishments are, the greater is their Influence to appease God's Wrath; then by the same Reason, the greater the Person is that suffers, the more efficacious must his Sufferings be to our Salvation: And that, because as the Dignity of the Person adds much to the Merit of his Passion, so every Circumstance of this Kind, by representing the Difficulty of our Pardon in the high Price of our Atonement, still magnifies the Glory of God in the Administration of his Mercy.

4. There is another Thing consequent upon our Saviour's Passion, that adds much to the Merit of it, and has no small Influence to set forth the Righteousness of God in our Salvation; and that is that he not only suffered, but he also conquered Death for us. And let this be remembered as the

III. Third great Performance of our Redeemer in our Nature and our Stead.

This Conquest that Christ gained over Death and Hell, by his rising from the Grave, may very properly

perly be called the Victory and Conqueſt of human Nature; it is as truly ſo, as the Sin and Apoſtacy of *Adam* could be called the Sin and Apoſtacy of human Nature; and there is as much Reaſon that Mankind ſhould be reſtored to Life by Chriſt's Conqueſt over Death, as that the Diſobedience of the firſt *Adam* ſhould involve his Poſterity under the Sentence of Death and Condemnation. The whole Reaſon and Righteouſneſs of the firſt Diſpenſation was founded in our Relation to *Adam*, as our Father; and the ſecond *Adam*, Jeſus Chriſt, is our Brother, who took upon him our Nature, that he might accompliſh for us in it what the firſt *Adam* had covenanted, but not performed. And therefore as in this Relation he not only died for us, but conquered Death, and roſe again in our Nature, and as our Redeemer, his Atonement and his Conqueſt may as reaſonably be imputed to us in order to our recovering an eternal Life, as the Sin of *Adam* was imputed to our Condemnation.

And here we have an undeniable Evidence of the divine Nature of Jeſus Chriſt; he is, as St. *Paul* truly teaches us, *declared to be the Son of God with Power, according to the Spirit of Holineſs, by the Reſurrection from the Dead.* For nothing leſs than what is truly God, ſeems capable of ſo wonderful an Operation. But

5. *Laſtly*, Another Thing that has its Influence to the Efficacy of Chriſt's Atonement is, the Relation that he bears to us, not only as the Son of Man, but alſo as he is the Son of God; by whom God made the World; ſo that when he came into the World, properly ſpeaking, *he came unto his own*, to redeem his own from the enemy; to redeem his own Poſſeſſion, whom he had a Right in by Creation, and whom he created for Happineſs, and in whoſe Innocency and Felicity he propoſed to have been glorified. Theſe he came to redeem from the

Miſchiefs

Mischiefs of that Apostacy, whereby the Devil had endeavoured to defeat his Expectations. In Consideration of all which, the Deliverance and Restitution of his Creatures, whose Guilt he had atoned for, and whose Calamities have been so conquered, becomes an Act both of Reason and Justice, not only to the miserable Creatures so redeemed, but also to the Redeemer; to him who has been both willing and able thus to satisfy for, and to assert his Right in his own Creatures, and to deliver them out of the Destroyer's Hand into his own Jurisdiction. There is a great deal both of Reason and Justice, that he who had an original Right over us by Creation, and had afterwards expiated our Apostacy by his Blood, purchased us by his Death, and conquered our Enemies by his triumphant Resurrection, should have Power to deliver us from Death, and restore us to Immortality. This is not only to assert his Right to us, but to shew that he is able under all these Difficulties, to make all Things to answer the End of his Creation, and minister to his own everlasting Glory.

In one Word, when we contemplate what Jesus Christ did, and suffered in our Nature, we see in some good Measure the Redemption of human Nature; not in an arbitrary Way, but consistent with a Law of Righteousness; that in Consequence thereof, the Benefits of Christ's Sufferings and Performances may as righteously be imputed to our Advantage, as the Disobedience of *Adam* was to our Condemnation.

And seeing I am mentioning the great Performances of our Redeemer in order to our Salvation, let me add,

IV. *Lastly*, His Ascension into Heaven.

For as no Atonement is to be made for Sin, but what Christ made in human Nature, and no Conquest over Death, but what he has made by his own glorious

glorious Reſurrection; ſo there is no Entrance for Mankind into the Kingdom of Heaven, but what he has made by his own Aſcenſion thither in our Nature. This is indeed the glorious Exaltation of human Nature in the Perſon of our Redeemer; and in the Influence of his glorious Exaltation to exalt us alſo, that we might be happy with him, *John* xiv. 2. To this End he there makes Interceſſion for us.

But, then as it was not from a celeſtial, but from an earthly Paradiſe, that Mankind fell in *Adam*; ſo the Benefit of this his Exaltation is not ſo abſolutely communicated, as the other Advantages are. So far as we ſuffered by *Adam*'s Sin, we retrieve the Miſchiefs by Chriſt; and accordingly the great Advantage that we abſolutely receive by our Redemption is, a Deliverance from Death, and our being reſtored to an eternal Life. But then as all that Miſery that we were to expect in a State of Death was from our own actual Sins; ſo, whether that endleſs Life, to which we ſhall be raiſed by Jeſus Chriſt, ſhall be a Life of Happineſs or Miſery, muſt depend on our new Covenant with God in our Redeemer, and on the Care we ſhall take to anſwer the Ends and Obligations of that. This indeed is what we are next to ſpeak to, *viz.*

II. The Redemption of our Perſons by a new Covenant of Grace made in the Blood of Chriſt.

In treating on this Subject, I ſhall

I. Speak in general concerning the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God to Mankind, in dealing with us by Covenants.

II. Shew the Reaſonableneſs of a new Covenant on this Occaſion.

III. *Laſtly*, Shew the Excellency of our Chriſtian Covenant.

I. I will ſhew the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God in dealing with Mankind by Covenants.

It is very great in ſeveral Reſpects. It not only helps

helps to inform our Understandings, and to regulate our Notions of God, but thereby administers great Confidence with him, and is of great Use to keep us from the two dangerous Extremes of Presumption and Despair. By express Covenants, the Presumptuous may see the Folly and Danger of expecting more Mercy than what God has stipulated with him, and of hoping beyond all the solemn Conditions of his Covenant. And the desponding Sinner may with equal Plainness see the unreasonable Folly of distrusting God's Goodness, where he has promised Mercy.

II. I will shew the Reasonableness and Necessity of a new Covenant, and of such a one as God has made with us all in Jesus Christ.

The Condition of the first Covenant running upon an absolute Obedience, is altogether impracticable in this our degenerate State. And therefore it would have been a most hard Thing to have delivered us from a State of Death, and yet not to have made a new Covenant with us. To have bound us still to absolute Righteousness, must necessarily have required, that we should be restored to the original Strength and spiritual Power which were given us at our first Creation.

But suppose all this had been done, we could enjoy the Benefit of such Redemption no longer than we continued absolutely perfect. In such a Case the first Fault would bring us back again into that very State of Death and Misery from which we had been redeemed, and we should want another Redeemer to make our Peace.

And at this Rate, as every Man is now answerable only for himself, according to that Covenant, I do not know but that as many Sinners as there should be found in the World, there would be wanting also as many Saviours to redeem them: For the same Covenant established upon the same Conditions,

Conditions, would neceſſarily call for the ſame Puniſhment to be inflicted, and every Return into the ſame Miſery want a new Redemption and Expiation.

There is therefore nothing more agreeable to the wiſe Purpoſes of God for the Happineſs of Men, than a new Covenant eſtabliſhed on more favourable Conditions, accommodated to the Weakneſs of our fallen apoſtate State. This is indeed what Chriſt has done; and in Regard to his kind Condeſcention in it, it is properly ſtyled *a Covenant of Grace.* Which brings me,

III. To ſhew the Excellency of this Covenant.

1*ſt*, In its Conditions.

2*dly*, In its Promiſes.

1*ſt*, As to its Conditions, they may be comprehended under theſe two Expreſſions, *Faith*, and *Repentance.* To theſe the Promiſes of Salvation are made, and there is nothing unreaſonable or unrighteous in all this. For,

1. As to Faith. If the Chriſtian Doctrine of our Redemption be confeſſedly true and worthy of our Acceptation, it cannot but be both reaſonable and neceſſary, that Faith in Chriſt ſhould be made one of the indiſpenſable Conditions of obtaining it. Neceſſary, firſt for the Glory of our Redeemer, that all Men in a ſerious Senſe of his wonderful Condeſcention, ſhould *honour the Son as they honour the Father:* And neceſſary alſo in regard to the Good of Men, that they may be led by this Goodneſs to come unto God by him, by whom alone they can be ſaved: And in the divine Authority of his Religion, ſee the Neceſſity of that Holineſs, and faithful Obedience which are recommended in it. And this is what the Goſpel means by *Faith*, when the Promiſe of eternal Life is made to it.

2. The ſecond general Condition of the Goſpel, is *Repentance.* By which I mean ſuch a hearty Sor-

row

row for all the Evil we have done, as becomes the Principle of a better Conversation, and leads us in every instance, to do no more so wickedly, but universally to do Good. And that a holy God should require this, cannot be wondered at.

It may rather be made a Question, how *Repentance* should now be admitted as the great Condition of our Salvation, more than it was before.

To which I answer,

First, That Repentance is the most that this our degenerate State can attain to. But,

Secondly, This Repentance for Sin is not accepted on its own Account, but for the Sake, and through the Mediation of *Jesus Christ*, and the Atonement is not made by our Contrition, but by his Blood, *Matt.* xxvi. *Heb.* x. 29. xiii. 20. It is the Death of Christ that makes our Repentance acceptable before God, to our eternal Happiness, which otherwise could not have availed to that End. But then I must add,

Thirdly, That in all this, not only the Reason and Principle, but the whole Authority of the first original Law are still so kept up, that there is no Recovery, no not even by Jesus Christ, of that immortal Bliss and Happiness, which we lost by Sin, until we shall recover also by him, that full Perfection of Righteousness and Holiness, by falling from which our Felicity was taken away from us. Thus far therefore the Decree still stands good, that so long as we continue in a lapsed, tho' a penitent State, we are only in a State of Trial, and not of Recompence. And as our Infirmities are great, so are our Delights imperfect. And as there is in the best of us a Mixture of Wisdom and Folly, of Innocency and Guilt, of Obedience and Transgression, so in our Circumstances there is the like Mixture of Crosses and Comforts; and we are as far from being compleatly happy, as we are from being compleat-

ly innocent. Nor shall we ever attain to an absolute Perfection of immortal Bliss, until we are by Jesus Christ restored to a Capacity of perfect Holiness. For as the one was by God's original Decree ordained to be the Reward of the other, so they are still kept so inseparable, that Misery will be the constant Companion of Sin, and there will be no true Happiness, till we arrive at that Place, where our spiritual Capacities shall be recovered in their full Measure, and our Obedience be made as complete as the Glory and Happiness we shall enjoy. And this brings me from the Conditions to speak,

2*dly*, Of the Promises and Benefits of our Christian Covenant.

And passing by all others, I shall speak only of these two great Benefits.

1. The Administration of divine Grace here to enable us for, and assist us in those Duties, which are indispensably required from us. And,

2. The recompensing our sincere, though imperfect Obedience and Repentance with everlasting Glory in Heaven.

1. The Administration of divine Grace to enable us and assist us in doing the Duties of Religion.

The New Testament does so expressly declare our receiving Help from God, and by the in-dwelling of his Spirit in all the good Actions which we do, that to me, no one Doctrine is more plain, than the Necessity of the divine Grace of God's holy Spirit in order to a holy Life. And what more wonderful Instance can there be of Goodness, than to exhibit to us that Blessing, by which we become capable of attaining Salvation, in performing the Conditions upon which alone that is promised to us, and without which we could not be happy?

And it cannot but be a wise Thing also in God, to make us thus dependent on him, for one of the choicest Favours that he can bestow. It must invite us

us to frequent Prayer; it must make us sensible of the Danger and Mischief of Sin, in rendering us incapable of receiving so great a Blessing; and cannot but have its Influence to restrain us from vice, as that which tends to our everlasting Ruin.

2. The second great Advantage of this Covenant is, the Recompence of Reward.

The blessed Jesus has by this new Covenant promised to, and stipulated with us, to reward our Faith in him, and our true Repentance and sincere Obedience towards God, however short of our original Perfection, with everlasting Life and Happiness in the World to come. A great Part of which Happiness will be then in having our Natures changed by the Power of God in our Resurrection, and improved, and refined, and spiritualized, and made more ample *Partakers of the divine*, and in transforming the whole Man not only into that divine Similitude and *Image of God*, after which we were originally created, but with such peculiar Advantages as to all the religious and spiritual Capacities, that may fit us for a heavenly Life. But tho' God rewards an imperfect Service in us with everlasting Happiness; yet it is so contrived, that not only our Sins are atoned for, but our Nature also so changed and renewed, that we are made capable of an absolute Conformity to the Will of God; at the same Time that we are admitted to this Happiness; whereby the original Decree is so far observed, that perfect Righteousness and perfect Happiness are still inseparable. A State of Sin is still such a Bar to the Enjoyment of it, that no Expiation of our Guilt will be sufficient to bring us to this inestimable Glory, unless we are also first restored to the lost Advantages of the divine Image in which we were at first created.

But I must observe again, that the same Gospel, which tenders eternal Life to the faithful and penitent,

denounces also eternal Torments to the vicious. Nor is there any thing unjust in this; it is all pursuant to God's original Decree, and to the unchangeable Obligations of the first Law, that a State of Sin, and a State of immortal Happiness, are incompatible. And as this original Decree is founded in the eternal Nature and Difference of Good and Evil; and of their Relation to God, he can now no more supersede the Obligations of it, than he can cease to be God.

To complain therefore of the Severity of such Threatenings, is in Effect to complain, because God is holy; and yet he could not be holy if he acted otherwise.

Nor will the Eternity of the Torments to be endured at all help to make up the Justice of the Complaint; in that the perpetual Duration of our State is not added to us as a Part of our Punishment, but proceeds from our Creation. God made Man a Creature by Nature immortal, and with a Design that he should be eternally blessed; but Man by his Perverseness and Folly makes himself miserable; and being an immortal Creature, he thereby becomes miserable to all eternity. What then has he to complain of against God? Is it that he is immortal? He, who thereby enjoys immortal Bliss, will never think so. Was it a Fault that God made his Happiness to depend on his Obedience and Holiness? This also has its Foundation in the Reason and Relation of Things. Or is it a Fault to execute his own divine Ordinances, which are founded on the Perfection of his Nature? No, sure, for where the Sanction is essentially righteous, the Execution of it must be so too. Instead therefore of complaining against God, and charging him with Unrighteousness on this Account, the proper Reflection to be made is on the incorrigible Folly of wicked Men, who will purchase the Pleasures of Sin at so dear a Rate.

Dr. *BUTLER*'s

BOYLE's LECTURES

ABRIDG'D.

RELIGION
NO
MATTER
OF
SHAME or REPROACH.

THE Infidels of our Times despairing of being able to reason Religion out of the World, seem now to place all their Hopes of Success in sneering and laughing it out of Countenance.

To arm Men therefore against these rude Assaults, wherein their chief Strength lies, I will shew, *That whosoever is a true Christian, both in Faith and Practice, can have no Reason to be ashamed of his being so.*

To which End I will endeavour to make good these following Propositions.

First, That there is nothing in the Matter of this Faith shameful to him.

Secondly, That there is nothing shameful in his Practice.

Thirdly, That he has chosen the wisest Course, which will be safe in the End.

Fourthly, That he hath no Reason to be ashamed of his Faith or Practice, so far as the public Good is concerned in them.

Fifthly, That he hath no Reason *to be ashamed* of them upon the account of any Thing in them really prejudicial to the Happiness of this present Life, which is promoted by them.

Sixthly, That he hath no Reaſon to be *aſhamed of* any ſuch fooliſh Credulity, as the Infidels are wont to reproach him for, and have the greateſt Reaſon to be aſhamed of themſelves.

Firſt, That there is nothing in the Matter of his Faith ſhameful to him.

He believes he is the Workmanſhip of a wiſe and good God; that he is the Object of his Providence; that the whole Creation were deſigned for the Uſes for which they ſerve; that he has ſomething more in his Compoſition than dull Matter; that he is endued with an immortal Soul formed after the Likeneſs of God, and capable of an everlaſting Enjoyment of him.

How much more honourable is this to Mankind, than to be, as the Atheiſt aſſerts, the Creature of blind Neceſſity, without *God* in the World, formed by Chance, and when he dies, to periſh as the Beaſts for ever.

The Chriſtian further believeth that God hath a tender Regard to Mankind, that he gave his *only begotten Son* to take our Nature, to ſuffer Death, to redeem us out of that State of Miſery into which we were fallen, and to be *Author of eternal Salvation*, to thoſe that believe in him, and obey his Laws. That he roſe from the Dead, aſcended into Heaven, ſat down at the right Hand of God, ſent his holy Spirit to aſſiſt us, and that he will come again at the End of the World to render to every Man according to his Works.

Now what is ſhameful in all this? Is it not for the Honour of Mankind that God ſhould ſo love them, as to ſend his Son to do ſo much for them, and that our Bodies are not to periſh for ever in their Graves? Theſe Things are too glorious for us to ſuffer ourſelves to be laughed out of the Belief of them; and nothing but the cleareſt Evidence of our being deceived, ſhould be able to *make our Glorying void.*

Second-

Secondly, There is nothing ſhameful in the Chriſtian's Practice. For,

1. The Chriſtian's Life is an Imitation of God in all his imitable Perfections, and exerciſing to the utmoſt of his Capacity, that Juſtice and Fidelity, that Goodneſs and Mercy, for which he is adored by Men.

2. The Chriſtian's Life is doing the Will of God, and can it be a Matter of Shame to be directed by an infinitely wiſe and good Being, and be dutiful to him, *who giveth us Life, and Breath, and all Things?*

3. The Practice of a Chriſtian is agreeable to the beſt Reaſon of Mankind, and ſuch as I believe thoſe very Men who wantonly ſcoff at, did never ſeriouſly diſallow. How little Reaſon then can we have *to be aſhamed* of ſuch abſurd Reproaches, whilſt we can commend ourſelves to our own and every Man's Reaſon and Conſcience?

As for the peculiar Precepts, the poſitive Inſtitutions of Chriſtianity, tho' they may not be dictated to us by natural Reaſon, yet they are not contrary to it; they are either Improvements of thoſe moral Virtues to a greater Perfection, which Men without the Aſſiſtance of divine Revelation could not ſo eaſily diſcern their Obligations to; or deſigned more ſtrictly to engage to the conſtant Practice of them, and as reaſonable to a Chriſtian, as any moral Virtue to another Man. A Chriſtian then has no Occaſion *to be aſhamed* of his Practice. I proceed, to ſhew

Thirdly, That a Chriſtian hath taken that Courſe which will certainly be the moſt ſafe in the End.

For if Death ſhould put an end to his Being, he will then be not the worſe for his Religion; but if there be a God and a future State of Happineſs or Miſery, according to Mens Works, he is ſure it will be incomparably beſt for them who believed in him, and ſerved him. And therefore a wiſe Man

ſhould hear without Prejudice all the Arguments for Religion, and not caſt off the Belief and Practice of it, without the plaineſt Proof of its Falſhood; nor to caſt off the Fear of a God, till they are ſure there is none to be feared, but to live by thoſe Principles he is ſure can do him no Hurt, but may be of infinite Advantage to him.

Fourthly, That the Chriſtian hath no Reaſon to be aſhamed of his Principles or Practices, ſo far as the Public is concerned in them.

They have a natural Tendency to promote the Peace and Welfare of Societies; whereas Atheiſm and Irreligion do manifeſtly promote public Miſery and Confuſion.

No Men deſerve ſo well of the Public as good Men, and therefore no Men have leſs Reaſon to be *aſhamed*.

1. What a Bleſſing to a Nation are ſuch Magiſtrates, who are influenced by the Principles of Religion; who believe themſelves *Miniſters* of God for the public *Good*, and therefore *continually attend upon this Thing*.

But if Princes were once perſuaded that there is no God to call them to Account, that there is no Evil in Tyranny, or Danger to Tyrants, if they can but ſecure their Perſons, and maintain their Power; what Principle could be ſtrong enough to reſtrain them from the worſt of Practices, whenever their Luſt or Intereſt urged them thereunto?

2. Let us conſider how much the Happineſs of a Nation depends upon the Principles of Religion.

When the People are taught to obey Magiſtrates as *the Ordinance of God*, *not only for Fear*, *but for Conſcience ſake*, then the firmeſt Foundation is laid for the Support of Government, and the public Peace.

But if Men were perſuaded that there is no Guilt in Treaſon and Rebellion againſt the beſt of Governours;

nors; that they were under no Obligations to consider any thing but their own particular Safety and Advantage; that there is as much Virtue in doing the greatest Mischiefs, as in doing the greatest Good; that neither of them is rewardable or punishable hereafter, which Atheists assert, what a miserable World would this be?

3. Let us consider how necessary it is to the Support and Welfare of Society that Men have a Regard to Oaths. Whilst these are held sacred, Men are capable of being put under the strongest Ties of Conscience, to execute Justice impartially.

Of what pernicious Consequence then must the Principles of Atheism be to human Society; to believe there is no God, that sees our Perjury, nor will punish it? If Men should be thus persuaded, Laws would be of little Use for the Security of public Order and Justice, and the Lives and Properties of Men.

4. Religion not only enjoins us to put off all Anger, Hatred, Malice, Pride, and all unrighteous Dealing, and to put on Bowels of Mercy, Humbleness of Mind, Love, Charity, to speak Truth, and to do as we would be done by, but sets before us the strongest Motives to persuade us to an exact Obedience, threatening eternal Punishments to Transgressors, and promising everlasting Happiness to the Obedient.

And if we are defective in any of these Things, it is through Want of Faith in the Principles of our Religion. And therefore those ought to be punished as public Enemies, who attempt to break or loosen the Obligations of Religion.

Thus much then may suffice to shew how little Reason a good Christian can have to be ashamed upon the public Account.

Fithly, I proceed to shew, that the true Christian hath no Reason to be ashamed of his Faith and Practice,

tice, so far as his own particular Happiness is concerned in it.

There is nothing valuable in this Life, or of any Moment to the Happiness of it, which his Religion doth not tend in its own Nature to produce in him, or to procure for him.

1. Religion doth very much conduce to the Welfare of his Body. Meekness, Temperance, Contentment, Hope in God, Love and Charity, adorn the Countenance of a Man, and give it all the Advantages it is capable of; whereas Wrath, Malice and Revenge sour our Looks, and Discontent and Envy pale the Countenance, and Hatred makes it look heavy and dull.

What better Course can a Man take to keep his Body healthful, than in observing those Rules which Religion prescribes in governing our Passions; which when violent, put the Blood and Spirits into Disorder, and shorten our Lives.

2. Religion doth very much tend to his Advantage, in respect of his outward Condition in the World.

He does not consume his Estate *upon his Lusts*, or *waste his Substance in riotous Living*, or lose it at Play.

He is not debarred from bettering his Condition by all honest Means; and these are the most likely Methods of making a safe Improvement of our Estates. His Religion makes it easier for him to be rich than other Men, because he has no Pride, Luxury, Intemperance and Lust to satisfy; and his little which he has to answer the real Conveniences of Life, is by this Means equivalent to a great Estate.

3. Religion doth very much conduce to the Peace of our Minds.

For it is most evident,

1. That the Calamities of Life are not so terrible

to

to a good Man, as to Men of no Religion. His Religion obliges him to fear none of these Things, when he apprehends them coming towards him, and it makes it more easy for him to comply with them; for,

1. It assures him that God is able to rescue him out of the most imminent Dangers, and to whom he may apply himself with a good Hope of being preserved from them.

2. The Evils of this Life, to the religious Man, do not appear so intolerable, as they do to others. They hope that God will uphold and strengthen them, and expect the divine Grace for their Comfort.

3. The Evils of this Life do not appear so evil to religious Men, as they do to Men of no Religion. The Atheist cannot expect any Benefit by them, who knows no good, but of that Kind, which the Calamities of this Life deprive him of. But the religious Man looks upon the Evils of Life not only as painful, but as Things useful to him; entirely in the Power of a wise and tender Father to prevent or inflict them, who designs him good by all his Dispensations.

2. The religious Man is best armed against the Fear of *Death*. The Thoughts of which must be extreamly disquieting to those who love nothing but the Pleasures of this Life, and expect, when they die, of never existing any more for ever. Whereas the good Man looks upon Death as the Improvement of Life, and an Entrance into a State of immortal Glory.

3. He is best armed against the Fear of future Punishment. The Atheist may pretend here that his Mind is eased of all Fears of this Kind; but with how little Reason, will appear by considering these following Things.

1. How

1. How long it must be before Men, who are educated in the Principles of Religion, can utterly extirpate these Principles confirmed by so many Arguments from Reason, Testimony, and Experience. They must suffer as much Disquiet in their Minds, as they suppose the religious Man doth in regulating those inordinate Lusts and Passions, for whose Sake they are engaged in it. The religious Man knows there is no Danger, and believes he shall reap unspeakable Advantage by succeeding in his Undertaking. But *they* expose themselves to the utmost Danger by their Attempt, if it be rashly undertaken; and till they think themselves sure that there is no God, and no Religion, they must often be disturbed with Terrors of Conscience, and Apprehensions of future Misery, which they cannot but fear, because they do not yet believe there is no such Thing. So that a religious Man with less Trouble may overcome all the Difficulties of a holy Life, than the wicked Man can attain to a confirmed and steady Infidelity.

2. He can never be able to demonstrate the Impossibility of the Being of a God of infinite Power, Wisdom, Justice and Goodness, or baffle all the Arguments which are taken from the Frame of the World, Tradition, Consent of Men, and Miracles, so as to free himself from all Doubt. They may fancy they have found out a Way how the World might be made without a God; but can they pretend that it certainly was so? They may pretend to shew how possible it is for Fear and Policy to frame the Notion of a God, but surely they will not say the Principles of Religion could have no other Original? They may plead the Fallibility of History against the Arguments for the Being of a God, but they can make no other Conclusion from it, but that it is possible they may be false. He may hope indeed he may be safe in indulging his Lusts, but he

can

can never prove himself secure, that there is no Punishment for his Impiety. And yet he must have so much Fear as he wants of such Security.

3. Future Punishments are only terrible to the Wicked. The Christian believeth, that he and all the World are under the Government of a just and powerful, but withal an infinitely good and merciful Being; who punishes none but the obstinate, who overlooks the Ignorance and Infirmities of those who sincerely endeavour to do his Will, and pardons the most wilful Offenders upon their Repentance and Amendment, and rewards them with everlasting Life. And surely such a God as this can never be terrible but to wicked Men. The Sinner cannot be sure on better Grounds, that there is no God, no future State, than the religious Man is, that if there be, he hath nothing to fear from him. And if we suppose them but equally exempt from Fear, the religious Man must needs have the Advantage, upon the Account of his glorious Hopes, which the other has no Pretence to.

The Infidel therefore vainly boasts of the Ease and Quiet he hath procured to himself, by freeing his Mind from all the Fears of Religion, the Belief and Practice of which is the surest Remedy against all Disturbance from those Fears, he pretends to have overcome.

2. Religion is the most effectual Means of preserving the Mind in Peace and Quiet from those Disturbances which Anger, Envy, and Malice give it. The Mind of a froward Man can hardly ever be at Ease; the envious Man is always fretting at the Good of others, and Malice torments the Breast which entertains it with Fear and Impatience.

But the Love and Charity which the Gospel commands easeth the Soul of these Vexations and painful Vices; it calms our boisterous Passions, and withal is not difficult for a Christian to practise.

From a Consideration of the Love of God to us in sending his Son to redeem us, we are most effectually engaged to love one another. And Tranquillity of Mind is the natural Effect of that universal Love, which no true Christian can be without, and which his Religion requires. But as to our Atheists, they have no Principles of Love and Charity; they profess themselves under no Obligation either to God or Nature, to entertain them in their Hearts. Their State of Nature is a State of War; and if at length they become weary of fighting for Power and Possessions, and enter into Society, every one does it only for his own particular Advantage. He believes that Love and Hatred, Meekness and Malice have nothing in their own Nature to oblige us to prefer one before the other; and therefore he cannot agreeably to his own Principles do good, when he hath no Prospect of Advantage to himself, or may receive Prejudice to himself by it. But perhaps he may say, that he knows by Experience he can love and forgive, and be charitable, without any Prospect of Advantage to himself, as well as others. But if this be true, it can only prove, that the Principles of human Nature may be too strong for his Principles of Atheism; and that there is something within him which approves these Things as fit and reasonable, which as an Atheist he can by no Means allow them to be. This however is plain, that every good Christian hath attained these Virtues, in such a Measure, as gives a great deal of Quiet to his Mind.

3. Religion is the best Means of preserving the Mind in Peace under the Evils and Sufferings of this Life.

It not only commands us to be *patient* in *Tribulations*, but furnishes us with such Motives as makes it an easier Service to a religious Man, than to any other: The *Atheist* believes, that all his Troubles

are the Effect of Chance: The *religious Man*, the Appointments of a tender Father.

The *Atheiſt* has no Hope of Belief from any Thing, but from natural Cauſes. The *Chriſtian* believes that there is a God who is watching over him for good, who hath the Direction of all thoſe Cauſes to fulfil his Will, which he believes is always good to good Men.

The *Atheiſt* has nothing to do but bear as patiently as he can, the Troubles he feels; but the *Chriſtian* believes that there is a Being, who will not ſuffer him to be afflicted any longer than it is for his Good; and in the mean Time will give him Power to bear them. Perhaps the Atheiſt may think that Death will end them; but this is poor Comfort: Whereas the good Chriſtian is comforted with a firm Belief that theſe Afflictions will work for him a far more exceeding and eternal Weight of Glory after Death. If the Atheiſt is in Want or Sickneſs, he is without Hope. But the Chriſtian believes his Afflictions are a proper Means to prepare him for another World, and therefore he *faints not*. The utmoſt which an *Atheiſt* can arrive at, is but a ſtupid Sort of Indolence. But the Conſolations of Religion give a poſitive Content under any outward Troubles of Life. The Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Providence of God were Arguments that wrought in the Heathens Patience in Adverſity. But Chriſtianity improves all the Arguments of natural Religion, and gives a greater Support in Calamity, than meer Philoſophy ever did.

It does not leave us to make ſuch Deductions for our Comfort, as our own Reaſon can draw from the Contemplation of the Perfections of God, but lays before us expreſs Declarations of his gracious Intentions in afflicting us, and the Reward for our Patience under them. How unreaſonable therefore is it to be aſhamed of that Faith, which is the beſt Support under the Afflictions of Life? 2 Re-

2. Religion doth very much conduce to the Delight and Peace of Mind.

The Atheist can have no inward Pleasure, but what depends upon temporary uncertain Objects. The *religious Man* hath all these as far as is safe and reasonable, and hath other Pleasures of the Mind which the other wants.

1. What incomparable Pleasure does the Christian feel in the Contemplation of the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, the Creator and Governour of all Things, who made all Things here for the Delight and Service of Mankind? How must he rejoice, when he considers his providential Care over us? That he is able to supply all our Wants; that he loves us with the Tenderness of a Father, would have us as happy as we can be, and hath put it out of the Power of all but ourselves to hinder our being so? Is it not extremely pleasant to consider that unsearchable Riches of his Love in the amazing Method of our Redemption by *Christ Jesus?*

What Pleasure is it to consider the spiritual and immortal Nature of the Soul, of which the *Atheist* confesseth he hath no Belief? How low a Pleasure must that be, which such Thoughts of himself can give the Atheist, in Comparison of that which a religious Man feels, when he considers himself endued with an immortal Soul, inspired into him by the Father of Spirits, with signal Characters of his own divine Essence impressed upon it, and capable of attaining a far more glorious Resemblance of him, of gaining his Friendship, and of seeing and enjoying him for ever, who is all good, and an everlasting Fountain of Happiness?

2. What great Pleasure doth a good Christian feel in reflecting upon his Life and Actions, from the Testimony of a good Conscience, which a Man of no Religion can have no Share in. He thinks

thinks all Actions alike as to any intrinsic Goodness or Obligation of Conscience, and therefore can have no Pleasure in reflecting upon what he hath done, as more becoming him to do, as better in itself, or more his Duty than any Thing else would have been.

But how transporting are those Joys of a good Man, when his Conscience tells him, that he hath done the Things which are most excellent, and secured a Title to the most valuable Blessings?

3. How great also is the *Rejoicing* of a good Christian's *Hope?* when he considers and applies to himself all the *great and precious* Promises of the Gospel. The Atheist can have little Pleasure in looking forward; for how great a Value soever he may put upon any Thing he thinks himself capable of, he knows he can enjoy it but a little while: And if blind Necessity does not procure it for him, he has no Hope to obtain it. But the Hopes of a Christian are built upon a firm Belief, that God can do whatever he pleases, and cannot but do, whatever he hath promised. And the Objects of his Hopes are as large as the Promises he believes he has made, both *of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come.*

Thus we see, that as to the Pleasures of the Mind, the Christian hath much the Advantage of the *Atheist*, who hath no such lovely Being, as the Christian hath, to delight himself in the Contemplation of; no such pleasing Thoughts of his own Nature, no Rule of Conscience to approve himself by; no Hope of any Thing beyond this present Life to rejoice in.

If the Atheist objects that he enjoys a free and full Indulgence of his bodily Senses and Appetites, which the religious Man denies himself, without any Remorse. In answer to this I shall shew,

Firſt, That the Atheiſt hath not ſo much the Advantage of the religious Man, as he is apt to boaſt of, even with reſpect to the Pleaſures of the Body. And,

Secondly, That thoſe Pleaſures of the Mind which are peculiar to religious Men, are greatly to be preferred before them.

Firſt, That the Atheiſt has not ſo much the Advantage of the religious Man, as he is apt to boaſt of, with reſpect to the Pleaſures of the Body. For the religious Man denies himſelf none of theſe Pleaſures, but ſuch as would impair his Health, weaken his Underſtanding, ſtain his Reputation, waſte his Eſtate, and lay a Foundation for Shame and Remorſe. If there ſhould be a little more Pleaſure in thoſe Degrees of bodily Pleaſures, which are not conſiſtent with what we call Temperance and Virtue; the religious Man does not envy thoſe who partake of it at ſo dear a Purchaſe.

2. That thoſe Pleaſures which are peculiar to religious Souls, ſuch as I have already mentioned, are much to be preferred to thoſe Gratifications of Senſe and Appetite which the Atheiſt ſets ſo great a Value upon. The Atheiſt ſurely will allow, that they have a Power of contemplating, of reflecting, and hoping, which the Brute Creatures have not; that theſe are nobler Faculties than any they have. And if there be proper Objects for all theſe Powers of the Soul, as delightful as can be imagined, as I have ſhewn there are to the religious Man; then certainly it muſt be owned, that the Pleaſures he receives from the Exerciſe of theſe Faculties upon theſe Objects muſt be the moſt excellent Pleaſures of Men. Theſe are Pleaſures which are always near us. The *temporal Things* of this World are oftentimes at a Diſtance, when they ſhould comfort us. But our Faith reaches the moſt diſtinct and inviſible Objects

Objects of it: It can lay Heaven and all its Glories before us; and no earthly Power can hinder its Intercourse with God.

From hence we have abundant Reason to conclude, that the best and greatest Pleasures the Soul of Man is capable of, are such as are derived from the Principles of Religion, and consequently the good Christian cannot have any Reason *to be ashamed* of his Faith and Practice. I come now,

Sixthly, To shew that the true Christian hath no Reason to be *ashamed* of any such Credulity, as the *Atheists* and *Infidels* are wont to reproach him for.

I. That by the Principles of *Atheism* there can be no such Matter of Reproach as a foolish Credulity.

II. That by the same Principles there can be no Error or Misbelief for us to *be ashamed* of.

III. That if a Man can bring himself to believe the Principles of Religion upon insufficient Grounds, he can have no Reason to *be ashamed* of such Credulity, whereby he so wisely consults his own Interest. But,

IV. That if an Infidel believe the Principles of Religion false, upon insufficient Grounds, his Credulity is foolish and shameful. And,

V. That the *Atheists* and *Infidels* are more credulous than the *religious Men and Christians.*

I. That by the Principles of Atheism, there can be no such Thing as a foolish or shameful Credulity.

For believing is nothing in the Opinion of the Atheist, but a certain Disposition and Motion of Matter, moved by other Matter, and so on; that all these Motions are necessary, carried on by natural Causes with irresistible Force, there being no Free-Agent to interpose: So that whatever moves the Matter of the Soul, for the Atheist will allow it to be nothing else but Matter, and gives it the Figure and Motion of believing any Thing, doth it

with so much Strength as cannot be resisted. How then can a Man be charged with believing too easily, who believes fatally, mechanically, and irresistibly?

II. That by the Principles of Atheism there can be no such Thing as Error or Misbelief.

They tell us, that Man is nothing but Body modified into Flesh, Blood, Brains, *&c.* and so and so organized, that there is nothing in him self-active, or capable of beginning any Motion; that Cogitation or Judgment therefore are nothing else but Passion: For hence it must necessarily follow, that there can be no such Thing as false Thinking, or false Judging; for every Passion is true Passion.

But if Error may proceed, as *Epicurus* says, notwithstanding from the Operation of the Mind, from some Action of its own upon the Passion of Sense, this is to attribute a self-active Power to the Mind of Man; and to contradict themselves.

If then according to these Men's Principles, every Man's Thoughts or Judgments of Things are true, how absurd must it be for an Atheist to reproach Men for a foolish Credulity? But if believing be not altogether an involuntary Act; if we suppose it to be the Issue of any Application of the Soul, managed by Choice, or any Power in us to correct the Appearances which are raised by Sense, as it must be, if it be worthy of Praise or Reproach: If the Atheist will pretend to own, what is so plain a Contradiction to the Principles of Atheistic Philosophy, I shall proceed to shew,

III. That if a Man can bring himself to believe the Principles of Religion upon insufficient Grounds, he can have no Reason to be ashamed of such Credulity, whereby he consults his own Interest.

He is sure he cannot be the worse for it in another World, and he is abundantly the better for it in this, with Respect to his Body, Estate, and his Mind. If therefore a Man can manage himself so as to establish

eſtabliſh his Mind, by any Means, in that Faith, which will contribute more to the Happineſs of his Life than any thing elſe can, he ought to be eſteemed a wiſe Man in the Opinion of the Atheiſt, who thinks nothing unfit to be done, which conduceth to this End. I proceed now,

IV. To ſhew, that on the other Side, if an Infidel believe the Principles of Religion falſe upon inſufficient Grounds, his Credulity is fooliſh and ſhameful.

For 'tis impoſſible a religious Man ſhould ſuffer ſo much by his Faith, as Men of no Religion muſt ſuffer by their Infidelity, if it ſhould happen to be built upon weak Grounds. The religious Man at moſt loſes only a little ſenſual Pleaſure: But the irreligious Man ventures the Loſs of eternal Happineſs, and the ſuffering eternal Miſery; and therefore, if it can be made appear, that he is too eaſy of Belief in giving Credit to irreligious Principles, his Credulity is extreamly fooliſh. I proceed therefore to ſhew,

V. That *Atheiſts* and *Infidels* are more credulous than *religious Men* and *Chriſtians*.

Two Things are here to be conſidered;

1. The Credulity of *Atheiſts*.
2. The Credulity of *Infidels*.

1. The Credulity of *Atheiſts*.

Here I ſhall ſhew,

1. What we mean by an *Atheiſt*.
2. What Degrees of Evidence are neceſſary to vindicate ſuch a one from the Shame of a fooliſh Credulity.
3. The Reaſonableneſs of our Belief, that there is a God.

1. What we mean by an *Atheiſt*.

An Atheiſt is one who believes that there is no eternal, intelligent Being, perfectly wiſe, juſt, and good, the Maker and Governor of all Things; and

therefore will not worſhip him, at the Hazard of being eternally miſerable, if they ſhould be miſtaken.

2. I ſhall now conſider what Degrees of Evidence are neceſſary to vindicate ſuch Men from the Shame of a fooliſh Credulity.

If theſe Men will pretend not to be over credulous, they ought in Caſe of ſo much Danger to be very certain, that there can be no ſuch Being or Obligation. For this Queſtion, whether there be a God or not, is not a Queſtion of meer Speculation, wherein we have no Intereſt concerned. And though if we ſhould ſuppoſe the Probabilities to be equal on both Sides; nay though we ſhould ſuppoſe the Probability were ſomething greater on the Side of *Atheiſm*, and that then it would be no fooliſh Credulity to believe them ſo to be; yet there would another Queſtion ariſe, whether thoſe Probabilities were ſufficient to juſtify him in giving ſo full an Aſſent to the Truth of that they are alledged to prove, as to depend upon them in the Government of himſelf, when he runs the greateſt Hazard if he ſhould be miſtaken. So that in this Caſe there is a Queſtion not only of meer Speculation, but alſo a Queſtion of Prudence; and though the *Atheiſt* ſhould not be over credulous in the one, yet he may be ſo in the other. This therefore we ſhould always carry in our Minds, when we are conſidering the Arguments for and againſt Religion, whether the Arguments for it are ſufficient to juſtify our embracing it for the Government of our Lives, whereby we can run no conſiderable Hazard, and are likely to attain many great Advantages; and whether the Arguments againſt Religion are ſtrong enough to juſtify our deſpiſing God, when an eternal Ruin would be the Conſequence of a wrong Perſuaſion. He that ventures more upon any Probabilities, than it becomes a wiſe Man to venture upon them, is certainly too credulous. I have inſiſted upon this, not

that

that we have any Reaſon to doubt of the far greater Strength of the Arguments for Religion and the Being of a God, but that we may the better diſcern the Height of thoſe Degrees of Folly in the Credulity of an Atheiſt, who denies a God upon Arguments that have no Strength in them. Alas, what is it that the common Herd of *Atheiſts* have to ſay for themſelves for denying the Being of a God, to their utter Ruin, if there ſhould be ſuch a Being? Nothing but the moſt clear Demonſtrations can be ſufficient Ground for ſuch daring Confidence, yet we may challenge the greateſt Part of them to produce any Thing of Weight in Defence of their Principles. I ſhall therefore ſhew,

3. The Reaſonableneſs of our Belief that there is a God. To prove which,

1. I ſhall conſider the Argument taken from general Conſent. Which I ſhall,

1. Explain, and,

2. Secondly, vindicate from thoſe Objections whereby the Atheiſts attempt to weaken it.

1. I ſhall explain the Argument taken from general Conſent.

The Belief of a God has ever been the Profeſſion of all Nations; and therefore it may naturally be eſteemed to ariſe in the Minds of Men from the Uſe of Reaſon, and to be the Perception of a plain Truth. I proceed therefore,

2. To vindicate thoſe Objections which the Atheiſts are wont to urge againſt it. As,

1. That there hath been no ſuch general Conſent as we argue from, and,

2. That ſuppoſing ſuch a general Conſent, this might probably ariſe from other Cauſes than the Reaſonableneſs of the Subject of this Conſent.

1. 'Tis objected that Men have not had ſuch a general Conſent, for,

1. They tell us there have been whole Nations

Strangers to the Notion of a God. To which it may be replied,

1. That in the most ancient Times no such People were known.

2. We find that those Countries which for so many Ages were unknown to the rest of the World, were not without the Acknowledgment of a Deity. But,

3. Atheists have never been able to produce an Instance of one civilized Nation in the World, without the Belief of such a Being. They have not pretended to affirm this of any, but some who were so brutish, that they seem to have nothing more than the outside of Men. And they might with as much Reason plead the Instance of Children who are not as yet come to the Use of their Understanding, as of such a People, who, they must own, have in a great Measure lost it.

Secondly, 'Tis objected, that the wisest Men even among the most knowing and civilized People have maintained the Principles of Atheism, who cannot well be supposed not to have discerned the Evidences of a divine Being, if they had been so obvious to human Understanding, and if the general Belief of his Existence had proceeded from its Agreeableness to the Reason of Mankind. To this we reply,

1. That our Atheists can give no Proof of this before *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; for tho' some of the more ancient Philosophers in their Physics take no Notice of an efficient Cause, but only of the first Material, yet it doth not follow they believed none. And *Simplicius* tells us, that they designed only to philosophize concerning natural Causes, but by no Means concerning those above Nature. And tho' *Aristotle* in some Places tells us, that many of the more ancient *Ionics* thought that Matter alone was the Principle of all Things, he is not to be believed, because he is continually endeavouring

vouring to leſſen the Eſteem of all that were before him. However he allows it at length to be probable, that they rather omitted to mention, than denied an efficient Cauſe.

2. Not only the ſuperſtitious Vulgar at *Athens*, but their grave Judges cenſured thoſe as *Atheiſts* who only ſhewed Contempt of their Idols.

3. It was only Pride and Affectation of great Wiſdom which made the Philoſophers contradict the common and received Opinions; and ſurely we cannot reaſonably believe, that the Authority of a few ſuch vain-glorious Boaſters is to be preferred to the general Conſent of the reſt of Mankind.

4. Among thoſe who have philoſophized atheiſtically, very few have been abſolute *Atheiſts*. They have rather endeavoured to reaſon themſelves into an Opinion ſo agreeable to their Wiſhes, than believed in their own Minds that there was no God. And if this was the Caſe of the Profeſſors of Atheiſm in the Heathen World, it certainly muſt be much more ſo of thoſe, who have been educated in the Chriſtian Religion. They may for the ſake of their Vices, raiſe Doubts in their Minds, but they can never really believe there is no God; they never can eraze thoſe Impreſſions of him which they ſo readily received, before the Intereſt of their Luſts made them deſire that there ſhould be none, but will frequently find them riſing in their Minds. And if the Caſe be thus with them, what Argument can be taken from ſuch Inſtances as theſe, againſt the Univerſality of the Acknowledgment of a God.

But ſome perhaps may tell us,

Thirdly, That the Belief of a God cannot be ſo general as we pretend it is, becauſe many who make Profeſſion of this Faith, do ſhew by their wicked Lives, that they do not believe as they would be thought to do. To which I reply,

That *Men* may know *God*, and *not glorify him*

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as God, they may *deny him in their Works*; that is, they may follow such a Course of Life, as no Man in Reason would persist in, who believes a just and good God; which amounts to no more than this, that reasonable Creatures may do unreasonable Things.

Fourthly, it may be objected, that there can be no such Thing as a general Agreement of Mankind in the Belief of a God, because it is impossible that Men should have any Idea of him. To confirm this, they assert,

1. That we can have no Object or Conception of any Thing, but what is the Object of some bodily Sense; and it being acknowledged by us, that the Word *God* doth not signify any such Thing, it must therefore signify nothing. But this is contradicted by the common Experience of Mankind, who know they have in their Minds, Thoughts, and Conceptions answering to those Words, of which they can have no corporeal Phantasms, besides those which their sound produces. These Men might as well say that Power, Wisdom, and Goodness are nothing, because they are not subject to any corporeal Sense. For however sensible their Effects are, the abstract Notion of them is not sensible.

2. They object to us, that we allow the Nature of God to be incomprehensible, and therefore they argue, that we cannot truly say, that the Generality of Men agree in the Belief of the Existence of a God. For whatever Idea we pretend they have in their Minds, answering to the Word *God*, is not the Idea of such a Being, whose Existence, we say, they agree in the acknowledgment of. That therefore which they are said so unanimously to affirm doth exist, is not God, it is something contained in the narrow Capacity of our Conception, which nothing infinite or incomprehensible can be. In answer, let it be considered;

1. If this be a true way of reasoning, it will equally serve us to prove, that there never was an Atheist in the World, one who said in *his Heart there was no God.* For a Man can no more deny *in his Heart*, than he can believe *in his Heart*, the Existence of a Being of which he can have no Conception, of which no Idea can enter his Heart. But,

2. I appeal to every Man's own Experience, whether he hath not a different Conception answering to these Words, *finite* and *infinite*, an *eternal* and *limited* Duration. How extremely credulous then must they be, who in a matter they are infinitely concerned not to be mistaken in, suffer themselves to be imposed upon by such Arguments as are urged from Principles, so manifestly contrary to their own Sense and Experience?

3. We readily grant that we cannot have such a comprehensive Knowledge of him as is commensurate to the divine Perfections; yet we may frame such a singular Idea of God, as is proportionate to our Nature and Understanding; a reasonable Foundation for our Worship, our Fear, our Love, and our Obedience, and such as we cannot think due to any other Being.

I proceed now to consider the other Objection of the *Atheist*, *viz.* That supposing such a general Consent as we pretend there hath been, this might probably arise from other Causes, than the Reasonableness of the Subject of this Consent.

Which Causes, as they are assigned by the Atheist, I will give a full answer to.

1. One Cause to which they ascribe this general Consent is Tradition. But this Pretence of Tradition can be of no Advantage to the Cause of Atheists, unless they mean either,

1. That it was an eternal Tradition from Father to Son; and then Mankind must have been eternally in an Error, if there be no God: And if Mankind did

did exist eternally, they must be self or necessarily existent, such as they did exist from eternity, and therefore with a false Notion of God in their Minds; and what is thus necessary, must be also natural, and as truly of the Essence of a Man, as any Thing else which belongs to him.

And if so, I would ask the Atheists to shew, why they are not to be esteemed Monsters, as much as any other of the Race of Mankind can be supposed to be. It must be a monstrous Faith which believes such an eternal Tradition; and as monstrously fooliſh must their Credulity be, who can entertain such an Hypothesis with such a Confidence, as to venture eternal Salvation upon it. But if any other Sort of Atheists make Use of this Pretence of Tradition, who believe that Mankind, and the Notion of a God, and the Tradition of it, were not eternal, they must mean,

2. That it happened, no body knows when or how, that wise Matter formed itself into such Order and Figure, and gave itself such Motions, that at length Men were produced; and though in other Respects these noble Machines seemed to be most curiously framed, yet by means of some unlucky Contexture of the Matter of their Minds, the false Notion of the Existence of a God was formed in it; which when these Men begat Sons and Daughters, they were careful to communicate to them, by which Means it has been transmitted through all Times. But this also supposeth the Notion of a God to be natural to the Constitution of Man; and if so, then the Atheists have something unnatural in them, and justly may be reckoned Monsters. If they say that those Deviations from the Nature of Man, as it was at first framed, are not to be called monstruous, which correct the Error of Nature by obliterating the false Notion of a God, which was at first impressed upon it; this

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is taking for granted, what they ſhould firſt prove, that there is no God. But if this be alſo not what they intend, by aſcribing the general Conſent of all Nations in the Belief of a God to Tradition, then they muſt mean,

3. That either from all Eternity to a certain Time, or when Men at firſt ſtarted up into the World, they were all Atheiſts; but at length ſome of them unluckily got this Notion in their Heads, and by ſome unaccountable Methods of Art or Force, brought all others into the Belief of it.

Certainly that Man who can eaſily acquieſce in this Account muſt believe any thing an Atheiſt ſhall aſſert. For he has no Hiſtory to produce for the Proof of what he ſays; but if it had been ſo, what tolerable Account can he give, how they came ſo eaſily to entertain an Opinion of God's Exiſtence, which he believes the moſt tormenting Principle in the World? If they found no very good Reaſon for it, how came it to paſs, that Tradition ſhould ſo effectually convey the Notion of a God, but ſhould not be able to preſerve the Principles of Atheiſm, if theſe were more agreeable to the Reaſon of Mankind? How came this Error to creep into the Minds of Men of all Nations? Will they ſay it began when Men were but a ſmall Company? But how can they ſuppoſe this, and not believe that Men ſprung from one Stock? For if Men were produced any of thoſe Ways, our Atheiſts tell us, they were, by the Power of undirected Matter, why might not this have happened in the moſt diſtant Parts of the World from one another? What precarious Principles do theſe Men pretend to reaſon upon? And what Fools muſt they be who ſuffer themſelves to be perſuaded by them? Tradition could never convey the Notion of a God ſo univerſally, unleſs it was firſt taught when Men firſt began to live upon the Earth by their firſt Pa-

rents, who could not be ignorant of their own Original by whom they were made; and that there were some strenuous Proofs of it to the Reason of Men. If the Opinion of the Existence of a God came first into the Minds of Men any of those Ways the Atheist would have us believe it did, it would certainly have been long rejected by the more learned Nations, and lost among the barbarous. I proceed to consider what farther Account the Atheists give us of this Matter.

2. They tell us that the Notion of a God came first into the Minds of Men by Fear.

But in answer to this, I have these following Things to offer.

1. The Atheists have no Evidence that there was a Time when there was no such Notion. He must therefore be very credulous, who will believe their Supposition concerning a Matter of Fact, for which they cannot produce one Witness.

2. This Account of the Original of the Notion of a God, is not consistent with their own Atheistic Principles. For they tell us, that Things must be, before they can be perceived, or at least there must be some corporeal Things without us, which raise a Phantasm within us: And if so, the Thing affrighting must be before the Fear of it. And I ask what it was, in their mechanical Way, that produced the Phantasm or Idea of God. They cannot say that it was somebody's describing the Existence of such a Being; it must therefore be according to their Principles, some dreadful Noise which impressed the terrible Figure of God in their Brain, through the Fright of which they were so terrified, that the Mind was never able to recover its true and original Motion. 'Tis possible, that Thunder and Lightening, and some other amazing Appearances in the World, might excite Men's Fear, and move them to consider the Reason of them;

them, and so lead them to the Apprehension of a more powerful Being than they had any Knowledge of.

But this is a Discovery made by Reason, and occasioned only by Fear, which excited the Mind to enquire into the Causes of those frightful Appearances.

3. If the Notion of a God was only an Impression made by Fear, without any Use of Reason, I cannot see the same Objects, acting mechanically, and causing Fear, should not cause the same Motions, and Impressions in the Beasts of the Field, as well as in Men, so far as Reason is not concerned. For tho' some Atheists tell us, that Reason can be no where, but in the Figure of a Man, yet seeing Brutes are capable of Fear as well as Men, why not also of every Thing else, which Fear produces without Reason? They may perhaps say, that the Matter on which the frightful Impression is made in Man only, is of such a particular Form and Texture, as disposeth it to receive such a particular Impression from affrighting Objects. This however makes the Notion of a God natural and necessary, and supposeth an unhappy Error in the Constitution of Man, whereby he is rendered unable to keep out of his Mind a Notion which they think is most troublesome.

4. If this Account were true, the most certain Way to plant the Notion of a God in the Minds of those who are destitute of it, would be to fright them, which is so very absurd, that it may be thought Loss of Time to mention it.

5. This Pretence of *Atheists*, that the Notion of a God comes from Fear, imports that those frightful Objects which caused the Notion of a God to fix in the Minds of Men, put them in such a Fright as disordered their Understandings, which is as much as to say, they were frightened out of their Wits;

so

ſo that if you believe this Plea of the Atheiſts, you muſt believe, that the firſt Authors of the Notion of a God were mad, that none were able to withſtand it, but only a few ſtout Atheiſts, whoſe Brains were better tempered, ſo that they could not be moved with ſuch an Exceſs of Fear as was able to diſturb their Reaſon; but if they can give us no better Proof that they are only in their Senſes, I leave it to every one to judge whether any but the moſt credulous Fools can be capable of any great Eſteem of their Underſtanding.

6. The Notion of a God, which Men have ſo generally entertained, is not ſo frightful as the Atheiſts ſuppoſe it to be. It includes Almighty Power indeed, but managed by equal Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Goodneſs. The World have conceived God to be one who is able to hear us and help us, and ready to do us good. And therefore the Atheiſts might as well have aſſigned Love, or Deſire, or Hope, to have been the Cauſe of the Opinion of the Exiſtence of a God, as Fear: But,

7. It is much more probable that Fear was the Cauſe of *Atheiſm*, than that it was the Cauſe of *Religion*. For Atheiſts agree that the Notion of a God is very frightful, and they are pleaſed when they can baniſh the Fear of him out of their guilty Breaſts. Whereby they declare they think it for their Intereſt that there ſhould be no God, and this is the Reaſon of their Pains to deliver themſelves and others from the Terror of him, and of their ſo eaſily crediting thoſe weak Arguments they alledge to diſprove his Being.

But after all, if we ſhould grant, that the Idea of a God was firſt formed by Fear, this Queſtion would ſtill remain unreſolved, *viz.* whether the believing it to be the Repreſentation of a real Being, was with Reaſon, or againſt it? If with Reaſon, 'tis no Matter how it came firſt there; if againſt Reaſon,

Reaſon, we are ſtill at a loſs to know how it ſhould come to paſs, that the Reaſon of Men, except in a few *Atheiſts*, no wiſer than other Men, ſhould never be able to find out it was nothing but an Impoſture of their own Fears. But if this Pretence of Fears will not ſatisfy us, they tell us,

Thirdly, That the Notion of a God firſt came into, and has ſo long been maintained in the Minds of Men, by their Ignorance of the Power of Matter to form itſelf into the Syſtem of the World, without the Help of any other Being diſtinct from it. But,

1. I would enquire of thoſe who impute the Original of the Notion of a God, to the general Ignorance of Men, as to the Powers of Matter, how we may ſafely rely upon the Diſcovery they pretend to have made, that the World was made without an intelligent Maker? One will magnify *Democritus*, another *Epicurus*; another will tell us *Epicurus* hath not mended the Matter. One will pretend to account for every Thing by ſtupid ſenſeleſs Matter, put into Motion they do not know by what. Another that dead Matter is not ſufficient for theſe Things, and therefore ſuppoſeth that every Particle of Matter hath Life eſſential to it. And others will tell us, unleſs we ſuppoſe Senſe, and Reaſon too, to be of the Eſſence of Matter, the Work can never be done.

Now how ſhall we know, amongſt all this contradicting Variety of Opinions of atheiſtic Philoſophers, who have been confuting in every Age by freſh Principles of Atheiſm, the Atheiſm of that before it, where the Truth and Certainty lies. For,

3. We are aſſured that thoſe who have ſtudiouſly enquired into the Natures and Cauſes of Things, the more they have ſearched, the more they have been convinced of the Neceſſity of a God.

How then can Men impute that to ignorance in

natural Causes, which the greatest Part of the learned World in all Ages have been more strongly confirmed in the Belief of, the more they have searched into the Power of them? But,

4. If we should suppose that the Assertors of a Deity had not so much Skill in Physiology as our Atheists pretend to have, yet Men without the Assistance of Philosophy, might discern the Being of a God, from the exquisite Frame and beautiful Order of the World, if they will but exercise their Faculties in a serious Contemplation of its several Parts. But,

5. Let us enquire into the great Proofs of Knowledge in the Causes of Things, which atheistical Men pretend to; if you ask one Sort of them, how all Things came to be as they are, they will only tell you, that it was always so, which is only to say they know nothing of the Matter. Another will tell us, Things are as they are, because they could not be otherwise.

Another will tell us, that an innumerable Company of little Crums of Matter, after they had been confusedly rambling about and justling one another, for no Body knows how long, in infinite Space, at length by meer Chance ranged themselves in the best Order that the most perfect Wisdom could have disposed them into.

This is indeed a wonderful Discovery: But after all, it doth not inform us, what the Cause was which put Things into the Order they are in, but only what it was not. But if we will not allow their Pretence, that the Notion of a God was the Creature of Ignorance, they have another Account to give us of its Original; and tell us,

Fourthly, That it was the Invention of Politicians to keep the Vulgar in Awe. But in answer to this, I shall observe,

1. That this depends upon the Truth of divers Matters

Matters of Fact, of which they have not the leaſt Degree of Truth. It is grounded upon a Suppoſition, that there was a Time when all the World were *Atheiſts:* It alſo farther ſuppoſeth, that Princes and Stateſmen were the firſt Deviſers and Teachers of Religion; and farther yet, that they learnt them not from any real Proofs, which they were better capable of obſerving than Perſons of meaner Parts and Education, but purely framed the Notion of a God for the Sake of the Ends it was ſerviceable to. But they can prove nothing of this, but on the contrary the moſt ancient Hiſtories are Evidences againſt them, and as far as we can know any Thing of the Matter, it is falſe. But,

2. The Suppoſition itſelf is not conſiſtent with the other Principles of *atheiſtical* Men. For if the Notion of a God was invented by Politicians, then it did not come by fear. But what Power of Invention can there be in the Minds of Men, which the Atheiſt tells us, are only acted upon, and can make no Ideas, but what are formed by ſomething without? If therefore they will be conſiſtent with themſelves, they muſt own, that when they ſay the Notion of a God was invented by Politicians, they mean only that it happened to be firſt formed and found in their Minds, in this their mechanical Way; then,

3. It is reaſonable to inquire how it came into the Brains of theſe Politicians. A Man would think that the Matter of wiſe Minds ſhould be leaſt capable of having any fooliſh Idea formed in them, and ſhould not be the firſt that ſhould feel that Paſſion, from the Motion of Matter without, wherein it conſiſts. And if this Notion did come into the Minds of theſe Men firſt, when the Idea appeared there, how came they to know it to be falſe? Or what Credit is to be given to their Judgment in thinking it falſe, who being ſo diſpoſed to oppreſs

Mankind, must needs be greatly prejudiced against the Belief of so mighty and righteous a Judge of Men? But

4. Were all the rest of the World so ignorant as to be imposed upon with their pretended Discovery of so slavish a Principle, as this Plea supposeth the Belief of a God to be, without any Proof of the Truth of it? Or had the People then no Suspicions of their Governours to impose upon them for their own Interest?

5. If we should suppose all this to be true Matter of Fact, yet how unreasonable is it to believe that it hath always been so? That Men should never be able to discover the Falshood of an Opinion, which had no better Foundation than the Authority of some cunning Statesman? That it should continue as long as we have any Account of Things, and be nothing but the Imposture of Men in Power; that tho' several Persons have made it their Business to undeceive them, and yet so few could be brought to esteem it a Cheat; that Princes and Politicians themselves should be awed with the fear of a God as well as other Men; which was only an Invention of their Predecessors no wiser than themselves; these are such unaccountable Things, as nothing but extreme Folly could ever induce Men to venture their eternal Happiness upon.

6. If the Notion of a God was the Invention of some very politic Head, how came it to be found among the most ignorant Nations, where there were no Proofs of the Policy of their Princes? If they will say that they might have some wiser Heads among them in former Times, they should also tell us how it came to pass that no other Appearances should remain of their wise Instructions; that this only should stick in their Minds, if there were not some obvious Reasons, even to the lowest Understanding of the Truth of it.

7. The

7. The Notion of a God which hath ſo generally prevailed, is of a Being, who is a ſupreme Lawgiver, an Inſpector into the Actions of Men, and a Revenger of them who do Evil, a Being to whom Princes and Stateſmen, as well as the common People, are accountable: Whereas if it had been the Invention of theſe great Men, they would have made it more ſerviceable to their particular Intereſt, Honour, and Security. And therefore we may conclude it was not invented by Politicians.

I come now,

Fifthly, To conſider another Cauſe to which a late Author, (*See Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm*) imputes the original of that Notion of a God, which hath ſo generally prevailed, and this is, *ill Humour*, and the want of Goodneſs in Mankind.

And the Subſtance of this Writer's Argument is this;

If there be a ſupreme Being, he muſt be perfectly good; and if he be perfectly good, there can be no Reaſon to fear him. He can have nothing of that Juſtice we vulgarly ſuppoſe in him; no Inclination to puniſh any Thing we think diſpleaſing to him. And Men had never entertained the Notion of a God to be feared upon any account, but becauſe they were not good themſelves; and therefore could not underſtand what true Goodneſs is. But being ill-natured themſelves, and *liable to Offence and Indignation*, they thought God ſo. In anſwer to this, I ſhall propoſe ſeveral Things to be conſidered.

1. That Juſtice hath been always included in that Notion of a God Mankind hath ſo generally conſented in; and therefore whatever Argument there is, in this general and conſtant Conſent of Mankind in believing the Exiſtence of a God, to prove that he is, doth equally prove that he is a juſt and righteous Being. Great Calamities have been

generally esteemed Effects of God's Displeasure; and Men have used Supplications and Expiations to appease it. The Terrors of Conscience prove Mens Agreement in the Notion of a just God, who *executes Wrath upon them that do Evil.* And that universal Practice of appealing to God by Oaths, doth evidently imply their Belief, that God doth concern himself to punish Falshood and Injustice. But this Author argues from a Principle directly contrary, *viz.* if there be a God, he must be so good as to have no such Justice as may give Men Cause to fear him.

2. If this Writer's Account of the original Notion of a God to be feared be true, then none but the most ill-natured Men did ever believe there was a just Governor of the World. And then we should find the most malicious and cruel Men, had the most awful Apprehensions of a God; not because they thought he would be displeased with their Cruelty, but because they thought the like Ill-nature to be Perfections of God. For where the Cause, the *only* Cause, is in the greatest Strength, there the Effect is most likely to be produced in the greatest Perfection, and consequently where there is the most *Ill-nature*, the only Cause of fearing God, there will be in all Reason the highest Degree of this Fear. And yet we find many of these ill-natured Men, *making as bold with God*, as this Writer himself in that *Height of Goodness* he pretends to have raised himself to.

3. If the Notion of a divine Being, a just Object of Fear, be wholly owing to the *Ill-nature* of men, if the more we improve in Goodness, the less apt we are to believe such a Being, then it would follow, that the best Christians, as to their Temper and Practice, would be most easily inclined to believe, that God would not punish any Thing we do. For Love, Meekness, Patience, are the Duties of Christianity,

ſtianity, and the moſt diſtinguiſhing Marks of a true Chriſtian, ſo that the beſt Chriſtians are the beſt humoured Men in the World; and yet I believe, that in their *nobleſt Heights of Love and Goodneſs* they have not thought that God's executing his Threatenings can proceed from nothing but Malice. But have rather *then* had the moſt tender Senſe of the dangerous State of wicked Men.

Our bleſſed Saviour was as highly ſenſible of the Juſtice of God, of his Reſolution to puniſh Unbelief, and Impenitence as ever any Man was. And no Perſon ever appeared in the World, who gave more Teſtimonies of invincible Goodneſs, Meekneſs and Gentleneſs, or gave leſs Cauſe to be ſuſpected of ill Nature: And therefore according to this Writer's own Confeſſion, he muſt have been excellently qualified to judge whether thoſe *Forms of Juſtice, thoſe Degrees of Puniſhments, and thoſe Meaſures of Offence and Indignation we ſuppoſe in God*, are conſiſtent with the true Idea of Goodneſs; yet thoſe *Forms*, &c. were plainly taught by him, as the moſt real and manifeſt Truths.

4. Goodneſs itſelf in the higheſt Perfection, is ſo far from rendering a Being, endued with it, not at all to be feared, that in ſome Caſes it muſt be a juſt Cauſe for Men to fear him. If it be a Being on whom we depend, and concerns himſelf about us, the more he abounds in Goodneſs, the more will bad Men fear him. For it ſeems impoſſible to conceive how ſuch abundant Goodneſs ſhould have the ſame affectionate Regard to what is contrary to it, as for Love, and Meekneſs, and Charity.

5. Not only thoſe Things which are oppoſite to Goodneſs, muſt be diſpleaſing to a perfect Being, becauſe he is good; but theſe, and all other Kinds of moral Evil, becauſe he muſt as neceſſarily be juſt; and his Goodneſs can only be ſuch as is conſiſtent with Juſtice. If there be any ſuch Thing in

Nature *as moral Good* and *Excellence*, as certainly there is, and is allowed to be by this Writer; then there must also be some Things, which are in like Manner morally bad; and such Things must be offensive to the Will of a perfect Being, who cannot but know what is unfit for Men to do, and cannot but will that they should not do it. And if Virtue and Vice are different Things in their own Nature, there must be a different Relation of Things and Circumstances to the one and to the other; and Rebuke or Punishment will have the same Relation to Vice, as Praise and Reward to Virtue; and there will be as much Reason for a vicious Man to stand in Awe of the Justice of a *supreme Manager*, as for a virtuous Man to hope in his Goodness; for to suppose him to treat in the same Manner, Things, which in their Nature are so different, is to suppose him to do what in Nature is not fit to be done; and not to render to every Man the *Recompence which is meet.*

What Perfection of Goodness soever we ascribe to a divine Being, cannot be such as takes away all Ground of Fear whatever we say or do; for such Goodness, if it may be so called, is in Truth inconsistent with the natural, as well as moral Perfections of such a Being; and implies either Want of Understanding of the different Nature of Things, or Want of Will to treat them in a Manner befitting their different Nature, and to suit the Condition to the Qualifications of the Persons. We cannot therefore deny the Justice of God, unless we also deny the Perfection of his Power, or Knowledge, or Wisdom, or suppose him capable of being persuaded by some Temptation, or other, to act contrary to these Perfections, to make such Applications of Affection and Circumstances to Things and Persons, as he knows are not fit to be made, and is no Ways constrained to by any superior Power.

It

It is therefore a Contradiction in this Writer to acknowledge a perfect Being without Justice, or such a Regard to the moral Actions of Men, as may and ought to be a *Terror to evil Doers.*

Our Author pleads for a Liberty of ridiculing every Thing, which should seem to intimate a Belief that there was no real Difference in Things; but he pretends for the Ground of this Plea, that we cannot know what is grave, 'till by trying how well Things will bear Ridicule, we come to know what Things are grave and serious, and what not. But when we come to know the true Nature of Things, we must then treat them agreeably to their Nature, or we make ourselves *ridiculous.* By his own Confession then, there can be no Excuse for the Injustice of treating every Thing alike, but our Ignorance of the true Nature of Things, or Inability to do otherwise; neither of which can be supposed in a *perfect Being.*

6. That if there be a divine or perfect Being, this Writer says, he must be so good that no Man can have any Reason to be afraid of him, and represents him under the Notion of *a general Mind*, that *hath Relation to the whole.* I suppose he means as the Soul to the Body. For saith he, *if there be a general Mind, it can have no particular Interest; but the general Good, and its private Good, must needs be one and the same. It can intend nothing besides, nor aim at any thing beyond, nor be provoked to any thing contrary.* No more without doubt he would have us believe, than the Mind of Man can design or inflict any thing hurtful upon any Part of himself. But if we would suppose such a *general Mind*, it is certainly very weak or ignorant, or very far from being so *perfectly good* as is pretended. For it is evident, that Mankind, who are no inconsiderable Part of the Universe, are not in the happiest State they are capable of. They would be more hap-

py, if they were in constant Health and Peace, nor felt any of the Calamities they are subject to.

These Evils, in this Author's Opinion, can have nothing of Discipline or Punishment in them; they can be no Warnings of future Evils in another State; no Means designed to bring us to Repentance, that worse Things may not hereafter come to us. According to his Principles therefore, his *general Mind* must be supposed to be no great Lover of Mankind, or to want Power to exercise his Goodness towards them, or to understand but little of what concerns *them*, that is a considerable Part of himself. And thus there will be little Difference betwixt the Notion of *forlorn Nature*, and a *fatherless World*, and his Notion of a *general Mind*, a Mind which hath so little Regard of its own Welfare, or so little Power or Knowledge to help himself.

As *Religion* therefore *now stands among us*, good People must have less Fear from the Belief of a wise, powerful, just and good God, who is continually watching over them for good, and by their Afflictions working for them *an eternal Weight of Glory*, than from the Belief of *forlorn Nature*, or such a *general Mind*, which regards only their present Good, and yet suffers them oftentimes to be of *all Men the most miserable*.

'I must here observe the Inconsistency of this Author's Notions of what he calls a *divine and perfect Being*; it is sometimes a *general Mind*, and at other Times a *common Parent* and Father of the World.

As for this *general Mind*, he tells us, that the *general Good, and its own private Good, must be one and the same*: Which seems to suppose this *general Mind* and the Universe to be one and the same Being. And if so, how can this Mind be called the *common Parent* and *Father* of the *World*, or which is all one, the Father of itself? And if we may be allowed to give what Names we please to the *supreme*

preme Manager, and then reaſon from them, as he doth from that of a *general Mind*, that what is ſo can intend nothing but the Good of the whole, and therefore cannot be a proper Object of Fear. Why may we not as well argue from his other of a *common Parent*, that if there be ſuch a one, it is reaſonable to expect he ſhould be differently affected towards his Children, according as they obey or diſobey him?

7. This Writer's Notion of the Goodneſs of a perfect Being, according to his own Principles, can only appear reaſonable but when we are what he calls in the *beſt of Humours*; and therefore he ſays he *cares not to think on Religion, without endeavouring to put himſelf in as good a Humour as poſſible.* But if Truth be always the ſame, that will be moſt true, which appears ſo to Men in all Humours: And certainly it is very abſurd for any Man to pretend to this *good Humour*, before he hath caſt out of his Mind all dreadful Thoughts of a ſupreme Manager, and yet to own, as this Author doth, that we muſt be firſt in this *good Humour*, before we can caſt them out.

But this confirms what he obſerves, that *Atheiſm is not exempt from Enthuſiaſm*: That Men by a ſtrong Paſſion for Vice and Pleaſure, may bring themſelves to believe they are delivering the Oracles of Reaſon, when they are uttering the groſſeſt Abſurdities, for the diſproving thoſe Perfections, which all other Perſons own, and even they themſelves, when their Tranſport is over. *In Adverſity, or ill Health, under Affliction, or Diſturbance of Mind*, ſaith he, *it is we ſee Wrath, and Fury, and Revenge, and Terrors, in the Deity*; when his *good Humour* fails, then his pleaſing Notion of the divine Goodneſs fails him too, when he hath moſt need of Support and Comfort from it. But *then* it is that the good Chriſtian, by having Recourſe to God's Promiſes, calms diſturbing Thoughts, and delights

lights himself in him: And it is nothing but a fond Affection for Vice, can dispose Men to wish against the Being of such a just and righteous God, as our holy Religion describes.

Is it not then a foolish Credulity which entertains that for the true Notion of divine Goodness against the general Consent of Mankind, which appears to be so only to some loose Persons, in one *Humour* of their Lives, without any Reason to support it but this, that in this *Humour*, they find by Experience, they have no fear of God before their Eyes.

8. This Writer's Notion of perfect Goodness in a supreme *Manager*, is not only contrary to the constant general Idea, which Men have had of a divine Being, but hath all the Evidence and Proofs of the Truth of the *Gospel* against it. For therein the Wrath of God is plainly revealed against *all Ungodliness and Unrighteousness of Men*. And yet he brings no Arguments against it; but only insinuates, that our Faith hath no *other Foundation but the specious Pretext of moral Evidence, and Matter of Fact*; that is, the best Evidence it is capable of; and tells us, that when he is in a very *good Humour*, he cannot believe as we do. But doth not his own Argument depend upon moral Evidence? And we have nothing but the moral Evidence of his own Word that he was in so good a Humour when he wrote his Letter.

Thus I have endeavoured to explain and vindicate the Argument taken from general Consent, to prove the Being of a God, to shew wherein the Strength of it lies, and to answer the several Objections of atheistical Men, by which they endeavour to weaken the Force of it.

I come now to consider the Evidence we have of a divine Being from the Contemplation of ourselves. This will appear by considering the Account which the *Atheists* give of these Things.

First,

First, That Men have been from all Eternity such as they now are: Or,

Secondly, That Men were formed in Time out of eternal self-existent Matter, by the casual Motion of its Parts.

First, That Men have been from Eternity such as they now are.

But if Man be an eternal Being, he must be independent, or dependent. If independent of any other Being, he must exist by the Necessity of his own Nature; and if so, then it is impossible to suppose that Man should not exist. But no one sure will say that there ever was a Man whose Existence was thus necessary; for then he must have been immortal, a Man of whose Essence it was necessarily to exist, and therefore always to exist. They cannot say that human Nature is thus necessary, for that can have no Existence but in Singulars. And if it be possible for all Men to perish, then it is possible for human Nature to be utterly extinguished.

If Man were an eternal dependent Being, an eternal Effect of an eternal Cause; if that Cause be allowed to be intelligent, wise, and good, this would be to acknowledge a God.

If it were a stupid unintelligent Being, the Atheists can never make it credible, that that should be a competent Cause of such an Effect; and it is equally absurd to make it so from Eternity, as to make it so in Time; for Time and Eternity make no Difference in this Case; and whatever is alledged to shew the Unreasonableness of supposing unintelligent Matter to produce such an Effect as Man in Time, equally proves it to have been always so.

I proceed therefore to shew the Absurdity of the other Account of the Atheist, *viz.*

2. That Men were formed in Time out of self-existent Matter, by the casual Concourse of the Parts of it. To this End I shall consider,

1. The

1. The Nature of the Effect, Man. And,

2. The Insufficiency of the Cause they assign of its Production.

1. The Nature of the Effect, Man.

1. Then let us consider the Frame of our Bodies. How curiously are they made? How manifestly are every one of its Parts set in such Places, and in such Order, as may best serve their proper Ends? How every Part hath such a Fence, such a Situation, such a Temperament, as is most conducing to Ease, Safety, Beauty, and Use? To how many excellent Purposes do the Organs of our Bodies serve? How useful, and yet how wonderful is the peristaltic Motion of the Intestines, the Motion of the Diaphragma for the assisting Respiration, and the Systole and Diastole of the Heart, whereby the Blood is driven thro' various Channels into the several Parts of the Body? But,

2. Let us consider the Powers of the Soul. How excellent and capacious they are? How swift are their Motions, how delightful their Exercises? What Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge is the Soul of Man capable of containing? What Variety of Arts, and what Volumes of History? What subtil Reasonings, what abstract Notions, what sweet Meditations, what joyful Remembrances, what delightful Hopes, and what divine Virtues it is capable of?

All which are Proofs that we are made by a Being powerful, wise, and good, beyond all Expression. And that this may appear a very just Conclusion, I shall consider,

2. The Insufficiency of the Cause which the *Atheists* assign of its Production, and of the Frame and Powers of Mankind.

They will allow no Wisdom to have any Hand in producing this admirable Effect: They ascribe it wholly to blind Necessity, or the lucky Jumble of Atoms. They suppose that the Organs of our Bo-

dies, though so exactly fitted to such excellent Ends, were never designed for any; that all Things happened into such Form by a casual Fluctuation of Things; that the most wise Contrivances were the mere Effect of Blunder; that the Operations of the Soul are nothing else but the various Friskings of senseless Matter; that Sense and Reason were the Product of an unintelligent Cause; that Thought, Remembrance, Wisdom, Will, and a self-determinating Power, are nothing else but a fortunate Mixture and undirected Motion of those little Atoms, of which the Soul, they assert, is composed. But these are such gross Delusions, that none but an Atheist could be betray'd into. For nothing can be more precarious than those Principles on which they ground their Belief, that we are not the Workmanship of such a Being as we call God. Can they alledge any Thing to prove that there can be no self-existent intelligent Being, capable of producing such a Being as Man? That there is something eternal and self-existent, they themselves allow, and also that there was something capable of producing such a Being; and why must that be unintelligent? Are Chance or Necessity more probable Causes of such an Effect, than Wisdom and Counsel? Can they give any tolerable Account of the noble Faculties of the Soul from dull Matter alone? Can they make it credible against our own Experience, that we are nothing but meer corporeal Machines, that all our Thoughts are only the Effect of the forcible Impressions or Impulse of Bodies without us? Can any Thing be more precarious or more incredible than the Truth of these Things? Can any Thing be more worthy of our Indignation, than the Attempts of Men to persuade us to believe them? If we can believe such Things as these, which are the Principles into which all Atheism must be resolved, or the most evident Consequences from them, upon the

Authority

Authority of a few vain-glorious Pretenders to Wit and Philoſophy, we may juſtly be *aſhamed* of our Credulity. I come now,

2. To conſider the Credulity of the Infidels amongſt us, who believe that it is more reaſonable to renounce than to perſiſt in the Chriſtian Religion. To prove which Credulity,

1. It will be proper for us to conſider the Poſſibility of a divine Revelation. And ſure we cannot think it above the Power of an almighty Being, in Ways unknown to us, to enlighten the Minds, and to improve the Underſtanding of Men, and to make them capable of declaring ſuch Things with great Sincerity, which he thus filleth them with the Knowledge of. And if we act reaſonably, we muſt allow it poſſible, unleſs we can find a manifeſt Contradiction in the Nature of the Thing ſuppoſed to be done, which I preſume never was, or can be diſcovered.

2. Let us conſider the Poſſibility of God's exerciſing his Power in this Manner. And ſurely we cannot think it improbable, that ſuch a perfectly good Being ſhould make ſuch a Revelation, if it might be to the Benefit of Men. And I conceive no Man will prove that it is ſo very eaſy for all Men, by the Strength of their natural Abilities, to attain the Knowledge of all Things which are of Uſe to them, that they are incapable of receiving any Benefit by ſuch Revelation.

3. If we ſuppoſe God ſhould be inclined to make any ſuch Revelation, there is nothing more likely to be the Subject of it than the *Goſpel*, which inſtructs us in the true Knowledge of God, and our ſelves; how we are to live, ſo that we may ſecure eternal Happineſs, and avoid everlaſting Miſery. And what End can be more becoming a wiſe, juſt, and holy God to deſign, by making a Revelation, as to reform the World to renew us after his Image,

and to lead us to the Practice of those Virtues which tend to the publick and private happiness of Mankind? And,

4. Though there be some Doctrines which are above our Comprehension in the *Gospel*, yet this cannot be sufficient Reason to renounce the Christian Faith, unless it be reasonable to believe, that God can tell us nothing is, but what we can understand how it should be, and fully comprehend all, even the unrevealed Circumstances of it. Which I believe none will be so proud as to own.

If now upon a due Consideration of these Things, we are satisfied, that a divine Revelation is not impossible, and that there is nothing in the Gospel, but what might probably be the Subject of such a Revelation, if God pleased to make one; it will then be proper for us to consider,

5. What Proof we have that the Gospel is such a Revelation. And here we may observe,

1. That it is plainly asserted by the Writers of the New Testament, that *Jesus* was a *Teacher* come from God, and that his Disciples were inspired by the *holy Spirit*.

2. That the many Miracles which *Jesus* wrought, if they are true, as related by them, sufficiently confirm the Truth of the Assertion.

3. That they were sufficiently qualified to know the Truth of what they related, being Eye-Witnesses of the Facts.

4. And we cannot suspect their Fidelity, because they had no worldly Interest to serve, but knew they should be ill-treated for publishing these Things; and as they were not dismay'd at the Threats of their Enemies, so neither could any one of them under the most grievous Tortures, be brought to confess himself a Cheat. And,

5. That this cannot be supposed to be the Effect of Enthusiasm or Obstinacy, is plain, when we consider the great number of Converts, whom they

converted, by the Signs and Wonders, which they wrought to confirm what they taught.

For how credulous ſoever we may ſuppoſe Men to be, with Reſpect to ſuch Matters as favour their Luſts and Intereſt, or to the Cuſtoms and Religion they have been educated in, yet we may reaſonably ſuppoſe the utmoſt Averſion in them to the believing and profeſſing a Religion, which required them to contradict their ſtrongeſt Inclinations, to renounce the Religion of their Fathers, and charged them with the Murder of killing the Saviour of Mankind. I know nothing we have more to conſider than,

Laſtly, Whether the Books of the New Teſtament were written by the Apoſtles, and have faithfully been tranſmitted down to us.

And for this we have as good a Proof as a Thing of this Nature is capable of, which in other Caſes is generally allowed to be ſufficient. If we conſider how early, how univerſally theſe Books were received, as written by the Authors whoſe Names they bear; how vain the Attempts of the Enemies of Chriſtianity have been to deſtroy the Credit of them; what Care hath been taken to compare the ſeveral Copies of them, and how exactly the Doctrines now contained in them, agree with what we find in all others Authors, neareſt to thoſe Times, and what Sort of Men they generally are, who ſhew their deſpite to them: If we ſeriouſly conſider theſe Things, I know no Reaſon we can have to throw off that reverend Regard to them, which we have been taught they deſerve and require from us.

Thus have I briefly mentioned ſome of thoſe Arguments, by which we are confirmed in our Chriſtian Faith, and which, if duly conſidered, would be ſufficient to ſhew, that our Reaſons for perſevering in it, are ſtronger than any the Infidels can produce for their renouncing it, and conſequently that the Credulity is on their Side. Dr.

Dr. *WOODWARD*'s

BOYLE's LECTURES

ABRIDG'D.

THE
Divine ORIGINAL
AND
Incomparable EXCELLENCE
OF THE
Christian Religion.

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1 COR. i. 21.

For when in the Wisdom of God, the World by Wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the Foolishness of Preaching to save them that believe.

IN treating of these Words, I desire you to remark,

I. That whereas our Apostle affirms that the *Gentile World by their Wisdom knew not God*, he does not mean, that the Light of Nature is not able to discover the *Being* and prime Attributes of God, for he elsewhere affirms it.

II. That the Text does expresly declare that many Truths of Importance to the present Peace and everlasting Happiness of Men, are clearly revealed in the Gospel, which could not be known by the Light of Nature.

I. The Apostle does not mean that *the Light of*

Nature is not sufficient to discern the *Being and prime Attributes* of God.

For *Rom.* i. 20. he declares that the invisible Things of God are clearly seen by the Things that are made.

We have five Demonstrations of a God continually before our Eyes.

I. The Frame of the World.

II. The manifest Footsteps of an over-ruling Providence.

III. The reasonable Sentiments of all wise Men in all Ages concerning these Things.

IV. The wonderful Frame of our Bodies.

V. The Faculties of our Souls.

I. The Frame of the World demonstrates a Deity.

The Magnitude, Number, and Order of the Stars; together with the Frame, Glory, Position, Motion, and Uses of the Sun, appear evidently to be the Effects of infinite Wisdom, Power and Goodness. How just is it in its Distributions betwixt Light and Darkness. Was it either nearer or more distant from us, it would either burn us up, or we should perish with Cold. Whence comes this exact Order in Things without Sense? How come they to serve such good Ends? They must be the Works of an Omnipotent God, *Psal.* xix. 1.

If we descend to consider the admirable Nature, and Uses, and Inhabitants of the *Air*.

If we consider the Element, Uses, and Inhabitants of the *Water*.

If we come down to the *Earth*, and consider all those various Creatures that live on it; if we consider their Capacities; and how justly they are proportioned.

If we consider the Variety of *Vegetables*, the Beauty of their Clothing, and their manifold Uses.

If we consider also those innumerable Creatures with which almost every Leaf is stocked.

And

And if after all we consider the numerous Kinds of *Minerals*, and *Fossils*, with their various Uses for the Benefit of human Life, we cannot but confess, *O Lord! how wonderful are thy Works? In Wisdom hast thou made them all.*

II. The second Proof of a Deity, is the manifest Footsteps of an over-ruling Providence.

Can any reasonable Man suppose that the Hosts of Heaven could be ordered without some great General? Or the Inhabitants of the *Earth* and *Water* subsist without the Care of some common Proveditor, who fills all Things with his Plenteousness?

Who can consider the political Adjustment of *Power* and Interest in the various Nations of the World, without adoring him, whose Kingdom ruleth over all?

The special Providence also attending good Men, is a Demonstration of a watchful Providence above: Of this the most prudent Men of all Ages have been persuaded; which leads to the third Proof of a Deity.

III. If we consult the Sentiments of the *wisest* and *best* Men of all Ages, we shall find that they acknowledged and feared a supreme Being, who made them, and will call them to an Account. The former were too wise to be *imposed* upon, and the latter *too great* to be *over-awed* by vain Imaginations. Yea, we have seen and heard of many Persons of all Ranks, whose Sins have been turned into Punishments by the Horrors of their Minds, that we cannot but look upon them as Introductions of a Judgment to come.

On the other Side, the same *Power* of Conscience cheers up an innocent Person, though under Injuries and Aspersions.

IV. The Frame of human Bodies is the fourth Proof of a Deity. Who can reflect upon the Mechanism and Uses of every Part of the Body; upon

the Eye, the Ear, the Heart, and Circulation of the Blood, and not cry out with the Psalmist, *I will praise thee, O Lord, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made?*

V. The fifth Proof of a God is the Operations of the Soul, of whose Original and Capacity no reasonable Account can be given without the Supposition of a Deity. We find nothing in this visible World that has such noble Faculties as the Soul of Man; that can *reason* and *reflect*, *forecast* and *recollect*, *meditate* and *abstract*, as we ourselves can, nor is it conceivable that *meer Matter* can be wrought up to this Pitch of Rationality, because there is no Degree of it in Things meerly material.

Besides we find something of Religion connatural to Man; he no sooner can open the Eyes of his Mind, but he discerns the Glory of his *omnipotent Maker*. His Reason concludes, that the highest *Veneration* ought to be given to *infinite Majesty*, the highest *Affection* to infinite *Goodness*, the greatest Fear to infinite *Power*, and the firmest *Obedience* to infinite *Authority*, and that it must be the best *Improvement* of human Nature to resemble the *Truth*, *Justice*, and *Beneficence* of God, which is the Sum of *natural Religion*.

So that Religion is as true as our *Faculties*. If there be such a Thing as *Reason*, there is a God of infinite *Perfection*; for this is the Lesson that true Reason reads in every Page of the *Book* of *Nature*: And if there be an all-perfect *Being*, who made us, we ought in *Duty*, in *Interest*, and in *Honour*, to love, reverence, and serve this glorious Being.

Having shewn, that the Apostle does not mean that the Light of Nature is not able to discover the *Being* and *prime Attributes* of God; for he elsewhere affirms, that *the invisible Things of God from the Creation are clearly seen by the Things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead.*

I come now to shew what the Apostle intends in the Text, which is, II. That

II. That many Truths of great Importance to our present *Peace* and *Happiness*, are revealed in the *holy Scriptures*, which could not be duly known by the Light of Nature.

In order to which I propose to manifest the Truth of these three Assertions.

I. That the Christian Religion discovers many *Truths*, necessary to our *Pardon* and *Peace*, and to our *Purification* and *Hope*, which could not be found out by the Light of Nature.

II. That the Christian Religion communicates supernatural *Aids*, in order to the Reformation of Men's Hearts and Lives; by which such Improvements are made upon human Nature, as cannot otherwise be attained.

III. That the Christian Religion lays such a solid Foundation of *Comfort* in all Conditions, and thereby leads Men to such a State of Serenity and *Peace* in Life and Death, as no other Rules can bring us to.

In order to prove the first *Assertion*, I must observe,

I. That the Nature and Attributes of God cannot be known by the Light of Nature, so far as is necessary to the present Peace and future Happiness of Men.

For here we should know not only that there is but one God, but also in what Way he may be worshipped acceptably. We should also know how he may be *reconciled*, when we have offended him.

But instead of proper Instruction in these great Points, what abominable *Notions* and *Rites* do we find in the *Doctrine* and Worship of the best of Heathens?

What a strange Medley of Gods were worshipped both by the *Romans* and *Athenians?* And what wicked Ceremonies were introduced into their divine Worship? And their Philosophers were as bad as

the

the common People; and for all *their Wisdom* they knew not God.

In a Word, the Notions of God among the Heathens were *low* and *base*, and their Ways of Worship *unsuitable* and *unseemly*.

II. The most learned Heathens could not give any tolerable Account of the Origin of the World.

The Notion of a *creative Power* that could produce Things out of Nothing, was above the Reach of their natural Conceptions; and therefore *Aristotle* fell into the absurd Notion of the Eternity of the World. Not considering that it implies these Contradictions, *viz.* that an *Infinity* can be *increased* daily; that a Thing which had no *Succession*, had no *Beginning*; that there is such a Thing as *infinite Number*; that Things which *change* are *eternal*; that *Causes* and their *Effects* are both *eternal*.

Democritus, and others, seeing the Absurdity of this Opinion, asserted that the World was formed in the present admirable order from a *casual Hitt* of innumerable Atoms; but they cannot tell us how these Atoms came to have a Being, how they began to *move*, or how they came to be differently *shaped*, or what occasioned their *oblique Motion*, to which they are not prone; or why some of them moved obliquely, rather than the rest, or how the different Quantities of them came to be justly proportioned for such and such Productions, or how all Things in the World continue in such admirable Order, without an understanding Governor.

Thus we see that the Heathens had no true Notition of the Origin of the World.

But by Faith we learn that the *Worlds were made by the Word of God*, Heb. xi. 3.

III. We do not find in any uninspired Author any true Account of the *Depravity* and *Misery* of Mankind.

It is very evident that such Things as are *spiritu-*

ally good, as the *Image*, the *Love*, and the *Grace* of God, are the greatest Happiness of Man, because they tend to the greatest Benefits, and of the longest Duration.

How comes it then that Men are averse to these Things by a natural Indisposition? Why are they so prone to transgress God's Commands, since his Will is best?

The more judicious Heathens saw and lamented the universal Tendency of Men to Wickedness, but were ignorant of the true Source of it. They generally owned that the chief Good of Men consisted in the Exercise of Virtue, but complained of an *irregular Sway* in the Wills of Men, which rendered their Precepts of little Use.

Upon the whole it puzzled them to give a Reason why Man, that has the noblest Faculties of any *Being* upon Earth, should yet generally pursue their Destruction with as much Industry, as a Beast avoids it?

They knew not why a Man should be more afflicted than other Creatures; and why a *virtuous sober* Person should suffer more Diseases than a Herd of Cattle. The Heathens called these Sufferings the *Tributes of Life*; but Christians more properly the *Penances of Sin*.

IV. We do not find in all the *Pagan* Volumes any Account of the *Incarnation*, *Sufferings*, and *Mediation* of the Son of God for Men. The divine Method of our Salvation was to the *Greeks Foolishness*; for these two Reasons: 1. Because the Apostles used not Eloquence in their Preachings. 2. Because they preached Salvation to Men by the Merit of a crucified Saviour. What is said of the Writings of the Sybils is with Judgment rejected. (*See St. Austin de Civitate. Dei. lib.* 18. *cap.* 47.) For before Christ's Appearance the *Gentiles sat in Darkness*, which is the Point I am now insisting upon.

V. They

V. They had no Notion of any Way in which God would pardon their *Offences* againſt him that could ſatisfy their Reaſon.

Their natural Light could ſhew them their *Guilt*, but could not ſhew them a *Remedy*. They could not ſee how *infinite Juſtice* could ſtoop to one Thought of pardoning Offences againſt his *infinite Majeſty*; or if they had hope that God would pardon them of *his meer good Nature*, as the *Socinians* imagine; how could they at this Rate retain ſuch *venerable Ideas* of God's perfect Righteouſneſs and Majeſty as are neceſſary to overawe Men into a Fear of ſinning againſt him?

VI. The Sanctification of a Sinner by the *Holy Spirit of God*, which is the only Way of attaining it, was a Thing foreign to their Notions by natural Light. Some of them forbad Men to pray to the Gods to *make them good*, which they ſaid, they ought to do themſelves. But what Hope could a bad Man have of this, when their Rules for Mortification were inſufficient for that Purpoſe.

They rather diverted the carnal Diſtemper, than *crucified the Fleſh*, with its Affections and Luſts; which is indeed only to be laid in *Regeneration*, by the Spirit of God, and the divine Gift of a *new Heart*.

VII. The Heathens had not any perfect Scheme of moral Rules for Piety and good Manners.

They never taught it to be a Duty *to love Enemies*, and *forgive Wrong*. They allowed *Polygamy*; and thought Pride and Vain-Glory proper Incentives to Virtue and great Actions; the ſubduing of which is the firſt Leſſon in true Virtue.

And then as to the interior Acts of the Soul, the Adultery of the *Eye*, and the Murder of the *Heart*, they were little regarded.

VIII. They had no Certainty of the *eternal Rewards and Puniſhments* of a future State. They had

indeed general Notions of a future Life, but they wrote about it with great Doubtfulness; as we may see from *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and the best Heathen Writers.

Now this Doctrine being the chief Support of Virtue, the Heathens were very unhappy in this Respect, and in the other Points beforementioned, for they nearly concern the Peace and Bliss of all Men.

But what they wanted, the Gospel has supplied, in which *Life and Immortality are brought to Light.* And not only so; but,

II. The Christian Religion communicates supernatural Aids, in order to the Reformation of Men's Hearts and Lives, by which such divine Improvements are made upon human Nature, as cannot be attained by any other Means.

The holy Gospel comes in the Demonstration of the Spirit, and with Power: God here has promised his *holy Spirit to them that ask him*, and by this divine Power he will put *his Law in Men's Minds, and write them in their Hearts.* i. e. He will make their Minds and Hearts agreeable thereto.

This is the most honourable and happy Change that can be wrought upon human Nature: And this is effected by the *Grace of God, which bringeth Salvation, and teacheth us to deny all Ungodliness and worldly Lusts, and to live righteously, soberly, and godly in this present World. Looking for that blessed Hope, and the glorious Appearance of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ.* Which leads us to the last *Excellency* of the Christian Religion above all other, *viz.*

III. That it lays such a solid Foundation of Comfort in all Conditions as no other Rules can bring us to.

While we keep to those Directions which we are assured are the *Will of God revealed for our Salvation*, we know we are safe. God will direct us in all our

our Doubts, comfort us in all our Troubles, ſupply our Wants, and after Death receive us to everlaſting Reſt.

Having already conſidered the Evidences of God's Being and Attributes by the Light of Nature, and the more clear Diſplay of them by the Beams of Revelation, I come now to prove the Truth of the Holy Scriptures, and ſhew upon what Grounds we believe this to be the *Word of God.*

In order to this we muſt premiſe that there are *three Sorts* of *Certainty.*

I. There is a *phyſical Certainty* which depends upon the Evidence of Senſe. As I ſee a Colour; which no Body doubts, where the *Organ*, and the *Medium*, and the *Object* are rightly diſpoſed.

II. There is a *mathematical Certainty.* As that *twenty* are more than *one.*

III. There is a *moral Certainty*, to make which, the Evidence depends upon a due Connection of Circumſtances, and Clearneſs of Teſtimony: And when all theſe fully agree, the Thing will appear ſo *certain* and *evident*, as not to admit any reaſonable Doubt. As that the Chriſtian Religion was founded by *Jeſus Chriſt* and his Apoſtles, and that God confirmed the ſame by *Miracles* and *Signs*, with other Things of like Importance; in which if the *ſacred Revelation* which we embrace has but common Right done it, we ſhall ſoon come to a juſt Evidence of the Point before us.

In order to this, let us conſider the following Arguments.

I. The Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt appears to be the Will of God revealed for our Salvation, by the *unparallel'd Excellency* of its *Doctrine.*

II. By the exact Completion of many antient Prophecies relating to it.

III. By the divine Power and Goodneſs which appeared in the Miracles that atteſted it.

IV. By

IV. By the vast Cloud of credible Witnesses, that attested it.

V. By the marvellous Efficacy of this Doctrine by means in themselves insufficient to attain such Ends.

I. From the *divine Excellency* of its *Doctrine.*

Our Bible contains the most important Truths, the most sublime *Mysteries*, the most improving *Doctrines*, and the most perfect *Morals*; the most sure *Prophecies*, the most powerful *Persuasives*, and the most divine *Aids*; the most constraining *Motives*, and the most awful *Rewards* and *Punishments*. In *Doubts* it gives us *Counsel*, in *Darkness Light*, in *Trouble Consolation*. In a Word, it is a Book *worthy* of God, and infinitely *advantageous* to Men. We find in it every where very excellent Doctrines relating to God and our selves, which cannot be discovered by the Light of Nature; with this great Satisfaction, that all the Malice in the World has not been able to find out one *Untruth*, or one *unsound* Doctrine in the whole.

There are two Things which clearly demonstrate the *Divinity* of the Gospel from the more intrinsic Excellency and Worth of the Doctrine itself.

The first is, in that it perfects the moral Law, which is founded in the Nature of Man corresponding with the Nature of God. For since this Law was first written by the *Finger* of God, and greatly demolished by Man's Apostacy; there was none that could repair it, but God, it must be his Work to write these Laws in the wicked Hearts of Men.

We see in the Gospel what Improvements are made upon the moral Law by Jesus Christ. The moral Duty of acknowledging the true God is exalted to the Pitch of loving him with all our Soul. The moral Laws relating to our Duty to *Men* are carried up to as true a Love to them, *as to ourselves.*

So that we must be so far from shedding their *Blood*,

Blood, that we must not give them a *reviling Word*, or harbour an *ill Wish*.

Now, where these exalted Rules are so written in a Man's Breast, as to be the manifest Principles of his whole Life, after such a State of Degeneracy as Men are fallen into, we must conclude that he is *born* of *God*, being renewed by his holy Spirit. So then since none could be the Redeemer and Restorer of Men, but he that was their Creator, and since our Lord Jesus Christ does by his Gospel effectually re-impress the Image of God upon Men, in true Righteousness and Holiness; we may say by this we *believe and are sure, that he came forth from God, and that he only hath the Words of eternal Life.*

The second Evidence of the Divinity and Excellency of the Gospel is, that it supplies us with a Revelation of those *supernatural Truths*, we could not have elsewhere. We have here an unparallel'd Method of Relief to such as find themselves under the Displeasure of the almighty God, we see with what tender Affection these *broken Hearts*, and *wounded* Spirits are relieved in the Gospel. We see here what a Price was paid for the Redemption of Man; we find here *a merciful and acceptable Mediator*, a Covenant suited to our *Infirmities*, which promises Pardon to the penitent Believer; and that they may be enabled to live up to that Holiness required in the Gospel; they are promised the *holy Spirit* of God to be no less a *Comforter*, than a Helper of those that sincerely enter into the Bonds of this Covenant, and will be as a *Seal* upon them by the inherent Holiness he produces in them, thereby consigning them to everlasting Happiness.

From all which Considerations it appears, that the Bible is superior to all other Books in the Excellency of its Doctrines, and therefore is properly called the *Book of God*.

II. The Gospel appears to be the Word of God by

by the exact Accomplishment of the many ancient Prophecies.

The whole System of Prophecies in the *Old* Testament, are punctually fulfilled in the *New*. The Design, Temper, and Office of the Messiah were foretold by a Train of inspired Prophets, with the *Divinity* as well as *Humanity* of his Nature, and with all the material Circumstances of his *Conception*, *Birth*, *Life*, *Doctrine*, *Contempt*, *Abuses*, *Death*, *Resurrection*, *Ascension*, *Intercession*, and the sending of the *Holy Ghost*; with the Deportment of the *Gentiles* and his Disciples towards him.

Now as this could not be effected by any human Power, it must have been the Work of God, *which he foretold by all his Prophets, which have been since the World began.*

And by what we have already seen fulfilled concerning the Events foretold in the New Testament, *viz. The Destruction of Jerusalem*, the *Dispersion of the Jews*, the self Exaltation of the *Man of Sin*, and the *general Decay* of Christian Faith; we may be assured that every Tittle of it will be fulfilled in its Season.

III. The Divinity of the Gospel appears in the Miracles that attested it, *John* x. 25. which were too *many* to be mistaken, and too *great* to be counterfeited, and too *openly* worked to be an Illusion.

There can be no Room for Suspicion that any diabolical Power could do such Things; or if the Devil had Power, yet he had no Inclination to do so much Good to Men as our Saviour's Miracles did, and he is too wise to favour a Doctrine that undermines his Kingdom.

Nor were our Saviour's Miracles denied by the greatest Enemies of Christianity; *Celsus* and *Julian* own it, and the *Jews* in their *Talmud* confess the same. Had there indeed been any Question of

those Matters, St. *Peter* durst not have made that Appeal to them as he did, *Acts* ii. 22.

IV. The Gospel is verified by a vast Cloud of credible Witnesses, who have attested it by all the Ways that any Thing can be testified.

Thousands, who held it a damnable Sin to tell a *Lie*, have by Word and Writing declared the Things which *Jesus did and taught*; and tho' they suffered such horrible Punishments for so doing, not one of them ever discovered any Combination to impose upon the World.

Besides, they instituted *anniversary Solemnities* on the Day of the *Birth*, *Death*, *Resurrection* and *Ascension* of our Lord, which they never durst have attempted, had they not been certain of the Facts; because they durst not praise God for what they knew to be a Lie; and because if those Facts had not been fully known, their Enemies would have disproved them.

V. The fifth Proof of the Divinity of the Gospel, is from the marvellous *Efficacy*, *Progress*, and *Continuance* of this Doctrine by Means in themselves insufficient to attain these Ends, which must demonstrate the Assistance of a *supernatural* Power.

The self-abasing, and flesh-crucifying Doctrine of the Gospel prevailed like a Torrent over the Wickedness, Laws, Customs, and Nations of the World, unassisted by the Power of Princes, the Severity of human Laws, or the Persuasion of Eloquence.

So that if this Thing had been of *Men*, it must have sunk in a very short Time; but it was of God, and so prevailed, and will continue to the Consummation of all Things.

From all which it appears, that the Bible is the Word of God.

Having opposed the *antiscriptural* Adversaries of the

the Christian Religion, we come now to consider the Opposition made to a *fundamental Article* of it, *viz.* the divine Nature of Christ, which is denied by some who pretend to own the Authority of the Holy Scriptures. The Truth of which I shall assert by the four following Arguments.

I. The Scriptures of the *Old* and *New* Testament speak of the Messiah in Terms and Attributes so manifestly *divine*, that a serious Mind cannot but understand them as declaring him to be God.

II. This has been the Doctrine of the Catholic Church in all Ages.

III. No other Notion of our Saviour clears the *Justice* and *Honour* of God in the Pardon of Sin.

IV. No other Notion of our Saviour answers the *principal Ends* of his Messiahship.

I. The Scriptures of the *Old* and *New* Testament speak of the Messiah in Terms and Attributes so manifestly *divine*, that a serious Mind cannot but understand them as declaring him to be God.

And we cannot conceive so unsuitable a Thought of the infinitely wise and good God, as that he would reveal the most important Doctrines concerning the Salvation of Men, in such Terms as were likely to deceive them.

As to the *Old* Testament; after the Promise of a Redeemer, *Gen.* iii. 15. there was at various Times some Appearance of a *divine Presence* in the *Jewish Church* either *approving* or *directing* that People. Of this St. *Paul* speaks, *Rom.* ix. 4. *whose is the Glory and the Covenants.* And the *Jews* call it *Shechinah*, a *Beam of Glory* darted down upon *Abel*, and on his Sacrifice, and is thought by some to be that which moved *Cain*'s Envy. For in this manner did God testify his Approbation of *Abram*'s Sacrifice, *Gen.* xv. 17. a divine Glory like the Flame of a Lamp passed between the Sacrifices. The Answer of God by *Urim*, Numb. xxvii. 21.

was of this Nature. As also the Cloud that filled the Tabernacle, *Exod.* xl. 34. And likewise the *Pillar of a Cloud* and the Pillar of Fire that attended the *Israelites* in the Wilderness.

The New Testament expressly shews us, that some of these *bright Effulgences* were *Beams of Glory* from the *eternal Son of God*, to which St. *Paul* directs the unbelieving *Jews*, Heb. i. 2. And that they might know who this Son of God was, he there minds them of the *Shechinahs*, to which their Fore-Fathers had been long used, to train them up to expect the Appearance of his Son in a *visible* Manner. For, saith he, this Son of God is the *Brightness of the Father*'s Glory (the *Shechinah*) and *the express Image of his Person*, Ver. 3.

And as there were frequent *Effulgencies* of the Son of God, so there were many Appearances of the same *divine Person* in human Shape.

There is just Reason to conclude, that one of the three Angels that appeared to *Abraham* was the *Son of God*. For our Saviour says, that *Abraham saw his Day, and was glad*; and *Abram* received such *Grants* from him as none but God could give. See *Gen.* xviii. 23, *&c.* and calls him four times in this Passage by the Name *Jehovah*, which Name is incommunicable to a Creature.

The same *Angel of the Covenant* appeared to *Abram* when he was about offering his Son, saying, *Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy Son, thy only Son from me*; which no Angel durst apply to himself.

This was he that wrestled with *Jacob*, and blessed him: After which *Jacob* acknowledges, that he *had seen God Face to Face.* Gen. xxxi. 24.

Manoah, *Judges* xiii. 13, 18. and *Joshuah*, *Jos.* v. 14. had the like *Appearance.*

This Angel is many Times called an *Angel of God*, in one Verse, and *God* in another; as *Exod.* iii. 2. 4.

And

And both the ancient *Hebrew Paraphrasts* and the ancient *Christian Fathers* did conceive, that these Appearances were the *Preludia Messiæ*, the *Prefigurations* or *Preludes* of the Incarnation of the *Son of God.*

St. *Stephen* tells his Murderers, *Acts* vii. 38. *This is he that was in the Church in the Wilderness, with the Angel that spake to Moses, and with the Fathers, who received the lively Oracles to give unto us.*

So likewise the *Lord Jesus* is affirmed to be with the Angels that were in the Mount. *Psal.* lxviii. 17, 18. *The Chariots of God are twenty thousand, even thousands of Angels, the Lord is among them, as in Mount Sinai, in the holy Place: Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led Captivity captive, thou hast received Gifts for Men.* Now since these last Words are spoken of Christ, and of the Gifts he sent by the Holy Ghost, the former must be spoken of him too.

Let us now consider the *divine Names* and *Attributes* given to the Messiah in the Old Testament. He is called *Jehovah*; the *mighty God*, and *everlasting Father.* Isa. ix. 6, *&c. The Man that is God's Fellow*, Zech. xiii. 7. *Jehovah our Righteousness*, Mic. v. 2. He is called *Immanuel*, Jer. xxiii. 6. and is foretold to *be born of a Virgin*, Isa. vii. 14.

In the New Testament, *Matt.* i. 23. he is called *Immanuel.* He is positively affirmed to be God, *John* i. 1. iii. 4. with the Attributes of *Eternity*, *Omnipotency*, and *eternal Vitality.* It is said, *Col.* ii. 9. *that the Fulness of the Godhead dwells in him bodily.* It is declared, *that by him all Things were created*, and he *is before all Things, and by* him *all Things consist.* It is said, that Christ *took not on him the Nature of Angels, but the Seed of Abram:* By which is proved his *Pre-existence* before his Incarnation, and his Divinity; for if he was not of the Nature of Angels, he must be God.

The incommunicable Attributes of one God are applied to him, *Revel.* i. 8. And if it be granted that it was the Son of God that descended to divide the Tongues of the Builders of *Babel*, the Title of *Most High* is given to the Son of God by *Moses*, *Deut.* xxxii. 8. And whereas it is said, *Gen.* xi. 7. *Go to, let us go down*, and there confound their Language, the Apostle tells us who he was that went down, *Eph.* iv. 10. Now he that *descended is the same also that ascended far above all Heavens.* Though this is spoken of another Ascent and Descent of Christ, the Reason of it is equally valid.

This then fully answers that Elusion of the *Socinians*, *viz.* that when our Lord *Jesus Christ* is called God, it must be taken as when it is applied to *Princes*, and to *Prophets* to whom the *Word of the Lord came.* For no *Prince* or *Prophet* was ever called the true *God* (*John* v. 20.) *the Almighty God*, (*Revel.* i. 8.) Nor is a *creative* Power ascribed to such. And one Thing that is very material, is evident both from the Sentiments of the *Jews*, and the Words of our Saviour; *viz.* that the *Son of God* implies the same Thing with God. Thou blasphemest, (said the *Jews*) because thou sayest, *I am the Son of* God, *making thyself God.* Our Saviour owns the Force of the Argument, and says, the Term God is sometimes applicable to Men of *Piety* and *Power*. *I have said, ye are Gods*, but then their Mortality is immediately subjoined; but *ye shall die like Men.* But of Christ it is said, *thy Throne*, O God, *is for ever and ever.* And it is evident that *Christ* is called the Son of God, and therefore God in a higher Sense, than it was ever ascribed to the Prophets, see *Heb.* i. 1.

And whereas God spake with *Moses Face to Face*, this Appearance to *Moses* is supposed by St. *Austin* (*Epist.* 119.) to be the Appearance of the Son of God. *For no Man hath seen God at any Time, the only begotten*

gotten Son, who is in the Bosom of the Father, he hath declared him; and we beheld his Glory, saith St. *John, the Glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of Grace and Truth.*

The *Word*, as *Tertullian* observes, was God's Minister before the Law, and under the Law, being the *Angel of the Covenant*; and then the *Logos* spake by some principal Angel, and assisted the Angel in a miraculous Motion of the *Air*, to form an articulate *Voice*; or by an intelligible Impression on the Brain of the Persons spoken to, equally miraculous. But under the Gospel the *Logos* spake with his own Mouth.

If the *Socinians* would consider these Things, they would not clamour against the *Term* Person, especially as we now consider it with Relation to Christ as the Πρόσωπον, the *Face* or personating *Shechinah* of the Father.

They also who rightly distinguish betwixt Christ, as God's Word, and *Shechinah* under the former Covenants made with *Adam*, *Noah*, and *Abraham*, and as the Mediator and the *incarnate Son* of God under the Gospel, will better understand those Texts that speak of Christ's *Pre-existence*, and those that speak of his coming in the *Fulness of Time*, and consequently will be better able to solve the *Doubts*, and answer the *Arguments* of the *Socinians*.

II. The Catholic Church hath in all Ages confessed the Divinity of Jesus Christ.

We are initiated into the Church of Christ at our Baptism in Words that cannot be well understood in any Sense but what implies the Doctrine of the *Triune* God. *Go ye, teach all Nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.* Now to be devoted to *Jesus Christ*, and to the *Holy Ghost* at the same Time, and with the same awful Solemnity as to the *Father*, is a very extraordinary Bond upon us to be stedfast in this Doc-

trine, as is also the apostolical Blessing pronounced, 2 *Cor.* xiii. 14. *The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Love of God, and the Communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all, Amen.* This is the Apostle's solemn Prayer to every Person in the holy Trinity, and for the special Blessings of each particular Person; and nothing can be a greater Proof of their Divinity.

When we use the Word Person, we use it in no Sense that implies a Plurality of Gods, for we own a strict Unity of Essence in the Godhead.

This being the Doctrine of the Apostles, it was also of the *primitive* Church. *Vid. Grot. de Christ. Rel. Lib.* 2. *Sect.* 5.

Tertullian sets himself to manifest the Divinity of our Lord in his Apology for Christians, (see *Du Pin. Pag.* 74. *Vol.* 1.)

Clemens of *Alexandria* asserts the same Thing, and after him *Athanasius* defended the same.

And in the Year of our Lord 325, 318 Bishops condemned *Arius* as a Depraver of the Christian Doctrine.

Now had not this Doctrine been generally taught before this Time in the Christian Church, we cannot conceive that so many hundred Persons of the most eminent Piety, *Learning*, and Station, cou'd have agreed so unanimously in a Doctrine of this important Nature, Important indeed, in the most eminent Degree. For where is that Manifestation of the *inexpressible Love* of God, which is mentioned very often in the Gospel, to appear in the Gift of his Son *Jesus Christ*, if he was a mere Man, as others are? And if so, what wonderful Love did Christ shew to Men by suffering as he did, to be exalted as he is? So that the Glory of the *Contrivance* and *Undertaking* of our Redemption, which the Gospel represents as such a *Height* and *Depth* of divine Love as exceeds human Comprehension, falls at once by this *Socinian* Dream. If

If we consider the Faith of the *Jews* as to this Point, we find that they were so well instructed by their *Prophets* and *Paraphrasts*, concerning the divine Nature of the *Messiah*, that when they became Christians, they easily owned the Doctrine of his Divinity. For their Prophets gave him not only the Names of *Elohim* and *Adonai*, but even of *Jehovah*, which implies *Self-sufficiency*, and the *original Being*.

III. No other Notion of our Saviour clears the *Justice* and *Honour* of Almighty God in the *Pardon* of Sin.

We find in the Scriptures an Account of the first Transgression of Man, which no other Book or Author has, or could relate to us.

We see here the Proto-types of Mankind fallen from their *Innocency*, and under God's Displeasure: And in them the Hope of a happy Posterity entirely cut off.

How can the righteous God now forbear to take Vengeance, though we cannot conceive it to be done but with great Inclinations to Mercy?

If impartial Justice cuts off these two Criminals, without Respect, there is an End of Mankind; and if they live, the Offspring will be polluted.

On the other hand, if God was inclined to Mercy, how could infinite *Wisdom* and *Truth*, *Righteousness* and *Purity* yield to it?

Will God part with his *Honour?* Will he part with his Glory to his Enemy? If Men transgress so heinously, and come off free, will any one fear to offend God?

Moreover, if so great an Offence committed against the *first positive* Law given to Man, shall be passed over without any Testimony of *divine Vengeance*, how can *Angels* and Men retain *just* and *awful* Notions of God?

Yea, would not the fallen Angels have complained

of Partiality in the divine *Juſtice*, had they ſeen Men pardoned on Motions of mere Mercy, and themſelves condemn'd for ever, without the leaſt *Glympſe of it?*

But this whole Matter is fully adjuſted by the wonderful Expedient of the Sacrifice of the Son of God, to the great Glory of God in all his Attributes, to the great *Comfort* of Men in all their Guilt and Infirmities; and to the ſtopping the Mouths of blaſpheming Spirits in all their Envy and Miſery.

By the Death of Chriſt there is a full Satisfaction to the Demands of divine *Juſtice*; and the Love of God to his *Laws*, his Zeal for his *Honour*, and his Indignation againſt Sin is more brightly diſplayed in the Sufferings of his Son, as ſmitten by the hand of a *righteous Father*, than it could have been in the *Condemnation* of the whole World.

I dare not ſay there was no other way to ſave Men beſide the Death of the Son of God; but I may ſay, this was the *beſt*, becauſe it ſeemed beſt to infinite Wiſdom. And we may be ſure that it was not the Invention of *Man*, becauſe infinite Wiſdom could only have found it out. And if it had been a *ſhorter*, or leſs painful, or leſs *ſhameful Death*, the *Indignation* of God againſt Sin had not been ſo fully ſeen.

IV. No other Notion of our Saviour is ſufficient to anſwer the principal Ends of his *Meſſiahſhip*. Which were,

1. To reſtore corrupt Men to the *Image* and *Favour* of God.

2. To give the higheſt Glory to the infinitely great and good God.

3. To lay the greateſt Obligation on Men to love and ſerve God.

1. If Chriſt had not been God incarnate he could not have reſtored corrupt Men to the *Image* and Favour of a *pure* God.

It

It is a fundamental Truth, that Men are, by their Apostacy from God, cut off from the Principle of spiritual Life; and are, as of themselves, dead as to spiritual *Light*, *Affection*, and *Action*.

Now the *Son* of *God* comes to communicate the *divine Nature* to a dead World. He is the only *Remedy* for Men dead in Sins, and their only *Hope*.

This spiritual *Resurrection* of a Sinner to a holy Life is said to be done by the *same Power that raised up Jesus from the Dead*. For as Christ had Power to *raise his own Body from the Grave*; so had he Power to *quicken whomsoever he would*.

It is thro' the gracious Gifts of this most bountiful *Mediator*, that the Work of Sanctification is advanced in all true Christians, who are consecrated by his Spirit as so many Temples of God.

And it is through the ordinary Communication of the Gifts of this infinite Mediator, that a Man is not *incorrigibly* set on Wickedness.

The Expressions of spiritual *Regeneration*, a new *Creation*, and a divine Resurrection describing our Restoration to the *Image* of God by Jesus Christ, are not to *amuse*, but to shew the Danger of our Distemper, and the infinite *Goodness* and *Power* which can only work a *Cure* upon us.

The Rules of Moralists may *polish* a Man, but cannot *renew* him.

Whether God was pleased to give any *uncommon* Degrees of Grace, for his Son's sake, to some *sober Heathens*, we cannot tell; but we know, if our *Righteousness does not exceed theirs*, *we cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven*. For the Son of God comes to *turn Men from Darkness to Light*, *and from the Power of Satan unto God*. And as a Man in his *corrupt* State feels the *Springs* of a sinful *Principle* tending to Vice; so will the same Person, when renewed by the *Spirit of Life* in Christ Jesus, feel the *Motions* of a *divine* Principle to Righteousness.

neſs. So that we muſt be *born again of Water*, and of the Holy Ghoſt, or we cannot *enter into the Kingdom of God*.

The Sum of this Particular is, that none but *he that made Man after God's own Image*, could re-impreſs that *Image* of God upon Man after his Apoſtacy, and *Depravation*, which proves the *Divinity* of the Son of God.

II. Another End of Chriſt's Meſſiahſhip was, to give the greateſt Glory to God hereby.

And nothing could redound more to his Glory, than that God *himſelf* in the Perſon of his *eternal Son*, united the Soul and Body of Man into a perſonal Union with the Deity; and in this *divine Perſon* becomes a *Sacrifice* of infinite Merit to redeem the loſt *Race* of Men; and therefore,

III. This lays the greateſt Obligation upon all Men to *love* and *ſerve* God faithfully for the future.

Nothing ſpeaks ſuch *Terrors* to Sinners, as the Crucifixion of *Jeſus Chriſt*. For if he ſpared not his own Son, how can they think he will ſpare them? On the other Hand there is the greateſt Argument and Inducement to bring us to the Love and Service of God.

For we may reaſonably conclude that God will receive us with great Delight, when we forſake our Sins, and turn to him, ſince he *ſacrificed* his only Son to make Way for this very Thing. And how can we but love and ſerve ſuch an infinite Lover of Men? For if when we were yet Sinners, God ſo *pitied* us, as to give ſuch a *Ranſom* for us; who can conceive what Glories he has prepared for thoſe that ſhall be *reconciled* to him thereby? For he that *ſpared not his only Son, but freely gave him up for us all*, how ſhall *he not with him freely give us all Things?*

This fixes the Conſolation of the Penitent who believes in Jeſus; and fully anſwers that gracious

Part

Part of his mediatorial Office, in which he was to *heal the broken in Heart, and bind up the bruised Spirit.*

Having endeavoured to shew that the Denial of the Being of a God is a Thing abhorrent to Reason; and that an Unbelief of the *Christian Revelation* is unworthy of a serious Mind:

I come now to enquire whence these impious Absurdities took their Rise; and how they came to such a Height as we see them. And here upon Inquiry we shall find them owing to these five general Causes.

I. The Violence of Mens carnal and worldly Inclinations.

II. The want of careful Instruction in the Time of Youth.

III. Undue Conceits of human Sufficiency.

IV. Gross Abuses of Prosperity.

V. The Impudence and Impunity of Persons scandalously wicked.

I. Mens carnal Inclinations, when they grow impetuous, and are unguarded, break thro' the Intreaties of Friends, the Fear of God, and the Remonstrances of their own Consciences. When they *do not like to retain God in their Knowledge*, they set themselves against all his Ordinances, and Workings of his Spirit, and against that very Light of their Minds which approves them, till at last their Darkness becomes gross, their Prejudices strong, and their Case in a Manner desperate. For now they are, as it were, equip'd with the whole Armour of Darkness, and their Desire and Design is to oppose the Light. The Notion of a just and holy God strikes a Damp upon their Appetites and Pleasures, and therefore they first cast it out of their Thoughts, and then out of their Creed.

II. The second Cause of Atheism and Infidelity, is the want of careful Instruction in the Time of Youth.

The

By the Neglect of ſetting young Perſons right in the Beginning of their Courſe, and teaching them the true Methods for the Conduct of their Lives, they become weak in their Judgments, and violent in their Appetites. Temptations crowd in upon them, and infernal Spirits blow up the Flame. They fall firſt into Vice, and then into Hardneſs of Heart; then to Scoffing and thence to Atheiſm, or to an atheiſtical Sort of Life, as *without* God in the World.

III. Another Cauſe of Atheiſm is an undue Conceit of *human Sufficiency*.

The Man that fancies he is able of himſelf to know and do every Thing that concerns his Salvation, comes naturally to deſpiſe divine Revelation; or to bring all Revelation to a level with his own Notions. Now both theſe proceed from a Spirit of Pride: And it is no wonder at all, if they not only remain in Infidelity, but are more and more hardened therein; and ſcoff and mock at others for their revering thoſe Myſteries, which the Holy Ghoſt aſſures us *were made known to all Nations by Jeſus Chriſt, for the Obedience of Faith.*

In this Caſe ſurely the *Mind of Man* ſhould yield an entire Deference to the Voice of God, becauſe what he ſays muſt be true.

The Goſpel ſpeaks of Man as ignorant of ſpiritual Things, which came upon us as Deſcendants of *Adam*. And the ſame Goſpel directs us to *Jeſus Chriſt* the *Wiſdom of God*, and *the Power of God*, to regain our ſpiritual Sight and Senſe. Such then as are too proud to ſeek divine Inſtruction, or too *unſerious* to apply it, are likely to die without *Knowledge*, and to be condemned of themſelves, in their laſt Moments, as *undone* by their own Folly.

IV. Another Cauſe of Atheiſm is the Abuſe of *Proſperity*.

There are but few Heads ſtrong enough to bear the Height of worldly Exaltation without Giddi-

neſs.

ness. Atheism scarce ever grows but in a fat Soil. The afflicted Person cannot forget God; but the *Prosperity of Fools destroys them.*

V. The Impudence and Impunity of Persons scandalously wicked, contribute to the Advancement of Atheism and Infidelity.

Whenever Things come to such Extremity, that the Laws of God are trampled on with Insolence, and the Mysteries of our holy Faith are made the Scorn and Laughter of prophane Men; if Blasphemy and Obscenity come into Credit, and Religion and Virtue are pointed at as ridiculous; if it be thought a mean Thing to fear God, and to make serious mention of his *Name*; if it be unfashionable to appear serious in our Churches; if the holy Name of God be not only *vainly* used, but *vilely* treated; his *sacred* Day levelled with the rest, and there be no Power in *Church* or *State* put forth to stem or controul them; such a Nation will, without a Miracle, first become a horrible Scene of *Atheism* and *Impiety*, and then of *Misery* and *Destruction.*

There are sundry other Things which contribute to carry Men on in these Falsities. Such are the *Hypocrisy* of some who have been esteemed for Religion, and the carnal *Divisions* among Christians: The Passions of Theological *Writers*, and the building our Faith on *Man:* A superficial View of *natural Philosophy*, and a Distrust of every Thing: The *Prosperity* of *prophane* Men: The Burlesquing of the Holy Scriptures, and jesting on a future State, with other Insults on Religion and the Author of it: These, and many other such Things, are many Times Irritations of an atheistical Humour, though without any Colour of Reason.

Having shewed what are the Causes of modern Infidelity:

I come now to consider the infinite Advantages that

that our Faith ſecures to us, which are ſo great that they can only be ſurely known by *divine* Revelation. So that the very Rewards propoſed by the Chriſtian Religion, make one great Proof of its divine Original; for who but the *eternal* God can offer *eternal Life* to his Servants?

By *eternal Life* we mean a Life of perfect Happineſs for ever: And when this is applied to Man, we comprehend the Body of Man as well as his Soul; which makes the Caſe ſtill more ſhocking to Reaſon. What Wonder does it create in us to think that theſe frail Bodies of ours after Death ſhall ariſe in a perfect and immortal State?

But tho' this amazes human Reaſon, it does not invalidate the Chriſtian Faith. For the Matter is not what we can do, or conceive, but what infinite Power can do for us, and what infinite Truth has declared that he will do. We muſt therefore reſolve all into the infinite *Wiſdom* and *Power* of *God*, keeping his *Truth* and *Faithfulneſs* as our Stay.

This is the glorious Article of the Chriſtian Faith laid open to Men in the bleſſed Goſpel, as a leading Motive to engage all Men in the Vows of the Chriſtian Religion: And that it is built upon a ſure Foundation, will appear from theſe three Propoſitions.

1. That the State of eternal Life in the World to come, is declared in the holy Scriptures.

2. That theſe are revealed by God.

3. That God, who revealed theſe Things to Men, cannot lie.

As to the firſt. The great Truth of a future State was not clearly manifeſted to the *Jews*; but in the New Teſtament it is fully declared: For here we ſee not only a bare Aſſertion of the State of eternal Life, but the very Manner and Means of reſtoring Men to the Hope of it when they had loſt it. When we read here of a *Reſurrection* of the *unjuſt* as well as the

the *just*; and that the *wicked* shall go away into *everlasting Punishment.*

And that these Writings are the Word of God and revealed by him is the

2. Thing to be considered.

Now this appears in that God *gave evident Testimony to this Word of his Grace, granting Signs and Wonders to be done* by his Apostles.

The Lives also of these holy Men shone with a divine Brightness like the Doctrine they taught, and tended no less to destroy the Kingdom of Darkness.

Did ever human Eloquence reform so many thousands as the preaching of the Apostles did in one Day? Their Doctrine prevailed by the meer *Goodness* of it, notwithstanding all the Prejudices of Men. And every Convert manifested such a divine Change of Heart and Life, that he was a living Witness of the glorious Power of the holy Gospel.

All these Things put together demonstrate that the Writings, called the *holy Scriptures*, are the Will of God revealed for the *Salvation* of Men.

So then there remains but one Thing more to clear the Truth of an eternal State to come; and that is,

3. That God *cannot lie.*

It is the very Nature of God to be a Being infinitely perfect. But could he prevaricate, he could not be morally perfect, and consequently would not be God. It denotes either the *Darkness* of Men's Understandings, or the *Corruption* of their Wills, and the *Faultiness* of their Intention, that they utter lies; but in a *Being* of all Perfections, nothing of this can be imagined.

So then if the Scriptures are the Word of God, and if God who affirms these Things *cannot lie*, there is an unshaken Foundation for our Belief.

So then, as to the Ground of our Belief of the eternal State of Man after Death, we place it wholly on the Truth of the *Christian Revelation.*

As to the Date of it, it is said to be made *before the World began.* Which Expression, if it be taken in the largest Sense, must be meant of *the secret Will and Purpose of God*, even before he made Man, that he would give him an *immortal Soul* capable of *eternal Happiness.*

But if the Expression (Πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων) be rendered, *in ancient Times*, or *many Ages ago*, then they relate to the Promise of Man's Restoration to the Hope of eternal Life by the *Seed of the Woman*, which was afterwards made clear by the *preaching of the Gospel, according to the Commandment of* God *our Saviour.*

But though this Article of our Faith can only be duly asserted by the Authority of Revelation, yet there are many solid Arguments in Reason for it. As,

I. If all Things are ascribed to the Mechanism of *Matter* and *Motion*, there must be a perpetual Continuation of all Things in *Being*; because no *Being* can be brought to *nothing* but by a supernatural omnipotent Power. The utmost Power of natural Action and Production, is to pass from one *Term* to another, and from one *Thing* to another. And therefore there can be no Action, in the Course of *Nature*, where there is nothing to *act for*, as surely as where there is nothing to *act from.* So that it requires the same infinite Power to *annihilate* as to *create*; and no Being passes *naturally* from a State of *Being* to *nothing*, any more than from *nothing* to *Being.*

The Atheist therefore must confess a *God*, or deny *Annihilation.*

As to such who own the *Being*, but deny the *Providence* of God; they ought to consider, that nothing is more universally pursued in all the natural Course of Things, than to preserve every Being in its Order and Subsistence. For every Place is full, and

and the absolute Loss of any one Being would break the *Continuation* and *Perfection* of the Compages of the Universe. And as to the Preservation of the Being of every material Thing, we may observe a very strong and wise Concourse of Things to serve this End, which is one principal Tendency of Nature.

II. God who had his Being before the Existence of any other Being, must have his Being for ever, since nothing can obstruct him.

So then, whether God will continue Life to Men in another World, is the only remaining Question. As to which let us remark,

III. God has put into the Nature of Man a perfect Aversion to *Annihilation.*

Yea farther, we generally find that the wiser and better Men grow, their desire is principally carried forth towards God, whom they earnestly desire, as their *Portion for ever.*

Now if this Desire of immortal Happiness be in all Men, it is implanted in their Nature; and if it prevails chiefly upon *good* and *wise* Men, it is a *right* and *honourable* Desire.

IV. It is highly agreeable to Reason, that as an infinitely good God has given *Being* to many reasonable Creatures, and has brought many of them to delight in him, and love his Commands, that he should preserve, not destroy these his faithful Servants.

All the visible Works of God declare his immense Goodness. We cannot therefore in Reason think otherwise of God's dealing with Men in another World.

We see daily the great Goodness of God to wicked Men; he bears long with his professed Enemies, and if there be such present Indulgence to the Wicked, will there not *verily be a Reward for the Righteous?*

This Argument will be further advanced, if we consider what eminent Service some holy Men and Women have rendered to their Creator: They have offered their Lives as a Sacrifice to his Glory. And how can we imagine, that when an infinitely good God has seen such Trials of their Faith, that he will then rob these his Servants of their very *Being*, and not suffer them to have a *Place* in the World?

Moreover, does the wise and good God put an *Appetite* into any of his Creatures, without preparing a suitable Object to satisfy it? This would not suit the infinite Goodness of God. Since then there is a strong Desire of *eternal Life* in the Nature of Man, placed in it by his Creator; and since it is the Business of Religion to cherish this hope, who can doubt of the Certainty of the Enjoyment of the Thing hoped for?

When Men are by a long Train of religious Exercises brought to the highest Esteem of God, and a most ardent Desire of him, will infinite Goodness disappoint these good Dispositions at the last? This is a Thought unsuitable to the divine Nature.

I will only add one Point more; which is, that it cannot but be true Pleasure to infinite Goodness to find Objects meet for his Bounty: For indeed we see it eminently so in Men of singular Goodness and Liberality.

Thus we see that there are in common Reason many solid Pleas for the *Immortality* of Man.

That there will be a Resurrection of the Body; and that the everlasting Punishments of another Life are equitable, I will in the last Place shew.

Against the Resurrection of the Body there can be only one Argument, that 'tis *impossible*.

But it cannot in Reason be thought impossible for the God of all Power to re-unite the Dust of human Bodies; or that he who gave them *Life* at first should *revive* them.

And

And as to the *Eternity* of the Punishments of a future State.

It is very reasonable to grant, that as the Nature, Majesty, and Glory of God are *infinite*, that he will punish in a Manner suitable to himself. The Demerit of *Sin* against a *Being* that is *infinite in all Perfection*, is certainly infinite: So that the Sinner thereby contracts *infinite Guilt*, and is bound over to *infinite Punishment*.

But as we are sensible that the Perfection of divine Justice does not appear in the present Dispensations of Providence, it is therefore reasonable to conceive that God will shew his Wrath in another World on *the Vessels fitted for Destruction*.

These Arguments demonstrate how well grounded the good Man's Hopes and Fears are, with Reference to the infinite Retributions of another World: And how foolish they are, who mock and despise them?

And, now may all serious Christians be directed to the certain Means of finding Favour in the Sight of the supreme Judge at his Appearance.

Mr. *DERHAM*'s

BOYLE's LECTURES

ABRIDG'D.

A

DEMONSTRATION

OF THE

BEING and ATTRIBUTES

OF

GOD

FROM THE

Works of CREATION.

IN diſcourſing upon this Subject, I ſhall confine myſelf to our *Terraqueous Globe*, and ſhall diſtribute the Works therein,

I. Into ſuch as are not properly Parts, but *Appendages* or *Outworks* of the Globe.

II. The *Globe* itſelf.

BOOK I.

Of the Outworks *of the* Globe, *the Atmoſphere, Light, and Gravity.*

CHAP. I.

Of the Atmoſphere in general.

THE Atmoſphere which ſurrounds our Globe will appear to be the Work of a wiſe Being, if we conſider its *Nature*, and its *Uſe*.

1. Its

1. Its *Nature*, a Maſs of Air, fit to penetrate into the inmoſt Receſſes of Nature, to excite, animate, and ſpiritualize it.

2. Its *Uſe*; It is the Air by which the whole animal and vegetable World lives: To which the Birds owe their Flight, and by which even the Fiſhes aſcend and deſcend in their Element. But it would be too tedious to reckon up the many Benefits of it in many uſeful Engines (See *Boyle, of the Cauſe of Attraction by Suction*) in many of the Functions and Operations of Nature; in Conveyance of Sounds, and in its admirable Uſe in miniſtering to the enlightening of the World by its reflecting the Light of the heavenly Bodies to us, and refracting the Sun Beams to our Eyes, before it even ſurmounteth our Horizon; by which Means the Day is protracted throughout the whole Globe, and the long Nights are ſhortened in the frigid Zone, yea the Sun riſeth to Appearance to the great Comfort of thoſe forlorn Places, when it is really abſent from them. (See *Varen. Geo.* c. 19. Pr. 22.)

But paſſing by all theſe Things, I ſhall only inſiſt upon the excellent Uſe of the Atmoſphere, in Reſpect of its two Meteors, the *Winds*, and the *Clouds and Rain*.

CHAP. II.

Of Winds.

The great Uſefulneſs of theſe demonſtrate them to be the Work of an infinite Creator. For if the whole Maſs of Air was always at Reſt, and without Motion, it would ſuffocate, and poiſon all the World. But the perpetual Commotions it receives from Gales and Storms, keep it pure and healthful, and give Pleaſure to Mankind; witneſs the Summer Gales, but eſpecially the perpetual Gales, which cool and make healthful the torrid Zone; and

and without these Mankind could have little Commerce with one another. (See *Dampier's Discourse of Winds*, Chap. 4.)

CHAP. III.

Of Clouds and Rain,

Which are useful to the World in the refreshing Shades which are afforded by the one, and the fertile Dews and Showers of the other, whithout which the Trees and Plants would die with Drought.

And if to these Uses we should add the Origin of Fountains and Rivers, we should have another Instance of the great Use of this Meteor. (See *Raii Physico Theolog. Disc. 2. pag. 90, &c.*)

And now if we consider the Necessity of the Atmosphere to the many Uses of the Globe, and its great Convenience to the whole; who could ever say that such a Body, so different from the Globe it serves, should be made by any other Efficient, than by the Power and Wisdom of the infinite God?

CHAP. IV.

Of Light.

Let us consider the great Necessity and Use of it to all our animal World, and we shall find it the very Life and Pleasure of all those Creatures.

By the Help of this all the animal World is enabled to transact their Business. By this they can take a View of all the glorious works of God, and see his wonderful Art and Contrivance in the Parts of Animals and Vegetables, and in a Word behold the Harmony of the lower World, and of the Globes above, and survey the exquisite Workmanship of every Creature.

To all which I might add, the Improvement which Men have made of it by the Refractions and Reflections of Glasses. But,

But, to wave enumerating more of its particular Benefits, I shall only observe these two, *viz.* the Swiftness of its Motion, and its vast Extension.

1. It is a very great Act of Providence, that so great a Benefit as Light is, is not long in its Passage from Place to Place. Was it not so swift as it is, (See *Newt. Opt. Lib.* 2. *Part* 3. *Prop.* 11. *Phil. Transf.* N° 136.) its Vigour would be greatly cool'd, its Rays less penetrant; and Darkness would be with great Difficulty removed. But passing with nearly the Swiftness of 60000 *English* Miles in one Second of Time, or being but about seven or eight Minutes in coming from the Sun to us, we receive the kindly Influence of that noble Creature of God.

2. Another Thing of great Consideration about Light, is its vast Expansion, which is as boundless as the Universe (See *Hook*'s *Post. Works*, *Lect. of Light*, p. 77.) Which is manifest from our seeing some of the heavenly Bodies with our naked Eye, some by the Help of optical Instruments, and others in all Probability farther with better Instruments.

CHAP. V.

Of Gravity.

Gravity is that Tendency which Bodies have to the Center of the Earth.

By this Power our Globe is defended against Dissipation, and all its Parts kept in their proper Place and Order. All material Things do naturally gravitate thereto; and even the fleeting Waters by this Means keep their constant æqui-poise in the Globe.

Another Thing owing to *Gravity* is *Levity*, that whereby what we call light Bodies swim; a Thing useful in many Respects to many Animals, but particularly serviceable to the raising of Vapours, and to their Conveyance round about the World. (See *Lowthorp*'s *Abridgment*, Vol. II. p. 108, 126.)

And

And now from this tranſient View of the bare Appendages of the Globe, we have ſo manifeſt a Sample of the Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs of the infinite Creator, that it is eaſy to imagine the whole Fabric of a Piece, the Work at leaſt of a ſkilful Artiſt.

BOOK II.

Of the Terraqueous Globe itſelf in general.

HAVING diſpatched the Outworks, let us take a Survey of the *Globe itſelf*, which does no leſs than the Outworks aggrandize its Maker, and in all its Parts proclaim its infinitely wiſe and good Compoſer. And for a Demonſtration of this, I ſhall,

I. Take a general Proſpect of the Globe.

II. Survey its Particulars.

I. The Things which fall under the general Proſpect of the Globe, are its *Figure*, *Bulk*, *Motion*, *Place*, *Diſtribution* into Earth and Waters, and the great *Variety* of all Things upon it, and in it.

CHAP. I.

Of its Figure.

Its Figure is ſpherical, which is the moſt commodious upon many Accounts; as it is moſt capacious, as its Surface is equi-diſtant from the Center, not only of the Globe, but, (at leaſt nearly) of Gravity and Motion too. But to paſs by theſe:

1. This Figure is moſt commodious in reſpect of Heat, and Light alſo in ſome Meaſure. For by this Means, Light and Darkneſs, Cold and Heat, Moiſt and Dry, are equally imparted to the World.

2. This Figure is admirably adapted to the commodious and equal Diſtributions of the Waters in the

the Globe. For since by the Laws of Gravity the Waters will possess the lowest Place; therefore if the Map of Earth was cubic, prismatic, or any other angular Figure, one Part would be drowned, and another be too dry.

3. The orbicular Figure of the Globe is more beneficial to the Winds and Motions of the Atmosphere. If the Earth were of any other Figure, the Currents of Air would be much retarded. We see what Influence high Mountains, Capes and Headlands have upon the Winds (See *Dampier's Winds, Ch.* 1.) and divert and change even the *constant Winds* that blow round the Globe in the Torrid Zone. And therefore since this is the Effect of such little Excrescences, what would be the Consequences of Angles that would equal a quarter, tenth, or an hundredth Part of the Globe's Radius?

Thus the Figure of the Globe doth manifest it to be a Work of Contrivance.

CHAP. II.

Of the Bulk of the Globe.

It is a Mass of above two hundred and sixty thousand millions of Miles solid Continent; a Work too grand for any Thing less than a God to make.

CHAP. III.

The Motions of the Globe.

The Motions of the Globe are round its own Axis, and round the Sun. That so vast a Body of Earth and Waters should be moved at all, that its Motions should be so regularly performed for near 6000 Years, do manifestly argue a divine infinite Power. But especially if to this we add the wonderful Use of these Motions to the Inhabitants, nay to all the Products of the Earth and Waters: For to the diurnal Motion

tion we owe the comfortable Changes of Day and Night; to its annual Motion we owe the various Seasons, and the beneficial Influences these have on the Bodies and State of Animals, Vegetables, and all other Things, both in the torrid, temperate, and frigid Zones.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Place of the Globe in respect of the heavenly Bodies.

Another Thing very considerable in our Globe, is its Place and Situation at a due Distance from the Sun, its Fountain of Light, and Heat, and from its neighbouring Planets, and from the fixt Stars, for if the Earth was nearer the Sun, it would be burnt up; and if at a greater Distance, we should be frozen with Cold.

CHAP. V.

The Distribution of the Earth and Waters.

The Distribution of these is well adjusted to the Uses and Conveniency of the World. By this there is a just equi-poise of the whole Globe; and the Earth and Waters are so admirably well placed about the Globe, as to minister to one another's Uses. The great Oceans, and the lesser Seas, are so distributed throughout the Globe, as to afford sufficient Vapours, Clouds, and Rains, to temperate the Cold of the northern frozen Air, to cool the Heats of the torrid Zone, and to refresh the Earth with Showers, yea in some Measure to minister fresh Waters to the Fountains and Rivers. (See *Philos. Transf.* N° 289.) Nay, so abundant is this Blessing of God, that there is a Surplusage of this useful Creature. The fresh Waters are so ordered, as to be carried thro' convenient Channels back again to the Sea, and many of them thro' such large Tracts of Land, and to

such Distances, that it is a wonder that the Fountains should be high enough, or the Seas low enough, ever to afford so long a Conveyance: And indeed, such prodigious Conveyances of the Waters make it manifest, that nothing less than the Fiat of the Almighty could ever have made so long and commodious Declivities and Channels for the Passage of the Waters.

CHAP. VI.

The great Variety of all Things upon and in the Globe for the Uses of the World.

There are so many Beasts, so many Birds, so many Insects, Trees, Lands, and Sea-Plants, Fishes, Minerals, Metals, and Fossils, so many Species of these *Genera*, so many *Individuals* of those *Species*, that there is nothing wanting to the Use of Man, or any other Creature. If every Age should change its Food, its way of Cloathing; if every Age had its Variety of Diseases; nay if Man or any other Animal was minded to change these Things every Day, still the Creation would not be exhausted. For the Creation is so various, that there is enough to supply the Wants, the Conveniences, yea almost the Extravagances of all Creatures, in all Places, all Ages, and upon all Occasions.

And this may serve to answer this Objection, why God made so many noxious Animals, Insects, and Plants?

To which I may answer, that these serve as Rods to chastise us, as Means to excite our Wisdom, Care, and Industry; that this great Variety is a most wise Provision for all Uses; some for Food, some for Physic, some for Habitation, and some for Recreation, either to Man, or some other Creatures, for whom God has liberally provided, as well as for Man.

And it is manifest, that all the Creatures of God have,

have, or may have their ſeveral Uſes even among Men; for although in one Place many Things may be neglected, yet in other Places they may be of great Uſe. Many Things there are alſo, which in one Form may be pernicious to Man, but in another of great Uſe. There are many Plants, many Animals, many Minerals, which in one Form deſtroy, in another heal.

Or if there be many Things of little immediate Uſe to Man, yet to other Creatures they may afford Food, or Phyſic. How many Trees, Plants, nay even the very Carcaſſes of Animals, yea the very Duſt of the Earth (See *Phil. Tranſ.* N° 291.) are either Food or Medicine to many Creatures, afford them Retreat, are Places of Habitation, or Matrixes for their Generation, as ſhall be ſhewed hereafter? The prodigious Swarms of Inſects in the Air, and in the Waters, tho' of no great Uſe to Man, are yet Food to Birds, Fiſhes, Reptiles, Inſects themſelves, and other Creatures, for whoſe happy Subſiſtence God had bountifully provided.

BOOK III.

Of the Globe in particular.

FOR the more regular Proceeding on this Subject, I ſhall diſtribute the Globe,

I. Into the Earth and its Appurtenances.

II. Into the Waters and theirs.

I. Into the Earth, *&c.*

In ſurveying the Earth, I intend,

1. To conſider its conſtituent Parts.

2. The Inhabitants thereof.

1. As to the Earth itſelf, the moſt remarkable Things, are,

1. Its various Soils.

2. Its ſeveral Strata, or Beds.

3. Its subterraneous Passages.
4. Its Mountains and Vallies.

CHAP. I.

Of the Soils in the Earth.

The various Soils are an admirable Contrivance of God, in making this Provision for the various Vegetables, and divers other Uses of the Creatures.

Some Vegetables delight in a warm Soil, some in a cold, some in a heavy, others in a light Soil; and some in moist, and some in dry Places: Still we find Provision enough for all these Purposes; every Country abounding with its proper Trees and Plants.

The various Soils are also of great Use to divers Animals, Fowls, Insects, and Reptiles, who make their Places of Rest in the Earth, their Security from Enemies, and their Nests to repose their Young; some delighting in a lax and pervious Mould, and others in a more solid Earth, that will better secure them against Injuries.

CHAP. II.

Of the various Strata of the Earth.

By the *Strata* I mean those Layers of Minerals, Metals, Earth, and Stone, lying under that upper *Stratum* of the Earth, all of great Use to Mankind.

There is one grand Use of one of these *Strata* that cannot be omitted, and that is, those subterraneous *Strata* of Sand, Gravel, and laxer Earth that admit of, and facilitate the Passage of the sweet Waters, and may probably be the Colanders, whereby they are sweetened, and then at the same Time also conveyed to all Parts of the World.

Now that which in a particular Manner doth seem to me to manifest a special Providence of God in repositing

repoſiting theſe watry Beds is, that they ſhould be diſperſed over the World: That they ſhould ſo entirely, or for the moſt Part, conſiſt of lax Earth, and be ſo ſeldom blended with other impervious Moulds; or if they are ſo, it is commonly but accidentally: And that they are interpoſed between the other impervious Beds, and ſo are as a Prop and Pillar to guard them off, and to prevent their ſinking, and ſhutting up the Paſſage of Waters.

CHAP. III.

Of the ſubterraneous Caverns and Vulcano's.

Theſe, beſides the many ſecret Functions and Operations of Nature in the Bowels of the Earth, that in all Probability they miniſter unto, are of great Uſe in the Countries where they are.

The Vulcano's are as Spiracles or Funnels to the Countries where they are, to vent the Fire and Vapours that would otherwiſe make dreadful Havock, and often do ſo, by diſmal Convulſions of the Earth.

Nay if the Hypotheſis of a central Fire and Waters be true, theſe Out-lets ſeem to be of the greateſt Uſe to the Peace of the Globe, in venting the ſubterraneous Heat and Vapours; which, if pent up, would make dreadful Commotions of the Earth and Waters. (See *Woodward*'s *Eſſay*, Part 3. Conſect. 13.)

CHAP. IV.

Of the Mountains and Vallies.

As to the Buſineſs of Ornament, Beauty, and Pleaſure, I may appeal to all Men's Senſes, whether the grateful Variety of Hills and Dales be not more pleaſing than the largeſt continued Plains.

But be the Caſe as it will as to Beauty, we ſhall find as to Convenience, this Configuration of the Earth the moſt commodious on many Accounts.

1. It is moſt healthful to Man. To ſome Conſtitutions indeed any Place or Temperature of the Air are agreeable. But then others are ſo weakly, as not to be able to bear one, but can live comfortably in another Place; to conſumptive Perſons the finer Air of the Hills agree; and others grow healthy in the warmer Air of the Vallies.

2. Another great Convenience of Hills is, they ſerve as Skreens to keep off the Cold, and reflect the Rays of the Sun, and ſo render our Habitations more comfortable in Winter, and promote the Vegetables in Summer.

3. Another Benefit of the Hills is that they ſerve for the Production of great Varieties of Herbs and Trees. (See *Ray*'s *Wiſdom of God.* p. 252.)

4. Another Convenience is, that the Mountains ſerve for the Harbour, Entertainment, and Maintenance of various Animals, Birds, and Inſects. (See *Ray*, *ubi ſupra.*)

5. The Hills ſerve to the Generation of Minerals and Metals, and in them principally are the moſt uſeful Foſſils found.

6. It is to the Hills that the Fountains owe their riſe, and the Rivers their Conveyance; and conſequently thoſe vaſt Piles are not, as they are charged, uſeleſs Excreſcences of our Globe, but were made by the infinite Creator to diſpenſe this great Bleſſing to all the World. For was the Surface of the Earth even and level, it is moſt certain, there could be no Deſcent of the Rivers, but inſtead of gliding thro' thoſe gentle Declivities to the Sea, they would ſtagnate and ſtink.

Nor could there be any Fountains, becauſe the Waters could find no Deſcent, if there were no higher Lands, by Vertue of their own Gravity, and therefore could not break out into thoſe commodious Currents, which we every where almoſt find in, or near the Hills, and ſeldom, or never in ſpacious

cious Plains; and when in them, at inconvenient Depths of the Earth; nay those very subterraneous Waters that are to be met with by digging in the Plains, are in all Probability owing to the Hills. (See *Ray*'s *Disc.* 1. *p.* 40.)

Or if there be any Place that is devoid of Mountains, and yet watered, as perhaps some Islands may; yet in this very Case that whole Mass of Land is no other than as one Mountain descending, though unperceivedly gently from the midland Parts to the Sea, as most other Lands do; as is manifest from the Descent of their Rivers, the principal of which in most Countries have generally their Rise in the more lofty mid-land Parts.

BOOK IV.

HAVING taken a Survey of the Earth in particular, I shall next take a View of the Inhabitants thereof.

These Creatures are either sensitive or insensitive.

In speaking of the sensitive, I shall consider,

1. Some Things common to them all.
2. Things peculiar to their Tribes.

1. The Things in common are,

1. The five Senses, and their Organs.
2. Respiration.
3. The *Motion* or Locomotive Faculty of Animals.
4. The *Place* in which they live.
5. The *Balance* of their Numbers.
7. Their *Cloathing*.
8. Their *Houses*, *Nests*, or *Habitations*.
9. Their Methods of *Self-preservation*.
10. Their *Generation*.

CHAP. I.

Of the five Senses in general.

The Consideration of these Particulars alone, if there were no other Demonstrations of God, is abundantly sufficient to evince the infinite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of God. For who can but stand amazed at the Glories of these Works; at the admirable Artifice of them, and at their noble Use and Performances! Without *Sight*, we could not view the Glories of the Heavens, nor the Beauties of the Earth: Without *Smell* or *Taste*, we could not discern between wholsome and unwholsome Food; nor enjoy the Pleasures of delightful Odours. If we had no Hearing, we should not perceive the Sounds of Music, the Melody of Birds, and all the rest of the Harmonies the Creator hath provided for the Delight of his Creatures. And lastly, how could Man, or any other Creature distinguish Pleasure from Pain, Health from Sickness, without the Sense of *Feeling*. Here therefore we have a glorious Oeconomy in every Animal, that commandeth Admiration, and deserveth our Contemplation.

CHAP. II.

Of the Eye.

For our clearer proceeding in the Consideration of this noble Part, I shall consider,

1. The *Form* of the Eye,
2. Its *Situation*,
3. Its *Motions*,
4. Its *Size*,
5. Its *Number*,
6. Its *Parts*.
7. The *Guard* Nature hath provided for this so useful a Part.

1. The

1. The *Form* of the Eye.

The *Form* of the Eye is globular, or ſomewhat of the ſphæroidal Form, the moſt commodious, as being fitteſt to contain the Humours within, and to receive the Images of Objects from without. Was it a Cube, or of any multangular Form, ſome of its Parts would lie too far off, and ſome too nigh thoſe lenticular Humours, which by their Refractions cauſe Viſion. But by Means of the abovementioned form, the Humours of the Eye are commodiouſly laid together, to perform their Office of Refraction; and the Retina is neatly adapted regularly to receive the Images without.

To this we may add the Aptitude of this Figure to the Motion of the Eye. For by this Figure it is well prepared to move every Way with great Facility.

2. The *Situation* of the Eye. By the Situation of the Eye in the Head it is prepared to take in more Objects; and beſides its Proximity to the Brain, it is the moſt convenient Place for Defence.

Another Thing obſervable in the Sight of the Eye is the Manner of its Situation in the Head, in the fore Part, or the ſide Part thereof, according to the particular Occaſions of particular Animals.

In Man and in ſome other Creatures it is placed to look directly forward, but yet ſo as to take in near the Hemiſphere before it.

In Birds, and ſome other Creatures, the Eye is ſo placed as to take in near a whole Sphere, that they may the better ſeek their Food, and eſcape Danger. In Hares they are placed ſo as to ſee their Enemies backwards, and ſo eſcape them.

And for the Aſſiſtance of the Eyes, and ſome other Senſes in their Actions, the Head is generally made to turn as Occaſion requires. Which leads me,

3. To the *Motions* of the Eye, and this is gene-

rally every Way, for the better Reception of the visual Rays.

But in those Creatures, whose Eyes or Heads have no Motion (*viz. Spiders* and *Snails*) Providence has placed their Eyes at a Distance from the Head, to be circumvolved here and there; or one this, and the other that Way, as the *Cameleon* does at Pleasure. And in Creatures, whose Eyes are without Motion, they have more than two Eyes, or their Eyes are nearly two protuberant Hemispheres, and each Hemisphere often consisting of a prodigious Number of other little Segments of a Sphere; by which Means those Creatures are so far from being denied any Benefit of Sight, that they have probably more of it than other Creatures, answerable to the Rapidity of their Flight, and brisk Motion; and to their Inquest after Food, Habitations, or Repositaries of Generation.

Another admirable Provision in the Eye is in its *Size*, which is different according to the Size of different Creatures, and their different Ways of Living.

5. Another Thing remarkable are its *Numbers*; not less than two, and in Spiders more. (See *Powers, Microsc. Observat. p.* 11.)

Now this is an admirable Provision; first, for the Convenience of taking in a larger Angle or Space, and lest one of them should be destroyed. But the most considerable Thing is, that the Object is not multiplied as well as the Organ, but appears but one, though seen with two, or more Eyes. A manifest Proof of the exquisite Art of the Maker. But his infinite Skill will best be set forth,

6. By surveying the *Parts* and *Mechanism* of the Eye. And here we cannot but stand amazed when we view this admirable Fabric, and consider the prodigious Exactness, and the exquisite Skill employed in every Part ministering to this noble and necessary Sense. Nothing

Nothing can be more manifestly an act of Contrivance, than the *Muscles* of the Eye, wich are adapted to move it any Way, so as always to keep that Parallelism of the Eye, which is necessary to true Vision. I might here instance the artificial Structure of the *Trochlearis*, and the Augmentation of its Power by the *Trochlea*; the Magnitude and Strength of the *attollent Muscle*, something exceeding that of its Antagonist; the peculiar Muscle called the *suspensory Muscle* given to Brutes, by reason of the prone Posture of their Bodies, and frequent Occasions to hang down their Heads; (see *Willis de An. Brut. p.* 1. *c.* 15.) I might also speak of the Origin and Insertion of the *lower oblique Muscle*, but it would be tedious. I shall therefore only observe the exquisite Equilibration of all these *opposite* and *antagonist Muscles*, effected partly by the equality of their Strength; which is the Case of the *adducent* and *abducent Muscles*; partly by their peculiar Origin, or the Addition of the *Trochlea*; which is the Case of the *oblique* Muscles, and partly by the natural Posture of the Body and the Eye; which is the Case of the *attollent* and *depriment Muscles*. By this so curious and exact Librations, all unseemly Contortions of the Eye are prevented, and it is able with great Readiness and Exactness to apply itself to every Object.

As to the *Tunicks* of the Eye, I might take Notice of the Prodigious Fineness of the *Arachnoides*, the acute Sense of the *Retina*, and the Transparency of the *Cornea*, and the strong Texture of that and the *Sclerotica*. But I shall consider that Part of the *Uvea* which makes the *Pupil*.

The Pupils in divers Animals are of a different Form. In Man it is round, that being the most proper Figure for the Positions of our Eyes, and the Use we make of them by Day and Night. In some other Animals it is of a longish Form; in some

some others transverse, *viz.* in *Oxen*, *Goats*, *Horses*, *Sheep*, &c. with its Aperture large; which is an admirable Provision for such Creatures to see the better laterally, and thereby to avoid Inconveniences, as well as to help them to gather Food. In Cats the Fissure of the Pupil is erect, and also capable of opening wide, and shutting up close: The latter of which serveth to exclude the brighter Light of the Day, and the former to take in the more faint Rays of the Night, to enable them to catch their Prey in the Dark.

The next Thing I shall take Notice of, are the *Humours* of the Eye, and that only concerning the prodigious Art and Finery of the constituent Parts of the *crystalline Humour*, it being, according to some late microscopical Observations, composed of divers thin Scales; and these made up of one single minutest Thread, or Fibre, wound round about, so as not to cross one another in any one Place, and yet to meet some in two, and some in more different Centers. A Web not to be woven, an *optic Lens* not to be wrought by any Art less than infinite Wisdom.

Concerning the *optic Nerves*, I shall only take Notice of one wise Provision the Creator hath made about the Motion of the Eye, by uniting into one the *third Pair* of Nerves, called the *motory Nerves*, each of them sending its Branches into each Muscle of each Eye, would cause a Distortion in the Eyes; but being united into one, near their Insertion into the Brain, do thereby cause both Eyes to have the same Motion; so that when one Eye is moved this Way and that Way, the other Eye is turned the same Way also.

Lastly, let us consider what Security God has made for the *Guard* and *Security* of this so well formed Organ. And here we find the whole Organ fortified and fenced with strong compact Bones, lodged

lodged in a ſtrong well made Socket, and the Eye itſelf guarded with a nice-made Cover. Its Humours and its inward Tunicks are indeed tender, proportionate to their tender, curious Uſes, but the Coats without are context and callous, firm and ſtrong; and particularly in Birds, ſome Parts of theſe Tunicles have the Nature and Hardneſs of Bone or Horn.

But for thoſe Creatures whoſe Eyes are tender, and without the Guard of Bones, there Nature hath provided for this tender Senſe, a wonderful kind of Guard, by endowing the Creature (*Snails*) with a Faculty of withdrawing its Eyes into its Head.

Thus I have ſurveyed this firſt Senſe of Animals, the prodigious Workmanſhip thereof abundantly demonſtrates it to be the Work of an infinitely wiſe, powerful, and beneficent Creator. The Uſes and Benefits of it I need not expatiate upon, ſince we receive the Benefit of it every Moment, and the Want or Defect of which we lament every Moment of our Lives among our greateſt Misfortunes.

CHAP. III.

Of the Senſe of Hearing.

Concerning the Senſe of *Hearing*, I ſhall take Notice of two Things; the Organ of the *Ear*, and its object *Sound*.

1. The Organ of the *Ear*. Paſſing by its convenient Number of being double, which ſerves for the more commodious Hearing on both Sides; as alſo the wiſe Proviſion for the Loſs or Injury of one of the Ears: I ſhall conſider its Situation and its admirable Fabric.

1. It is ſituated in the moſt convenient Part of the Body, near the common Senſory in the Brain, to give more ſpeedy Information; in a Part where it can be beſt guarded, and where it gives the leaſt Annoy-

Annoyance to the Exercises of any other Part; in the most eminent Part of the Body, where it can perceive the most Objects, and receive the greatest Information; and near the Eye, with which it hath peculiar Communication by its Nerves. But

2. If we survey its Fabric, it will appear to be an admirable Piece of the divine Wisdom, and Power. For the Manifestation of which, let us distinctly survey the outward and inward Part of this curious Organ.

1. For the *outward Ear*. It is nicely prepared to the peculiar Occasions of each respective Animal. In Man it is of a Form proper for the erect Posture of his Body. In Birds of a Form proper for Flight. In Quadrupeds its Form is agreeable to the Posture and slower Motions of the Body. In Hares it is large, erect, and open, to hear the least Approach of Danger, in others covered, to keep out noxious Insects. In the subterraneous Quadrupeds, as a protuberant Ear would obstruct their Labours, so they have their Ears short, lodged deep, and backward in their Head, and passing to the under Part thereof, and all sufficiently fenced. And as for Insects, and Fishes, if they enjoy this Sense, it may probably be lodged, and commodiously placed under the same Security and Guard, as the Smelling and some other Sense is.

And as the Form of this Organ is various in various Animals, so in each of them its Structure is very curious, being in all admirably contrived to collect the wandering, circumambient Impressions and Undulations of Sound, and to convey them to the Sensory within. But without running to the several *Genera* of Animals, I shall confine my self to the human Ear. And here the first Thing that offereth itself to our View is the *Helix*, with its tortous Cavities made to stop and collect the sonorous Undulations, to give them a gentle Circulation and Refraction,

Refraction, and so convey them to the *Concha* or larger and more capacious round Cell, at the Entrance of the Ear, and to bridle the Evagation of the Sound, when arrived so far, but withal not to make a Confusion thereof by any disagreeable Repercussions; we may take Notice of a very curious Provision in those little Protuberances, called the *Tragus* and *Antitragus* of the outward Ear, of a commodious Form and Texture, and conveniently lodged for this Use. The great Convenience of this Form and Contrivance of the outward Ear is sufficiently manifest by the want thereof, which causeth a *Confusion in the Hearing, with a certain Murmur, or swooing, like the Fall of Waters.*

Another wise Provision of the Creator is, in the Substance of the outward Ear; which is cartilaginous. For if it had been Bone, it would have been troublesome, and might have been broken off; if Flesh, it would have been subject to Contusions, it would neither have remained expanded, neither would it so kindly receive and circulate the Sounds, but absorb, or blunt their Progress into the inward Organ; But being hard, curiously smooth and tortous, Sounds find an easy Passage with a regular Volutation and Refraction. But,

2. Let us survey the inward Part of this admirable Organ: And here we find the most curious and artful Provision for every Occasion. The *auditory* Passage in the first Place, curiously funnelled, and artfully turned, to give Sounds an easy Passage, as well as a gentle Circulation, and Refraction, but withal, so as to prevent their too furious rushing in, and assaulting the more tender Parts within.

And forasmuch as it is necessary that this Passage should be always open, Nature hath secured it from the Invasion of noxious Insects, with a bitter nauseous Excrement, afforded from the Glands, appointed for that Purpose.

To

To pass by the Passage to the Palate, and its Uses, let us stop at the Part containing the rest, namely, the *Bone*, the particular Texture and Hardness of which above other Bones of the Body is very remarkable, whereby it serves not only as a Guard to the Sensory, but also to oppose the Impulses of the ætherial Matter, that there may be no Loss nor Confusion of Sound, but that it may be conveyed regularly and entirely to the auditory Nerves.

I might take Notice of the fine Membrane called the *Tympanum* or *Membrana Tympani*, with its inner Membrane; together with the four appendant Bones, and the three inner Muscles to move them, and adjust the whole Compages to the several Purposes of Hearing, to hear all Manner of Sounds; from this Region of the *Tympanum*, I might pass to that of the *Labyrinth*, and therein survey the curious Structure of the *Vestibulum*, the *semi-circular Canals*, and *Cochlea*; particularly the artificial Gyrations, and other singular Curiosities observable in the two latter.

But I shall only consider one special Contrivance of the Nerves ministring to this Sense of Hearing, and that is the Branches of one of the *auditory Nerves*, spread partly to the Muscle of the Ear, partly to the Eye, partly to the Tongue and Instruments of Speech, and inosculated with the Nerves to go to the Heart and Breast. By which means there is an admirable Consent between these Parts of the Body, it being natural for most Animals upon the Hearing any uncouth Sound, to erect their Ears, to open their Eyes, and to be ready with the Mouth to call out. And accordingly it is very usual for most Animals, when surprized, presently to shriek and cry out.

But there is besides this in Man, another great Use between the Ear and Mouth, and that is, that the

Voice may correſpond with the Hearing, and be a Kind of Eccho thereof, that what is heard with one of the two Nerves, may be readily expreſſed with the Voice with the Help of the other.

Thus concerning the Organ, the *Ear*. Let us,

2. Take Notice of the Object of the Ear, *Sound*; which, whatever may be the Nature and Properties of it, none but an infinitely wiſe God could contrive and make ſuch a fine Body, ſuch a Medium, ſo ſuſceptible of every Impreſſion, that the Senſe of Hearing hath Occaſion for, to empower all Animals to expreſs their Meaning to others; to make known their Fears, their Wants, their Pains and Sorrows in melancholic Tones; their Joys, and Pleaſures in more harmonious Notes; to ſend their Minds at great Diſtance in a ſhort Time in loud Boations, or to expreſs their Thoughts near at hand with a gentle Voice, or in ſecret Whiſpers. And to ſay no more, who leſs than the ſame moſt wiſe and indulgent Creator could form ſuch an Oeconomy as that of Melody and Muſic is! and contrive that it ſhould not only affect the Fancy with Delight, but alſo give Relief to the Grief and Sadneſs of the Heart, yea appeaſe all thoſe turbulent Paſſions which are excited in the Breaſt, by an immoderate Ferment and Fluctuation of the Blood?

And now, who can reflect upon all this curious Apparatus of the *Senſe of Hearing*, and not own it to be the Work of an omnipotent and infinitely wiſe and good God?

CHAP. IV.

Of the Senſe of Smelling.

It being neceſſary that the odoriferous Effluvia of Bodies ſhould have an eaſy and free Paſſage to the olfactory Nerves, the all-wiſe Creator hath made ſufficient Proviſion for the Reception of Smells, by the

the Apertures of the Nostrils which are cartilaginous, the better to be kept open, and withal to be dilated or contracted, as there is Occasion: For which Service it hath several proper Muscles.

And forasmuch as it is by breathing, that the odorant Particles are drawn in, therefore there is a very wise Provision made in the *Laminæ* with which the upper Part of the Nose is barricado'd, which serve to two Uses; partly to keep any Thing noxious from entering the Passages in our Sleep, or when we are not aware; and partly to receive the Divarications of the *olfactory Nerves*, which are here spread thick, and which do by this Means meet the Smells entering with the Breath, and striking upon them.

And accordingly, the more accurate this Sense is in any Animal, the longer we may observe those *Laminæ*, and more in Number, and crouded together, to contain the more nervous Filaments, and to detain and fetter the odoriferous Particles.

And what admirable Provision this is, which God hath made for the Good of brute Creatures. In Insects and many other Creatures, it is of great Use in the Propagation of their Kind, as particularly in helping them to safe Places for the laying their Eggs and breeding their Young. Others by the Accuracy of their Smell are of Use to Mankind. And most of the irrational Animals do by their Smell find out their Food. With what Curiosity do the herbaceous Kind pick and chuse such Plants as are good for Food or Medicine, and refuse such as would hurt them? And all by the Help of the Smell assisted by the Taste.

CHAP. V.

Of the Taste.

In this, as in the last Sense, we have an Apparatus abundantly sufficient to the Sense. Nerves curiously

riously divaricated about the Tongue and Mouth, to receive the Impressions of every Gusto, and these Nerves guarded with a firm and proper Tegument to defend them from Harms; but withal so perforated in the papillary Eminences, as to give a free Admission to Tastes.

The Situations of this Sense and the Smell are in the most convenient Place for the Discharge of their Offices, at the first Entrance into the Mouth, to survey what is to be admitted therein, whether wholsome or unwholsome, pleasant or unsavoury. And for this End God seems to have established a great Consent between the Eye, the Nose and Tongue, by ordering the Branches of the same Nerves to each of those three Parts; by which Means there is all the Guard that can be against pernicious Food; every Thing before it is admitted into the Stomach, undergoing the Scrutiny of the Eye, and the Probation of the Taste and Smell.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Sense of Feeling.

The *Sense of Feeling* is performed by Nerves spread in the most incomparable Manner through the Body. But to describe their Origin in the Brain, and spinal Marrow, their Ramifications to all the Parts, their Inosculations with one another, and other Matters, would take up too much Time; I shall only take Notice of the Dispersion of this Sense throughout the Body, both without and within. The other Senses, I have observed, are placed where they may be of most Service to the Animal; and forasmuch as it is necessary to the Being and Well-Being of the Body, that every Part should be sensible of Things safe, therefore God has dispersed the Sense of Feeling through the whole

Body, to distinguish between Pleasure and Pain, Things salutary, and hurtful to the Body.

Thus we have in the five Senses of Animals an Œconomy worthy of the Creator, and manifestly demonstrating his Power, Wisdom, and Indulgence. I pass next to consider Respiration.

CHAP. VII.

Of Respiration.

Of all the Acts of animal Life this is the chief and most necessary, and may justly deserve a Place in this Survey of the Works of God in the animal Kingdom.

And here I might describe the exquisite Mechanism of the *Larynx*, its Variety of Muscles, its Cartilages, all so exquisitely made for the Purpose of forming the Voice (See *Keil*'s *Anat. cap.* 3. *Sect.* 7.) and also the Tongue which ministers to that and many other Uses.

Next, the Fabric of the *Trachea* deserves especial Remark. Its Valve the *Epiglottis* on the Top, to fence against all Annoyances; its cartilaginous Rings (See *Grew*'s *Cosmolog. Sacr.* Book 1. Chap. 5. §. 9. 10.) nearly environing it, with its membranous Part next the Gullet, to give the freer Passage to the Descent of the Food, and lastly, its Tegument of exquisite Sense to be readily affected with, and to make Efforts against every Thing that is hurtful or offensive, these, I say, deserve our Admiration.

And no less prodigious are the *Bronchi*, and the *Vesiculæ* with their muscular Fibres, (See *Willis*, c. 2.) they have, together with the Arteries and Veins, which every where accompany the airy Passages, for the Blood to receive there its Impregnations from the Air.

From hence I might proceed to the commodious Form

Form of the Ribs, the curious Mechaniſm of the intercoſtal Muſcles, the Diaphragm, and all other Muſcles miniſtering to the Offices of Reſpiration. But paſſing them by, I ſhall obſerve one prodigious Work and manifeſt Contrivance of the Creator, and that is the Circulation of the Blood in *the Fœtus in the Womb*; ſo different from the Method thereof after it is born. In the Womb whilſt it is as one Body with the Mother, and there is no Occaſion nor Place for Reſpiration, there are two Paſſages on purpoſe for the Tranſmiſſion of Blood, without paſſing it through the Lungs. But as ſoon as the *Fœtus* is born, then theſe two Paſſages are ſhut up; one nearly obliterated, the other becomes only a Ligament, excepting in amphibious Creatures.

And now what Action of Man doth ſhew more Reaſon, Deſign, and Contrivance, than this Act of Nature doth the Contrivance of the great God?

Another excellent Contrivance a-kin to the laſt, is for the Preſervation of ſuch Creatures, whoſe Occaſions frequently neceſſitate them to live without, or with but little Reſpiration. Thus many amphibious Creatures, many Quadrupeds, Inſects, Birds, and other Animals, who can live ſome Hours, Days, nay whole Winters with little or no Reſpiration, in a Torpitude, or Sort of Sleep, or middle State between Life and Death. The Proviſion made for theſe peculiar Occaſions of Life, in the Fabric of the Lungs, Heart, and other Parts of ſuch Creatures, is manifeſtly the Work of God.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Motion of Animals.

And here I might view the Muſcles, their curious Structure, the nice tacking them to every Joint, to pull it this Way or that, according to the Purpoſe and Office of every ſuch Joint: Alſo their va-

rious Size and Strength, exactly fitted to every Place, and every Uſe of the Body. And laſtly, I might take Notice of the muſcular Motions, both involuntary and ſpontaneous.

I might ſurvey the ſpecial Fabric of the Bones miniſtring to animal Motion. I might take Notice of their Joints, their compleat Form adjuſted to the Place and Office they are employed in; their Bandage keeping them from Luxations, the oily Matter to lubricate them, and their own Smoothneſs to facilitate their Motion.

And laſtly, I might trace the various Nerves throughout the Body, ſent about to miniſter to its various Motions. I might conſider their Origin, their Ramifications to the ſeveral Parts, and their Inoſculations with one another.

But I ſhall only ſpeak diſtinctly to the Locomotive Act itſelf, or what relates to it. And here it is admirable to conſider the various Methods of Nature, ſuited to the Occaſions of the various Animals.

Reptiles, whoſe Food, Habitation, and Neſts lie next the Clod, Plant, Tree, or Hole, or can bear long Hunger and Hardſhip, they need neither Legs nor Wings for their Tranſportation; but their vermicular or ſinuous Motion is ſufficient for their Conveyance.

Man and *Beaſts*, whoſe Occupations require a large Room, have accordingly a ſwifter Motion, with proper Engines for that Service, anſwerable to their Range for Food, or their Want of Armature, and to ſecure them from Harms.

But for the winged Creatures, as they are to traverſe large Tracts of Land and Water for their Food, Habitation, or breeding their Young, ſo they have accordingly the Faculty of Flying in the Air, and that ſwiftly or ſlowly, according as their Occaſions require.

Ano-

Another remarkable Thing in the motive Faculty of all Creatures, is the geometrical Performance of it. The moſt accurate Mathematician can't preſcribe a nicer Motion to the Legs and Wings of thoſe that walk or fly, or to the Bodies of thoſe that creep, neither can the Body be more compleatly poiſed for the Motion it is to have in every Creature, than it is.

But among all Creatures, none more elegant than the ſizing the Body of *Man*, the gauging his Body ſo nicely, as to be able to ſtand erect, to ſtoop, to ſit, and indeed to move any Way, only with the Help of ſo ſmall a Stay as the Feet, whoſe Mechaniſm is very curious.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Place allotted to the ſeveral Tribes of Animals.

All Parts of the Globe fit for an Animal to live and act in, are ſufficiently ſtocked with proper Inhabitants. The Waters abound with Creatures fitted for it. The Earth is plentifully ſtocked in all its Parts.

But that which ſheweth the divine Management in the Caſe, is, that thoſe Creatures are manifeſtly deſigned for the Place in which they are, and the Uſe and Services they perform therein.

CHAP. X.

Of the Balance of Animals.

The Surface of our Globe can afford only Room and Support to ſuch a Number of Animals. The keeping therefore the Balance even, is manifeſtly a Work of divine Providence; to which End God hath determined the Life to ſuch a Length, and their Increaſe to ſuch a Number, proportional to their Uſe in the World. Noxious Animals breed but

slowly, whereas those that are useful to Man, are produced in great Plenty. And those Creatures whose Life is long, increase but slowly; and where the Increase is great, their Lives are proportionally short.

Thus the Balance of the animal World is throughout all Ages kept even.

But that especial Management of the Recruits and Decays of Mankind, so equally all the World over, deserves our particular Observation. In the Beginning of the World, and so after the Flood, the Longævity of Men, as it was of absolute Necessity to the more speedy peopling the World, so it is a special Instance of the divine Providence; and the same appears in the following Ages: When the World was pretty well peopled, the common Age of Man was to 120 Years. And when the World was fully peopled, the common Age of Man was reduded to 70 or 80 Years. And by this Method of Providence the World is neither too full nor too empty of Inhabitants. For now if the Generality of Men were to live to 1000 Years, or only to *Abraham*'s Life of 175 Years, the World would be too full. Or if the Age of Man was limited to 10, or 20, or 30 years, the Decays of Mankind would be too fast. But now the Balance is kept even, and Death and Life keep an equal Pace. As to Births, two Things are very considerable: One is the nearly equal Proportion of Males and Females. The other is, that a few more are born than die. Which is an admirable Provision for the extraordinary Emergencies and Occasions of the World. All which can proceed from nothing else but the Management of an infinitely wise and powerful Being.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Food of Animals.

The divine Providence and Management in his providing Food for the animal World, will be exemplified from these following Particulars.

1. From the subsisting and maintaining such a large Number of Animals throughout all Parts of the World.

2. From the proportionate Quantity of Food to the Eaters.

3. From the Variety of Food suited to the Variety of Creatures; or the Delight which various Animals have in different Food.

4. From the peculiar Food which peculiar Places afford to the Creatures suited to those Places.

5. From the admirable Apparatus made for the gathering, preparing, and Digestion of the Food. And,

6. From the great Sagacity of all Animals in finding out and providing their Food.

1. It is a great Act of God's Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, to provide Food for such a prodigious Number of Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Insects.

But I shall leave this Consideration, because it will be illustrated under the following Points; and proceed,

2. To consider the Adjustment of the Quantity of Food in Proportion to the Eaters. In all Places generally enough, but not such a Superfluity as to waste and corrupt. But that which is remarkable here, is, that among the great Variety of Foods, the most useful is the most plentiful, easiest propagated, and most patient of Weather and other Injuries. As the herbaceous Eaters are so many, so the Earth is covered over with Grass, and other agreeable wholsome Plants; propagating themselves eve-

ry where, and scarcely destroyable by the Weather, or any Art. So likewise for Grain, which is useful for Men, how easily is it cultivated, and what increase doth it make?

3. Another wise Provision the Creator hath made relating to the Food of Animals is, that various Animals delight in various Food: Whereas if all delighted in the same Sort, there could not be sufficient for all. But now various Animals living on various Food, all the Provisions the Globe affords are well disposed of, which would otherwise encumber the World and stink: For our most useful Plants would mould and rot; and those Beasts, Fowls, and Fishes, which are reckoned amongst the greast Dainties, would turn to Carrion and poison us: Nay, those Animals which are become Carrion, would be more grievous Annoyances, was it not for the Provision which God hath made, by causing these Things to be sweet, pleasant, and wholsome Food to some Creature or other.

4. Let us take a View of the peculiar Food which particular Places afford to the Creatures inhabitating therein.

It is an admirable Act of the divine Providence that every Place affords a proper Food to all the living Creatures therein. But of all Places, one would think that the Waters were a very unlikely Element to produce Food for so great a Number of Creatures as have their Sustenance therein: But yet they are all richly provided for;

And the Provision which the Creator hath made for this Service in the Waters is observable: Not only by the Germination of divers aquatic Plants there, but particularly by appointing the Waters to be the Matrix of many Animals of the Insect Kind, and by that Means become Food to the Inhabitants of the Waters.

To this it is objected, that Necessity maketh Use.

Animals

Animals must be fed, and they make Use of what they can find.

But this Objection will be found frivolous, and the Wisdom and Design of the great Creator will demonstratively appear, if we take a Survey,

5. Of the curious Apparatus in all Animals made for the gathering, preparing, and digesting their Food.

Let us begin with the *Mouth*. And this we find in every Species of Animals, nicely conformable to the Use of such a Part; neatly sized and shaped for catching of Prey, for the gathering and receiving Food, for the Formation of Speech, and every other such like Use. In some Creatures it is wide and large, in some little and narrow, in some with a deep Incisure up into the Head, (as in wild Beasts) for the better catching and holding of Prey, and more easy Comminution of hard and troublesome Food; in others with a much shorter Incisure, for the gathering and holding of herbaceous Food.

In *Insects* it is very notable. In some forcipated to catch, hold, and tear their Prey: In some aculeated, to pierce and wound Animals, and suck their Blood, as in Gnats.

In *Hornets*, and *Wasps*, and Worms, it is strongly rigged with Jaws and Teeth, to gnaw and scrape out their Food, to carry Burthens, and perforate the Earth, and Wood, yea even Stones for Houses to themselves, and Nests for their Young.

In *Birds* the Mouth is neatly shaped for piercing the Air, and making Way for the Body thro' the airy Regions. In the next Place it is hard and horny, to supply the Want of Teeth and Hands. Its hooked Form is of great Use in tearing the Prey, in climbing, in grinding their Food, *(as in Parrots)*. The extraordinary Length and Slenderness of the *Woodcocks* and *Snipes*, &c. Bills, is very useful to grope for their Food in moorish Places. And

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the Length of the *Ducks* and *Geeſe*'s Bill to ſearch in muddy Places. The *Green-Woodſpite* and all *Wood-Peckers* have Bills curiouſly made to perforate Wood. But it would be endleſs to reckon up the various Shapes and commodious Mechaniſm of all.

Let us then next take a ſhort View of the *Teeth*; in which their peculiar Hardneſs is remarkable, their Growth alſo, their firm Inſertions in the Gums and Jaws, and their various Shape and Strength: The foremoſt weak, as being only Preparatives to the reſt; the others being to grind and mince, are made ſtronger, and placed near the Center of Motion. Their various Form in various Animals is conſiderable; and laſtly the temporal Defect of them is no leſs obſervable in Children, and ſuch young Creatures where there is no Occaſion for them.

From the Teeth let us proceed to the other miniſterial Parts; and here the *parotid*, *ſublingual*, and *maxillary Glands*, together with thoſe of the Cheeks and Lips are conſiderable, all lodged in the moſt convenient Places about the Mouth and Throat, to afford that noble digeſtive ſalival Liquor to be mixed with the Food in Maſtigation, and to moiſten the Paſſages, to give an eaſy Deſcent to the Food. The Form of the Jaws alſo deſerve our Notice, together with the Articulation of the lowermoſt, and its Motion. And the Form, Strength, Lodgment and Situation of the Muſcles and Tendons, which ſet forth the infinite Workman's Care and Skill.

Next to the *Mouth*, the *Gullet* preſenteth itſelf in every Creature well ſized to the Food it hath Occaſion to ſwallow; in all exceedingly remarkable for the curious Mechaniſm of its Muſcles, and the artificial Decuſſation and Poſition of their Fibres. (See *Drake*'s *Anat.* V. 1. Lib. 1. Chap. 9.)

I come now to the *Stomach*; and here I might deſcribe the admirable Mechaniſm of the Tunicks,

Glands,

Glands, Nerves, Arteries, Veins, and Digeſtion; but I ſhall only give theſe Things a bare Mention, and take a more peculiar Notice of the ſeveral Proviſions made in the particular Species of Animals for the Digeſtion of their appointed Food.

In every Species of Animals the Strength and Size of their Stomach is conformable to their Food. (See *Grew*'s *Coſmol. Sacr.* Chap. 6.)

Another very remarkable Thing in this Part is the Number of Ventricles in divers Creatures. In many but one; in ſome two or more. In ſuch as make a ſufficient Comminution of the Food in the Mouth, one ſuffices: But where Teeth are wanting, and the Food dry and hard, as in granivorous Birds, there the Defect is abundantly ſupplied by one thin membranous Ventricle, to receive and moiſten the Food, and another thick, ſtrong, and muſcular one, to grind and tear it. But in Birds and other Creatures, whoſe Food is not Grain, but Fleſh and Inſects, or partly one, partly the other, there their Stomachs are accordingly conformable to their Food, ſtronger or weaker.

But a very remarkable Thing is the curious Contrivance and Fabric of the ſeveral Ventricles of *ruminating* Creatures.

The very Act itſelf of Rumination is an excellent Proviſion for the perfect Maſtication of the Food, at the reſting Times of the Animal: But the Apparatus for this Service deſerves great Admiration. (*Vide J. Cour. Peyeri de Ruminantibus & Ruminatione comment.*)

I come now,

6. To ſpeak of *the great Sagacity of all Animals in finding out, and providing their Food.*

And here we ſhall find a glorious Scene of the divine Wiſdom and Power, Providence and Care, if we view the various Inſtincts of Beaſts, Birds, Inſects and Reptiles. Among every Species of

whom we may find notable Acts of Sagacity, proportionable to their Occasions for Food.

With what entertaining Power and Artifice do some Creatures hunt and pursue their Prey! and others watch and way-lay theirs! with what Sagacity do others grope for it under Ground, both in wet and dry Places! and how curious and well-designed a Provision is it of particular large Nerves in such Creatures, adapted to that particular Service! How surprizingly do *Wolves* and *Foxes* smell their Prey at great Distances! How piercing is the Sight of the Eagle! What a curious Provision hath God made for Animals that are forced to climb for their Food, not only in the Structure of their Legs and Feet, and in the Strength of their Tendons and Muscles acting in that particular Office! What a Provision also is that in nocturnal Birds, and Beasts, in the peculiar Structure of the Eye (and we may perhaps add the Accuracy of their Smell too) whereby they are enabled to discover their Food in the dark? But among all the Instances we have of natural Instinct, those Instincts made to supply the Necessities of helpless Animals, do in a particular Manner demonstrate the great Creator's Care. Of which I will give two Instances.

1. The Provision made for young Creatures. That Στοργὴ, that natural Affection so connatural to all Creatures towards their young. What an admirable Principle implanted in them by the wise Creator! By Means of which they with the greatest Tenderness nurse their Young! How carefully will they lead them about in Places of Safety! Yea some of them admit them into their own Bowels! How will they caress them, and lull and quiet them with their tender paternal Voices! put Food into their Mouths! suckle and keep them warm? teach them to pick, and eat, and feed themselves!

And

And as for Insects, whose numerous Offspring are too great for their Parents Care, these are so generated, as to need none of their Care, by reason they arrive immediately to their perfect State. Yet thus far their Care extends, they reposite their Eggs in such commodious Places, some in the Waters, some on Flesh, some on Plants proper to their Species, and some shut up agreeable Food in their Nests, partly for Incubation, partly for Food, that their Young may find sufficient Food to bring them up, till they arrive to their Maturity.

Next we may observe, that as their Parents cannot take the Care, as Man doth of their Offspring to nurse them, their Young with the little Helps of their Dam, shift for themselves, and naturally hunt for their Teat, and take their proper Food.

2. The other Instance I promised is the Provision made for the Preservation of such Animals as are sometimes destitute of Food.

In Winter there being no Food to be got for such Animals as live upon Summer Fruits and Plants; and no Living for such as are impatient of Cold; the wise Preserver of the World has so wisely ordered the Matter, that such as are impatient of Cold should have such a special Structure of Body, particularly of the Heart and Circulation of the Blood, as during that Season, not to suffer any Waste of their Body, and consequently not to need any Recruits; but that they should Sleep in their Retreats, until the warm Sun revives both them and their Food together.

The next Provision is for such as can bear the Cold, but want Food then; and that is in some by a long Abstinence, in others by a notable Instinct in laying up Food beforehand against the approaching Winter.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Cloathing of Animals.

1. The Cloathing of Animals is suited to their Place of Abode, and Occasions there; a manifest Act of Design and Skill.

Mankind being indowed with the transcendent Faculty of Reason, and thereby being able to help himself, God hath wisely made him naked, and left him to shift for himself.

And a notable Act this is of the Wisdom of God, not only as the more setting forth his Kindness to them, that most needed his Help, the irrational Creatures, and in his not overdoing his Work; but also as it is most agreeable to the Nature and State of Man both on natural and political Accounts. That Man should cloth himself is most agreeable to his Nature, particularly as being most salutary and most suitable to his Affairs. For by this Means he can adapt his Clothing to all Seasons, Climates, or Business: But above all, by this Method of Clothing, with the natural Texture of his Skin adapted to it, *insensible Perspiration* is performed, at least promoted, without which, an human Body would be soon over-run with Disease.

In the next Place there are good political Reasons for Man's clothing himself; for hereby his Industry is employed, his Care, Diligence and Ingenuity are exerted: Many Callings and Ways of Life arise from hence; and the Ranks of Men are hereby discovered to others.

Thus it is best for Man that he should clothe himself.

But for the poor shiftless Irrationals, it is a prodigious Act of the great Creator's Indulgence, that they are furnished with such Clothing, as is proper to their Place and Business. Some covered with Hair,

Hair, ſome with Feathers, ſome with Scales, ſome with Shells, ſome only with Skin, and ſome with firm Armature.

To *Quadrupeds* Hair is a commodious Clothing, which fitteth them for all Weathers, to lie on the Ground, and to do the Offices of Man. And the thick Furs and Covering of others are a Defence againſt the Cold, a ſoft Bed to ſleep in, and a comfortable Covering to cheriſh their Young.

The Feathers of *Birds* are uſeful to them againſt the cold and wet, a warm Covering to their Young, commodious for their Flight; for which Service their Texture is very light, and withal very ſtrong.

How well adapted are the *Annuli* of ſome Reptiles, and the Contortions of the Skins of others, not only to fence the Body ſufficiently againſt outward Injuries, but to enable them to creep, to perforate the Earth; and in a word, to perform all the Offices of their reptile State, much better than any other Tegument of the Body would do? And the ſame might be ſaid of the Inhabitants of the Waters, but that I ſhall omit till by and by.

2. Let us take a Survey of the *Garniture* and *Beauty* of Animal's Clothing.

The Clothing of the moſt ſordid, leaſt beautiful, nay frightful Animal, when we come ſtrictly to conſider and view the admirable Texture and exact Symmetry of the whole, hath Strokes in it of inimitable Skill.

But if we view thoſe to whom God hath been pleaſed, as it were, to give ſurprizing Beauties, how greatly are we captivated with them?

And now who can without the greateſt Obſtinacy deny this to be God's handy Work? Our Apparel we readily own to be the Work of Man: And ſhall we deny the Clothing of the animal World, which infinitely ſurpaſſeth all the Robes of earthly Majeſty, to be the Work of any Thing leſs than of

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an infinite intelligent Being, whoſe Art and Power are equal to ſuch a glorious Work!

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Houſes and Habitations of Animals.

Having ſurveyed the Clothing of Animals, I ſhall next take a View of their *Houſes*, *Neſts*, and *Habitations*.

God having given Man the Gift of Reaſon and Underſtanding, whereby he is able to ſhift for himſelf, to contrive and build as his Pleaſure leads him, and his Abilities will admit of, hath abundantly provided for him in this Reſpect; and a wiſe Proviſion this is, inaſmuch as it is an excellent Exerciſe of his Wit, Ingenuity, and Induſtry.

But ſince Ingenuity without Materials would be fruitleſs, therefore God hath provided great Variety of Trees, Earth, Stone, and Plants, anſwering every Occaſion of Man for this Uſe.

Thus ſufficient Proviſion is made for the Habitation of Man.

And no leſs ſhall we find is made for the reſt of the Creatures; who although they want the Power of Reaſon to vary their Methods, yet we find that natural Inſtinct, which the Creator's infinite Underſtanding hath imprinted in them, to be abundantly ſufficient, nay, in all Probability the beſt or only Method they can take, or can be invented for the reſpective Uſe and Purpoſe of each peculiar Species of Animals.

And as the natural Sagacity and Inſtinct of the irrational Animals in the Convenience and Method of their Habitations is admirable; ſo no leſs is it in the Fabric of them. With what inimitable Art do theſe untaught Creatures lay a Parcel of rude and ugly Sticks and Straws, Moſs and Dirt together, and form them into commodious Neſts? With what

Curiosity do they line them within, wind and place every Hair, Feather, or Lock of Wool, to guard the tender Bodies of their Young, and to keep them warm! With what Art do many of them coat their Nests without, to dodge and deceive the Eyes of Spectators! (See *Ray's Synopsi. Avium. p.* 74.)

And so for *Insects*, what admirable Artists are they in this Business of Nidification! With what geometrical Subtilty do *Bees* and *Wasps* work their deep hexagonal Cells, the only proper Figure that the best Mathematician could chuse for such a Combination of Houses! And with what Care do these sagacious Animals line their Houses within, and seal them up! How artificially will others fold up the Leaves of Trees and Plants; others house themselves in Straws; others (as Cod-baits) glew light and floating Bodies together, and by that Artifice make themselves floating Houses in the Waters, and transport themselves at Pleasure after their Food, or other necessary Occasions of Life! (See *Raii Method. Insect. p.* 12.)

And now from this short View of the architectonic Faculty of Animals, especially the Irrational, we may easily perceive some superior and wise Being was certainly concerned in their Creation.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Animals Self-Preservation.

The next excellent Provision the wise Creator hath made for the Good of the animal World, is the Methods which all Animals naturally take for their *Self-Preservation.* And here it is remarkable, as in the Cases before, that *Man* who is endowed with Reason, is born without Armature, and is destitute of many Powers which irrational Creatures have in a much higher Degree than he, by Reason he can make Arms to defend himself.

But other Animals being deſtitute of this, are ſome Way or other provided with ſufficient Guard. Some by their natural Clothing, their Shells; others with Horns, or Quills, or Claws, or Stings; ſome can make their Eſcape by their Wings, or Swiftneſs; ſome can ſcreen themſelves by diving; the Ink-Fiſh by tinging the Waters; the *Salamander* can guard his Body even in the very Flames, by the Ejection of the Juice of their Bodies: Some by their accurate Smell, Sight, or Hearing can foreſee Dangers: Others by their natural Craft can prevent or eſcape them: Others by their uncouth Noiſe, by the horrid Aſpect, and ugly Geſticulations of their Body; and ſome by the Power of their Excrements, and their Stink can annoy their Enemy, and ſecure themſelves: And againſt ſome the divine Providence itſelf hath provided a Guard.

By ſuch Shifts a ſufficient Guard is miniſtered to every Species of Animals in its proper reſpective Place; enough to ſecure the Species from Deſtruction; but yet not enough to ſecure Individuals from becoming a prey to Man, or to other Creatures, as their Neceſſities of Life require. To which purpoſe the natural Sagacity of the one in intrapping, being in ſome Meaſure equivalent to that of the other in evading, is as excellent a Means for the maintaining the one, as preſerving the other; and if well conſidered, argues the Contrivance of the infinitely wiſe Creator and Preſerver of the World.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Generation of Animals.

I ſhall confine my ſelf to theſe five Matters.

1. Their natural Sagacity in chuſing the fitteſt Places to repoſite their Eggs, and Young.

2. The fitteſt Seaſons they make uſe of for their Generation.

3. The

3. The ſtated Number of their Young.

4. Their Diligence in their bringing them up.

5. Their Faculty of feeding them, and their Sagacity exerted therein.

1. Their natural Sagacity in chuſing the fitteſt Places to repoſite their Eggs and Young.

It hath been already ſhewn, and will hereafter appear, that the Places in which the ſeveral Species of Animals lay up their Eggs and Young are the beſt for that Purpoſe. But there are two or three Things more obſervable, which plainly argue the Inſtinct of ſome ſuperior Being. As,

1. The compleat Order which many Creatures obſerve in laying up their Eggs; of which I ſhall ſpeak in another Place.

2. The ſuitable Apparatus in every Creature's Body for laying up its Eggs, Seed, or Young in their proper Place. Thus Inſects, who have neither Feet adapted to catch, nor Noſes to dig, nor can make artificial Neſts to lay up their Young, had abundant Amends made them, in the Power they have either to extend the *Abdomen*, and thereby reach the commodious Places they could not otherwiſe come at; or elſe they have ſome aculeous Part or Inſtrument to terebrate, and make Way for their Eggs into the Root, Trunk, Fruit, Leaves, and the tender Buds of Vegetables, or ſome other ſuch curious and ſecure Method they are never deſtitute of. To which we may add,

2. The natural Poiſon which many Flies have to cauſe the Germination of ſuch Balls, Caſes, and other commodious Repoſitories as are an admirable Lodgment for their Eggs. But of this I will take Notice hereafter.

2. Animals chuſe alſo the fitteſt Times and Seaſons for their Generation. Thoſe, indeed, whoſe Proviſions are ready at all Seaſons, produce their Young at any Time. But others, whoſe Proviſions

are peculiar, and only to be met with at certain Seaſons, or who by their Migration are tied up to certain Seaſons; theſe, as if endowed with a natural Care and Foreſight, do accordingly lay, hatch and nurſe up their Young in the moſt proper Seaſons for their Purpoſe.

3. I may add the peculiar Number of Young produced by the irrational Creatures: Of which I have already taken Notice. Now, if there was not a wiſe Governor of the Creation, it could never happen, that every Species of Animals ſhould be tied up to a certain Rule and Proportion of its Increaſe: The moſt uſeful would not be the moſt fruitful, and the moſt pernicious produce the feweſt; but all would be in a confuſed State. Inſtead of which we find the Balance of the Genera, Species, and Individuals always even, the Balance of the Sexes the ſame; moſt Creatures tied up to their due Number, ſome more, ſome leſs, but not more than they can cover, feed, and cheriſh; which minds me,

4. Of the Diligence and earneſt Concern which irrational Animals have of the Production and Breeding of their Young.

1. Their wonderful Inſtinct of Incubation. It is impoſſible that ever unthinking Animals ſhould take to that only Method of hatching their Young, was it not implanted in their Nature by the infinitely wiſe Creator. But of theſe Matters in a more proper Place.

2. When the Young-ones are produced with what Courage do all, or moſt Creatures defend them! It is ſtrange to ſee Creatures, who at other times are fearful, boldly encounter their Enemies, and expoſe themſelves to Danger, to ſave their Young. To this we may join,

5. Their Sagacity of feeding them. Of which I ſhall obſerve three Things.

1. Their

1. Their Faculty of ſuckling the Young, is an excellent Proviſion the Creator hath made for thoſe helpleſs Creatures.

And here the Agreeableneſs and Suitableneſs of that Food to young Creatures deſerves our Regard; as alſo their Delight in it, and Endeavours after it, even as ſoon as born, together with the Willingneſs of all, even the moſt ſavage Animals, to part with it to their Young, yea to teach them in the Art of taking it.

And to name no more, the curious Apparatus which is made for this Service in the divers Species of Animals, proportionable to the Occaſions of each Animal, by Glands in their Breaſts to ſeparate the nutritive Juice, the Milk, by Arteries and Veins, to convey it from them, with Duggs and Nipples placed in the moſt convenient Part of the Body of each Animal to adminiſter it to the Young; all theſe Things proclaim the Care and Wiſdom of God.

2. As for ſuch Animals as do in another Manner breed up their Young, by finding out Food, and putting it into their Mouths, the Proviſion made in them for this Service, to catch, to pouch, and convey their Food to their Young, is very conſiderable; and ſo is likewiſe their Sagacity in equally diſtributing it among them, that all ſhall be duly fed.

3. Thoſe Animals who can neither adminiſter Suck to their Young, neither lay them in Places affording Food, nor can convey them Food, do with their Eggs lay up Proviſion for their Young. This is reported of the *American* Oſtrich, and is true of many Inſects.

A

SURVEY

OF THE

Particular Tribes of ANIMALS.

HAVING taken a View of the Things in common to Animals, I will now inspect the particular Tribes, in Order to give a further Manifestation of the infinite Creator's Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, towards the Animal World.

BOOK V.

A Survey of Man.

CHAP. I.

Of the Soul of Man.

WE have enough to fill us with Admiration of the Munificence, Power, and Wisdom of the infinite Creator, when we contemplate the Faculties of this our superior Part, the vast Compass of our *Understanding*, the Quickness of its *Thought*, the Subtilty of its *Invention*, the commanding Power of its *Wisdom*, the Depth of its *Memory*, and in a Word its divine Nature and Operations.

But not to dwell on this, because it is least known; I shall,

1. Take Notice of the various *Genii* or *Inclinations* of Men to different Employments: Which is an admirably wise as well as necessary Provision, for the easy and sure transacting the World's Affairs;

fairs; to answer every End and Occasion of Man; yea to make Man helpful to the poor helpless Beasts, as far as his Help is needful to them; and all with great Pleasure. For the greatest Labours become pleasing to him who is pursuing his *Genius*.

2. The next Thing I shall observe is, the *inventive Power* of the Soul. Under which I will take Notice only of two Things; because they manifest the particular Agency of the infinitely wise Creator. The

1. Is, That *Man's Invention* should reach to such a great Variety of Matters, either useful to himself or Society, or beneficial to the lower Part of the Creation.

For the Illustration of this, I take a View of all Arts and Sciences, and Trades. And indeed what is there that falleth under the Reach of Man's Senses, that he doth not employ to some Use for the World's Good? The celestial Bodies he employs to the noble Uses of Astronomy, Navigation, and Geography. And what a vast Reach must the Soul be endowed with, to invent Geometry and Arithmetic, and those nice Instruments made use of by the Geometrician, Astronomer, Geographer, and Sailor! And lastly, what a Sagacity is shewn in the Business of Optics, and in the Invention of Telescopes!

And as for this lower World, what Material is there to be found, that Man's Contrivance doth not make some Way or other advantageous to himself, and useful for Building, Clothing, Food, Physic, or for Tools, or for even his Pleasure? But,

2. There is another Thing that doth farther demonstrate the Super-intendence of the great Creator and Preserver of the World, and that is, that Things of great and absolutely necessary Use, have soon occurred to the Invention of Man; but Things of little Use, or very dangerous Use, are rarely or slowly discovered, or still utterly undiscoverd.

That this is the true Reason of these Matters, see *James* i. 17. *Prov.* ii. 6. *Job* xxxii. 8. 1 *Kings* iv. 29. *Dan.* i. 17. 20. *Exod.* xxxi. 2——6. xxxv. 10. 25. 1 *Kings* vii. 14. In which Places the Contrivances and Crafts of Men are ascribed to the Agency or Influence of the Spirit of God upon that of Man. And there is the same Reason for the Variety of *Genii* or *Inclinations* of Men also; which from the same Scriptures may be concluded to be a Designation and Transaction of the same Almighty Governour of the World. And who indeed but he could make such a divine Substance endowed with those admirable Faculties and Powers as the rational Soul hath?

CHAP. II.

Of Man's Body, particularly its Posture.

The first Thing that presents itself to our View, is the *erect Posture* of Man's Body; which is the most commodious Posture for such a Creature as Man. [See *Cic. de N. D. l.* 2.] For without this erect Posture, he could not have readily turned himself to every Business. His Hand particularly could not have been in so great Readiness to execute the Commands of the Will: His Eyes would have been the most prone and incommodiously situated of all Animals; but by this Situation he can cast his Eyes upwards and downwards, and round about him. [See *Galen. de us. part. lib.* 1. *cap.* 3. *Ovid. Met. lib.* 1. *car.* 84.]

To support this erect Posture, how curiously do we find the Bones placed from Head to Foot! The *Vertebræ* of the Neck and Back-bone made short and complanated, and firmly braced with Muscles and Tendons, for easy Incurvation of the Body, but withal for greater Strength to support the Body's own Weight and Burdens. The *Thigh-bones* and Legs

Legs long, and ſtrong, and fitted for every Motion of the Body. The Feet accommodated with a great Number of Bones, curiouſly tacked together to anſwer all the Motions of the Legs and Thighs, and at the ſame Time to keep the Body upright, and prevent its falling, by readily aſſiſting againſt every Vacillation thereof, and with eaſy and ready Touches keep the *Line of Innixion* and *Center of Gravity* in due Place and Poſture. [See *Borelli de motu animal. part.* 1. *cap.* 18. *de ſtatione animal. prop.* 132, *&c.*]

And as the Bones are admirably adapted to prop, ſo all Parts of the Body are as incomparably placed to poiſe it; for which Service the Concurrence of various Muſcles that ſo readily anſwer to every Poſture, and comply with every Motion thereof, without any previous Thought, or reflex Act, is very wonderful and amazing.

CHAP. III.

Of the Figure and Shape of Man's Body.

The preſent Shape of Man's Body is the moſt commodious. For had he being a rational Reptile, he could not have moved faſt enough to do his Buſineſs; and, had he been a rational Quadrupede, among other Things, he had loſt the Uſe of his Hands. In a word, any other Shape of Body would have been incommodious, it would have rendered him more helpleſs, or have put it in his Power to have been more pernicious, or deprived him of ten thouſand Benefits, which his preſent State capacitates him for.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Stature and Size of Man's Body.

We have in the Stature and Size of Man's Body another manifeſt Inſtance of excellent Deſign. If he

he had been less, he had been too impotent to manage inferiour Creatures, and unable to transact the greater Part of his Labours and Concerns.

And had he been too enormously gigantic, it would have rendered him a dangerous Tyrant in the World, too strong in some Respects, even for his own Kind, as well as other Creatures. [See *Grew's Cosmol. Sacr. B.* 1. *c.* 5. §. 25.]

CHAP. V.

Of the Structure of the Parts of Man's Body.

Every Part of our Bodies are wonderfully made. No Botch, no Blunder, no unnecessary Apparatus, no Signs of Chance; but every Thing performed in the shortest and best Method, and adapted to the most compendious Use. [See *Galen. de Us. l.* 1. *c.* 18. *c.* 13.]

CHAP. VI.

Of the placing the Parts of Man's Body.

The Lodgment of the curious Parts of Man's Body is no less admirable than the Parts themselves, all placed in the most convenient Parts of the Body, to minister to their own Uses, and to assist one another. Where could the Eye, the Tongue, the Ear be so commodiously placed, as in the upper Part of the Building? Where could we find so proper a Part to lodge four of the five Senses, as in the Head, near the Brain, the common Sensory? And how could he lodge the Sense of *Touching* otherwise, than to disperse it to all Parts of the Body? Where could we plant the Hand, but just where it is, to be ready on all Occasions of Help and Defence, of Motion and Action? Where could we set the Legs and Feet, but where they are? Where could we lodge the Heart, and find Room for it to play freely

ly in, and be so well guarded, as in the Place where it is? Where could we so commodiously lodge the *Viscera* as in the Belly? How could we plant the Bones, Muscles, Arteries, Veins, and the Nerves Sensation throughout the Body so commodiously as in the Places where they are? And lastly, what Covering, better than the Skin, could we find out? How could we shape it to every Part, better, either for Convenience or Ornament? What better Texture could we give it, which though less obdurate than that of some other Animals, yet is so much the more sensible of every Touch, and more compliant with every Motion? And being easily defensible, by the Power of Man's Reason and Art, is therefore the propereſt Tegument for a reasonable Creature.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Provision in Man's Body against Evils.

For the Prevention of Evils, we may take the Instances already given of the Situation of the Eye, Ear, and Tongue, the better to descry Dangers at a Distance, and to call out for Help: And how well the Hand is situated to guard the Body. The Brain, the Nerves, and Arteries, the Heart, the Lungs, and in a Word, all the principal Parts, how well are they barricaded either with strong Bones, or deep Lodgments in the Flesh, or some such the wiſeſt Method, and most agreeable to the Office and Action of the Part? Besides, what a Provision has God made for the Loss of any Part, or any Defect in them, by giving us two Eyes, two Ears, two Hands, two Kidneys, two Lobes of the Lungs, Pairs of the Nerves, and Veins in the fleshy Parts, that there may not be a Defect of Nourishment of the Parts, in Cases of Amputation or Wounds, or Ruptures of any of the Vessels.

And as Man's Body is curiously contrived to prevent

vent Evils, so no less Art and Caution hath been used to get rid of them, when they happen. What Emunctories, what admirable Passages are dispersed throughout the Body, what incomparable Methods doth Nature take, and what vigorous Efforts is she enabled to make, to discharge the peccant Humours, and set all Things right again! (See *Grew*'s *Cosmol.* §. 28. 29.)

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Consent of the Parts of Man's Body.

It is an admirable Provision God hath made for the Good of Man's Body, by the Harmony between the Parts thereof. (See 1 *Cor.* xii. 8, 21, 25, 26.)

This mutual Consent of the Members of our Body is made by the Commerce of the Nerves, and their artificial Positions, and curious Ramifications throughout the whole Body: Of which I shall give one Instance, as a Sample of the whole; and that shall be the greatest Consent or Sympathy occasion'd by the *fifth Pair* of Nerves. Now this *fifth Conjugation of Nerves* is branched to the Ball, the Muscles and Glands of the Eye; to the Ear, to the Jaws, the Gums, and Teeth; to the Muscles of the Lips; to the Tonsils, the Palate, the Tongue, and Parts of the Mouth; to the *Præcordia* also, in some Measure, by inosculating with one of its Nerves; and lastly, to the Muscles of the Face, particularly the Cheeks, whose sanguiferous Vessels it twists about.

From hence it comes to pass, that there is a great Consent and Sympathy between these Parts: So that a gustable Thing seen or smelt, excites the Appetite, and affects the Glands and Parts of the Mouth; that a Thing seen or heard, that is shameful, affects the Cheeks with modest Blushes; but on the contrary, if it pleases and tickles the Fancy, then

then it affects the *Præcordia* and Muscles of the Mouth and Face with Laughter; but a Thing causing Sadness, doth accordingly exert itself upon the *Præcordia*, and demonstrate itself by causing the Glands of the Eyes to emit Tears, and the Muscles of the Face to put on a sorrowful Aspect of Crying? And in short, it is by Means of this Communication of the Nerves, that whatever affects the Soul, is demonstrated by a consentaneous Disposition of the *Præcordia* within, and suitable Configuration of the Muscles and Parts of the Face without. (See *Plin. Nat. Hist. lib.* II. *c.* 37.)

CHAP. IX.

Of the Variety of Men's Faces, Voices, and Hand-Writing.

Had Man's Body been made according to any of the atheistical Schemes, and not by God, this wise Variety could never have been; but Men's Faces would have been cast in the same, or not in a very different Mould; their Organs of Speech would have sounded the same or not so great a Variety of Notes; and the same Structure of Muscles and Nerves would have given the Hand the same Direction in Writing. And in this Case, what Confusion and Mischiefs would the World eternally have lain under? No Security could have been to our Persons, no Certainty, no Enjoyment of our Possessions, no Justice between Man and Man, no Distinction between Good and Bad, between Friends and Foes, between Father and Child, Husband and Wife, Male and Female; but all would have been turned topsy-turvey, by being exposed to the Malice of the envious and ill-natured, to the Fraud and Violence of Knaves and Robbers, to the Lusts of Effeminate and Debauched, and what not!

BOOK VI.

A Survey of Quadrupedes.

CHAP. I.

Of their prone Posture.

Concerning which, I shall take Notice only of two Things, the Parts ministring thereunto, and the Use and Benefit thereof.

1. As for the Parts, 'tis observable that in all these Creatures the *Legs* are made exactly conformable to this Posture, as those in Man are to his erect Posture: And what is farther observable also, is that the Legs and Feet are always admirably suited to the Motion and Exercises of each Animal: In *Elephants* they are made for Strength only: In *Deers*, *Hares*, and other swift Creatures, they are made for Agility and Swiftness. In some they are made for only Walking and Running: In the *Otter* and *Beaver* for that and Swimming too, their Toes being conjoined with Membranes as the Feet of *Geese*: In the *Mole* they are made for Walking and Digging; and in the *Bat* for Walking and Flying: In some they are made more lax and weak for the plainer Lands: In *Elks* and *Goats* rigid, and less flexible for traversing the Ice, and dangerous Precipices of the high Mountains: In some they are shod with tough and hard Hoofs, some whole, some cleft; in others with only a callous Skin: In which latter, 'tis observable that the Feet are composed of Toes, some short for bare going; some long, as in *Monkeys* and *Apes*, to supply the Place of a Hand. Some are armed with strong Talons to catch and tear their Prey; some fenced only with short Nails, to confirm the Steps in Running and Walking.

2. The prone Posture of Quadrupedes is most useful

useful and beneficial to themselves, and most serviceable to Man: For they are hereby better made for gathering their Food, to pursue their Prey, to leap, to climb, to swim, to guard themselves, and to do whatever may be of Use to themselves: As also they are hereby rendered more useful to Man, by carrying his Burdens, for tilling his Ground, yea even for his Diversions.

CHAP. II.

Of the Heads of Quadrupeds.

It is remarkable that in Man the Head is of one singular Form; in Quadrupeds as various as their Species. But passing by a great many Observations that might be made of this Kind, I shall stop a little at the Brain. In Man the Brain is large, affording Substance and Room for so noble a Guest as his Soul; in Quadrupeds it is but small. And another Thing no less remarkable is, the Situation of the *Cerebrum* and *Cerebellum*, or the greater or lesser Brain. (For which see *Willis*'s *Cerebr. Anat. cap.* 6. & 8.)

CHAP. III.

Of the Necks of Quadrupeas.

The Neck, though no principal Part of the Body, is yet a good Instance of the Creator's Wisdom and Design: Which as it is short in Man, agreeable to the Erection of his Body, so in four-footed Beasts it is long, proportionable to the Length of the Legs, except only the Elephant. (See *A. Moulin*'s *Anat. of the Elephant*, and *Phil. Transf.* N° 326. and *Galen. de us. part. lib.* 11. *c.* 8.) And in some of these long, and less strong, serving to carry the Mouth to the Ground; in others, as in *Moles* and *Swine*, shorter, brawny and strong, serving to dig and heave up great Weights. But

But that which deserves especial Remark, is that peculiar Provision made in the Necks of all, or most granivorous Quadrupeds, for the perpetual holding down their Head in gathering their Food by that strong, tendinous, and insensible *Aponeurosis*, or Ligament (called the *Packwax*) braced from the Head to the Middle of the Back. By which Means the Head, although heavy, may be long held down without any Labour, or Uneasiness to the Muscles of the Neck, that would otherwise be wearied by being so long put upon the Stretch.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Stomachs *of Quadrupeds.*

This in the several Species of Quadrupeds is sized, contrived, and made, with the utmost Variety and Art. None but God could so well adapt every Food to all the several Kinds of those grand Devourers of it; and so well fit their Stomachs to the Reception and Digestion thereof. One Kind of Stomach to the carnivorous, another to the herbaceous Animals; one fitted to digest by bare Mastication; and the whole Set of Stomachs in others to digest with the Help of Rumination!

CHAP. V.

Of the Heart of Quadrupeds.

In this Part there is a notable Difference between the Heart of Man, and that of Beasts. Concerning the latter of which I might take Notice of the remarkable Conformation of the Hearts of amphibious Quadrupeds, and their Difference from those of land Animals; some (*viz. Frogs*) having but one Ventricle; some three, (*viz.* the *Tortoise*. See *Phil. Trans.* N° 328.) And some, (see *French Anatomists*, *p.* 124.) but two, but then the *Foramen*

ovale therewith. But I shall content my self to speak only of two Particulars.

One is the Situation of the Heart, which in Beasts is near the middle of the whole Body; in Man nearer the Head. The Reason of which, (see *Lower de Corde*, *c.* 1. and *c.* 4.)

The other Particular is the Fastening which the Cone of the *Pericardium* hath in Man to the *Diaphragm*, whereas in all Quadrupeds it is loose. By which Means the Motion of the *Midriff*, in that necessary Act of Respiration, is assisted both in the upright Posture of Man, as also in the prone Posture of Quadrupeds, which would be hindered or rendered more difficult, if the Case were otherwise; which must needs be the Effect of Wisdom and Design, and that Man was intended to walk upright. (See *Lower de Corde*, *c.* 1. *p.* 8. *Ray's Wisdom*, *p.* 262.)

CHAP. VI.

Of the Difference between Men and Quadrupeds in the nervous Kind.

Here I shall only observe Nature's prodigious Care for a due Communication and Correspondence between the Head and Heart of Man, more than what is in the four-footed Tribe. For this Purpose besides the Correspondence those Parts have by Means of the Nerves of the *Par vagum* (common to Man and Beast) there is a farther Communication and Correspondence occasioned by the Branches of the *intercostal Pair* sent from the *cervical Plexus* to the Heart and the *Præcordia*. By which Means the Heart and Brain of Man have a mutual and intimate Correspondence and Concern with each other, more than in Brutes, who are made with a simpler Apparatus, and endowed therefore with only one Kind of Motion; whereas in Man there is

a great Variety. For by the Commerce of the *cervical Plexus*, the Conceptions of the Brain preſently affect the Heart, and agitate its Veſſels, and whole Appendage, together with the *Diaphragm*. From whence the Alteration in the Motion of the Blood, the Pulſe and Reſpiration: So alſo on the contrary, when any Thing affects the Heart, thoſe Impreſſions are reſtored to the Brain, and the Blood itſelf flies to the Brain with a different and unuſual Courſe, and there agitating the Spirits with divers Impulſes, produceth various Conceptions and Thoughts in the Mind.

But upon Account of this *intercoſtal Commerce* with the Heart being wanting in Brutes, there is another careful and wiſe Proviſion the infinite Creator hath made in them; and that is, that by Reaſon both the *Par vagum* and the *Intercoſtal* too, do not ſend their Branches to the Heart, and its Appendages in Brutes; therefore, leſt their Heart ſhould want a due Proportion of nervous Veſſels, the *Par vagum* ſends more Branches to their Heart than to that of Man. This, as it is a remarkable Difference between rational and irrational Creatures, ſo it is as remarkable an Argument of the Creator's Art and Care; who tho' he hath denied Brute-Animals Reaſon, and the Nerves miniſtring thereto, yet hath another Way ſupplied what is neceſſary to their Life and State.

BOOK

BOOK VII.

A Survey of Birds.

CHAP. I.

Of the Motion of Birds, and the Parts miniſtring thereto.

AS Birds have a different Motion from that of other Animals; ſome of them being amphibious, ſo is their Body accordingly ſhaped, and their Parts fitted for that Way of Life and Motion. As,

1. Their Body is incomparably adapted to their Flight; ſharp before to pierce the Air, and then by gentle Degrees riſing to its full Bulk. And,

2. The Feathers are all artificially placed for facilitating the Motion of the Body, and are alſo an admirable Clothing for it to keep it from Air and Weather. To which Purpoſe, as alſo for the more eaſy gliding of the Body thro' the Air, the Proviſion Nature hath made, and the Inſtinct of theſe Animals to *preen* and *dreſs* their Feathers is admirable; both in reſpect of the Art in doing it, and the *Oil-Bag* Glands, and whole Apparatus for that Service.

But as their Wings are the principal Inſtruments of Motion, ſo they are made with great Skill, and placed in the moſt commodious Point of the Body, to give it an exact Equipoiſe in the Air.

And here it is remarkable how curious every Feather is made; the Shaft ſtrong, but hollow below for Strength and Lightneſs ſake; and above, not much leſs ſtrong, and filled with a *Pith*, both ſtrong and light too. The *Vanes* as nicely gauged on each Side as made; broad on the one Side, and narrower on the other; both which miniſter to the progreſſive Motion of the Bird, as alſo to the Union and Cloſeneſs of the Wing.

And no less exquisite is the textrine Art of the *Plumage*, which cannot be viewed without Admiration, especially when the Eye is assisted with Glasses.

And no less curiously are the Feathers placed in the Wing, exactly according to their different Lengths and Strength: The *Principals* for Stay, and these again lined with *covert* and *secondary Feathers*, to keep the Air from passing through. And,

Lastly, What an admirable *Apparatus* is there of strong and light *Bones?* Of *Joints*, which open and shut, and move every Way, move according to the Occasions of extending and withdrawing the Wings? And of various *Muscles*, particularly the *pectoral Muscles*, which are much stronger in Birds than in Men, or any other Animal.

Next the Wings, the Tail is in Flight considerable; and greatly assisting in all Ascents and Descents, as also serving to steady Flight, by keeping the Body upright in the Air, by its readily turning and answering every Vacillation of the Body.

And now to the Parts serving to Flight, let us add the nice and compleat Manner of its Performance; all done according to the strictest Rules of Mechanism. (See *Borell. de mot. Animal.* Vol. 1. Prop. 182. *&c.*)

Next to the Parts for Flight, let us view the *Feet* and *Legs:* Both made light for easier Transportation through the Air; and the former spread, some with Membranes for swimming, some without, for steady going, for perching, for catching, and holding of Prey, or for hanging by the Heels to gather their Food, or to fix themselves in their Places of Retreat and Safety: And the *Legs* all curved for their easy perching, roosting, and Rest, as also to help them upon their Wings in taking their Flight, and to be commodiously tucked up to the Body, so as not to obstruct their Flight. In some long, for wading and searching the Waters;

in

in some of a moderate Length, answerable to their vulgar Occasions; and in others as remarkably short. To all which let us add the placing the *Legs*. In all somewhat out of the Center of the Body's Gravity; but in such as swim, more than in others, for the better rowing their Bodies through the Waters, or to help them in that and diving too.

CHAP. II.

Of the Head and Stomach, and other Parts of Birds.

Concerning the *Head* I have already taken Notice of its Shape for making way through the Air, of the Make of the *Bill* for gathering Food and other Uses; the commodious Situation of the *Eye*. And I might say a great deal of the peculiar Structure of the *Ear*, the *Brain*, the *Larynx*, the *Tongue*, and inner Ear; but I shall only insist upon the wonderful Provision in the *Bill* for judging of the Food, and that is by peculiar Nerves lodged therein for that Purpose; small and less numerous in such as have the Assistance of the Eye; but large and more numerous, and thickly branched about, to the very End of the Beak, in such as hunt for their Food out of Sight, in the Waters, in Mud, or under Ground. (See Mr. *J. Clayton*, in *Philos. Transact.* N° 206.)

I come now to the Stomach, another no less notable than useful Part; whether we consider the Elegancy of its Fibres and Muscles, or its Multiplicity; one to soften and macerate, another to digest; or its Variety, suited to various Foods, some membranaceous, agreeable to the frugivorous, or carnivorous Kind; some musculous and strong, suited to the Comminution and grinding of Corn and Grain, and so to supply the Defect of Teeth.

And now to this Specimen of the Parts, I might add the curious Structure and Lodgment of the

Lungs, the Configuration of the *Breast*, made like a Keel for commodious Passage thro' the Air, to bear the strong Muscles which move the Wings, and to counterpoise the Body, and support and rest it upon at Roost. The *Neck* also might deserve our Notice, always either exactly proportioned to the Length of the Legs, or else longer, to hunt out food, to search in the Waters, as also to counterpoise the Body in Flight. And lastly, I might take notice of the Defect of the *Diaphragm*, so necessary in other Animals to Respiration; but it would be tedious, I shall therefore pass on to consider the Migration of Birds.

CHAP. III.

Of the Migration of Birds.

In the Act of *Migration*, there are two Things very notable. One is their knowing their proper Times for their *Passage*; there is no doubt, but the Temperature of the Air, as to Heat and Cold, and their natural Propensity to breed their Young, may be great Incentives to these Creatures to change their Habitation; but yet it is a very odd Instinct that they should at all shift their Habitation; that some certain Place is not to be found in all the terraqueous Globe, affording them convenient Food and Habitation all the Year.

Also it is somewhat strange, that these Creatures shou'd so exactly know the best and only proper Seasons to come and go in; and it can only be ascribed to their Creator, who has imprinted upon their Natures such an Instinct, as moveth them to fly from a Place that would obstruct their Generation, or not afford them Food.

Another Thing remarkable in this Act of Migration, is, that those poor Creatures should know what Way to steer their Course, and whither to go.

And

And nothing but the great Creator's Inſtinct could move ſuch to venture over vaſt Tracts of Land, but eſpecially over large Seas, and perſuade them that one Country is better for them than another.

The laſt Thing remarkable in theſe *Birds of Flight*, is the Length of their Wings, or their more than ordinary Strength for Flight.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Incubation of Birds.

The firſt Thing remarkable in *Incubation*, is the *Egg*, whoſe inner Parts and cruſty Coat are well fitted for *Incubation*. That the *White* ſhould be partly provided for the Formation of the Body, before its exit into the World, and the *Yolk* for its Nouriſhment after it is come into the World, till the Bird is able to ſhift for, and help itſelf: And that theſe Parts ſhould be ſo accurately braced and kept in due Place, is certainly a deſigned, as well as curious Piece of Workmanſhip.

And then as to the *Act* of *Incubation*; what a prodigious Inſtinct is it in all? How ſhould they be aware that their Eggs contain their Young, and that their Production is in their Power? What ſhould move them to betake themſelves to their Neſts, and there with Delight and Patience to abide their Number of Days? Why does the Oſtrich lay her Eggs in the Sand, expoſed to the Heat and Incubation of the Sun? Is it not very odd that any one Species ſhould vary from all the reſt of the Tribe? And is not the Care of the Creator in this Caſe very remarkable, in ſupplying ſome other Way the Want of the Parent's Care; ſo that the Young ſhould be notwithſtanding bred up in thoſe barren Deſarts, where thoſe Birds dwell?

Thus having diſpatched what I intended to inſiſt upon concerning this State of Animals; I proceed to conſider Inſects and Reptiles.

BOOK VIII.

Of Insects and Reptiles.

CHAP. I.

Of Insects in general.

THESE, (as despicable as they have been, or perhaps may be thought) we shall find as exquisitely contrived, and curiously made for that Place and Station they bear in the World, as any other Part of the Animal World.

CHAP. II.

Of the Shape and Structure of Insects.

Let us begin with the Shape and Fabric of their Bodies; which, although it be somewhat different from that of Birds, being for the most Part not so sharp before, to cut and make Way through the Air, yet is better adapted to their Manner of Life. For considering that there is little Need of long Flights, and that the Strength and Activity of their Wings doth much surpass the Resistance their Bodies meet with from the Air, there was no Occasion that their Bodies should be so sharpened before. But the Condition of their Food and Manner of gathering it, together with the great Necessity of accurate Vision by that admirable Provision made for them by the reticulated *Cornea* of their Eyes; these Things, I say, as they required a larger Room, so were a good Occasion for the Largeness of the Head and its Amplitude before. But for the rest of their Body, all is well made, and nicely poised for their Flight, and every other of their Occasions.

And as their *Shape*, so the *Fabric* and *Make* of their

their Bodies is very curious, not built with Bones, and covered with Fleſh, as in other Animals, but covered with a moſt curious Mail of a middle Nature, ſerving both as Skin and Bone too, for the Shape as well as Strength and Guard of the Body, and as it were on purpoſe to ſhew that the great Contriver is not bound up to that Way only.

CHAP. III.

Of the Eyes and Antennæ of Inſects.

The Structure of the Eye in all Creatures is an admirable Piece of Mechaniſm; but that obſervable in the Eyes of Inſects muſt needs excite our Admiration; fenced with its own Hardneſs, yea even its own accurate Viſion is a good Guard againſt external Injuries; and its *Cornea* beſet with curious, tranſparent, lenticular Inlets, enabling thoſe Creatures to ſee (no doubt) very accurately every Way, without any Interval of Time or Trouble, to move the Eye towards Objects.

And as for the *Antennæ* or *Feelers*, whatever their Uſe may be in cleaning the Eyes, they are a good Guard to the Eyes and Head, in their Walk or Flight, enabling them by the Senſe of Feeling to diſcover ſuch Annoyances, which by their Proximity may eſcape the Reach of their Eyes and Sight. Beſides which, they are a curious Piece of Workmanſhip.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Parts and Motion of Inſects.

Here I might take Notice of the admirable Mechaniſm in thoſe that *creep*: The curious Oars in thoſe amphibious Inſects that ſwim and walk: The wonderful Proviſion made in the Feet of ſuch as walk, or hang upon the Surface: The great Strength and String in the Legs of ſuch as leap; the ſtrong Feet and

and Talons of such as dig; and the admirable Faculty of such as cannot fly, to convey themselves with Speed, by the Help of their Webs, (as *Spiders* do) or some other Artifice to make their Bodies lighter than the Air: These, and such like Things, I might take Notice of; but I will confine my Observations to the Legs and Wings only; which are incomparably fitted up for their intended Service, distended and strengthened by the finest Bones, and these covered with the finest Membranes, some of them adorned with neat and beautiful Feathers (as in *Moths* and *Butterflies*) and many of them provided with the finest Articulation and Foldings, for the Wings to be withdrawn, and neatly laid up in their *Vaginæ* and Cases, and again readily extended for Flight.

And then for poising the Body, there is an admirable Provision for this Purpose: In some by four Wings; and in such as have two, by Pointels and Poises placed under the Wings, on each Side the Body.

And lastly, 'tis surprizing to reflect upon the amazing Minuteness, Art, and Curiosity of the Joints, the Muscles, Tendons, and Nerves necessary to perform all the Motions of the Legs, and Wings, and every other Part of their Bodies; some of which are so very small as to escape our Sight. All this can proceed only from the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Creator.

CHAP. V.

The Sagacity of Insects to secure themselves against Winter.

Some Insects (*viz.* the *white Butterfly Caterpillar*) having sufficiently fed, nourished and bred up themselves to the Perfection of their *vermicular nympha State*, in the Summer Months, they then retire to Places

Places of Safety, and there throw off their *Nympha* and put on their *Aurelia* or *Chryſalis State* for all the Winter, in which there are no Occaſions for Food.

Others ſubſiſt in a Kind of Torpitude or Sleeping State, without any Food at all; by Reaſon as there is no Action, ſo no waſte of Body or Spirits, and therefore no need of Food.

But for others, (as *Ants* and *Bees*, &c.) that move and act, and need Food, the Creator hath given them an Inſtinct and Foreſight to lay up ſufficient Food in Summer for the Winter's Neceſſities. (See *J. Swammerd. Epilog. ad Hiſt. Inſect. p.* 153. *Lowthorp's Abridgment*, *Vol.* 2. *p.* 7. 9.)

CHAP. VI.

Of the Care of Inſects about their Young.

Here I might ſpeak of many Things, but I ſhall fix only upon two Things relating to their ſpecial Art and Care about the Production of their Young.

One Thing is their ſingular Providence for their Young, in making or finding out ſuch proper Receptacles and Places for their Eggs and Seed, as that they may receive the Advantage of a ſufficient *Incubation*, and that the Young, when produced, may have the Benefit of proper and ſufficient Food till they are able to ſhift for themſelves. It is wonderful to ſee with what Diligence and Care the ſeveral Species of Inſects lay up their Eggs or Sperm in their ſeveral proper Places. Some whoſe Subſiſtence is in the Waters, in the Water; *Maggots* to whom Fleſh is a proper Food, in Fleſh; *Ichneumon Flies*, to whom the Fruits or Leaves of Vegetables are Food, repoſite their Eggs, ſome in this Fruit, ſome on this Tree, ſome on that Plant, and ſome on that: But conſtantly the ſame Family on the ſame Tree, or Plant, the moſt agreeable to that Family.

Lice, whose Eggs require a constant Degree of Warmth, place them, some in the Feathers of Birds, some in the Hair of Beasts, some in the very Scales of Fishes, some in the Nose, some in the Flesh: Nay we find Worms in the very Bowels of Men and other Creatures. [See *Lowthorp*'s *Abridg. Vol.* 3. *p.* 121. 135.] And as for others to whom none of these Methods are proper, but make themselves Nests by Perforations in the Earth, in Wood, or Combs, they build, or such like Ways, 'tis admirable to see with what Labour and Care they carry in, and seal up Provisions, that serve both for the Production of their Young, as also for their Food and Nurture when produced.

The other Piece of Art and Care about their Young, is their Curiosity and Neatness in repositing their Eggs, and in their Nidification.

1. Great Curiosity and nice Order is generally observed by them in this Matter: Their Eggs are carefully laid up upon the Leaves of Vegetables, or other Materials on Land, always glued thereon with Care with one certain End lowermost, and with handsome Juxta-Positions. Or if in the Waters, in neat and beautiful Rows oftentimes, in that spermatic gelatine Matter in which they are reposited, and that Matter carefully tied and fastened in the Waters to prevent its Dissipation; or if made to float, so carefully spread and poised, as to swim about with all possible Artifice.

And as to their other Faculty, that of Nidification, whether it be exerted by boring the Earth or Wood, or building themselves Cells, or spinning and weaving themselves Cases and Webs, it is all a wonderful Faculty of those poor little Animals, whether we consider their Parts wherewith they work, or their Work itself. Thus those who perforate Earth, Wood, or such like, have their Legs, Feet, Mouth, and whole Body accommodated to

that Service. But for such as build or spin themselves Nests, their Art justly bids Defiance to the most ingenious Artist, so much as to copy the nice geometrical Combs of some, the earthen Cells of others, or the Webs, Nets, and Cases woven by others. And here that natural Glue, which *Wasps* and *Hornets* have to consolidate their Work, and which Silk-worms dart out, and intermix with their silken Balls, is so serviceable a Material, together with the curious Structure of all Parts ministring to this textrine Power, as may justly be accounted among the noble Designs of the infinite Creator.

There is another prodigious Faculty, which others of those little Animals have to make even Nature itself serviceable to their Purpose, and that is making the Vegetation and Growth of Trees and Plants, the very Means of the Building their Nests. Such as are the *Galls* and *Balls* found on the Leaves and Branches of divers Vegetables, as the Oak, the Willow, the Brier, and some others.

'Tis certain the Formation of those *Cases* and *Balls* is quite beyond the Cunning of the Animal itself; but it is partly of the Vegetable, and partly of some Virulency in the Juice, or Egg, or both reposited on the Vegetable by the parental Animal. (See *Malpighi de Gallis*). And as this Virulency is various according to the Difference of its Animal, so is the Form and Texture of the Cases and Balls excited thereby; some being hard Shells, (as the *Aleppo Galls*) some, (as *Oak Balls*) tender; some scaly, some smooth, some hairy, (as those on the *Briar* or *Dog-Rose*) some long, some round, and some conical, as *those Swellings in the Body and Branches of the Blackberry-Bush.*) And lastly, all those Species of Insects are endowed with Parts exactly made for this Purpose, to bore and pierce the Vegetable, and to reach and inject their Eggs and Juice into the tender Parts thereof.

And

And now these Things being seriously considered, what less can be concluded, than that there must be some wise Artist, that from the very beginning of the Existence of this Species of Animals, hath with great Dexterity and Forecast provided for its Preservation and Good.

BOOK IX.

Of Reptiles and the Inhabitants of the Waters.

CHAP. I.

Of Reptiles.

THE first Thing I shall take Notice of here, is the Motion of Reptiles, which is not less curious than it is different from that of other Animals, whether we consider the Manner of it, as vermicular, or sinuous, or like that of the Snail, (see Dr. *Lister*'s *Exercit. Anat.* 1. §. 1. and 37.) or the Caterpillar, or the Multipedes, or any other Way, or the Parts ministering to it, particularly the Spine, and the Muscles co-operating with the Spine, in such as have Bones, and the annular and other Muscles in such as have none; all incomparably made for those curious geometrical Windings and Turnings, Undulations, and all the various Motions to be met with in the reptile Kind. (See *Blas. Anat. Anim. p.* 1. *c.* 39. *de Vipera e Vesiingio.*)

Another Thing remarkable in Reptiles is, the Poison that many of them are stocked with; which is of great Use in many Distempers; and though it is noxious to Men sometimes, it cannot be objected as an Act of Injustice in God, because he may make Use of such noxious Creatures to execute the divine Chastisements upon ungrateful and sinful Men.

As

As to the Animals themſelves, their Poiſon is no doubt of ſome great Uſe to themſelves, ſerving to the more eaſy Conqueſt, and Capture of their Prey, which might otherwiſe eſcape them: And beſides all this their Poiſon may be probably of very great Uſe to the Digeſtion of their Food.

And as to the harmleſs Part of the Reptile-Kind, they as well deſerve our Notice for their Harmleſſneſs, as the others did for their Poiſon. For as thoſe are endowed with Poiſon, becauſe they are predaceous; ſo theſe need it not, becauſe their Food is near at Hand, the next Earth affording Food to ſuch, (*viz. Worms*) as can terebrate, and the next Vegetable being Food for others that can climb (as *Snails*) or but crawl to it.

CHAP. II.

Of the Inhabitants of the Waters.

We have here as glorious a Scene of the infinite Creator's Power and Art, as hath been already ſet forth on the dry Land. For the Waters themſelves are an admirable Work of God, and of infinite Uſe to that Part of the Globe already ſurveyed, and the prodigious Variety of Creatures in it are an inexhauſtible Scene of the Creator's Wiſdom and Power. The vaſt Bulk of the Whales, and the prodigious Minuteneſs of others, together with the incomparable Contrivance and Structure of the Bodies of all; the Proviſions and Supplies of Food afforded to ſuch an innumerable Company of Eaters, the Buſineſs of Reſpiration performed in a Way ſo different from, but equivalent to what is in Land-Animals, the Adjuſtment of the Organs of Viſion to that Element in which the Animal liveth; the Poiſe, the Support, the Motion of the Body forwards with great Swiftneſs, and upwards and downwards with great Agility; all theſe Things do lay before us an inex-

inexhaustible Scene of the divine Power, Wisdom and Goodness.

BOOK. X.

Of Vegetables.

THE Vegetable Kingdom, though an inferior Branch of the Creation, exhibits to us a glorious Scene of the Creator's Wisdom and Art. I might insist upon the great Variety there is, both of Trees and Plants provided for every Use and Occasion. (See *Plin. N. H. l.* 22. *c.* 6. *Grew's Cosmol. l.* 3. *c.* 2. §. 47. *Ol. Mag. Hist. l.* 2. *c.* 16.)

I might also survey here the curious Anatomy of the Structure of their Bodies, [see *Lowth. Abr. Vol.* 2. *p.* 710.] and shew the admirable Provision made for the Conveyance of the lymphatic and essential Juices, for communicating the Air, as necessary to vegetable as to animal Life [*Vid. Malpig. Op. Anat. Plant. p.* 15. 14. *Grew. ibid. l.* 3. *c.* 3. §. 16. *&c. Raii Hist. Plant. l.* 1. *c.* 4.] I might also speak of the curious Covering they are provided with, the Variety and Texture of their Leaves, the Finery and Fragrancy of their Flowers. [See *Grew ibid. l.* 1. *c.* 4. §. 14, *&c. Malpig. de Gemmis. p.* 22, *&c. Sam. Moreland in Phil. Transf.* N° 287.]

I might also enquire into the wonderful Generation and Make of the Seed, and the great Usefulness of their Fruit, and Rudiments and Lineaments of the Parent Vegetable, tho' never so large and spacious, is locked up in the little Compass of their Fruit or Seed, tho' some of those Seeds are scarce visible to the naked Eye. *Vid. Malpig. Vit. p.* 67. *Phil. Transf.* N° 287. *Raii Cat. Cant. in Acer Maj. Raii ubi supra, l.* 1. *c.* 13. *l.* 3. *p.* 132.]

And forasmuch as the Safety of the Species depends

pends upon the Safety of the Seed in a great Measure, I might obſerve the Care God hath taken for the Conſervation and Safety hereof, in ſuch as dare to ſhew their Heads all the Year, how ſecurely their Flower, Seed or Fruit is locked up all the Winter, together with their Leaves and Branches, in their Gems, and fenced and covered there with neat and cloſe Tunicks. (See *Grew*'s *Coſmol. l.* 1. *c.* 4. §. 8. *&c. & l.* 4. *c.* 3.)

And for ſuch as dare not to expoſe themſelves, with what Safety are they preſerved under the Coverture of the Earth in their Root, Seed, or Fruit, till invited out by the Warmth of the Spring! And when they are thus called out, it is pleaſant to obſerve the Methods of Nature in guarding thoſe inſenſitive Creatures againſt Harms, by making ſome to lie down, others to cloſe themſelves up upon the Touch of Animals, and the moſt to ſhut up their Flowers, their Down, or other Guard upon the Cool of the Evening; or other Matters that may be prejudicial to the tender Seed.

To theſe Conſiderations I might add the various Ways of Nature in diſſipating and ſowing it, ſome being for this Purpoſe winged with light Down or Wings to be carried about by the Winds; others being laid in elaſtic ſpringy Caſes, that when they burſt, dart their Seed at convenient Diſtances. [See *Grew. ib. p.* 199. *Ray*, *ibid. p.* 132. Dr. *Sloane. Voy. to Jamaic. p.* 150. *of the Gentianella Flore cæruleo, or Spirit Leaf. Raii Hiſt. Plant. lib.* 16. *c.* 20. *Sloane*, *ib. p.* 50.] Others by their agreeable Taſte and Smell and ſalutary Nature inviting themſelves to be ſwallowed and carried by the Birds, and thereby alſo fertilized by paſſing through their Bodies, and others by their Uſefulneſs in human Life, invite the Huſbandman and Gardiner to ſow and nurſe them up. [See Sir *T. Pope Blunt's N. H. concerning the Propagation of Nutmegs*. *Ray*'s *H. P. lib.* 27. *c.* 4.]

I might also add the nice Provision that is made for their Aid, in standing and growing, that they may keep their Heads above Ground, and not be rotted in the Earth themselves, nor annoy us; but to minister to all their Ends and our Uses; to afford us Houses, Utensils, Food, Physic, Cloathing, yea Pleasure too, by the Beauty of their Looks, Fragrancy of their Smell, by creating us pleasant Shades, and skreening us against piercing Winds and Cold of Winter. [*Vide Ray's Hist. Plant. l.* 1. *c.* 24. *p.* 46.]

And 'tis very observable what admirable Provisions are made for this Purpose of their Support and Standing, both in such as stand by their own Strength, and such as want the Help of others. In such as stand by their own Strength by Means of the more ligneous Parts being made not inflexible, as Bones, because they would then be liable to break; but of a yielding, elastic Nature, to escape and dodge the Violence of Winds: And by Means also of the Branches spreading about at an Angle of about 45 Degrees, by which Means they equally fill up, and at the same Time make an Æquilibration of the Top. [See *Account of the Origin and Formation of Fossils, Shells,* &c. Print. *Lond.* 1705. p. 38, 41.]

And as for such Vegetables as cannot support themselves, 'tis wonderful to see how they embrace and climb up others; some advancing themselves by catching and holding with their curious *Claspers* and *Tendrils*; some by striking in their rooty Feet; and others by the Emission of a natural Glue, firmly adhering to something or other that administers sufficient Support unto them. All which various Methods being so nicely accommodated to the Wants of those helpless Vegetables, is a manifest Indication of the Contrivance of the Creator, who condescends to assist the most helpless Part of the Creation. [*Vid.*

Malpig. de Capreolis, &c. p. 48. *Harris's Lex. Tech. in Verb. Claſpers.*]

I might in the laſt Place add a large Catalogue of ſuch Vegetables as ſeem to be deſigned by God for the Good of Man and other Creatures. Among *Grain*; I might name the great Fertility of ſuch as ſerve for Bread, and the eaſy Culture thereof. Among Trees and Plants, I might inſtance in ſome that ſeem to be deſigned as 'twere on purpoſe for almoſt every Uſe. [See *Sloane's Voyage to Jamaica, p.* 247. 249. *Ray, ib. l.* 22. *c.* 7.] Some to heal our Diſtempers, and alleviate our Pains all the World over. And ſome for the peculiar Service of particular Places, either to cure ſuch Diſtempers as are peculiar to them, or elſe to obviate ſome Inconvenience there, or to ſupply ſome conſtant Neceſſity. For Inſtance, 'tis an admirable Proviſion made for ſome Countries ſubject to Drought, that when the Waters every where fail, there are Vegetables which contain not only Moiſture enough to ſupply their own Vegetation, but afford Drink alſo both to Man and other Creatures; and more might be inſtanced of a like Nature, and Things that bear plain Marks of the divine Wiſdom and Care, that they manifeſt the Superintendence of the infinite Creator. [See *Sloane, ib. p.* 188. *of the wild Pine, Philoſ. Tranſ.* N° 251. *Lowthorp's Abridg. Vol.* 2. *p.* 669. *Dampier's Voyage to Campeachy, c.* 2. *p.* 56.]

Thus I have given a Sketch of another Branch of the Creation, which tho' one of the meaneſt, yet if accurately ſurvey'd, would abundantly manifeſt itſelf to be the Work of God.

As to the *inanimate* Part, ſuch as Stones, Minerals, Earths, and ſuch like, that which I have already ſaid ſhall ſuffice.

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